The extent and nature of feuding in Scotland, 1573-1625 by Brown, Keith M.




















Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 





POLITICS AND THE FEUD 
!HE GREAT NORTHERN FEUD 
If any feud stands out from among the others of this 
period as the supreme example of a feuding society then 
it was that great struggle which convulsed the north and 
the court during the last decade and a half of the 
sixteenth century. Its length is not particularly 
impressive; it began around l586-~7, most of the fighting 
was over by 1595-96, and it was settled during 1603-04. 
However, for sheer violence and bloodshed it outstripped 
all other feuds and it was the most significant in the 
political life of the entire kingdom. Even on its own 
it is worthy of study as a facinating insight into the 
conduct of magnate politics in the early modern period 
in what was, in spite of its vitality, something of an 
Indian Summer for a form of political conduct which had 
been dominant in the Scottish state for centuries. 
What was the feud about? The answer is of course 
fairly complex. It WBS about fishing right on the Spey 
and about the principles upon ~hich the crown ruled the 
north; it was about the rights to the bishopric of 
Noray and about plots for a Counter Reformation and a 
Spanish invasion; it was about control of clan Campbell 
and control of the king; it was about lordship ove~ the 
Grants and ~fuckintoshes end the patronage of chancellor 
Mait1and. It was all these things and many more, a fusion 
of interests which were both local and national in their 
implications. It involved relatively unimportant local 
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landmmers and broken highland clans, and it obsesserl the 
greatest magnates of the kingdom and the most powerful 
politicians of the court. It was also a feud and thus 
it was about itself, about honour, revenge and power. 
A complete survey of the Inen involved in this struggle 
and their relative strengths as undertaken in the above 
Cunningham-Montgomery feud would not be possible here, th~ 
number of men involved being far too many. However, some 
analysis of the principals will be helpful to an understanding 
of the feud. It had been the basic maxim of Scottish kings 
for the last hundred and fifty years to secure the government 
of the north through the aggrandisement and employment of the 
earls of Huntly and Argyll and their Gordon and Campbell 
kinsmen, and therefore one must at least have some under-
standing of the politics of these families to grasp the 
political context of the north in the l5SQ's. The Campbell 
kin in Argyll dominated the north-west of Scotland with a 
pervasive influence stretching out into the many islands 
along the west coast. However, the death of the sixth 
earl of Argyll in 15S4 left the earldom in a minority, 
his son being then only nine years old, and what followed 
was an intense struggle within the kindred for control of 
it., The details of this have been well documented already 
by E.J. Cowan in his study of the politics of Argyll during 
this minority and of the subsequent rule of Archibald, 
seventh earl of Argyll, and there is no need to repeat it 
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1 here. Cowan's point that during this period the Campbells 
were "the closest they ever came to·fragrnentation" underlines 
the effect of this struggle which developed into a bitter 
feud between different factions within the Campbell kin, 
principally between the houses of Cawdor and Ardkinglass.2 
With the Campbells thus engaged in internal feud the 
western seaboard became even more unstable than usual 
. 
with a vicious feud between the MacLeans and the ¥.i8cDonalds 
running wild, while throughout the north-west aqy restraining 
impact an earl of Argyll might have bad was withdrawn. 
Regional instability was thus fairly evident, but the effect 
of this hiatus in Campbell power was even wider and had 
implications for the entire government of the north. 
On the east the astonishing growth of Gordon power had 
also suffered a set-back, but earlier, in the 1560's and 
1570's. The fourth and fifth earls of Huntly had both 
ended their lives as political has-beens. The fourth earl 
died after his rebellion agai~t queen Mary had collapsed 
and his estates were subsequently forfeited, yet another of 
the queen's major miscalculations. One of the reasons 
for Huntly's rebellion had been a quarrel with the queen's 
half-brother, lord James stewart, first earl of ¥~ray, 
over the administration of the earldoms of ~~r and Moray 
1. Cowan, "Clanship, kinship and the Camp~ell acquisition 
of Islay", p 132-157. 
2. ibid., p 140. 
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which had been in HUntly's hands, but which l.fury had trans-
ferred to lord James.3 Huntly's failure to get these back 
was thus the beginning of a diminution of Gordon power in 
the north-east as the ambitious Moray sought to increase 
his own influence in the region. Defeat for the fifth earl 
in the civil war in which Moray was one of his principal 
enemies further shook the confidence of the Gordons, and 
while their hold on the region was maintained throughout 
the war and the peace which followed, Moray's own death 
removing the greatest threat to them, there had been a 
loosening of some of the older certainties about their 
power. The earl's death in 1576 left a son of fourteen to 
inherit what was still the most powerful earldom in Scotland, 
but with a number of problems which would have to be resolved 
if the Gordons were to recover some of the ground they had 
lost in the previous fifteen years. 4 
George Gordon, sixth earl of Huntly was one of the most 
enigmatic characters of his time. At the time of, or shortly 
after his father's death, he was shipped off to France where 
he completed his education and was sufficiently instructed 
in the catholic faith to ensure a lifetime devotion to it. 
He returned in the early 1580's to take some small part in 
the final stages of the agreement between the Gordons and 
, . 
the Forbes' which had largely been handled by his uncle 
Auchindoun, and he quickly became one of the bright young 
3. Donaldson, lames V - James VII, p 111-12. 
4. Scots Peerage, iv, p 539-40. 
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noblemen to grace the court in the post-l~orton era. His 
first knmm political act yas to escape yith the king from 
the Ruthven Raiders and thereafter he identified himself 
with the conservative Arran regime. However, he escaped any 
. I 
repercussions following Arran's fall and in fact his fortunes· 
rose with him being married to the sister of the young duke 
of Lennox,the king's cousin, being granted the commendator-
ship of D'lnfermline abbey, and being appointed lord high . 
chamberlain in 1587. Tyo years later he briefly added the 
captaincy of the guard to his offices. It is worth pointing 
out here just how important both these offices Yere. Too 
often it is assumed that the chancellor, treasurer, secretary 
and other offices associated yith the privy council were the 
keys to controlling the government, but in fact these tyO 
household offices gave the holder a very great say in 
deciding access to the king and in deciding yho should be 
around him. With these positions Huntly yas able to dominate 
the chamber with his own friends and thus have a very 
significant say in helping form the king's opinion. In 1589 
control of the guard alloyed him to increase this monopoly 
by appointing his own men to be guards. With his enormous 
local poyer and the power invested in him as lieutenant 
of the north and other lesser local offices, Huntly yas 
between 1587-89 the most powerful man in the kingdom after 
the king. 5 
5. Scots Peerage, iv, p 541; C.S.P.Scot., x, p 17. 
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The character of the man is a little more difficult to 
pin dovm. He was a man who seemed to inspire extreme 
reactions in others who either loved him with passionate 
loyalty or feared and intensely hated him. Certainly at 
a superficial level he was an attractive and likeable person . 
and after Arran's fall he gradually took the latter's place 
as the royal favourite. In August 1587 it was noted that 
he was 11 indeid ane greit curteour and knawis mair of the 
Kingis secreittis nor ony man at this present dOithell • 6 
Six months later, after he had been implicated ih treasonable 
dealings with Spain, Fowler could still write of the king's 
11 extraordinary affection to Huntly" which remained 
"unremoveabletl and through which the earl could "persuade 
his majesty to any matters to serve his own particular 
or friends tl • 7 In fact there was a limit to the king's 
patience with Huntly, but in 1597 after three major 
rebellions and innumerable acts of treason, it was still 
being recorded that "Huntly was never so great nor so 
8 
much made of both with king and queenM • Two years later 
he was with lord Hamilton raised to the dignity of marquis 
and the king continued to shower patronage on him even 
though George Gordon must have been one of the more bitter 
disappointments of James' life. 
,I" 
6. C.s.P.Scot l , ix, p 476. 
7. 9,.S.P.Scot. , x, p 3. 
8. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 132. 
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Yet if Huntly was the courtier par excellence among 
James VI's nobility, there was another side to his nature. 
The reputation he had for violence even among some very 
tough company seems to have been well earned. This feud 
and others in which he participated indicate that Huntly 
was every bit the archetypal warring magnate who resorted 
to naked violence almost as his first option. He was 
constantly surrounded by large bodies of armed men and 
one. observer noted his arrival at court with the words that 
9 . 
IIHe comes (as he always does) strong". He was described 
while in his mid-twenties as IIfoo1ish, hot and hardy", but 
age did not mellow his confidence in violence and its threat 
as a solution to his problems. lO Like Bothwe1l his enemies 
feared him, but he was never the swashbuckler that Bothwell 
was, lacking the other's personal bravado and even 
indifference to danger,though,he clearly understood how 
to use violence as a tool to terrify and to oppress, and 
he had the men to put it into effect. 
There is another puzzling side to his character. He 
was described as "shallow witted" though 'surrounded by 
"shrewed counsellors ••• whose advice he follows", men like 
. 11 . 
Auchindoun and Gordon of Gight. . He was also called "a most 
.. 
semple man and tymorous", while even the king thought him 
I 
9. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, p 395. 
10. C.S.P.Scot" ix, p 655. 
11. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 3. 
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"but young, merry, disinterested in matters of state". After 
the 1589 fiasco James said that "he sees himself the nature' 
of the man, easily led to evil or to good. He. would never 
trust so "leak a man, or pardon his offences without great 
pun( ishment) If .12 Of course James did pardon him and did 
trust him again, and one suspects that, as this was said 
in the context of the 1589 rebellion; the king and others 
were reflecting their judgement on what had been a badly 
handled affair by Hunt1y, while on the king's part there 
may even have been some attempt to find excuses for his 
favourite. One might agree that Hunt1y was nothing more 
than a stupid big bully, but one instinctively feels that 
such a conclusion would be a gross error. Hunt1y was subtle 
enough in his political life to play the misled fool when 
Bothwe1l did not know when to admit defeat, and in 1589 
and whenever he thought it necessary Huntly admitted his 
wrongs, cut his losses and then returned to his former 
scheming. 
Another co~mentator observed of him in 1583,that while 
he was powerful he had not been able to fully recover from 
the effects of his fnmily's losses under his father and 
grandfather. Therefore, he was 11 slowe to engage himself in 
any faction or quarrel of state,but at the Kinge's pleasure, 
to whose hurnor he dothe wholly b1ende and apply himselfll • 13 
This' is a very accurate analysis of Hunt1y's behaviour for 
12. Q.~§'!..E.Scot., x, p 84, p.85, ii. 
13. Estimate, p 31. 
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he did remain aloof from court politics until after 1587, 
devoting his time to gaining the king's confidence and 
restoring his power in the north. Huntly clearly understood 
the nature of power for a Scottish magnate; royal favour 
and local domination. These two axioms of political life 
he kept at the fore of all his activities throughout his 
political life, applying them with remarkable success 
considering the course he mapped out for himself. Like others 
he ·made bad mistakes, but his personal kno~ledge of the king 
and his grasp of local affairs allowed him to indulge in 
the most overt opposition to the king, the church and most 
of his fello~ magnates and still emerge from it all largely 
unscathed. 
Those who had benefited most from the difficulties of 
the Gordons ~ere the St~art earls of Atholl and Moray. 
James Ste\.Jart, second earl of Moray, ~as something of an 
upstart in the eyes of a man like Huntly. A younger son 
of lord Dou~e, himself a recent arrival to the nobility, 
he had acquired the wardship of the regent Moray's daughters 
and, having married the eldest of these, ~as created earl of 
Moray, the earldom being held jointly ~ith his wife.14 
In spite of the romantic image in which he was cast after 
his death, l-10ray does not seem to have been a very agreeable 
sort of man or a very responsible one. He did not get on 
14. Scots peera7e, vi, p 316-17; S.R.O., HorayMuniments, N.R.A., 217 3/2/180. 
353. 
T~e House of Huntly 
George, 5th earl ••••••••• Adam of Auchindoun •••••••• Sir Patrick 
m of Auchindoun 
Anna Hamilton (Chatelheraut) 
· • 
· George, 6th earl •••••••••• Jean ••••••••••••••••••••• and others 
m m 
HenriettD. stewart (Lennox) George, 5th earl of Caithness 
· , 
Georg~, 7th earl •..•.•••••• Ann ••••• ~ •••••••••••••••• and others 
m 
Ann Campbell (Argyll) 
The House of Argyll 
Colin, 6th earl 
m 
m 
James, 3rd earl of Moray 
Jane Stewart O,1ethven) - no issue 
Annas .Keith (lvIarischal.' and countess of Moray) 
• 
Archibald, 7th earl •••••••• Colin of Lundie •••••••••• another 
m 
Agnes Douglas (Horton) 
• 
· 
ArchibDld, 8th earl •••••••• Ann •••••••••••••••••••••• and others 
m 
George, 2nd marquis of Huntly 
The House of Nora~ 
James V 
· • 
· • ( illegitimate) 
James, 1st earl 
m 
James, 1st lord Doune 
m 
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Annas Keith (Narischal) 
• 
• 
Hargaret Campbell (d 4th earl of 
Argyll) . 
Elizabeth, countess of James Stewart, 2nd earl •••• Henry, lord 
Horay m . st Colrne 










Jean Hepburn (sister to Bothwell) 2nd m John, master of Caithness 
• • 
• 
George, 5th earl of 
Caithness 
Francis Stewart, earl of Bothwell m Margaret Douglas (Angus) 
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well with his wife, he was a gambler who was forever in debt, 
and both the "Historie" and Sir Robert Gordon speak of his 
envious attitude with regard to Huntly.15 He was also "the 
maist weirlyke man bayth in curage and person, for he was a 
cumlie personage, of a great stature and strang of bodie lyk 
a kemp.1I 16 From the epithet he posthumously acquired as the 
"Bonnie Earl of Horay" one can assume that he was indeed an 
attractive man. Hm,lever, his power was slight, being "not 
17 
cOinparable to the uther, as all men knawis". Being only 
a few years younger than Hunt1y he appeared at court at much 
the same time, during the years of Arran's dominance, and in 
fact he was related to the chancellor and saw some patronage, 
18 including his earldom come his way during those years. 
HO\Olever J he was never anything more than a courtier when 
at court and was of no political significance at all outside 
his own 10cality.19 
The rivalry between Huntly and l-10ray arose over two 
local issues: land and men. rhe former centred around 
15. S.R.O., Horay Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/168; 217/2/3/260-
268; Gordon, §.utherlend, p 214; His~orie, p 246. 
16. liis~orie, p 246. 
17. ibid. 
18. S.R.O., Horay Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/239, 217/2/3/70. 
19. Oddly enough in 1589 he was described as Ita paiste and 
freinde to the Erle of Huntlyll , quite remarkable for the 
man who was to die as a prot.estant martyr at Huntly's 
hands, q.S.P.Scot., ix, p 656, p 677. 
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the old quarrel over the Horay earldom. Huntly's grandfather 
had been granted the earldom in 1548 and as has been already' 
said lost it to lord James some fifteen years later. 20 Closely 
bound up with the fort.unes of the earldom at this time 'WBS the 
old bishopric of Horny and as well as grabbing a hold of the • 
earldom,J10ray and his wife had got their hands on certain 
pensions from the bishopric and were keen to get more.21 
HOvlever, in 1584 Huntly drew up a contract ylith the bishop 
which amounted to a bond of manrent and maintenance, Huntly 
offering his protection in return for specified fruits of 
the benefice.22 In a sense this marked the beginnings of 
competition betvleen the two in the locality. 
Huntly was not aiming at Moray in making this agreement 
"dth the bishop, but was engaged in a deliberate policy of 
recruiting support throughout the north. In 1583 he had 
made a bond of friendship with the then chancellor Argyll 
which indicated their willirigness to recognise one another's 
. 23 
spheres of influence. The earl's qeath in 1584 left Huntly 
unchecked and during 1585-86 he acquired the bonds of Nunro 
of Foulis, HacAngus of Glengarry, l-fuckenzle of Kintail, 
MBcLeod of Lewis, MacGregor of Glenstray, Drummond of Blair, 
Robertson of Struan, Dunbar of Cumnock who was also sheriff 
of Horay, Donald Gorm of Sleat, Grant of Freuchie and 
Rattray of Craighal1 who all either confirmed Huntly as their 
20. S.R.O., Gbrdon Castle Muniments, G.D. 441~~3. 
21. S.R.O., Noray Kuniments, N .R.A. 217/2/3/176. 
22. S.R.O., R.D. ~2419. 
23. Bro1rm,"Bonds of l':ayg-ent" ,appendix, p 545, no 70. 
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lord or recognised Huntly lordship for the first time. 24 
In ranging so far afield for dependants Huntly could be 
sure that there would be no serious complaints from the 
Campbells as long as they were divided against themselves, 
but opposition did come from the earl of Atho11. 
Like Hunt1y and Noray, John Stewart, fifth earl of Atho11 
was a young man in his early twenties when his quarrel with 
the Gordons began. His father had been no friend of Hunt1y's 
father, but had been a rran of political weight whose position 
in the central highlands put him between Argyll and .Hunt1y 
end made him the third link in the buffer of ear1doms which 
straddled across Scotland from Argyll in a north-easterly 
direction up to the Gordon territories. His son lacked the 
personal qualities of the fourth earl, being described as 
"a man ot: lyttle valuer or accompte", but he could still 
put a lot of men in the field and was to prove a tenacious 
if not always skilled opponent of Huntly's ambitions in the 
north. 25 He too had exploited Gordon decline and had 
attracted the support of Mackintosh of Dunnchattan, an 
extremely slippery character whose family' had moved between 
the earls of Atho11 and Hunt1y whenever it suited them. 
Yet Mackintosh's dependancy wes only one issue between them 
for Drummond of B1air had switched from Atho11 to Hunt1y 
when the former failed to trea"t him with the same confidence 
as his father had, and so both lords felt that the other 
24. Brown, "Bon,ds of Manrent" ,p 467ff. 
25. Estimate, p 11, p32. 
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was stealing his dependants. 26 
In 1587 tension bet\.Jeen them broke over some rebels 
Huntly had outlawed but Atholl was maintaining, and both 
nlen levied their forces and set out for a trial of strength. 
Fortunately they stopped on receipt of an order from the 
king and agreed to let their dispute be settled by law. 
A tholl agreed to appear and ans\Oler the charges. against 
him and to lift his protection from the men who were 
raiding the lands of Menzies of lJeymes and Drummond of Blair 
against whom the raids were being cond'~cted to test Huntly's 
protection. HO\Olever, Huntly set the tone for his high-
handed behaviour in local affairs, refused to give assurances 
and announced that he would try some of the men he had caught, 
or intended to catch, in his own courts. Atholl complained 
to the council which hastily arranged arbitration, the 
decision being in Huntly's favour. 27 The incident had shown 
Huntly's willingness to take to the field as soon as his 
interests were threatened, and while Atholl was keen to 
avoid a show-down, Huntly was prepared to insist on his 
rights whatever the consequences. His lordship was always 
to be exercised in this manner whatever the issue. 
During this same period Huntly had also begun proceedings 
against Moray and his wife. The countess was summoned for 
the reduction of her titles to the lands of Spynie, a 
26. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 276-77; Brown,"BO.nds of Manrent", 
appendix, p 393, no 2. 
27. R.P.C., iv, p 121, p 131, p 149-50, p 210; Gordon, 
§utherlandj p 208, S.R.O.,Gordon Castle Muniments, G.D. VllJ 271. 
.359. 
matter in which Huntly met with complete success.2B This 
was followed by a more serious clash over fishing rights 
in the waters of the river Spey which were, like the Spynie 
lordsh1p, tied up with the lands of the Horay bishopric. 
The fishing rights had in fact been a running sore since 
1570 or before when Moray's mother-in-law first clashed 
with Huntly's father over them. In 1586 dame Annas Keith 
had lost none of her vigour, and when her servants were 
prevented from fishing by the Gordons, she had Huntly charged 
before the council and made to give c~ution. Thereafter the 
matter continued to be debated in the council and the session 
. 29 
with each side scoring temporary successes. 
These local skirmishes did Huntly no harm and others 
continued to put their confidence in his lordship.' In 1587 
the king's uncle, the earl of Orkney, formed a bond of 
friendship with him, while further bonds of manrent were 
given by Menzies of Pitfode1ls, the provost of Aberdeen, 
Menzies of that Ilk, Scott of Abbotshall and James Beaton, 
fiar in Malgand. Even more importantly, in April 1587 
Archibald Campbe11 of Lochne11, Argyll's cousin, gave Huntly 
his bond and in the following year the most powerful of the 
Campbell cadets, Duncan Campbell of Glenorchy, followed 
him. Allegiance to Argyll was excepted, but both these 
men were curators of the young earl and had been pushed 
28. S.R.O., l>1oray Hunimcnts, N.R.A., 217/2/1./24. 
290 lhX&, iv, p B6-B7; Horsy M.S o, HoNoCo vi, p 650. 
Two of l·ioray's servants were killed by the 3ordons 
at this time, W.Fraser, !he Chiefs o.r Grant, 
(Edinburgh, IB8.3), vol iii, p 176-79. 
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aside by James Campbell of Ardkinglass and John Campbell of 
CawdOr \-lho were themselves competing for supremacy within 
the kindred.30 Glenorchy was making bonds with many others 
of his -neighbours at the time, but not bonds of maintenance, 
and thus Huntly now had some sort of a foot in the Campbell 
network of power itself and was by 1588 in a position of 
enormous strength in the north. 
viliile he was so active in the north Huntly had not 
disregarded his interests at court. Here he had one over-
riding ambition, to bring the Counter-Reformation to. Scotland. 
With his enormous regional power, his dominance of the chamber 
and \oli th the king so confident in him, Huntly' s political 
ambitions could afford to be grander than many of his 
contemporaries. His catholic sympathies were widely known; 
as early as 1586 he was suspected of plotting against the 
reformed religion and again in 1587 rumours about his 
treasonable intentions were circulating, though-Birre1 was 
sure that "ther wes no such thing in ther heids at that tymell • 
Surprisingly he was not linked with lord Y~xwe11ts catholic 
adventuring during these years.31 In 1588, the year of the 
Armada and of protestant panic, he gave a more explicit 
signal of how far he might go when he met with the Hamiltons 
and other noblemen to "liberate" the~king from his present 
30. Brown,IIBonds of Ha nrent" , appendix, p 548, no 85 and 
p 467ff; CO\lan, "C1anship, Kinship and the Campbel1 
acquisition of Islay", p 136-37. 
31. C.B.P., i, p 236; Birre1, "Diary'l, p 24. 
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advisors, but the king ordered them to disperse and told 
H~ntly to send home his Jesuit advisors and bring Gordon of 
Gight to law for the murder of one of the earl Narischal's 
kinsm~n. Huntly ignored both commands and continued to 
conspire against Naitland and 3lamis whom he regarded as 
the stalwarts of the king's protestant advisors and enemies 
of the nobility.32 Then during the summer, a Spanish agent, 
colonel Semple, landed in Leith and though he was arresteq 
Huntly took him from his captors and helped him escape out 
of the country. Hhen news of the Armada's sailing reached 
him he ylent north to prepare defences against a lanaing or 
to facilitate one, whichever would be most politic at the 
time. 33 
There was little doubt that Huntly was with E~roll, 
Crawford and lord ~~xwell already in receipt of Spanish 
subsidies by this time, but the extent of his commitment 
to the Counter Reformation cause remained shrouded in 
secrecy and confused by rumour.34 In the beginning of 
the new year he was even appointed captain of the guard. 
In a letter which he wrote to the" duke of Parma, Huntly 
explained the implications of this. Firstly, he pointed 
out that the Armada's failure had made rebellion impossible, 
but that he remained high in the king's credit and" "as he 
(the king) had broken his former guards, and made him (Huntly) 
32. Q.!.~.P., i, p 308-09, p 321-22. 
33. C.~.P., i, P 328, p 329. 
34. Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 392. 
establish others about his person, by whom at all occasions 
he might ensure himself, a~n be master of the king and so, 
when the support promised should arrive, spoil the heretics 
of his authority, and rrake sure the catholics' enterprises. 1t 
Unfortunately this letter along with others from Erroll, 
Crawford and the already imprisoned Maxwell were discovered 
en route and Huntly was arrested, deprived of the guard and 
warded. 35 Incredibly the king chose to take the whole case 
lightly, freed him after eight days and on the 14th of Harch 
reinstattd him to the guard captaincy following which Huntly 
immediately payed the guards and warned them to obey no-one 
but him. 36 The king's decision ,,,as one which must have 
surprised even Huntly, and one can only assume that Huntly 
had persuaded him of his loyalty. 
Hmllever, Huntly 1Nas not to be stopped by this setback 
and wanted to get himself and the king away from chancellor 
'Maitland and his friends as soon as possible. Maitland 1Nas 
furious at ~he king, but also afraid, and he began to increase 
his O1Nn guards since he had no confidence in the royal ones. 
Huntly in fact left Edinburgh, equally worried that the 
chancellor was plotting to kill him and he organised ~rroll 
and Bothwell, who had joined the catholic earls for reasons 
of his own, to stir up a fracas in the burgh in order to 
frighten the king into fleeing north with him. Huntly 
35. Spottiswoode, Hisiory, ii, p 390-91, p 386; Q.S.P.Scot., 
ix, P 682ff, x, P 1. 
36. ~.P.Scot., x, P 4, p 6; Q~B.P., i, P 335-36. 
still seemed to be under the impression that James ~as, if 
nota catholic hirr.self, then a prisoner of a more extreme 
religious faction than had existed under Arran, but the king 
was not persuaded by the earl's arguments and after a two 
hour discussion they agreed to part. Huntly went off to 
Dunfermline from where he continued to correspond with the 
king, and while the latter dismissed Huntly's guards, it 
was said that "the ~ourld thinkes he is be~itched with him". 
When it became clear to Huntly that nothing further could 
be gained he and the other catholic earls retired north, 
this now being the end of Harch, and there they came out 
in open rebellion.3? 
The entire episode is so charged with blunders that one 
~onders if the king and Huntly ~ere playing some elaborate 
game of bluff ~ith one another. The king's freeing of the 
earl after the discovery of his treason ~as clearly a mistake, 
but one had also to ask why Huntly did not kidnap the king 
~hen he had the opportunity to do so. Each appeared to be 
pushing the other as far as they could without actually 
doing anything which would not permanently damage their 
relationship, and even when Huntly did finally rebel, the 
evidence seems to suggest that Erroll was pulling him along 
with him. The rebellion itself can be read about elsewhere, 
but there too Huntly showed great reluctance to actually 
do anything more than mount what was nothing more than a 
3? C.S.P.Seot., x, p 6, p 8, p 9, plO, p 11; C.B.P/ i, 
P 335-36. 
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large protest, and only the more hard-line Erro11 was willing 
to face the king on the field. ~~en it came to a show-down 
at Brig O'Dee Huntly backed out, and the rebellion, which 
had never really started anyway, c011apsed.38 As Huntly 
had written in his letter to Parma, the time was not right 
for rebellion, and without the kin~'s person it was even less 
likely to s~lcceed. The 1589 rebellion was nothing more than 
a testing of the ground and Huntlyknew it would fail from 
the moment he left the king outside Edinburgh. 
The problem now was what to do with Huntly and the other 
rebel earls. The king himself had no wish to shed blood, 
while most of the loyal nob1es were either kinsmen of 
the earls or were in Huntly's case lIaffrayde to tacke 
him in bludll and become embroiled in a feud with ·the 
Gordohs.39 Huntly himself simply pled guilty to all the 
charges against him,thus convincing the king that he had 
been misled and was truly sorry. James believed him, and. 
after a short ward he was freed along with the other earls. 
Of the others,Erro11 was pardoned and Crawford given a 
remission, but Bothwe1l denied all the charges against 
him and was rapidly gaining a reputation as "a bloodyman 
infected with all notiryous vyces". However, he too was 
38. Lee, John Maitland of Thirlstane, chapter 8, "Hunt1yt s 
Rebellion"; Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 17,24,25,27,31,42, 
54, 62, 69; R.P.C., iv, p 367, p 371, p 373, p 375; 
C.B.P., i, p 337; Spottiswoode, liistorz, ii, p 394-95. 
There is a lot more material on this but these references 
will give the bare bones of the rebellion. 
39. Q.s.P.Scot., x, p 54. 
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freed, but like Huntly without a pardon, "to hold them in swell 
for a while. 40 Lord Naxwell was also set at liberty at the 
same time. Part of the motivation for this lenient treatment 
of the c!3tholic nobles was thought. to be to spite the rampant 
protestant party who were howling for blood and becoming too 
assertive. Furthermore, James had one eye on England and 
was using the earls and the threat of Spain against Elizabeth 
in order to avoid becoming her client. 
The split between Haitland and Glamis had also helped 
the earls and the former was now in league with his old 
enemy Bothwell while Glamis had come to some understanding 
with Huntly. By July, only three months after the rebellion, 
he was back in favour and worrying the English with his 
usual practice of surrounding the king ,.l1th his friends. 41 
, 
-In the north he and Erroll cemented their political alliance 
with a bond of friendship while ~~ckintosh of Dunnchattan 
t 42 and Innes of Innermarkie also gave him bonds of manren • 
Failure in -the rebellion had thus left Huntly's power at 
court and in the north unscathed. 
One would certainly have expected that during this time 
Huntly's enemies in the north would have attempted to exploit 
his difficulties. Both Atholl and Horay remained loyal to 
the king during the rebellion, but neither appears to have 
40. C.S.P.Seot., x, p 83, p 84, p 85; ~P.C., iv, p 821; 
Spottiswood, ~istory, ii, p 399. 
41. C.S.P.Seot., x, p 128; Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 397-99 
42. Brown, tlBonds of Manrent", appendix, p 549, no 90, p 470, 
no 79. 
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joined the king in his march to Aberdeen in April. l-10ray had 
in fact had Huntly horned during his first stay in ward, after 
the discovery of the letters to Parma, and had presumably 
hoped to take advantage of Huntly's confinement. As it was, 
the messenger who pronounced the letters of horning in Banff· 
was lucky to escape with his life, and Moray soon received 
a letter from one of his own servants in the north telling 
him that Huntly had given the word for the outlaw bands 
under his control to be set loose on Moray's lands. 43 This, 
and Huntly's very quick release, sbould have caused Moray 
considerable alarm, but in fact he appears to have done 
nothing, and while one does not know for certain whether 
he went north with the king,he was very quickly back at court. 
There his servants wrote to him in frustration. A James Torvie 
in Logie wrote that he wes unable to pay Moray the 1,000 merks 
Noray was demanding for the continuation of his tack because 
he had sQffered from heavy raiding and went in daily fear 
of his life. He included 80 merks and told the earl that 
it would just have to do since such ·"limmerers" would not 
be troubling him if Moray was at home to give his protection.44 
George Dunbar then wrote reminding Moray that he and Rose of 
Kilravock had already sent a letter informing him th3t his 
tenants were being badly oppressed and suffering greatly 
at the hands of his neighbours. FUrthermore, not only Horay 
43. S.R.O., Moray Muniments, N.R.A., 217/2/3/230, 217/2/3/227. 
44. ibid., N·.R.A., 217/2/3/229. 
45. ibid., N.R.A.,217/2/3/232. 
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w9s absent, but his baillie could not be found and his 
chamberlain had refused to meddle in these affairs unless 
his wife and children could be guaranteed security. Horay's 
affairs in the north were thus a shambles Dnd he clearly had 
no grasp of the obligations of good lordship. To a court 
playboy like Horay his earldom was little more than a 
revenue source and a symbol of status, a sharp contrast to 
a man like HUntly. 
In June, with Huntly's future at court secure, the 
Gordons moved from undercover attacks by outlaws to a 
direct attack on Moray. A party of them went to the Spey, 
broke I'laray' s fishing cobbles there and chased off his 
servants. Another of the earl's servants wrote that he 
feared an attack on Darnaway cDstle itself, and complained 
. , 46 
that liThe country is masterless at present". Heanwhile, 
in Edinburgh, Huntly set his friends to work on a legal 
case against Horay, had him warded for a while in Stirling, 
and prevented him from returning home to take command of 
ths situation.47 Moray's power had been exposed for ~hat 
it was, and his defeat looked inevitable when Bothwell 
stepped into the affairs of the north. 
The combination of Huntly and Bothwell in 1589 had been 
nothing more than a marriage of convenience, arranged to 
strike their mutual enemy, MBitland. Throughout the previous 
46. S.R.D., I-foray Huniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/217. 
47. a.s.p.scot., x, p 202; S.R.O., Moray Nuniments, N.R.A. 
217/2/3/280. 
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year they had been keen rivals and only a month before the 
discovery of Huntly's first treason they were being described 
as the leaders of the principal factions at the court, "even 
to stabbing and shooting one another". 48 Following the 
failure of the rebellion they very quickly reverted to their· 
positions opposite one another, recriminations over the 
conduct of the rebellion adding fuel' to the fire of their 
enmity. However, by agreeing with Maitland, Bothwell's 
reward was that he was entrusted with a large part of the 
running of the country when the king and his chancellor 
left for Den~ark in the autumn of 1589.49 
During these months when he and lord Hamilton virtually 
shared the government of Scotland, Bothwell conducted himself 
with remarkable restraint. Perhaps having realised his goal 
he really was capable of responsible government, but 
responsible or not he was determined to use his position 
to advantage, no sixteenth century politician could resist 
that temptation. In terms of men, l~nds and offices Bothwell 
was one of the most powerful magnates in Scotland, but his 
failure to successfully lead his dependants and friends 
out in rebellion in April had worried him and exposed his 
vulnerability. For the moment he was secure in his alliance 
with the chancellor, but he had little faith in ~fuitland and 
so he decided that he had to have a kin alliance of his own. 
48. C.S.P.Scbt., ix, p 538, p 676, p 678. This had been 
encouraged by }fuitland, p 680. 
49. Spottiswoode, Historz, 'ii, p404. 
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Even in his own locality there were few Stewarts to back 
him, he having been grafted onto the old Hepburn earldom. 
In his "cousin" Horay he found a man who was a Stewart, a 
courtier and an enemy of Huntly. Bothvlell offered Horay 
influence at court while through Horay he was able to damage· 
Huntly on his home ground. From the winter of 1589 the 
Stewarts began to appear as a recognisable kin alliance in 
the politics of the state. 
Previous to this there had been little sign. of any 
relationship between the two Stewart earls. A few years 
beforehand the countess of Horay and Bothwell had been 
involved in some transaction over fishing rights on the 
Tweed, but no other link between them can be found. 50 In 
November 1589, a month after the king's departure; Bothl.Jell 
went north to the house of another stewart earl, to Atho1l. 
Ostensibly he was there to mediate Moray's feud with Huntly, 
and also the latter's lingering feud with the Forbes', but 
nothing was achieved. Indeed one wonders whether Bothwell 
wanted the feud settled at all and whether the real aim of 
his visit was more likely to have been to bind Moray; Atholl 
and himself together in an alliance. Huntly was not even in 
the region, being in the far north extending his influenoe 
into the affairs of the earls of Caithness and Sutherland. 51 
50 •. S.R.O., Moray Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/2, 217/2/3/3. 
51. Bothwel1.'s failure prompted Asheby's corr.ment that lithe 
Scottish nature is hardly reconoiled l1 • C.S.P.Scot., 
x, P 184, p 191, p 196; R.P.C., iv, p 493-94; Gordon, 
Sutherland, p 200. 
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Such }~chiavellian intrigue became more apparent in the spring 
when Bothwell retuxned into the north and again made some 
overtt~res of peace to Huntly on behalf of Horay, but on being 
rebuffed he again met with Atholl and 1,~oray to forge an 
alliance. He was also at work trying to detach Erroll and 
Montrose from Huntly by reconciling them with Atholl, and 
thus "to complete the band amongst the Stewarts against Huntly." 
He was able to settle Athol1 and lviontrose, but the latter was 
not interested in his schemes, while in the cases of Hunt1y 
and Horay, and Atholl and Errol1, he left the situation 
11 vorse nor he founde it". 52 
By the spring of 1590 Huntly was beginning to feel the 
effects of this alliance. Moray had revived the issue of 
the bishopric in which Bothwell himself nOl-J "pretendeth 
some interest". 53 It would appear that Moray's wife had 
the better rights to the bishopric's lands and resources, 
but that Huntly had held onto the castle and lordship of 
Spynie with the Spey fishings. With Bothl-Je1l's court 
influence behind him, Horay nOl-J re-opened the case and 
had Hunt1y summoned to answer concerning Moray's rights 
on the Spey. Hunt1y ignored the summons, am thus letters 
of horning and then treason were issued against him. t.1hen 
the king returned in May it was expected that 'he would 
add his weight to the faction against Huntly and that he 
52. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 253, p 259, p 264, p 279. 
53. ibid., p 839, p 277. 
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"proposed to shew Murray - being a Steward - all the favour 
he can". 54 In fact the king was to be very unsympathetic 
to this new party formed by his "kinsmen". 
Within days of the king's return Huntly obtained a 
summons against Moray and his wife over the Spey fishings 
and had their own letters against him suspended. 55 Noray 
was still at court, but he seemed to be paralysed as to 
what to do and his wife wrote him telling him to do some-
thing as his neglect would be even more damaging. She, 
meanwhile, had been drumming up some support for him in 
the north. 56 Another letter arrived from rlilliam stewart 
of SeittC?n informing }loray of his enemies' activities 
and urging him to "strain every nerve for success in this 
present business lt which would either establish his authority 
or ruin him. 57 He did nothin~ and it was his wife who 
::> 
launched yet another legal counter-attack on Huntly, trying 
desperately to prevent him from having the backing of the 
law for his actions in the locality.58 
At the court Bothwell was still trying to put together 
a strong faction of his own, and he even tried to get 
Maitland to join him and exchange bonds of friendship with 
54. O.S.P.Scot., x, P 277; S.R.O., Moray HUniments, N.R.A. 
217/2/3/285, 21772/3/295, 217/2/3/274. 
55. S.R.O., Moray Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/257, 217/2/3/ 
,287-88; R.P.O., iv, p 496. . 
56. S.R.O., Moray Muniments, N.R.A., 217/2/3/255. 
57. ibid. , N.R.A., 217/2/3/304. 
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him. The chancellor would not be drawn though, predicting 
that great trouble would come of it. 59 Bothwell also went 
north again and visited Caithness who had been getting the 
worst of it in his feud with the Sutherland Gordons, and 
who, he hoped, would add his weight to the alliance. However, 
Caithness also avoided making any corr~itments. On the other 
side Erroll was busy trying to attach Glamis while Huntly 
managed to smooth over some of his differences with A tholl-. 
He was also able to win a victory over Spynie castle by 
having it granted to one of his former clients, Alexander 
Lindsay, now a royal favourite and soon to become lord Spynie. 
The latter paid his debts to Huntly with a bond of manrent 
and recognition of the earl's rights to certain parts of 
the ~'1oray bishopric. 60 However, all this ,,~heeling and 
dealing was to be put to the test when in December 1590 
the feud finally erupted into open violence. 
On the 7th of December 11aitland wrote that there was a 
"broyll fallen out in the north" between Huntly on the one 
side and Noray and Atholl on the other. All he knew was 
that Huntly had so far had the worst of it with one of 
his kinsmen being "deadly wounded", and that the incident 
had "set the whole north in twoe par-tea, having taken 
armes on both sydis". 61 In fact the flames had been lit 
59. c.S.P.Scot., x, p 351, P 392. 
60. ibid., P 352, p 410; S.R.O., Horay Muniments, N.R.A. 
217/2/37270; Brown "Bonds of Manrent, p 543ff. 
61. C.S.P.Scot., x, P 431. 
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a \.]hole month beforehand. Ill-feelins had existed for some 
time between the Grant kindred and a number of Gordons over· 
a struggle bet"leen John Grant, tutor of Ballindalloch, and 
the widml of the house who was a Gordon. The latter had 
been given the protection of the Jordons of Lesmoir and in 
1590 had married the brother of Gordon of Cluny. Consequently 
the Gordons began to increase their attempts to have a greater 
say in the affairs of Ballindalloch. Tensions increased to 
such a pitch that one day the tutor killed a servant of one 
of the Gordons. The latter immediately turned to Huntly 
for assistance and he had Grant outlawed, while the latter 
went to John Grant of Freuchy, his own chief, and asked for 
t t " 62 pro ec ~on. 
The Grants were not dependants of Huntly, but ·they 
recognised his leadership of the region and had in the past 
been considered his friends. However, in the last few years 
they had become increasingly tired of Gordon interference 
and worried by the growth of Huntly's power. In 1587 there 
had been trouble between them when one of Freuchie's 
kinsmen was killed by these same Lesmoir Gordons and 
another Grant was murdered, "be hinging of him be the 
bagstanes, binding of his heid and feitt together in the 
cruik, smuking of him to the deid". This ghastly killing 
was done by outlaws who worked for Huntly and the earl chose 
62. Gordon, ~utQer1and, p 214. 
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to leave them unpunished for it. 63 The Grants may have 
recognised HUntly's political domination of the north, but 
they were not prepared to accept either this kind of treatment 
or the interference by the Gordons in what they considered to 
be their spheres of influence. If this was to be the price 
of dependence or clientage to Huntly,then they considered 
it to be too high. Huntly hod become. a "bad lordll and an 
alternative was a welcome opportunity. 
Their neighbours, the Hackintoshes were in a similar 
situation. During the civil war I~ckintosh of Dunnchattan 
had played a clever game of remaining loyal to the king's 
party, picking up a lot of patronage in the north and then 
taking Huntly's side against the Forbes, hence avoiding 
a complete break with his former overlord.64 In 1580 he 
switched over to Atholl's lordship and in 1581 was again 
being gifted patronage which might normally have gone to 
the Gordons. However, the Mackintoshes lost favour in 
Edinburgh because of their ravaging of the surrounding 
countryside, and in 1583 Moray was given a commission 
against them. 65 In 1586 ¥~ckintosh decided to return to 
63. Gordon, Sutherland, p 214; Fraser, Qhiefs of Grant, iii,p 178. 
64. Mar gifted him lands from the Moray bishopric, S.R.O., 
Fraser-l·!ackintosh Collection, G.D. 128/3212/15; Norton 
granted him the barony of Dunnchattan directly from the 
crown rather than indirectly from HUntly, S.R.O., }!ackintosh 
of Hackintosh Nuniments, G.D. 176/104; against the Forbes, 
S.R.O., Moray Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/65. 
65. Brown,"Bol)ds of Hanrent",appendix, p 393, no 2; he also 
bonded "'1ith Campbe11 of Cawdor in 1581, p 544, no 68; 
granted the ward and non.-entry of Huntly's lands, S.R.O. 
Hackintosh t·~uniments, G.D., 176/123; his raids and Horsy's 
commission, SEalding Miscellan~, ii, p 83-84; G.D. 176/129. 
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the Gordon fold, probably because Huntly would protect him 
against Eoray, but he was clearly not happy at this,66 In 
1589 he joined the king against Huntly and was having a 
tUf3sle with the earl over the bllilding of a castle in 
Badenoch wbich would establish Gordon power too close to 
the heart of his own operations. He was thus obstructive 
and did all he could to slow down the building, refusing to 
fulfil terms of vassalage in supplying me~ and materials.67 
Like Grant he too was uncomfortable with the power structure 
in the north since Huntly had begun to revive and extend his 
power throughout the region. 
One other of Huntly's neighbours deserves some attention 
at this point. John Campbell of Ca"'ldor has been much maligned 
by some of the narrative sources for stirring up unrest in the 
region against HUntly, but there is little evidence for it. 
By the spring of 1590 he had displaced Ardkinglass and 
Lochnell as the earl of Argyll's chief advisor and was 
effectively in charge of the young e~rl. Not only was he 
the bitter enemy of these other Campbell lairds, but he was 
reputedly a client of }1aitland' s "from whome he receaved 
instructions to ingender differences of warrs betuein 
Huntley and Murrat,.68 Certainly Huntly had been supporting 
66. Brown, ''Bonds of Nanrent",p 470 no 78. 
67. Gordon, Sut~erland, p 214. 
68. "Historie, p 246-47; Gordon, Sutherla~, p 214. 
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the other Campbell lairds against him and he had a motive for 
wishing to cause trouble for Huntly in return, but that is 
all one has to go on and his plotting must remain unrpoven. 
Similarly, ,./ith his patron Haitland there is no evidence to 
show that the chancellor was working against H1mtly in the 
north, he had after all refused to co-operate with Both\Olell. 69 
On the other hand he too had good reason to fear Huntly and 
wish him tied up in the north. 
-These three relatively powerful la~rds thus agreed that 
the Ballindalloch incident and Huntlyts response to it was 
the last straw and they decided on collective action against 
the earl. Huntly had acted with his '.lsual speed and firmness 
in such affairs, obtaining a co~~ission against them and 
attempting to arrest the killers of the Gordon slain at 
-Ballindalloch at Grant's own house of Freuchie •. Frightened 
by this they hastily arranged a meeting with Moray and Atholl 
at Foresse and were joined by some Dunbar lairds and others 
who were dissatisfied by Huntly's overawing rule. The three 
lairds urged the earls to make themselves stronger in the north, 
they "haveing at this tyrne so great a partie, and being so weill 
freinded at court rt , by which was meant Bothwell and Naitland. 
It was an opportunity they could not afford to let pass though 
there was some opposition from the Dunbar lairds who advised 
against it "shewing how hard a matter it was for any faction 
69. Itistorie, p 246-47; Gordon, ~herland, p 214; Q&& 
Scot., x, p 462. 
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in these partis to resist Huntley 11 70 • • • • A bond was thus 
drawn up on the fifth of November at Ballacastle providing 
for mutual protection against any neighbour and it was signed 
by Atholl, ~·loray, lord Fraser, Grant of Freuchie, Campbell of 
Cawdor, Stewart of Grandtully, Grant of Rochiemurcus, Sutherl~nd 
of Duffus and Grant of Belliston, though not by any of the 
Dunbars or oddly enough by l"'Iackintosh who was certainly 
involved at this stage. 71 Atholl and Moray thus found 
themselves at the head of a very powerful alliance which 
offered a realistic alternative to Gordon hegemony in the 
north. 
Huntly also grasped the implications of the rebellion 
aBoinst him. He attempted to capture his rivals at Baweny, 
72 but they were worned and fled to Moray's castle at.Darnaway. 
Huntly gathered another two hundred men en route to DarnawaYt 
sent others on to Elgin to fortify the cathedral there, and 
73 
arrived at l'~oray' s castle on the 24th of November. The 
Gordons approached the castle with a great deal of noisy 
shouting and shooting which prompted someone to order the 
defenders to return fire and in the short exchange which 
followed, Cluny's brother was fatally wounded, "shot in the 
mouthe throw the craigll • 74 Without the men or equipment to 
70. Gordon, Sutherland, p 215. 
71. Brown," Bonds of Hanrent" , appendix, p 549, no 92. 
72. Q!.§.!..~.Scot .•. , x, p 425. 
73. ibid., P 428; S.R.O., Moray Huniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/296. 
74. l{oysie, 11emoirs, p 85. 
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take the castle Huntly retired, recrossed the Spey and then 
had to move further south into his own territories as he was 
followed by the Stewart earls, their allies and some two 
. 75 thousand men whom they had raised. For Huntly it looked 
as though his power had dramatically set into decline. 
By December the government had reports of sporadic 
fighting throughout the north-east and the king was determined 
to have it stopped. Both sides were sent orders telling them 
to discharge their forces and Huntly's commission to arrest 
John Grant was disCharged. 76 Huntly was then ordered to 
ward in st Andrews and the others had to ward in St Johnstone 
though Huntly was in fact already on his way to court.?? 
There things had in fact been changing to Huntly's advantage 
for ~fuitland had quarrelled with the king and was looking 
for an accommodation with Huntly to ensure that the earl did 
not add his voice to the many others clamouring for his 
removal. As he needed some assistance within the government 
Huntly was only too willing to listen, and an alliance between 
them looked certain.78 
Being aware of Runtly's enormous pull at court, the 
Stewart earls followed him south and both sides were in 
Edinburgh for Christmas. An attempt by the king to get a 
?5. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 428, p 433, p 462; Nelville, Hemqirs, 
p. 406; His ~orie, p 246-4?; Gordon, .§.~herland t p 215. 
76. R.P .Q. •. , iv, p 548. 
77. C~S.P.Scot., x, P 428-29, p 431. 
7S. ibid., p 354-55, p 423-24, p 434. 
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quick solution to the feud failed and so both sides were bound 
in caution to observe the peace, but HQntly succeeded in having 
his lifted through the influence of his wife. This threw the 
stewarts into a rage as they claimed that this would allow 
Huntly to take his revenge, and they warned the council that 
hostilities would be re-opened if they did not rescind the 
suspension. In the court at large both sides were lobbying 
for support \-1ith the Stewarts having the greater success, 
Huntly's attack on Darnaway being thought an obnoxious act 
which was almost universally condemned. Both\o1ell, more than 
any other hod "taken part with Murray and Atholl before the 
King and the Council and in the streets" having packed 
Edinburgh with his own men to the extent that Huntly had 
to have the protection of the provost when moving t~ and 
from the court. Bothwell also put pressure on the Stewart 
duke of Lennox to distance himself from his brother-in-law 
and \·18S thus paralleling the success his kinsmen had had . 
in the north. So pressed was Huntly now that it was said 
that he "shall hard1ie remayne in his hous or contrye".79 
Chancellor Hait1and's friendship was therefore of 
fundamental importance to Hunt1y for the king appeared to 
be toking a largely neutral line over the feud at this stage. 
~Jith Glarnis looking more and more threatening, l-fait1and was 
only too eager to accept his friendship, and ignored the 
propaganda being banded about by the Stewarts and their 
79. a.s.p.scot., x, p 437. 
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allies arnon6 the English representatives at court that 
Huntly was plotting another catholic coup. It was all done. 
very quickly with Huntly first getting a remission for his 
treason of the previous year, and then, with the king's 
assistance, he and Maitland sunk their differences. The 
king was thus again flanked by his favourite minister and 
magnate. Haitland had headed off GlB;mis and dropped his 
association with Both'oJell, and Huntly "had great court, 
and all doune at his plesour".80 
With his position at court again secure, Huntly could 
exploit his influence there to reverse his fortunes in 
the north. After fierce debate his friends in the privy 
council won him the concession of being allowed to return 
home, Maitland having "promysed to the said erle that 
advantage upon his enemy" while Moray and Atholl had to 
linger on in the sourth. It was a fairly blatant ploy 
to allow Huntly to enforce his authority in the north 
while his enemies were prevented from properly defending 
themselves, but Huntly was now too strong for even Bothwell's 
SI large faction with its backing from queen Elizabeth herself. 
The advantage was pushed home with l>foray being summoned to 
answer for creating disorder, while an investigation into 
Huntly's right to attempt to make an arrest at Darnaway 
found that as Huntly had not been informed of the suspension 
80. Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 442-4), p 439; Noysie, Nemoirs, p 85. 
81. Helville, Hemoirs, p 406-07; C.S.P.Scot., x, p 447. 
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of his commission until after the event, then he was in the 
right, and the officer who carried out the suspension, a 
James stewart, was deposed from his post. 82 Justified by 
these findings, and armed with various commissions, Huntly 
could leave his friends to tie up a~ loose ends at court 
and head north to deal with his enemies. 
The St.ewarts' fears about HUntly'·s intentions when he 
returned home were fully justified. A councillor who had 
witnessed the debate on whether to allow him to go, wrote 
"Sa schone an the Erle of Huntly was at hame in the 
north, and \olanting his competitour, tryUIllphed and tok 
sindre advantages upon the ErIe of Murrays dominions, 
geving the ErIe of Hurray occasioun to complain, bot 
getting na redress ••• " 83 
Bowes was still confident that Atholl and Moray were 
11 strone enough to encounter Huntly in his own bounds without 
the aid of the King", but even if they ever had been, and 
that is doubtful, Huntly had not wasted his time and had 
added to his friends in the north. 84 Both Caithness and 
Sutherland had assured him of their support, as had 
lords Elphingstone, Drummond and Inchaffrey, while Carneron 
of Lochiel had given him his bond and he had met with 
Montrose and other northern lords. Furthermore, lord Spynie 
and Innes of Innermarky now had their own quarrel. with Horay 
82. Fraser, Chiefs of Grant, iii, p 176-79; R.~.C., iv, p 569-
70; S.R.O., Horay I·runiments, N.R.A. 217fil3/36l, 217/2/3/330. 
83. Melville, Memoirs, p 407. 
84. Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 462. 
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after the earl's servants gave one of their friends a whipping 
for shooting at the countess's attendants. 85 Huntly gathered 
his forces at Spynie castle and at Elgin from where they spread 
out in all directions to ravage the lands of their enemies, 
while the Camerons had been specifically enlisted to attack 
Grant and Mackintosh from the west. At this point Atholl 
and Horay were finally able to get away from the court thein-
s elves and come north to try and hold together their 
threatened alliance.86 
Before coming north the two earls had tried to recover 
some ground at court during Huntly's absence. In fact 
the Gordon earl's friends thought that they could get on 
better without him, since his very presence made the 
protestants and the English nervous, and they advised him 
to stay away as long as was possible. However, Atholl and 
Horay were not even permitted to see the king Dnd they 
eventually went to Bothwell's house at Kelso to see if he 
could work out something for them. Even Lennox, who had 
been bullied by Bothwell into supporting them, had deserted 
their cause though the king wished the duke to act as an 
intermediary, something for which he had "greater desire 
87 than power". One problem of mediation was that the 
8 5. ~§.! p. Scot., x, P 452, p 454, p 462; Brown, "Bonds of Manrenttt , 
appendix, p 470, no 81; S.R.O., Horay Muniments, N.R.A. 217/ 
2/3/309. It was these two families Hunt1y wanted to deal 
with first, R.P.C., iv, p 832; Fraser, Qhiefs of Grant, 
iii, p 17.9, no 158. 
86. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 469; C.B.P., i, p 376. 
87. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 456, P 462. 
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steworts had no confidence in the king, being convinced that 
he was on HUntly's side, and their d:i-strust \-las increased when 
in February 1591 the privy council finally declared that the 
raid on Darnaway had been in the king's service.88 Disgusted 
with this treatment they thus \-lent north, but while Moray 
managed to add Dunbar of Boighall to his dependants, they 
were scarcely there before Moray was summoned south again.89 
The king had clearly wished Huntly to restore his 
authority in the region, but he had no wish for the fighting 
to get out of hand. Thus \-lhen he felt that that obJective 
had been attained, he cancelled HUntly's commission and asked 
him to come south too, so that another attempt could be made 
to negotiate. 90 His reasoning was probably that Huntly would 
be more willing to compromise from a position of strength, 
but he was in fact still determined on criminal prosecution 
of the killers of Gordon of Bismoir at Darnaway. l'-loray and 
his friends were all charged to attend trial before the 
justice, but in the middle of April the stewarts \-lere further 
shattered when Bothwe1l's association with the Berwick witches 
became known.91 
88. a.s.p.scot., x, p 460, p 469. 
89. S.R.O., Moray Nuniments, N.R.A., 217/2/3/330; C.S.P. 
Scot., x, p 497. 
90. N.R.A., 217/2/3/272; Ihf&, iv, p 597; Huntly's letters 
against Grant \-Iere also suspended, R.P.C., iv, p 626. 
91. N.R.A., 217/2/3/32), 217/2/3/346, 217/2/)/)14; ~P.C. 
iv, P 626. 
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Bothwell had once again turned to his main rivalry with 
the chancellor, but he was still very much involved in the 
affairs of Atholl and Moray.92 That he was framed in the 
matter of the witches seems likely,after all few men had so 
many enemies, for apart from his feuds with the Humes and 
lord Ochiltree, he could name the king, the chancellor and 
Huntly among them. On the other hand there is no reason 
to believe that Bothwell was not involved in some sort of . 
sorcery. ~lhatever the explanation, Bothwell w~s ru~ned by 
the affair.93 Initially he was fairly confident that he 
would be cleared and wrote to his 11 good Lord and brother", 
Horay, asking him to be there at his trial when he \lould 
prove his innocence. Moray replied that he had other urgent 
business, but would come if Bothwell thought it really 
necessary implying either that he too did not take the 
affair seriously or that he wanted to keep his distance 
from Bothwell.94 On the 21st of June Haitland tried to 
persuade Bothwe1l to go into exile, thus suggesting that 
the crOlm '-1as doubtful about its case, and the earl said 
he would consider the matter. That night he escaped from 
Edinburgh castle with suspicious ease. The king \las now 
92. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 456, p 482. 
93. Again a fuller explanation and discussion of th·is can 
be found else\lhere, e.g. Lee, Jqhn }~itland of Thirlstane, 
p 230-31. Entries concerning this episode can hO\lever 
be found in C.S.P.Scot. •. , x, p 50lff; Melville, Hemoirs~ 
p 395-97; R.P.C., iv, p 609-10. 
94. S.R.O., Moray Nuniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/251-252, 
217/2/3/254. 
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convinced of his guilt and invoked the 1589 sentence of treason 
still hanging over Bothwel1. For the Stewarts it signalled the 
end of their party at court or of any influence at all there.95 
The full implications -of this were not immediately manife~t, 
after all other men had recovered from similar positions in t.he 
past. At the time of Bothwell's escape both Atho1l and :t-foray 
were in fact in Edinburgh where they were dealing with bus~ness 
related to the feud. Only days after Bothwell's escape Horay 
struck one of Huntly's servants in the tolbooth before the 
counCil, and in fact Grant of Freuchie was able to get more 
of Huntly's letters against him suspended and registered a 
complaint about the earl's oppressions. 96 Hm-lever, while the 
Stewart earls were confined to Edinburgh, Huntly was again 
loose in the north where he carried out a further attack on 
Moray's fishing cobbles.97 Again and again one finds this 
swing between advantage at court and loss in the locality to 
disadvantage at court and gain in the locality. 
For Huntly the problem was less acute as he had good 
subordinates and advisors both in the north and at court, 
and he listened to them. :t-1oray was less in control of his 
affairs. In June one of his servants, John Leslie, wrote 
to him saying that his men had captured two of lord Spynie's 
95. As note 93. 
96. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 452; R.P.C., iv, p 646-47. 
97. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 541; S.R.O. , Horsy Muniments, l!.R.A. 
217/2131155. 
servants who had been oppressing l'-10ray's tenants, but that 
requests had been made for their release on caution. He 
stressed to Horsy the need to oppose this, and, in a thinly 
disg~ised criticism of his lord, told him that if he had 
left behind an appropriate commission anyway the two men 
would already have been executed. He also reminded Moray 
that the earl was slow in \'Iriting and that it was little 
wonder he was ill-served. Leslie then imparted some 
infornation about the activities of Horay's neighbours and 
asked the earl to send up some more hagbutts as ·they were 
98 
short of guns. Horay was clearly a poor mal"..ager of his 
interests and other letters confirm this, but it is also 
on insight into the problems created by the necessity of 
being in two places at the same time in an age of poor 
communications. Perhaps too in John Leslie one had the 
frustrntion of that whole class of hard working but 
anonyw.ous servants with the behaviour of their masters. 
Huntly returned to court in July, fresh from further 
attacks on Moray's property. As usual he arrived in strength 
and immediately began proceedings to overturn some of the 
decisions the laird of Grant had been able to get in his 
favour. By August Grant's complaint had been adjudged to 
be improperly obtained and Huntly's lawyers were able to 
begin preparations for prosecuting him.99 He also set about 
98. S.R.O., Mpray Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/3/327. 
99. Q.S.P.Scot., x,p 541, p 454, p 547; E~.C., iv, p 663-64. 
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trying to get back his lieu.tenancy of the north which had 
been taken av/ay in 1589, but in this the king was more 
sensitive. In spite of being lIa very great courtier" and 
in spite of his offer to track down Bothwell the king continued 
t t d · . th' 100 H o pos pone a eClSlon on . lS. owever, the fortunes of • 
his enemies continued to slide with Atholl being warded after 
he "Ias discovered to have sheltered B.othwell in his home.101 
The problem facing A tholl and }'!oray was that they \.lere 
politically dependant upon Both\.Jell and needed him if they 
were to have any chance at court even if after July 1591 
he had become a liability. 
Having spent a successful summer at court, Huntly returned . 
north for the traditional autumn raiding season. Once there 
he unleashed the full force of his power so that it was said 
. that IIBlood is drawn dailly in the north 
" • •• • 
In September 
the feud reached its most vicious levels yet with Cameron of 
Lochiel leading bloody forays into the lands of the Grants 
and }fuckintoshes and throughout Badenoch. Bowes wrote that 
"More blood will be drawn unless the king prevent it",but 
the association of Huntly's enemies with Bothwell had finally 
prompted the king to give Huntly his lieutenancy back and James 
made no effort to stop the earl reimposing his authority.102 
l-ioray had also gone north where he gathered. the Grants and 
Mackintoshes around him and tried to conduct retaliatory 
100. C.S.P.SCQt., x, p 547, P 557. 
101. ibid., p 557, p 569, p 571-72. 
102. ibid., P 572. 
391. 
raids in which close to a hundred of Huntly's people were 
said to have been slain. Wild tales were soon flying about 
concerning the numbers of dead and the brutality of each 
side, but though some were exaggerated one is able to get 
a fairly accurate idea of the level of violence from later 
claims by the victims for damages. Again like insurance 
claims they \Olould be inflated, but they are an indicator. 
Thus one of the September raids, led by Huntly's dependant 
Allan MacDonnell Dow of Lochaber, resulted in thirty of 
Mackintosh's men being slaughtered, the theft of five 
hundred cows, a thousand sheep and goats and a hundred 
pair of horses and mares with the destruction of all the 
houses in the settlement. The estimated cost of the 
damage was ten thousand merks. 103 This was being repeated 
throughout the north-east by the Gordons themselves and by 
their allies while Horay was doing his best to strike back 
with equal ferocity so that the entire region was 
effectively involved in a civil war. 
There was more to this than mindless destruction. 
Huntly's raids were conducted principally against his 
former dependants, Grant and Y~ckintosh, and by the middle 
of October they had had enough. HUntly's savage war 
against them had been a lesson in lordship as it had 
become clear that neither Moray, with his small kindred 
in the north,. nor the imprisoned Atholl could offer 




sufficient protection. On the 22nd or the month their 
rebellion against their lord ended ~ith a bond in ~hich 
Huntly accepted them in friendship lIas thai ~ar bef'oir", 
and in return he called off the raids by Cameron and 
HacRanald.104 During the following month Sutherland of 
Duffus, Dunbar of Blair and five other lesser men all 
scurried back to the Gordon fold. l05 - By the end of the 
year it was all over and the war for control of the north 
had been won. With Bothwell on the run, Atholl in disgrace 
and Horay shattered, the Stewart alliance had been smashed 
and a commentator could say with confidence that "Huntly 
rules all in the north, and over Moray ••• " .106 
For the Stewarts matters became even ~orse when on the 
27th of December Bothwell attempted a poorly executed coup 
at Holyrood thus confirming the king's determination to 
crush him and all who stood with him. l07 With the normally 
loyal Lennox implicated in the plot, the Stewarts as a ~hole 
came under suspicion and Horay' s nam~ was soon being 
mentioned as one of those present with Both~ell.l08 One 
cannot be certain of Moray's involvement, but a successful 
104. Fraser, Chiefs -of Grant, iii, p 159; C.S.P.Scot.,x, p 593. 
105. Brown, ''Bonds of Hanrent" ,appendix, p 470, no 83. Atholl 
made a belated attempt to maintain these men by taking up 
their case before the council but by then they had already 
made their peace with Huntly, S.R.O. Horay l1uniments, 
N.R.A. 217/2/3/347. 
106. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 601 • 
. 
107. Lee, John Maitland of Thirlstane, p 235. 
108. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 611-, p 617; C.B.P., i, P 390-91. 
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coup by Bothwell seemed to be the only way he could recover 
from the complete defeat Huntly had inflicted on him, and 
his moveIT.ents were so secretive during this time that not 
even his own servants knew where to find him. 109 At the 
very least he was s'-1spected of resetting Both"lell and was 
put to the horn for it in January 1592. Broken by the feud, 
and now on the point of being dragged even further down \./i th 
Bothwell, Horay decided to throw in the towel, and when 
lord Ochiltree, another stewart, approached him with a 
proposal to make his peace with the king and HUntly, Moray 
110 
agreed. 
The initiative for this had come from the court. Huntly 
had returned there in triwnph and was in as high a favour 
as ever. Chancellor Maitland, who had been badly shaken by 
Bothwell's raid, clung to the great magnate as his only 
security in a court in which he saw enemies at every turn. 
Thus, when Huntly.asked him to persuade the king to have 
Moray brought south for a mediation of their feud, Maitland 
agreed, and talked the king into sending lord Ochiltree to 
him. Moray then came as far as his house at Donibristle on 
the north side of the Forth where he awaited further 
instructio~q from the king. lll At the same time Huntly 
acquired a commission from the king to hunt down Bothwell 
109. S.R.O., l-foray Huniments, N .R.A. 217/2/3/356. 
110. Spottiswoode, HistorY, ii, p 419. 
. -
111. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 619; Historie, p 247; Gardon, §utherland, 
p 216; Moysie, Hemoirs., p 88; Nelville, Hemoirs, p 407. 
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and his supporters, and at the end of January he and Lennox, 
who had been cleared and so went along to keep an eye on 
Huntly's treatment of his kinsmen, were away fulfilling this 
task.112 Heanwhile, Haitland suggested to the king that all 
the ferries on the Forth should be ordered to remain on the 
south side of the estuary.113 The exact reasoning for this 
order is unknown, it could have been to prevent Both1tlell' s 
friends in the north joining him or to stop l·!oray from coming 
across to the king or to facilitate Huntly's plans on his 
return from the raid against Bothwel1. 
During the first week of February Huntly returned to 
court. On the 7th the king set out early in the morning to 
go hunting, but Huntly declined to go with him, saying that 
one of Bothwell's supporters was on the other side of the 
Forth and he was going to take him. According to one version 
he even told the king that he W3S going to Doriibristle where 
Horay was said to have been sheltering Bothwell. l14 The king 
warned Huntly not to start any unnecessary trouble, making 
sure that the English ambassador heard him, and set out on 
his hunt.115 Hunt1y left shortly afterwards, heading for 
Leith and then turned off to Queensferry and to the awaiting 
112. C.S.P.Scot., x, P 632. 
113. Historie, p 247-48, which also says that they were laid 
up in preparation for the seventh of February. R.P.C., 
iv, p 718. 
114. Moysie, Memoirs, p 88-89; C.S.P.Scot., x, p 635; 
Gordon, Sutherland, p 216. 
115. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 635. 
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ferries which he was able to appropriate by showing his 
, , f th k' 116 0 commlSSlon rom e lng. nce over the firth he headed 
strDight for Donibristle and laid siege to the house. The 
defenders refused to surrender and shot captain John Gordon, 
Gordon of Gight's brother, as he approached the house. 
HUntly's men then began firing back and a long exchange of 
fire followed. Finally, Huntly ordered that the house be 
set on fire, thus smoking out the defenders. Patrick Dunbar, 
sheriff of Moray, and five others were cut down as they 
emerged, but they acted as a decoy for Noray who escaped 
to the ,.,ater's edge and hid. After a search he was' 
discovered and brutally done to death, Huntly supposedly 
being asked to give the coup de grace by his servants in 
order to f~ly implicate him in the killing along with them. 
So ended the career of the "Bonnie Earl of Morayu.ll7 
\Vhile all this was taking place, lord Ochiltree had 
become worried about Huntly's movements and the goings on 
at court since he had arrived back with Moray. He had tried 
to follow Huntly across the Forth but was refused permission 
116. 1-1oY5ie, Memoirs, p 88. The whole question of v:hether 
there was a commission is debatable and Huntly may 
simply have forced his passage. 
117. Versions on the attack differ. Only Gordon says that 
Huntly asked for a surrender Bnd that captain" Gordon was 
shot first and he also relates that the house was fired 
and then stormed and the earl killed by Gight Bnd Cluny 
in revenge for the death of their brothers. Moray's 
mother was also in the house and her kinsmen later 
claimed that he experience killed her and she did indeed 
die a few months later. Gordon, Sutherland, p 216; 
Hoysie, Memoirs, p 88-89; Historie, p 247-48; Pitcairn, 
Criminal Trials, i, part 2, p 357-58; C.S.P.Scot., x, 
p 633, p 635; Birrel "Diary", p 26-27; Spottiswoode, 
~istorx, ii, p 419; The Chronicle of Aberdeen, spaldin, 
Hiscellany, ii, p 65; S.R.O.,l-ioray NUniments,U.R.A.217 2/1/58. 
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because of the order restricting passage. He therefore gathered 
his men and set out after the king, joining in with the hunt. 
At some point during the day the smoke from the burning of 
Donibristle was sighted but the king refused Ochiltree 
. . t d' t· t 118 L t t t ht perm~SSlon 0 go over an lnves 19a e. a er ha nig 
when the rumours began to circulate in Edinburgh of what had 
occurred, Ochiltree prepared his men ·to go out and investigate 
what had happened, but the king closed the town gates and the 
stables, and after an argument with Ochiltree had him confined 
to his lodgings.119 That the king knew perfectly well what 
had happened and was giving Huntly as much time as possible 
seems fairly obvious. Hm"ever, Ochiltree was to have some 
satisfaction for Huntly sent Gordon of Buckie to inform the 
king of what had happened, and as soon as Ochiltre~ heard 
he was in town, he broke his ward, gathered his men and 
chased him through the Oannongate and out of town. He then 
gathered some more, men belonging to Har and Lennox and set 
out in pursuit, this time presumably forcing a passage 
across the Forth and chasing Buckie to Inversheathing. . On 
hearing of his immanent arrival, Huntly retired, leaving 
behind the wounded captain Gordon who was taken prisoner.120 
News of the murder now spread rapidly around Edinburgh. 
The king was said to be "highly offended" ,a predictable 
118 •. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 635-36, p 639-40; Moysie, Nemoirs, p 88-89. 
119. Moysie, 1-femoirs, p 89. 
120. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 641. 
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attitude to adopt, but the people were soon in the streets 
11 crying out for justice" .121 This took the king by complete. 
surprise, but the people were already afraid of Huntly and 
now the menace of the great catholic earl from the north 
filled their imagination while their preachers added to the 
fire and stirred the whole burgh and court into a cauldron 
of anger. Within forty-eight hours o.f Horay's death news" 
had arrived that Campbell of Cawdor had been "slain in the. 
north by the practice of Huntly ••• ", thus adding to the 
panic .122 Stories of conspiracy and plotting flew about, 
noblemen cried out for vengeance, and "the clamours of 
the people" directed themselves against the chancellor who 
was seen as having been Huntly's co-plotter king James 
suddenly found that he had a crisis on his hands. 123 
A full discussion of why Horay was murdered is not 
possible here, but one cannot avoid it altogether. Clearly 
Huntly killed him out of vengeance, and all that has been 
said about the feud so far should be enough to convince 
one that even though Huntly had won his feud the taste of 
revenge was better than a victorious settlement. Furthermore, 
it was a political statement by the earl that he was not to 
be tampered with. George Gordon was king of the north and 
no-one else should question that if they valued their property 
and their lives. More confusing is his part in the killing 
121. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 633-34, p 636 • 
• 
122. ibid., P 633-34. 
123. Spottiswoode, Histotl, "ii, p 420. 
398. 
of Cawdor. The later investigation by Argyll into the murder 
revealed a very ~urky tale of plotting and double dealing, 
most of which had to do with the internal feud between 
Ardkinglass and Cawdor, but Huntly's name kept coming up 
like some threatening shadow and in the end Argyll believed 
that the Gordon earl was implicated. At its widest, the 
plot was supposed to have also involved 11aitland, with 
Argyll and his younger brother being intended victims of 
it, thus allowing the succession to fall to Lochnell, 
H~ntly's dependant. It all seems a little far fetched and 
the confessions and counter-confessions stretch the 
credibility of some of the principal witnesses, bltt on 
the other hand in the context of Huntly's Counter Reformation 
ambitions it would be very much to his advantage to keep 
Argyll in a forment, for with the earl approaching "adulthood 
his freedom of manoeuvre in the north was threatened. The 
later suppression by the crown of what took place at 
Ardkinglass's trial also suggests that there was more going 
on here than simple clan politics.124 
Evaluating the king's and Maitland's role is even more 
complex. Good reasons why }fuitland was not involved in 
the plot have been proposed by Lee, but it is hard to accept 
that he knew nothing of what wes going on •. Given the 
chancellor's skill in weaving webs of intrigue one can 
find many motives for him wanting Moray brought south and 
124. See below vol ii, p 606. 
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sacrificed to Huntly. He could have wanted to hit out at 
one ·of Bothwell's friends, especially so soon after the 
Holyrood raid, he may have wanted Huntly to take enough rope 
to hang himself, though this seems unlikely given his need 
for the earl's protection at the time, and he may even ha~e 
genuinely sought to pacify the feud and thus detach Horay 
from Bothwell. Certainly he was involved in bringing !-foray 
to Donibristle, and he must have known about Huntly's 
con~ission, the closing of the ferries, and probably about 
the earl's movements on the 7th. On the other hand it seems 
highly unlikely that he could have been involved in the 
wider plot which clearly had implications for the catholic 
Counter Reformation. 
The evidence for the king's involvement in plotting 
·Moray's death is even more damning, for not only did he 
facilitate it, but he also tried to protect Huntly from any 
real recriminations after it. Like MBitland, James was a 
good intriguer, and while he may never have given any positive 
assent to HUntly, he knew very well what the earl was 
manoeuvring for and he allowed it to happen. Like Haitland, 
his principal motive was the Bothwell factor, and like his 
chancellor he too could have known nothing about the wider 
ramifications about what Huntly had planned. As was pointed 
out in the previous chapter, as long as the political system 
was s·o enmeshed with feuds then to work successfully within 
it one ha.d to exploit feuding, even if in the long term 
one's objective was, as the king's most certainly was, to 
change the system.125 
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The croV.m's reaction to the murder was one of official 
outrage at Huntly's act, a~, on the king's part, private 
lack of sympathy for the stewarts. Thu3 while all of 
HUhtly's conmissions including his lieutenancy were cancelled, 
and a muster proclaimed to go after him, at the same time 
James refused to see Moray's mother or allow the dead earl's 
corpse to be 'led in procession through Edinburgh to him. 
Lady Doune had to.satisfy herself with having a gruesome 
painting done of Horay with all his wounds graphically 
displayed, but this too the king refused to see. Moray's 
corpse was embDlmed and left llnburied until he could be 
revenged and it was not until 1598 that the burial took 
1 t th d f th ' '1 126 Tb st t h d p ace a e or er 0 e prlvy counCl • e ewer s a 
some immediate satisfaction when lord Ochiltree, who was 
desperately trying to vindicate his own part in having been, 
duped into bringing Horay south, wrested the dying captain 
Gordon and two of his attendants from the protection of 
125. HS!!:tend~r Pa12ers, ii, S.H.S. Third Series, no 19, 
(Edinburgh, 1932), P 246-51; g~ghl@'Qd Papers, i, S.H.S. 
Second Series, no 5 (Edinburgh, 1914), p l89ff; liistorie, 
p 248; ,Ba1four "Annales", i, p 390, suggests that Horsy 
had some sort of relationship with the queen of which 
James was jealous. See also Lee, l~hn Ma~tland of 
ThiI:1;,st~.l. p 237-42; Gregory, History of the Uestern 
Highlands ~n1 Islands, p 244-59; D.H. Wilson, Kin~ James VI 
. and I, (London, 1956), p 107-08. 
126. ~.P.C., iv, p 725; ~foysie, p 90-91; liistorie, p 248; 
Calderwood, History, v, p 146; C.S.P.Scot., x, p 641; 
R.P.C., v, p 441+-45. 
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lord Sp;rnic and had them hastily executed.127 Their deaths 
were no compensation for 110ray's, and as Aston recorded, 
"all men are bent on revenge of this cruel murder ••• ", 
including not only other Stewart lords like Atholl, 
Ochiltree and even Lenno~, but also l-1orton, Har and Argyll 
who was already beginning to put together the pieces of the 
conspiracy.128 Ho,lever, Huntly's version of events was by 
now being broadcast by his friends who were openly saying 
that he had killed i-foray in the king's service and under 
the authority of the commission the king and his chancellor 
had given him. Both James and 11aitland denied this, but 
then added to the growing suspicion that it was true when 
the muster against Huntly was postponed on the grounds that 
129 capturing Bothwell was of more immediate concern. 
The resentment and fear which had been formenting in 
Edinburgh now became a much'louder cry against the king 
and his ministers. The earls of Argyll and Atholl announced 
that their forces were ready to move,.thus implying that the 
king had no excuse for not at least giving them a commission, 
and Lennox, Har and Horton all registered their complaints 
with the king, as did deputations from the ministry of the 
\... ' .. 
burgh and its magistrates. There was also popular unrest, 
so much so that James decided to leave Edinburgh; an 
announcement which only caused many of the craftsmen of 
127. Noysie, }-~moirs, p 90-9l. 
128. C.S.P.Scot., x,p 636. 
129.ibid., p 637-38; Hoysie, !:!~2i!:§., p 91. 
. .. 
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the burgh to take to the streets and shout their disapproval 
of chancellor l1ai tland It for not haiffing sick regaird to the. 
punischment of that murthour ••• ". Even the royal guard 
appeared to be on the point of nutiny when they exploited 
the situation to try and get pay that was owing to them. 
MeamJhile, lord Ochil tree took the dangerous step of publicly 
anno~ncing that only he, Maitland and the king had known 
about }foray's arrival at Donibristle, which was as good as ' 
accusing one or both of the other two of complicity in 
. 130 
the murder. 
The king was determined to leave all this behind and he 
left for Linlithgow and then went west to Glasgow and 
Dumbarton. Around this time he wrote to Huntly, 
"Since your passing heirfra, I have beene in suthe 
perrell of my life, as since I was borne I was never 
in the like, partlie by the grudging and tumults of 
the people, and partlie by the exclamatioun of the 
ministrie, wherby I was moved to dissemble. Alwise, 
I saIl remaine constant. ~~en yee come heere, come 
not by the ferreis; and if yee do, accompanie yourself, 
as yee respect yOQr owne preservatioun. Yee saIl write 
to the principall ministers that are heere,. for therby 
their anger will be greatlie pacified. u131 
The king's confidence in his favourite earl thus remained 
unshaken and he clearly continued to see Huntly as one of 
his principal supporters against not ,only Bot.hwell, but the 
more extreme elements in the church. However, for the moment 
James could not have Huntly with him and had to answer the 
130. J.10ysie, Hemoirs, p 91; Calderwood, History, v, p 146; 
C.~P.Scot., x, p 637. 
131. Calderwood, HistorI, v, p 146-47. 
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rumours that he had plotted with the earl to have Horay 
murdered. One of Bothwell's captured servants was threatened 
\vith torture to force him to confess that Moray ~ad been at 
the Holyrood raid so that he could be condemned as a traitor 
and Huntly's killing of him declared in the king's service, 
but nothing came of the plan.132 Presumably it was decided 
that such tr8nsparent duplicity would only inflame the 
king's critics • 
. Of those thirsting for revenge, lord Ochiltree was the 
most vehement. Previously he had been a loyal servant of 
the king, but he clearly felt that he had been used and that 
his honour had been compromised. It was said that at some 
point during Huntly's attack on Donibristle, Moray had told 
his sister, who was also present, that if he was killed she 
was to see that Ochiltree would revenge him, and Ochiltree 
had now sworn to receive "the like end" 8S Horay or "yield 
the like r~ard to some of them" .133 Having been so blatantly 
frustrated by the king in all his attempts. to press for action 
against Huntly, Oclliltree himself went north when the king 
left Edinburgh. There he met with Atholl, Montrose am 
th e la irds of ara nt, Mackintosh, l\Teymes and others of A tholl' s 
friends, and they all agreed to a band which bound them to 
132. Q.!...S.P.~, X, p 641. Calderwood, Histoa, v, p 147. 
133. In the same spirit lady Doune, Horay's mother, was said 
to have taken three bullets from her son's body and given 
them to certain friends to bestow in the bodies of his 
murderers, C.S.P.Scot. x, p 641. 
revenge Moray's death, since "this murthour was be law neglectitlt. 
The inclusion of Grant and }~ckintosh was very significant since 
it showed that while they had been defeated by Huntly in the 
previous year they were still dissatisfied with his lordship 
and were keen to find a way out of it. Ochiltree then took tne 
band back to the court where he had Horay's friends there sign it. 
However, his activities were disapproved of by the king who 
summoned him to explain his actions. Ochiltree apparently' 
explained himself a little too frankly with "rough language" 
in which he told the king that he would "embrace and refuse 
no freindship that wald assist and tak pairt in the revendge 
of that mttrthour rt , a thinly disguised reference to Bothwell. 
Offended by his words and his innuendoes, James had Ochiltree 
warded again until his temper cooled off.134 
On the 22nd of February the king returned to Edinburgh. 
Finding tha.t tempers were still running high he called three 
of the principal ministers of the burgh, Bruce, Rollock and 
Lindsay, before him, but it was he who ended up doing most 
of the listening. They told him that there was nothing he 
could do or say which would justify Runtly and he was cornered 
into promising justice.135 Just to ensure that he meant it 
Bruce and Rollock accompanied him when he left the burgh 
again two days later by which time even the queen's voice 
was added to those ranged against James. Edinburgh was in 
134. Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 661, p 639-42; 1-1oysie, Memoirs, p 92-93. 
135. Calderwood, liistorx, v, p 147. 
fact no less volatile than it had been before with "Hany 
spiteful libels ••• " being "cast in the streets ••• where 
sundry banished men are now bold to lodge, and most men 
arm themselves ready for troubles. "However, it was Maitland 
who W3S now the principal target for this anger and there 
was even talk of the chancellor leaving the country. With 
so many enemies even before this crisis Maitland's position 
looked precarious, but the king remained loyal to him and the 
chancellor simply shunned any publicity for a while and 
remained in the background.136 
Not surprisingly Both'-1ell took his opportuhity to exploit 
the chancellor's difficulties. In spite of the king's fanatical 
hunt for him he had remained elusive and had a great deal of 
sympathy from among the nobility, the church and the people 
to whom he was beginning to appear as a protestant martyr 
whose treatment contrasted startingly with that of Huntly, 
the arch-catholic. Thus, Bowes wrote 
liThe discontment of the people her.e is such, and 
chiefly for this last murder committed by Hunt1y, 
that I fear he (Bothwe1l) may go where he pleases, 
for no man will 'stir' him. By this last deed he 
has got more favourers than he had 'if the dorst 
otter there myndes'. But the fact he committed was 
so odious that none dare speak of him." 137 
Bothwell himself took up the pen in his own defence and wrote 
to "his loving brethern, the ministry and eldership of 
Edinburgh", setting out before them a list of Mait1and' s 
136. Q.S.~.Scot., x, p 645. 
137. ibid., P 648. 
406. 
treasonable crimes, among which he included this latest plot 
against Horay who, like him, was a loyal protestant nobleman 
ensnared by the chancellor and his catholic friends. 138 It 
was a clever piece of propaganda and one which found ready 
ears. 
With the crisis still escalating the king decided that 
something would have to be done to defuse it. Once again . 
a number of bizarre schemes were discussed to see if there 
was any way of making the murder appear as a legitimate 
slaughter, but none could be found.139 Huntly himself had 
sent a message to James offering to stand trial before the 
session or the justice general, but with the king's commission 
being the central fact in Huntly's defence, James was keen 
to avoid such publicity. "li th the Stewarts and their friends 
demanding a trial not only of Huntly and his friends at court, 
but also of Bothwell so that he could clear his name, the 
king agreed to let the former go ahead. The 3rd of March 
was set as the date thus allowing the muster on the lOth to 
138. Ca1derwood, ~is~orI, v, p 150-56. 
139. It was suggested that l~oray might be forfeited since he 
was at the horn for civil matters, but this was rejected 
as it would establish a very dangerous precedent. Even 
more hair-brained was the scheme to forfeit the regent 
Moray, dead for over tw.enty years, for his treason 
.against queen Mary and thus disinherit his children and 
with them Moray, ~S.P.Scot., x, p 643. 
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140 be abandoned. However, the arrangements continued to be 
altered. The trial was postponed and Huntly was ordered to 
ward himself,while the other killers would be pursued. Then 
this was changed to that of allowing Huntly to come in to 
ward only if he brought the others with him for trial, and 
finally he was warned that he had until the 7th of March to 
ward himself or the king would conduct a raid into the north. l41 
Clearly James was increasingly giving in to pressure and it 
served to prevent the Lothian presbytery from going ahead 
with its threat to excommunicate HUntly, something lNhich 
they had refused to do to BothlNell even when the king had 
asked them. In the meantime Huntly was engaging in yet 
another bout of brinkmanship and on the 8th of ~furch he had 
still not warded himself in Blackness. Then on the 9th or 
lOth he thundered into St Johnstone at the head of three 
hundred men, claiming that he lNas on his lNay to face 
140. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 643. It may have been at this time 
that James wrote to Huntly about his forthcoming trial, 
telling him that lNhat he had done had been done lNithout 
his permission, but to say what he had told him to at 
the trial. He reminded Huntly that he loved the 
protestant religion though he hated the seditious 
behaviour of its ministers and looked forward to lNhen 
"by your services thaireftir the tirranie of thir 
mutins may be repressit." He also told the earl that 
"gif of my favoure to you ye doubt, ye are the onlie 
man in Scotlande, that doubtis thairof, sen all your 
enemies will needis bind it on my bake." Alternatively 
this could have been lNritten in 1589 before the treason 
trial and it may have been James's advice that Huntly 
play the political novice, Gordon Letters, S"Qalding 
Hiscellany, iii, p 213. 
141. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 650-51, p 652; CalderlNood, History, 




trial. l42 This arrogant show of strength was meant as a 
clear threat to the king who did not want a trial, but when 
Maitland led the council in advising a stronger hand be taken 
with the earl the king agreed, and he was delivered a firm 
warning to ward immediately. This time Huntly sensed the 
tone of the order and obeyed, but he took so many of his 
own men with him that he and not his jailors was in control 
of Blackness castle. After a few days rest there he sent· 
word to the council that he would find caution for his 
behaviour, and left "expres aganis all justice and equitie, 
and in particular aganis the common lawis of Scotland". From 
Blackness he went to the house of his catholic ally, Crawford, 
'-1here he kept up the pretence of being in open ward.143 
In effect he had shown the privy council that he was far 
from overawed by their authority. 
The duke of Lennox, who was a Stewart but also Huntly's 
brother-in-law, was working on a compromise agreement. He 
let it be known that he had the ward of Horay's young son 
and would be satisfied with the heads of lesser men than 
Huntly himself. Some sort of reply came from Huntly to the 
effect that the actual killing had been done by Clu~, Gight 
and Innes of Innermarky who all had particular blood-feuds 
with Horay, but that he was willing to stand trial to prove 
his innocence. Huntly was throughout his life far from 
142· Calderwood, Hi~, v, p 148, Q.S.P., x, p 652, p 653; 
Hoysie, l1emoirs, p 92. 
143. Q!-,S.P.Scot., x, p 653, p 655; Calderwood, Historr, p 149; 
1-1oysie, Eemoirs, p 92; Historie, p 240. 
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disloyal to his friends and one can assume that his objective 
would be to have himself cleared so that he could return to 
court and use his influence in their interests there. However, 
Lennox's efforts came to nothing IIS0 it is not known what to 
do with Huntlyll. 141+ 
Having been embarrassed by its att.empts to constrain 
Huntly the crown again s~.Jitched back to what was in effect 
co-operation with him. A proclamation was thus issued saying 
that Horay's kinsmen should not pursue Huntly since he had 
done nothing "bot by hes Maistes Commiccions, and sua wes 
nather airt nor pairt of the Hurthour. nl45 It was a clear 
admission by the king that Huntly did have s!.lfficient 
commissions to att.empt to arrest }foray, but there was also 
an inference that Huntly might be separated from his men 
. who had gone further than he had intended them to, as he 
himself had suggested. Yet, when a party of commissioners 
was sent to the earl to have him write down under oath the 
contents of the commission, Huntly refused, and was said to 
have denied that one even existed. r-{ost of the evidence so 
far has suggested that there was a commission and the only 
explanation for this refusal was either that Huntly was 
protecting the king, just as James was protecting him, or 
that the cowmission was an open-ended one whose interpretation 
was questionable. As for a trial, it was proving impossible 
144. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 654, p 655. 
145. Pitcairn, Qriminal Trials, i, part 2, p 358. 
.. 
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to find a jury \.1hich included the requisite eight earls not 
related to either party. Any pretence that Huntly would be-
brought to trial or in a ny way suffer for the murder seemed 
to be fading a~ay, and with his friends in the chamber, men 
like Spynie and George Hume, beginning to re-emerge after a 
period of lo~ profile, his influence at court ~as again 
looking unassailable. l46 
The Stewarts \~ere thus becoming increasingly impatient. 
Already one of the late earl of Moray's servants had attacked 
some of Huntly's servants while en route to Blackness, fatally 
wounding the man and stealing Huntly's trunk with 6,000 merks 
in it. The man had also tried to assassinate Huntly himself, 
. but had been discovered and prevented from doing so.147 
Atholl and Ochiltree had each gone to raise their £orces and 
consequently had been ordered to remain within their own 
, 
148 bounds.· Further angered by this Ochil tree had even opened 
up negotiations with Bothwe11, the man who had slain his 
uncle, a nd he had let the king know tha t he vlould go as far 
as to band with Bothwel1 if it would get him revenge on 
Huntly.l/+9 In the government the council still had a majority 
146. Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 658. Thus lord Spynie had already initiated 
proceedings against Horay's young heir over the old question 
of the bishopric and was very soon at feud v1ith his femily 
in his own right, S.R.O., N'oray Huniments, N.R.A. 217/2/31349, 
217/2/1/1). 
147. a.s.p.scot., x, p 654, p 657; a.B.p~, i, p 391. This 
Robert Stewart, a younger son of lord Innermeith and thus 
a kinsman of }.foray's had sworn revenge against Hunt1y. 
148. a.s.p.scot., x, p 644, p 655-56, p 657. 
149. ibid., p 664. 
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against Runtly, and on the 22nd of lvIarch these men finally 
Gucceeded in having him denounced, but the chamber was able 
to block Mar's Guggestion that a convention of the nobility 
be held to discuss the Ylhole question of how to punish such 
offenders.150 S 'th t' , b t th ee~ng e con ~nuous see-saw~ng e ween e 
council and the chamber, and the king's general sympathy 
for the latter and for RUntly, Ochiltree met with Atholl, 
Argyll and others at Dunkeld to plot their own revenge. 
Unfortunately, this only angered the king who ordered Atholl, 
at whose house the meeting took place, to appear before him. 
The earl refused, but when James threatened to come after 
him he gave in after some persuasion from Mar, and was 
warded in Stirling. Again Huntly's enemies could only see 
that they were being treated more toughly than the great 
catholic murderer was and their sense of injustice and 
resentment remained as strong as ever.151 Huntly meanwhile 
had gone home where he tightened his alliances with Erroll 
and Crawford and reminded Grant and ~~ckintosh of his 
152 presence. 
The four months after Moray's murder had been intensely 
difficult ones for the king, but by the end of May the storm 
had been weathered. The general assembly was still planning 
to petition for punishment, lady Doune had died cursing the 
150. R.P.C., iv, p 734-35; C.S.P.Scot., x, p 663, p 666. 
151. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 668, p 670, he remained in ward for 
two weeks, p 674. 
152. ibid., P 679, p 686. 
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king, the English presence at court was trying to get James 
to give .his backing to the Stewarts, and even Haitland was 
coming around to disagreeing with the king.153 The chancellor 
had virtually been forced into semi-retirement during the 
crisis, a sacrifice to popular feelings, but when Maitland 
returned to court he did so determined to recover his 
position and to shift any suspicion of his association with 
Huntly elsewhere. From the spring of 1592 he thus became ' 
one of Huntly's fiercest critics.154 The king himself 
simply wished the matter pushed into the background and 
at the June 1592 parliament had far more pressing business 
to attend to than the supplication presented to the estates 
on behalf of young Horay. 155 'I,.!hatever his private feelings 
may have been, James's official stance was that Huntly just 
could not be tried since it was impossible to find an assize 
unrelated to him or his enemies and there was no alternative 
means of prosecuting him.156 Neans could have been found, 
but the king did not want them to be, as he desperately 
needed Huntly at court to frighten off the Bothwell 
sympathisers and the presbyterian influence which was so 
restricting his freedom in the church. In the light of 
political necessities Horsy's death was insignificant; as 
for justice James was of the opinion that as a probable 
participant in the Holyrood raid and as a friend of Bothwell's 
153 •. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 679, p 681, p 684; Calderwood, History, 
v, p 149. 
154. Lee, John Haitland of Thirlstane, p 248ff; Q.S.P.Scot., x, 
P 697. 
155. S.R.O., }~oray Huniments, N.R.A. 217/2/4158. 
156. Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 693. 
then justice had been done already. To destroy Huntly would 
not only have wrecked havoc with the government of the north· 
and instigated the effective civil war which followed in 
1593-94, but it would also have destabilised the king's foreign 
policy in which Huntly and his friends were an important chec~ 
to the strong English lobby, free the presbyterians from any 
restraint, and make the king dependant upon the support of 
the Stewarts and their friends, men who were keen to have . 
Bothwell restored. Furthermore, Huntly was still the king's 
personal friend. Even if the king had himself had no part 
in the plot against Horay, or even if Huntly had exceeded 
his instructions James could still not afford to sacrifice 
him to the baying of the Stewarts, the presbyterians and 
the English. 
Unfortunately there had to be a price and the 1592 
"Golden Act" was part of it. Less well known, but potentially 
just as damaging, was the Stewsrts' resolve to act on their 
own. On the 27th of June Bothwell launched another desperate 
attempt at a coup against the king at Falkland, but as yet 
the alliance between Bothwell and his other Stewart kinsmen 
had not quite re-emerged as the force it had been during 
1589-91, and without inside help the raid was another 
expensive failure. While none of the Stewarts and their 
friends could be connected with the raid the king was convinced 
of their complicity, ~nd its effect was only to further convince 
him of the need for Huntly's presence. Bothwell may have 
suffered another set-back, but in propaganda terms his fortunes 
continued to rise and he let it be known that were he to return, 
then Huntly would be dealt \-1ith and justice would be upheld; 
an ironic banner for Bothwell to pose under. 157 
In the north, Huntly continued to act as though there was 
no goverTh~ent in Edinburgh at all. Though his commission had 
been revoked he had not stopped acting as the king's lieutenant 
. 
and was levying more men with his now suspended commissions.158 
Another bond reinforced his lordship over the Camerons while 
Dunbar of Blair and Colquhoun of Luss were added to ftis list 
of dependants.159 However, he had local problems of his own 
when Cluny, Gight and Innermarky confronted him over his 
policy of throwing most of the blame onto them. Clearly they 
did not appreciate the finer points of Huntly's politics and 
wanted an assurance that their lord would protect them. In 
this spirit of rebellion they threatened that if he did not 
get them relaxed from the horn, they would get help from 
elsewhere, meaning Spain, and would choose Auchindoun as their 
chief should he fail to uphold them in everything. It is a 
striking corr~ent on the mutuality of lordship for even a 
magnate as powerful as Huntly to be coerced in this way by 
his dependants and kinsmen. Nor did his suggestion that he 
157. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 697, P 707ff, p 775-76; Spottiswoode, 
History, ii, p 421,22; Ochi1tree \·JaS certainly involved 
in plotting the raid, l1elvi1le, l.femoirs, p 407; see also 
-C.B.P. for this period and Lee, John r·1aitland of Thirlstane, 
p 252-53. 
158. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 701. 
159. Brown,IIBonds of }fanrent", appendix, p 467ff. 
might go into exile for a while and thus give the appearance 
of being punished go down well for that would have left the 
door open for someone else to obtain his lieutenancy and to 
persecute his friends. The Stewarts were equally umimpressed 
with this offer since, as they pointed out, it meant nothing. 
more than that Huntly was going to take a holiday.160 In the 
end he stayed and his dependants were satisfied \-11th his 
leadership, but it was a useful reminder to him of the 
corporate nature of even the greatest of kin-lordship 
alliances. 
By August the ground was being laid for Huntly to return 
to court. The king was by then openly criticising his enemies 
and defended the earl before an impressive array of representa-
tives of the burghs and the church. With angry sarcasm he asked 
. the ministers why it was that they and the people were so 
concerned with revenge for Noray, who was, he added with some 
degree of snobbery, nothing more than the son of the "Abbot 
of st Colme" (lord Doune), himself but the brother of 
lord Innermeith and far below the degree of a man like the 
earl of Eg1inton whose murder had failed to arouse such a 
high concern for justice among them.161 However, this was 
the high point in the king's support for Huntly as within 
the month the rumours of Huntlyts catholicism had given way 
to firm reports that he had heard the mass. This was more 
than. even the king could bear of Huntly, and just as he had 
160. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 719-20, P 729-30, p 705, p 741, p 742, 
p 748. 
161. ibid., p 745-46. 
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cracked dOi-m on lord Maxwell in 1586-87 when he had tried to 
establish local autonomy in religion, so his support for 
Huntly cooled as evidence of this latest outrage filtered 
south. Killing Horny was tolerable as it I1was done for a 
particular feud ll , but if he was encouraging apostasy in the 
north then for once the king was in agreement with the earl's 
protestant critics. 162 By this time though it was autumn 
and as in the past two years the goings on at court had 
little effect on the local resolution of the feud. 
Huntly had in fact unleashed his men in early August, 
and once again the clan Chattan were their principal targets 
in what was another rough wooing. Parties of Camerons, 
MacDonalds and the broken men dependant on Huntly skirmished 
and raided across Badenoch slaughtering some fifty. Hackintoshes 
in "one attack and eighteen Grants in another. The clan Chattan 
retaliated with a daring raid which led them up Strathbogie, 
strathspey Dnd Glenmuck where they committed equally cruel 
slaughters and killed a number of Gordon lairds.163 It went 
on with each side ravaging the" other in bloody raids until 
a very large part of the north-east was gripped in some of 
the worst feuding seen in Scotland in this period. The 
barony of Pettie,held by the }~ckintoshes of Moray, was 
162. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 782, p 792. 
163. Gordon, Sutherland, p 217-18; Noysie, Men:oirs, p 161; 
Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 424-25; Huntly was thought 
. to have influenced Ca i thness into executing two of 
}~ckintoshes younger sons during the s~~er, C.S.P. 
Scat., x, p 645. 
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devastated in a raid of quite savage ferocity in which 
Auchindoun led a small army of. some twelve hundred Gordons 
with their highland friends and slaughtered around forty 
people, devastated crops and buildings, and stripped the 
country of its livestock. The damage was later estimated 
164 at two hundred thousand merks. Once again the 
Vmckintoshes and Grants could not hope to hold out against 
Huntly and they approached the stewarts again asking for 
help if they were to continue fighting. Atholl responded by 
going to the king and asking for a corr~ission which, in the 
light of Huntly1s recent indiscretions in religious matters, 
the king gave him to oversee and protect Moray's lands. 
Atholl i~~ediately came north and gathered his men, but was 
prevented from getting through to Darnaway and was almost 
captured by the Gardons. On a second. attempt with lords 
Ochi1tree and Lovat and Hackintosh of Dunnachattan he entered 
165 Horay's territory and began to prepare its defence. 
"1orried at the extent of the fighting"the king sent the 
earl of Angus north with a commission of lieutenancy and 
judiciary over the warring clans, though not over the Gordons 
or any of the lowland kindreds, and to mediate between the 
164. 
165. 
S.R.O., Moray MUniments, N.R.A. 217/2/4/180; S,.R.O. 
Mackintosh Huniments, G.D. 176/2LP; !l.P.C., x, p 466. 
C.S.P.Scot., x, p 801-02; Moysie, Memoirs, p 98. Lord 
Forbes was also trying to get in on the act by intervening 
,in the Aberdeen burgh elections but Hunt1y himself arrived 
with three hundred men to ensure his candidate was elected 
provost, C.S.P.Scot., x, p 784, P 801. 
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opposing sides. Angus was a choice hardly likely to inspire 
confidence in HUntly's enemies, being himself a catholic and 
friendly to Huntly's cause.166 James also wrote to men like 
the laird of Grant, asking them to help Angus settle the 
feuding since he had not the pOHer himself in the north to 
do anything about it. l67 Unfortunately, Grant, like so many 
others in the region, had been caught up in the fighting with 
Huntly during the two months before the king's letter reached 
him. Angus was thus little more than a helpless onlooker 
of an ever escalating situation. Athnll's intervention had 
already staved off immediate military defeat for the clans 
now fighting Huntly, when news arrived that Argyll had 
finally left court and that his men were already moving into 
Lochaber, t.hus relieving pressure on the west of c~an Chattan 
by attacking the Camerons and MacDoneIm on their home territory. 
The threat posed by Argyll was enough to convince Huntly that 
while he could go on fighting, it was time to play the 
l 't' , ,168 po ~ ~c~an aga~n. 
Huntly approached Angus and told him that he would gladly 
make peace, but that his enemies were oppressing him and that 
he had to defend himself, a report which Angus passed onto 
the king. Huntly was asked to remain in open ward in Aberdeen, 
166. R.P.C., v, p 19-20; some actually though that An~s had 
been suggested by Huntly himself, C.S.P.Scot., x, p 815; 
Historie, p 259. 
l67.Fraser, Chiefs of Grant, ii, p 3-4. 
168. Moysie, Memoirs, p 98, p 161; C.S.P.Scot., x·, p811-12, 
P 815, p 817. 
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a burgh he largely controlled, while all his friends, including 
Horay's murderers, were relaxed from· the horn after he had given 
caution for them. 169 Seeing that peace could only be restored 
in the north with Huntly's co-operation, and no doubt hoping 
that in having given Atholl his backing he had persuaded HuntIy 
to behave himself, the king wrote to Angus telling him to get 
Huntly's help in Guppressing the disorders of the clan Chattan 
and to deputise him before he returned south.170 In effect 
the. king was putting his confidence back in Huntly as long 
as he did not overstep the mark in matters of religion. 
The king's shrewd exploitation of the feud at this time had 
.reminded Huntly that he was not independent of royal 
authority, and Huntly himself admitted shortly afterwards that 
he had been stung by the commission given to Athol~ and 
Mackintosh, an "honour that nevir was don to nain of his 
forbears ••• n.l71 A sec~nd letter to Angus followed after 
discussion-with the privy council who advised that assurances 
be sent up and si~ned by both sides "to draw on fast a 
conference, and in the end, a finall aggrement", and indeed, 
after some reluctance on the part of Atholl, assurances were 
172 
exchanged. However, Mackintosh was left out of them, 
whether on his own request of not one does not know. Thus, 
while the fighting continued between the clans dependant 
169. a.s.p.scot., x, p 820. 
170.· Fraser, The Douglas Book: Hemoirs of the House of Douq1as 
Bnd Angus, (Edinburgh, 1885), iv, p 37, P 31. 
l71. 1I 'l'heStraloch Pap.ers!!, Spaldin:s MiscelJ any, i, p 5. 
172. Fraser, The Dou~las Book, iv, p 37-38, no 32. 
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upon the 83rls, at lecst their main forces had been disengaged.173 
Huntly wrote his own version of events to the king in early' 
,January, just before the Spanish Blanks scandal rocked the 
kingdom, and '\.lhile onc finds his concern for the "puir pepillf' 
who were suffering "the war with sik extraordinar crualtiell , • 
a thing which should not be heard of in "ane civil contry" 
less convincing, his basic analysis of why the feuding was 
taking place \·JOS accurate enough. What was causing all this 
instability and violence i.Jas, in Huntly's opinion, dependants 
switching lords so that there was a situation of "sik man 
sik maistertl. Huntly was powerful and thus did not want the 
status quo upset, at least not where it upset him, but he 
\olas also right in that ever since Heckintosh end the other 
dissident lairds had tried to overthrow his lords~ip in 1590 
there had been civil war in the north-east. Stability in 
lord-dependant relationships was necessary if social and 
political anarchy was to be avoided, for Huntly was clearly 
not going to allow his vassals to diminish his power in such 
an arbitrary manner and he used all his force to quell t.hem 
into obedience, a point already touched upon in a previous 
chapter. Lordship was a good means of governing local society, 
but the tendency for dependants to search the market for better 
lords and for lords to similarly try and attach other men's 
173. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 820; though the murderers of Horay were 
exempt from the assurance which was to be nl111ifiOO if 
Huntly sheltered or protected them, something he continued 
to do, C.S.P.Scot, x, P 822. The level of the fighting 
still remained very fierce, C.S.P.Seot., x, p 821, p824. 
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clients ensendered competition and all too often feud. 174 
In the first week of January 1593 correspondence from 
Huntly, Auchindoun, Erroll and Angus to Spain was discovered 
implicD ting them in a plot to land a Spanish army in Scotland 
and overthrow the protestant regime. Angus was arrested on 
his return to court, while in the north Atholl was made the 
king's corr~issioner throughout Elgin, Forres, Inverness, C~omarty 
D nd all north of the Spey.175 Huntly, Auchindoun and Erroll met 
at Aberdeen to decide on a course of action and Erroll argued 
strongly for iw~ediate armed rebellion as he had in 1589, but 
again Huntly was reluctant to clash with the king and refused. 
Erroll c~lled Huntly "feeble" and left in anger, but Erroll 
was al'..J8Ys the most militant of the Scottish catholic lords 
and in this instance, as in 1589, H~ntly was probably right. 
He did not want to become another Both\.]ell, and as long as 
he could ge~ his way with the king by other means he was 
determined to avoid War with him.176 However, he went along 
with Erroll in refusing to ward himself and so at the 
beginning of February, almost to within a day of l.foray's 
murder, the two earls and Auchindoun were denounced for 
177 treason. 
174. "The Straloch Papers", Spalding HiscellanI, i,'p 5-6. 
175. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 828-29, p 830; xi, p 15-19 and following; 
R.P.C., v, p 33-36; ~10ysie, Herloirs, p 10l. 
176. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 34-35. 
177. ibid., P 37, p 40-41; 1!.P.C., v, P 42. 
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Though it had t.aken over a month to take this decision, 
once taken the king acted quickly.l78 Just over a ~eek later 
the king ~as in Aberdeen holding a justice court and receiving 
assurances of loyalty from most of the surrounding lords and 
lairds. Huntly retired into Caithness ~i th the more notorious· 
of his folloHers, and without him Erroll had no choice but to 
flee also. Others of Huntly's friends also refused to come 
to Aberdeen on the grounds that the Ste~arts ~ere there, and 
indeed it was Atholl who was the chief beneficiary of the 
forfeitures, he and the earl Marischal being ~iven commissions 
to govern the north between them. They were ordered to arrest 
t.he catholic rebels, apprehend Huntly for Horoy's murder, and 
restore order to the region. An impressive array of deputies 
were commissioned along ~ith them, including many ~f Huntly's 
enemies, men like Grant, ~·1ackintosh and lord Forbes being 
among them. On paper the king had had a very swift and easy 
victory, bl.lt the cracks in it became apparent almost os soon 
as he turnod south.179 
The 1593 raid on Aberdeen was little more than a show of 
strength, yet another turn in the screw in the brinkmanship 
which the king and Huntly had been playing at since 1588. 
James had even tried to prevent the English ambassador from 
8ccompa~ing him on the raid so that he ~ould not see just 
178. Angus had been allowed to escape, having been given an 
"assurance by the king that he would be ~mharmed if he 
did not rejoin Huntly and Erroll, Fraser, Th~_Douglas Book, 
iv, p 188-89; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 489. 
179. R.P.C., v, p 43-44, p ~S-47, p 49-58, p 51; O.S.P.Scot., 
xi, p 66-67, p 68, p 72-73. 
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how lenient he was being. ISO Only a few bf Huntly's cautioners 
from 1592 were arrested for the non-payment of their surety 
and the rest had been nothing more than a publicity stunt to 
. d th th hI· 181 A th 1 1 reDl1n e nor w 0 was nng. mon atar the rebe 
earls were even relaxed from the horn, while in the north 
Marischal was pleading to be relieved of his job as he had no 
wish to become entangled in a feud with Huntly, and was already 
being accused of lenience towards him. Only Atholl really 
gDined from his new authority which provided him with an 
opportunity to strike harder at Huntly and continue the 
feud through the king's offices.182 
The raid had not weakened Huntly unduly, but as wss his 
usual tactic he tried to make peace in the locality until 
he could recover some influence at court. He sent· messages 
with overtures of peace to Bothwell and made concrete 
offers to Atholl suggesting that his eldest son could marry 
Atholl's daughter as.amends for Horay's murder. However, 
Atholl was now playing for far higher stakes and was trying 
to persuade the king to transfer Lochaber and other Huntly 
lands in the north to him, and in effect to replace Gordon 
po~er with the Stewarts.183 An association with Bothwell was 
a very dangerous move and suggests that Huntly was now much 
closer to rebellion and much less confident of his ability 
180. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 48. 
181. ibid., P 77-78. 
182. R.P.C., c, p 53-54; C.S.P:Scot., xi, p 80-21, p 82-83. 
183. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 82-83, p 89. 
to yet again win back the king's confidence. James, meanwhile, 
was every bit as determined to have Bothwell's head or drive· 
him from the country, and in ~:ay 1593 he joined many of his 
nobles in a new band against the earl, obtaining a promise 
from them that they would be as earnest in their pursuit of 
him as they were in their own feuds. 184 How serious Huntly 
was about Bothwell at this stage one cannot know, and he may 
only have been feeling the ground, but he was certainly 
pursuing every possible option, and his friends at court were 
again at work in the chamber and popular support was being 
canvassed among the Edinburgh crafts.185 By the sprin~ he 
was once again feeling safe enough in his home territory to 
resume the fighting with Atholl. Once more the Spey fishings 
\Olere the pretext for the hostilities beginning and Atholl 
began further r~inous raids on Huntly's lands while the latter 
captured one of Atholl's servants and reputedly had him hanged, 
"and afterwards his head, arms and legs to be cut off in his 
own presence at Strathbogy and to be set on poles ll .186 The 
Spanish Blanks affair had thus .been nothing more than a short 
, 
interlude in the feud and had had no real or lasting impact 
upon local politics. 
Enemies of Huntly still hoped that he would be forfeited 
by parliament which was to meet in July, but when the time came 
184. R.P.C., v, p 72. 
185. Q~~P.Scot., xi, p 91. 
186. C.B.P., i, P 462; C.,S.P.Scot!" xi, p 91. 
the king himself was busy lobbying on Huntly's behalf trying 
to arrange terms which would satisfy himself, Huntly and the 
church. Some minor figures were forfeited for the burning of 
Donibristle and the slaughter of Noray,187 but it 'Was not 
enough to satisfy the Ste1tlOrts and the more extreme protestants. 
Atholl's refusal to ride with the king to the opening of 
parliament should have been a sign to him of just how angry 
he and "the noblemen and gentilmen of the stewartis" were,' since 
"thair blude was split without redres, and Bothuell lang baneist 
without any originall caus ••• ". Thus on the 24th of July, 
Lennox, who was having his own private feud with Maitland, 
led them in a dramatic palace coup in which they brought 
Bothwell back to court. In part it was an anti-Maitland coup 
and there was even talk of bringing back captain J~mes stewart 
to complete the Stewarts control of the court and government. 
They packed the court with their frjends, had the charge of 
witchcraft against Bothwell quashed, and began to rally 
support for an onslaught on their enemies, }~itland, Glamis, 
the Humes and the northern earls.188 
However, their new regime was short-lived and the king's 
forced acceptance of Bothwell could not last unless he was 
kept a prisoner. The more insecure Bothwell felt, the more 
demands he made on the king, such as trying to surround him 
with guards under Ochiltree, and thus the more he played into 
187. Hoysie, ~oirs, p 102; A.P.S., iv, p 15. 
188. Eoysie, Hemoirs, p 102; Historie, p 270; Q&.P .§££h, xi, 
p l30ff, p 145; C.B.P., i, p 477-81; Spottiswoode, ii, 
p 433-34; Lee, John Maitland of Thirlst~, p 261-65, 
has a fuller account of the details of the coup. 
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James' hands as a man bent on ruling his king. By degrees he 
and his friends were gradually distanced from the king who 
called on the support of the Hamiltons, negotiated with 
Huntly, and finally detached Lennox from the others. 
vJi thout Lennox the stewart faction lost its respectability, 
Bothwell once again had to become an outlaw, and the rest 
of the stewarts had to slip back to their homes. Having 
politically compromised themselves they could expect no 
further favours from the king who now more than ever was 
convinced by the coup of his need for Huntly's protection.189 
If the vJider political context had altered in Huntly's 
favour the more decided intervention of the earl of Argyll 
on the side of his enemies was a bitter blow to his local 
interests. Argyll was still only eighteen in 1593" and his 
leadership of the powerful "Campbe1l kindred was still very 
hesitant. Having had his principal advisor murdered in 1592, 
and with all sorts of rumours about treachery flying around 
in Argyll, the earl decided that his first concern had to 
be putting his own house in order. When he and his kinsmen 
met in June 1592 to inquire into Cawdor's murder he had 
Ardinglass, Glenorchy and !1acLean of Dowart all under suspicion, 
but the investigations he conducted gradually pointed more and 
more towards Ardking1ass. In the fighting in the north-east 
during the autumn and winter of 1592 he had lent support to 
Atholl against Huntly, whom he also suspected of having 
189. R.P.C., v, p 100-01; C.B.P., i, P 438-90; Spottiswoode, 
Hi~tory, ii, p 435-37. 
plotted Cawdor's and his own death, but it was a proxy feud 
and as yet he held back his forces until he was more sure 
of \-Jhom he could trust. In the following spring an attempt 
was made to assassinate Ardkinglass, but a servant was 
mistaken for him and brutally done to death while the laird 
himself escaped. After this Ardkinglass fled to lord Hamilton 
and begged for his protection. Argyll let him be for the 
moment, but he had signalled to his kinsmen that he was in· 
chDrge and just to stress the point he arrested his most 
powerful Campbel1 dependant, G1enorchy, holding him for a 
while on suspicion of plotting against him. However, the 
cohesion of the Camp bell kindred remained strained and 
Argyll continued to be obsessed ,~ith his security, but at 
least the minority was over and with Ardkinglass ha.ving been 
identified as the principal plotter against Argyll, the earl 
could more confidently turn to external enemies.190 
In the autumn of 1593 the fighting again flared up, 
but this time with Argyll lending his significant support 
to the stewarts. The dead were numbered in their hundreds 
with Argyll and Huntly "themselves taking part in very large 
scale operations throughout the north-east and there being 
"daillie spilling of much bloode".191 Hunt1y's brutality 
190. C.S~P.Scot., x, P 684, p 705, xi, p 99-100, p 102-03, p 170; 
~~P.C., iv, P 756, v, p 68-69; Moysie, }~emoirs, p 162; Argyll 
also had Colquhoun of Luss killed for bonding with Hunt1y, 
Fraser, The Chiefs of Colguhoun, (Edinburgh, 1869), vo1 i, 
p 156-57; Cowan, lIClanship, kinship and the Campbell 
acquisition of Is1ayll, p 141. Cowan also has a wider 
discussion of what was going on in Argyll at this time. 
191. Q.S.P.Scot., xi, p 137, p 139, P 143, p 151, p 152-53; 
C.B.P., i, p 494; Huntly also tried to have Mackintosh 
slain at a tryst or so it was said, C.B.P., i, P 165. 
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continued to be the subject of tales circulating in Edinburgh, 
and in one he 'Was reported to have captured t\olO of A tholl' s 
cooks and IIburnt them both, sending the Earl's word that he 
192 had left t,.Jo roasts for themll • Even the burghs were not 
immune from the fighting. Aberdeen barely escapro a riot 
'When a proclamation was read saying that Moray's murderers 
would not be prevented from entering the town, a flagrant 
abuse of authority by Huntly which inflamed the growing 
unrest with his power there. 193 In Inverness HacRanald 
of Keppoch drove }fuckintosh out of the burgh in· Huntly's 
name, but was then in turn defeated with the loss o~ one 
of his sons and an officer who were taken and hung. 
Hackintosh then made the burgh sign a bond with him agreeing 
to resist Huntly or "accept the deadly feud of the said 
Lach1an11 • Fo11o\.Jing the loss of Inverness Huntly spread the 
fighting yet further afield by stirring up trouble between 
Mackintosh.and the }~cpherson clan to his south.194 
Effectively there \Vas a minor war no\., raging in the north 
which was far more savage than the fighting done there during 
the civil war twenty years before. 
At court all Huntly's indiscretions of the previous winter 
had been forgotten, and even the chancellor was keen to see 
him back to counter th~ 'threat of yet another Both~ell coup.195 
192. Q.S.P.Scot., xi, p 165-66. 
193.· ibid., p 179. 
194. Gregory, Histor:cof thej!estern :!iCjh1ands, p 254; 3.R.O., 
Hackintosh Huniments, G.D. 176/162. 
195. C.B.P., i, p 492. 
The synod of Fife had gone ahead and excommunicated the c,atholic 
earls against the king's wishes, thus making his job more 
difficult and convincing him of the urgency of having Huntly 
there to prevent such arrogance from the church.196 In 
October the king made his first move towards restoring Huntly· 
when he tried to capture Atholl in a raid from Stirling, but 
while Hontrose and Gowrie gave themselves up, Atholl fied.197 
Arrangements were then made to hold a packed assize which . 
would clear Hunt1y and the others of the charges of treason 
made against them, and a strong pro-Huntly lobby was encouraged 
to form around lord Hume at court.198 On October the 12th the 
three earls made a staged subnission to the king and following 
this a convention of ,estates met and set terms for Huntly's 
reinstatement, none of which referred to Horay's murder. In 
short, the Spanish Blanks would be forgotten about if the 
earls took an oath of loyalty to the established religion, 
they being given until the 1st of January 1594 to agree to 
this, and another month after than in which to get rid of 
their Jesuit priests and catholic kinsmen or go into 
vo1untaryexile. l99 
The king was thus doing all in his power to bring Hunt1y 
back to his side, am it was soon being said that he "will 
196. Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 437-40. 
197. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 191, p 193. 
198. ibid., P 192, p 194, p 199, p 217. The king also hoped 
t'o arrange some sort of reconciliation with Horay's kin, 
p 188-90. 
199. E.P.C., v, p101-04, p 108-09; Ca1derwood, Historv, v, 
p 277-88; r'~oysie, Memoirs, p 105-09. 
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not only get courte againe, but also be greater than ever 
he was, and be made Lieutenant generall in the norths.,,200 
Certainly his enemies thought that yet again Huntly had 
outflanked them at court and Argyll wrote a sharp letter 
to Mar blaming him for allowing this to happen. Hackintosh • 
also feared the worst Dnd transferred his alle,giance to 
Argyll who gave him support for the fighting which was still 
going on in Lochaber. 20l Yet it was not to be HUntly's 
enemies who would \~reck this promising return to court, 
for Huntly, Erroll and Angus had all decided that their 
conscience could now allow them to give their loyalty to 
the protestant church. They would obey the king where 
possible, and in particular Huntly had always sought to 
maintain at least the appearance of obedience to James, 
but the oath of loyalty was to be his Rubicon and in the 
new year of 1594 he crossed it.202 
As a small part of the Counter-Reformation in Europe, 
Huntly's rebellion in 1594 was probably less significant 
than lord V~xwell's in 1587. Huntly was far more powerful 
than ~fuxwell and had greater catholic support in the region, 
but while he was still receiving Spanish subsidies, was in 
communication with Spanish agents in the Netherlands and 
possibly with Spain itself, there was no likelihood of foreign 
200. C.B.P., i, p 497. 
201." C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 250, p 245, p 251, p 251; Brown, 
"Bonds of Hanrent", appendix, p 389, no 66. 
202. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 260; A.P.S., iv, p 52-53; R.P.C., 
v, P 116, P 130. 
431. 
intervention in 1594. Huntly and Erroll - Angus did not take 
up arms - were thus not really fighting to restore catholicism 
to Scotland in 1594, but for local autonomy in religion and 
their own right to liberty of conscience. 203 The most they 
could hnve hoped for would be that they could manoeuvre the 
king into a better bargaining position, for the Counter-
Reformation had been lost in Scotland in 1585-89 when Huntly 
and Erroll had feiled to agree on a united effort with 
MaX1.olell and the catholics of the south-west. 
HUntly's action shattered the king's hopes for ~is return 
to court, but this time he could no longer tolerate him so 
easily and the Stewarts and their allies were quick to 
exploi t the adva ntages.· Forfeiture did not come until l·farch, 
but even before then they were escalating the war in the north 
after the lull at the beginning of the year. N'ackintosh was 
again at the fore of the campaign against Huntly and ,~as 
besieging Ru~hven castle in Badenoch which was being held 
for Huntly by the Hacphersons who were now on his side. 
MacAngus of Glengarry and clan Hackie also joined in while 
Atholl, Argyll and even Gowrie were busy raising their forces 
for a more substantial campaign than the guerrilla \-1arfare 
• 
largely seen so far. 204 Cecil dismissed reports that the 
Scottish lords were preparing to overthrow the king and 
wrote that they were simply doing what "is usual amongst 
them", but the scale of operations was continuing to widen 
203. C.B.P., i, P 470, for the subsidy. 
204. R.P.C., v, p 134; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 282, P 288-94, P 277. 
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at an alarming rate. 205 In the south too Bothwell was preparing 
his last and most daring plan yet. He toyed with the idea of 
throwing in his lot with Huntly and marching north to join him, 
but opted for a joint attack on Edinburgh by his own forces 
coming up from the borders and the Stewart lords descending 
upon the burgh from the north. Hha t made the plan more 
acceptable WElS that in doing this Both,~ell would keep the 
friendship of England and the church. Vi th the king in his 
hands he intended to be much more ruthless than he had been 
in 1593, and he intended to make an attack on H~ntly one 
of the first of his priorities once back in control of the 
court. However, it was not to be, and in spite of the 
daring tactical defeat he inflicted on the royal army, 
Bothwell had to flee back to the borders, disappointed 
that his stewart kinsmen had failed to turn up and ·support 
. him. 206 I-ihen their association with Bothw ell , s attack 
became known the stewarts found themselves in almost as 
much trouble as Huntly. Thus at the snme time as a muster 
\</as being proclaimed for a campaign i!1to the north, A tholl, 
Ochil tree and a number of others of their friends "lere 
denounced on the grounds of failing to answer for their 
relations with Bothwell.207 However, James was still willing 
to forgive if they would cut their ties with Bothwell and 
even went so far as to offer Atholl Coupar Angus abbey if 
205. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 299. 
206. Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 448; C.B.P., i, p 530, 
Boysie, i-!emoirs, p 113-16; Historie, p 301-02; 
C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 304-06. 
207. JiJ:Jh, v, p 140-41, p 143, p 144. Both ... ell was almost 
captured at this time after a tryst with Atholl and 
Ochiltree, C.B.P., i, P 537. 
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he would do so.208 
Even more than before it was Argyll \-Iho was now taking over 
as the leading fi:~ure in the feud against Huntly. His enthusiasm 
for attacking Huntly as early as possible irritated the king who 
was far from happy about the oncoming campaign, Bnd he sent Mar 
to prevent the young earl from setting out prematurely.209 
Argyll agreed and spent the intervening time going over new 
evidence which had come to light in the Cawdor murder case. 
In Hay he interrogated one of the killers, John Oig, who now 
revealed the details of Ardkinglassts plot, and the.role of 
not only the Campbell lairds of Glenorchy, Lochnell and Lawers, 
but also confirmed that Huntly did know of it. A bond 
subscribed by the plotters was said to have been recovered 
by Argyll, and Cawdor's murder was explained as necessary 
if Huntly \oJlJ s to get a\oJay with killing Horay, which to some 
extent was how events turned out. 2lO Oig was executed, but 
.Argyll had still not finished. He raided the home of MacAulay 
of Ardincaple, another suspect, but while he got away 
Ardkinglass was not so lucky and was dragged in for another 
interview with Argyll.21l He confirmed Oig's story, but 
added the details of a wider cons,iracy involving l~itland 
208. C.S.P.Scot.,xi, p 344, p .374; Atholl had made his peace 
by July but Ochiltree held out for a while longer. 
209. ibid., p 331. 
210. \Iarrender Papers, ii, p 246-51; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 338, 
·"it is commonly said that Huntly durst not have slain 
HorBY in the life of Calder ••• It. 
211. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 344. 
and in which Argyll and his brother were also to be slain. 
According to Ardkinglass it was Glenorchy who was the principal 
mover of this scheme, but when examined Glenorchy simply denied 
everything and offered to stand trial. Argyll had opened a real 
hornets nest and it looked as though a lot of people were about 
to be stung, but then four days after his first interrogation, 
Ardkinglass was examined a second time and withdrew his 
accusations about a great plot. Within a fortnight Glenorchy 
was freed, two more of Ardkinglass' s men who knev about or 
had t8ken part in the murder plot were put to death, and while 
he himself continued to be Argyll's prisoner it was said that 
liThe band for Argyll's death has been smothered as it concerns 
too many significant persons". A few years later, and in a 
quite different case, a defendant's lawyers drew attention 
to Ardkinglass' s trial in order to appeal to certain precedents 
laid down in it, but was told that the evidence of the trial 
was classified and not available. h'hether there was a great 
contract arranged to kill Argyll or not one will never know, 
but the manner in which the evidence and some of the defendants 
were treated points to some sort of closing of the ranks by the 
Campbells, Argyll and those in the government implicated in 
.t 212 ]. . 
By mid-summer the king's campaign had still not got under 
way. After a last ditch offer to go into exile if his friends 
212. Highland Papers, i, p 175-90; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 370,p 376. 
It should be remembered that Argyll was hereditary justice 
general of Scotland. 
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\~ould be safe was turned down. Huntly threw his energies into 
preparing for war with the king. He, Erroll, and their dependants 
told their tenants that they had to provide a mounted and armed 
horseman for six months or a footman for a year, or alternatively 
enough money to pay for one. The earls 'vere clearly preparing 
for a long campaign and had apart from these mounted levies 
a large contingent of clansmen at their command.213 In mid 
July Argyll, Atholl and lord Forbes were finally issued with 
their commissions against the enemies of the king. 214 The terms 
of the commissions allowed them to either act immediately and 
independently or to wait for the king who was preparing for 
the baptism of his son, a sign that James was perhaps still 
hoping that the rebellion could be settled without fighting. 
Certainly there were suspicions that the campaign would be 
nothing more than a propaganda exercise as in 1593 and the 
English were pressing for the rebels to be dealt with 
"without regard to feuds", something which was impossible 
in the Scottish political environment. 215 Last minute doubts 
by Argyll about whether he could trust his kinsmen, and 
diversionary attacks on his territories by Huntly's dependant, 
Donald Gorm, almost wrecked the entire plan, thus confirming 
such suspicions, and it took a great deal of persuasion from 
213. Q..S.P.Scot., xi, p 364, p ,385. Huntly also received another 
payment of Spanish gold to help finance his rebellion and a 
nUmber of Jesuits arrived in Aberdeen, Spottiswoode, History, 
ii, p 458; Fraser, !he Douglas Book, iv, p 374, no 334. 
214. H.H.C., iv, p 488, no 292; R.P.C., v, p 157. 
2l5 •. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 389-90, p 398, p 408, p 417. 
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the king, the church and other noblemen to get Argyll to march. 
Finally, at the end of September his army of between four and 
eight thousand men, the great majority of whom \-lere unmounted 
clansmen, marched out of Argyll with the nervous young earl 
at their head. 2l6 
The final plan arrived at by the king and his advisors. 
was for a two pronged move by Argyll coming from the west 
and lord Forbes and presumably Atholl marching from the 
south. Argyll would bring the bulk of the force. of highland 
footmen and hopefully meet up with Forbes who was to gather 
the horse, but now that he had decided to march Argyll was 
in a hurry to come to grips with his enemy. After a slight 
delay when he failed to take Ruthven castle, which was still 
holding out for Huntly, he marched out of Badenoch and into 
the Gordon lands well ahead of lord Forbes. Huntly had initially 
intended· a scorched earth campaign and had already stripped hls 
lands and houses, leaving the latter unattended, but on hearing 
of Argyllls arrival he and Erro11 qui?kly gathered a force of 
some fifteen hundred horsemen followed. by a company bringing 
light ordinance, and rode out to meet him. Sweeping aside 
Argyllls reconnaissance they came upon him largely unprepared 
at Glenlivet, and in spite of Argyl11s large superiority in 
numbers, his position on the high ground, and the large number 
of hagbutters he had, the earls decided to attack immediately. 
Erroll led a near suicidal charge of some three hundred gentlemen 
• 
216. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 400,.p 419, p 422, p 432; Spottis'\.'oode, 
History, ii, p 458. 
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and HUntly's o\-Jn guards straight uphill into the face of heavy 
fire from Argyll's front ranks, and in spite of heavy losses" 
including Auchindoun who was killed and Erroll himself '\-1ho 
received a number of wounds, they broke through. A similar 
attack by Huntly with the remainder of the force repeated 
the success and the catholic earls had won a victory which 
owed more to daring and sheer courage than to tactical planning 
or execution. Argyll's force was only just saved from a complete 
rout by a fine rearguard action from MacLean of Dowart and by 
the lack of infantry among the rebel army to pursue them in 
the rough terrain, but he had lost some five hundred or more 
men and \-Jas led \-Jeeping from the field. Huntly's losses were 
less, but they were concentrated among the best of the rebel 
cavalry and included a large number of wounded gentlemen. 
, 217 It was a victory, but it brought no real strategic advantages. 
Nothing '-1as changed by G1enlivet, and ,./ith lord Forbes 
approaching with the king and another large royal army Huntly 
and the badly wounded Erroll again fell out over whether to 
fight James or not. As he had most of the men Hunt1y had the 
last \-Jord and he once again opted for scorched earth so that 
for the third time in their partnership Erroll left in disgust. 
One wonders whether the history of the Counter Reformation in 
217. For the campaign and battle see Piteairn, Criminal Trials, 
i, part 2, p 361; C.S.P.Seot., xi, p 449-52, p 453, p 456-
60; Ca1derwood, History, v, p 348-54; Noysie, ~:!emoirs, 
p 119-21; Historie, p 338-43; Gordon, ,Sutherland, p 226-29; 
'R.P.C., v, p 176-77; Spottis\-Joode, Eistor:l, ii, p 458-60; 
Ba1four, !nnales, i, p 396-97; Birre1, "Diarylt, p 33. 
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Scotland would have been quite different had Erroll had the 
power that Huntly had available to him? Again Huntly was 
probably right since the best part of his army had been badly 
crippled. Furthermore, he had clearly not been able to raise 
as many of his lO\-11and supporters as he would have expected 
while his highland clansmen had been forced to remain on their 
own territories to protect them from Argyll's army. Hore 
importantly, while Argyll had fought under the king's royal 
'standard the battle had really been an extension of the feud 
between Huntly and the St.ewarts and their friends; fighting the 
king himself was quite a different prospect. Huntly thus slipped 
off into the hills and his army scattered while the earl's lands 
were overrun and his houses and castles destroyed by his enemies 
who iolere at last able to strike back at him with a vengeance. 218 
Once again the king failed or refused to deliver the 
crushing blow \lhich would have ended Huntly's domination of 
the north. Submissions were received from the lando\omers of 
the north-east, but none of the real rebels were captured and 
the king soon left for home, satisfied that he had at least 
shown Huntly what to expect if he was bent on rebellion. 
Lennox, Huntly's brother-in-law, was left in charge of further 
cleaning up operations and Gordon of Pitlurg, who had failed 
to follo\-1 his chief against the king, was left in possession 
of his property. The choice of these men YJas symbolic of 
just how far the king was prepared to go in punishing 
218. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 460-61, p 464, p 466; Gordon, Sutherland, 
p 230. 
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Huntly.219 However, what further influenced the low key na ture 
of the king's campaign was the state of his own army. Argyll 
was in disgrace after his defeat and was again arguing with 
his dependants and kinsmen about treachery on the battle-field. 
FUrthermore, when Argyll's reassembled forces had finally 
rendezvoused with lord Forbes and the king there had been 
fighting between them and the prospec~ of a feud loomed up 
220 . bet\o/een the two armies. \.Jhether the king could have done 
much more even if he had wanted. to was thus somewhat problematic, 
but at least he had convinced the English that he was no longer 
"partial to the papistsu •221 
No sooner had the king gone south than Huntly re-emerged 
from his hiding and a s in 1593 began to regain the initiative. 
For some completely unknown reason he succeeded in persuading 
Atholl to change sides, but the ~otive may have lain in the 
king's treatment of Atholl during the previous two years 
and in particular the way he had been virtually by-passed 
in the late campaign. There may also have been trouble 
bet\.]een him and young l.foray who was fast approaching adUlthood 
and was beginning to resent his tutorship. Whatever the 
reason for this abrupt turn about by one of Huntly's oldest 
enemies,it signalled the beginning of Huntly's recovery. 
Moray fled from his tutor and Argyll responded by sending 
220. C.S.P.Scoi:." xi, p 476, p 486-87; spottiS\'loode, !iistory, 
ii, p 460; Gordon, Sutherland, p 229-30 • 
. 
221. g.B.P., ·i, P 551. 
440. 
hi8 men to make savage reprisal raids on his erstwhile ally 
Atho·ll. 222 ~rgyll's r 1 t' i t t "orces were a so con lnu ng 0 opera e 
right across the north east aGainst any of Huntly's friends 
and tenants, but his men were not too discrimina.te and were 
soon ravaging as far afield as the rr.ore settled. lOY11and regions 
of Angus and the Hearns where men quickly remembered. that this 
had never happened during all the time that Hunt1y had ruled 
in the north. Opinion was thus swinging around to wishing 
for. HUnt1y's return,even among those who had no love for him, 
while Lennox's army was rapidly deserting him, leaving Huntly 
to return unopposed by the beginning of 1595.223 
Yet while recovery in his own domains looked certain, 
Huntly's position with regard to the king was to sink even 
lower in 1595. In February Huntly's enemies were able to 
. present the king with firm evidence that he had, along with 
Angus, Err~ll and Caithness, signed what came to be known 
as the Henmure band with Bothwel1, under which they all 
agreed to support one another until they were all fully 
restored. Huntly and Both,~ell also assured one another until 
Horay was seventeen when the former would make an offer of 
compensation which, if refused by Moray, would allow 30thwel1 
to "refus to tak his pairt in persewing that slaughter". 
The earls had also planned to capture the king and hold him 
in Blackness castle, .while they dealt with their enemies, the 
222. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 486, p 5CO, p 501. 
223. ibid., p 506, p 509, p 512. Lennox was actually protecting 
the Gordons and appeared to have the king's pernission to 
do so, ~B.P., ii, P 15; R.p.e., v, p 207-OS. 
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capto.in of the fortress being a client of BothloJell' 8, a sin 
for which he paid with his life, but the discovery of the bond, 
and its pUblication by the king, destroyed for ever B oth\.J ell , s 
caref'llly cultivated image as the champion of the protestants 
and it brnished Huntly in the king's eyes much more than his· 
plots with Spain had. 224 As a result of this lord Ochiltree, 
who had turned dmm a large bribe from Huntly and Both"'lell to 
join them, finally broke from the latter and made his peace 
with the king, telling him that he had only associated himself 
with the earl to have revenge on Huntly.225 Ironic~lly then, 
at the 83me time as Huntly was so distsnced from th~ king the 
Stewart party or alliance had been shattered and only Argyll 
was able to keep up the feud with him in the north. 
It was not the end of the feud, but after 1595·j.t became 
_ less and less of a dominant issue in Scottish politics. That 
year Innes of Innermarky \.Jas captured by Moray's kinsman, 
lord St Colme, ano was executed along with his servent for 
his part in killing the ear1. 226 Also that year Argyll re-
openErl his investigations into Cawdor's murder an:! had 
Ardkinglass t.ried, but the events of lithe grittast pannell 
that was in our dayisll were never revealed and while 
Ardkin~lass continued to suffer harassment from his chief, 
224. R.P.C., v, p 205; Q.~S.P.Scot., xi, p 525; 1-1oY3ie, Bemoi~~, p 16); Spottiswoode, li~stor~, ii, p 457. 
225 •. .Q..B.P., i, 496, p 510; Eoysie, ~irs, p 121; Bothwell 
was now "little herd of, as a man able to. doe nothinge", 
C.B.?, i, p 549. 
226. !!i..2.12.tie, p 347-48; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 643; S.R.O.Horay 
l;~unirnents, N .R.A., 2l7!2!1J93. 
he enjoy~J the protection of lord Hamilton and escaped any 
. h t 227 H tl E 11 t t pun18 men • un y and rro went in 0 exile separa ely,. 
but both were disappointed in the reception they found on the 
continent and returned home in 1596 to an outcry from the church 
vlhich w~mted them gone forever. However, by then the king was 
much more in control of his overmighty ministers and dismissed 
Robert Bruce' s claim that while Erroll and Angus could be 
tolerated, Huntly was "so hated of the subjectsll that he could 
228 
never be restored. Huntly was still "the man of greatest 
power, and one that could stand him (the King) in most stead". 229 
James thus wrote to Hunt1y, reminding him of "how of'ten I have 
incurred skaith and hazard for your cause", and ordering him 
to satisfy the church's requirements, or "if your conscience 
be so kittle as it cannot acept permit you" then his family, 
lands and titles would be safe, but "look never to be a 
Scottishman againrr • 230 It was to be the king's last offer 
and Huntly.recognised it as such. Nevertheless he did not 
miss the opportunity to lecture James, telling him that his 
offence had not been so very great anyway, and that "the pr ins 
pairt to his subiectis, suld be, as the father to the children, 
227. Ardkinglass's third confession, Hi~h1and Papers, i, p 190-
94, confession of John Oig's wife, Hi~hlElnd Papers, i, 
p 159-71; trial arran5ements, Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, 
i, part 2, p 363, p 391-92; C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 168; 
Highland Papers, i, p 152-59; comment in 1617, Pitcairn, 
Criminal Trials, iii, p 423; continuing problems within 
Campbells, C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 161-62; R.P.C., v, p 322-23. 
228. R.P.C., v, p 328-31; Spottiswoode, HistorI,iii, p 3; t.he 
'ministers were also warned not to bother him, Birre1, 
"Diary!!, p 42. 
229. Spottiswoode, History, iii, p 8. 
230. ibid., p 47-48. 
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not be rigour to scik thair utter ruin, (albeit racleslie thay 
have faillit,) bot be humiliatioun, to accept their ammandment. ,,231 
Fortunately for Huntly the king agreed .... lith his analogy, and with 
Huntly shO\.Jed a degree of tolerance and patience few magnates 
could have enjoyed from their king. Negotiations with the church 
took some time, but by the summer of 1597 the sentence of 
excommunication had been lifted - though Huntly continued to 
be a catholic to his death - and in December he was fully. 
restored by parliament and was once again dominating the court 
though he never again had the same political influence with 
232 James • It was a remarkable recovery for a man wlio had 
spent almost a decade rebelling against the king and for 
all the political explanations th3t earl be found one can only 
satisfactorily understand it in the light of the friendship 
'o1hich endured between them in spite of their religious and 
political differences. 
The settlement of the feud took place when it had acquired 
far less political significance and does not really belong 
with this discussion and so the following is only a very brief 
summary of what happened bet\.Jeen 1596-1693. The murder in 1597 
of the laird of Honcoffer, another of !·!oray l s killers, was the 
231. Ar$cta Scotica.,(ed.) J.~1aidment, (Edinburgh, .1834-37), i, 
p 102-03. 
232. The church I s conditions included repentence for I-!oray's 
murder, but it is not clear if Huntly agreed to this part 
of their demands, E..P.C., v, p 328; "The Straloch Papers" 
. S2aldin~ Hiscellany, i, p lO;].U.K., iii, p 892, p 922; 
Q.S.P.Scot., xii, p 429, p 500, xiii, part 1, p 56; for 
parliament, ~.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 132. 
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last recorded act of violence in the feud, and while both sides 
continued to be hostile to one another the feud was much less 
notorious than it had been.233 Atholl had died in 1595 and 
his successor, the last Stewart earl of Atholl, was never 
any threat to Huntly, while without Bothwell the Stewarts 
never again achieved any degree of cohesion as a kin alliance 
of any great political significRnce. They continued to work 
with young Horay in his negotiations with the king and Huntly 
to end the feud, but beyond that they effectively went their 
own ways. In the north the clans and families of the north-
east Dnd central highlands flocked back to Huntly's protection 
and lordship, the Grants and the cJan Chattan being among them. 234 
Writing during this time about his rule in the north, Huntly 
complained of the instability caused by the lack of his firm 
hand during the years when he had been fighting so many 
enemies, saying that 
"we craif ne thing bot our awin plaice and sik DS hes 
bein in all tymis past the custoum of our predicessouris, 
and that because nane in thir partis mair or viII presum 
to minister j~~tcis agenis ony spetiall heland clanis 
heir bot ve. 1I -j5 
It was the closest to a statement of policy that Huntly ever 
made and right until his death almost three decades later he 
233. !·loncoffer' s murder re-opened old sores with lord Spynie 
who was still feuding with Horay over the bishopric, 
C.~.P.Scot., xii, p 453, p 466; S.R.O., Moray Muniments, 
N .R.A., 217/2/1./13. 
234 •. Gordon, Sutherland, p 230; Brown, IIBonds of Manrent" , 
appendix, p 471-73, no 87-96. However, Hachintosh 
bonded with both Huntly and Horay, p 551, no 104. 
235. !L~nder PaRers, ii, p 353-56. 
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continued to £.;overn the north with this same jealous pride 
and commitment. 
The settlement of the feud largely took place between 
1601-04. The king made a . number of attempts to achieve a 
settlement, but found young Noray and Argyll intransigent. 
However, with the succession to the English throne looming 
up on the horizon, the king became even more urgent about 
pacifying this feud. Thus, he told Huntly and Argyll "how 
can ye two being two peers of my land, either do me good 
service or do your nation credit, being ready to cut one 
another's throat. For ye must know ••• that in the conquest 
of my inheritence (if they denied me) I will need both your 
helps and will make you both Dukes." Hhile some English 
observers could appreciate that James "had reason of his own 
policyll for settling the feud, and could never assemble a 
sizable army as long as these two and their friends refused 
to co-operate with one another, a more sober assessment was 
that "some wise fool" had suggested to the king· that he would 
have to fight for England and that "If I should write all the 
foolish speeches with the King of this purpose it would make 
your Honour think he had neither wit nor judgement.,,2.36 
Whether the king's analysis of the situation was correct or 
not, one result of it was that he constantly badgered Moray, 
Argyll and Huntly, applying almost relentless pressure on 
them· throughout 1602-0.3. 
2.36. a.s.p.scot., xiii, part 2, p 961, p 978. 
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The final terms of the feud settlement were never made 
public and in spite of a search for them in government and 
private records they remain a secret. However, fairly 
detailed records of the mediation have survived and while 
they cannot be discussed here one csn put together enough 
about the settlement to have an idea about the form it took. 
Thus in spite of the highly political. nature of the feud all 
political questions \-lere ignored and only the private questions 
of the feud relating to compensation and reconciliation were 
dealt with. ~1arriage formed the basis of the agreement with 
Horay marrying Huntly's daughter and being 3iven a sizable 
portion, while Argyll's daughter was to marry Huntly's eldest 
son and heir. Both these marriages went ahead. No homage 
was ever done by either side, and in spite of a claim from 
Moray for close to a million pounds in damages, and one does 
not know what the others were c1aL~ing, it would appear that 
no compensation was paid either, each side finally agreeing 
to accept their losses and sink their differences.237 
Considering the ferocity and bloodiness of the feud the peace 
was remarkably successful and the only occasion on wh~ch it re-
emerged was in a case between dependants of either side in 
1616.238 Though the great struggle between the houses of 
237. The details of the mediation can be traced through the 
Calendar of State Papers and Privy Council Register for 
1601-04: other sources are S.R.O., Forbes Collection, 
G.D. 52/70; S.R.O., Horay Huniments, G.D. 217/2/1/179-
.180; S.R.O., Gordon Castle MUniments, G.D. 44/33/2, 
44/13/2/6, 7/208; Ba1four,"Anna1es", i, p 411; Birre1, 
"Diarytt, .p 58; Calderwood, liistory, vi, p 205. In 1619 
Ardkinglass was also t~iven 8 bond by the Campbell lairds 
exonerating him from CaiNdor's murder, Brown, "Bonds of 
}lanrent", appendix, p 551, no 107. 
238. ~P.C., x, p 466, p 660. 
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Gordon and Campbell were not yet over, and was to be re-openoo 
in the mid seventeenth century, the feud between Huntly and. 
the stewart kindred was laid to rest before the privy council 
on the 3rd of Hay 1604.2.39 
Can one say that anyone won this feud? In local terms 
there is little doubt that Huntly came out of it best, having 
crushed an atte~pt by the Stewarts and some of his own 
dependants to unseat him from his dominance in the north. In 
that he reversed the trend set in 1562 by queen }/18ry, Huntly 
had achieved the first maxim of magnatial politics, that is 
to preserve the inheritance of the lineage. In his wider 
regional ambitions of expansion weshlards at the expense of 
Argyll he met with failure in spite of the shambles into 
which clan Campbell had fallen. Argyll also held his ground 
and did succeed in westward ~ansion himself, but that is 
another feud. On the political front Huntly almost certainly 
sacrificed an easy local victory for the much greater stakes 
he was playing for in the realm of Counter Reformation politics, 
though it can equally be said that he set back the latter by, 
for example, the slaugh+.er of Horay. In this context Huntly 
failed and failed badly. He was too late in his bid for a 
Counter-Reformation and he completely misread the king in 
thinking that James would allow local religiOUS autonomy. 
In the end he recognised his defeat with typical realism. 
That he had the choice to do so when Bothwell did not is a 
239 • .B:!.P.C., viii, p 3. 
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comment on just how important personalities were in politics 
of this kind., for there can be little doubt that it was his ' 
personal relationship \.Jith the king which saved him from the 
fate of his old rival and co-conspirator. If much of this 
has been about Huntly then it is because he was both the hero. 
and the villain of the piece. This was above all his feud, 
fought to attain his ambitions in his locality or region, 
and inextricably tied up with it were the politics of the . 
kingdom in \olhich he played such a dominant role for a decade 
from 1586-96. Huntly made ma~ ffiistakes both at court and in 
the locality, but whatever reservations one may have' abol1t 
his character,he was a supreme example of a sixteenth century 
magnate-politician at his best. 
However, t:1is is not just the study of a few years in the 
life of one man's very long public career. Above all it is a 
study of power and how it worked in early modern society. In 
the Jacobean state power was not centralised in the king or 
in the organs of his government, though the aggregate of power 
at the centre was commonly greater than any one local corporate 
interest. Only in exceptional circumstances did the localities 
find sufficient common interests ··to impos e their will on the 
centre, but the Glenlivet campaign shows something of how 
limited royal power was without local co-operation. Most men 
in public life could exert power either in the locality or 
in the centre; thus Noray was one of the former and chancellor 
}~itland one of the latter. For these two to operate outside 
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of these areas !·10ray had to ally himself \Ji th a court operator 
like Both1-1ell and 11aitland \Jith a local magnate like Huntly. 
Only a very fe\J like Both\Jell, Huntly, Argyll and Hamilton 
could bestride both with a network of kin, clients, land and 
office,and to a large extent this feud \Jas about the clash 
between Both'.>!ell and Huntly \Jho emerged in the post 1585 period 
as the most pm.]erfu1 and influential magnates in Scotland. 
Horay was very much a pawn caught up· in the struggle between 
them. Chancellor Hait1and., though a very clever manipulator, 
\Jas only fortunate in that these t\Jo were so intensely 
competing 1-1ith one another, for there was little doubt that 
the king preferred Huntly and his friends in the chamber to 
Hai tland, Glands and their connections. A great deal has been 
made of Haitland' s achievements in smashing the mag!13tes aTd 
in introducing a modern style of government, but 1-1ai tland' s 
achievements were in the realm of personal, factional 
poli tics v1here he outplayed Bothwell and Huntly, and, 
because he happened to be the chancellor rather than lord 
chamberlain, established an accidental balance of pOi.!er which 
favoured the privy council over the chamber. There was 
nothing revolutionary or reforming about it. 
In politics, which is largely about the exercise of pO\Jer, 
the period was not one of change but of continuity, a continuity 
\Jhich·would have made this world and the operation of politics 
within it recognisable to the magnates, officials and kings of 
earlier centuries. That this \Jorld disappeared during the 
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seventeenth century should not allow one to think that 
politics of this kind were already anachronistic in the 
sixteenth century. The actors of this great feud from the 
king down to John Oig had no concept of "kicking against the 
pricks" like some latter day cowboys trying to retain the 
ideals of the wild west. Feud and politics were not 
distinguishable to them whether they were settling the 
affairs of the kingdom or deciding who could fish on the Spey. 
Thus, in the court intrigue, in the parties of armed men 
stalking the streets of Edinburgh, in the overawing of burgh 
councils, in the apparently petty squabbles for plnce and 
patronage ,in the web of kinship and maintenance and in the 
burning vDlages and slaughtered men a nd women of this age, 
one is not looking at a picture of chaos and anarchy, but 
at an active political syntem which may be vastly different 
from our own,but which imposed a recognisable order upon the 
world which· its best exponents sought to control. 
THE BORD~ 
GOVERNMENT t DIPLOMACY AND FEUD 
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Boundaries between states like boundaries between private 
persons are almost inevitably places of tension. Historical-
awareness, immediate realpolitic and future aspirations all 
too often clash in their most bitter forms at these junctures 
of nations and cultures. The border between Scotland and 
its vastly more powerful English neighbour was by the 
sixteenth century one of the more enduring political 
divisions on the map of Europe, but centuries of inter-
mittent war and not so intermittent raiding made it an 
environment in which violence was clearly no stranger. 
Both international politics and local politics were at work 
here,often in co-operation and at times in conflict as local 
landlords and chiefs made their own wars and peace regardless 
of the dictates of London and Edinburgh. 
The borders then were a special case with their own 
set of problems and difficulties for sixteenth century 
governments to solve. There may not have been open warfare 
between Scotland and England since the 1550's, but along 
the marches the fighting and raiding continued with a 
ferocity which was largely unaffected by the new found 
detente between the two protestant powers of the British 
Isles. For Elizabeth I's government,though the borders 
were a nuisance in which she and most of her ministers had 
little real interest. Geography, communications and the 
social and cultural contrasts between the Home Counties and 
the north were a problem even in the sixteenth century. 
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The principal aim of the English government was maintaining 
the quiet and security of the borders at the minimum cost 
to its puroe. Elizabeth had no ambitions in Scotland and 
"s-imply wanted to ensure a government there which would not 
be a threat to her own security. At the most then the 
borders were the base for satellite diplomacy. On the English 
side the region had been politically castrated after the 
crushing of the 1569 Northern Rebellion and there were thus no 
significant magnate politics operating there, the region being 
nothing more than yet another battle ground for riv~l court 
factions to squabble over and establish their clientele in. 
Unlike Elizabeth, James VI and ma~ of his closest 
officials knew the borders well. The king understood march 
law, he personally took part in the administration of the 
borders from both the centre and by being seen in the region, 
he knew the men who filled the major offices there, and he 
had ma~ border men close to him at co~t. Local military 
superiority on the borders also gave James a powerful leverage 
over Elizabeth which did not cost him a penny; both border 
administration and defence being in private hands. On the 
other hand that very devolution of power was a threat, 
allowing Scottish magnates and officials to indulg~ in 
policy making of their own and making the crown at times 
dependant upon them. Thus, while the Scottish king could 
exploit the military and political weakness of the English 
borders with the threat of allowing his magnates a free hand, 
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so English manipulation among those men could be turned 
against him and his government. The feuds of those men was' 
thus a matter of vital interest to both governments and 
indeed to any other power yhich wished to destabi1ise the 
region and with it relations between Scotland and England. 
Ever since Scott's "Minstrelay", however, there has 
been a tendency to see the Scottish borders as not only 
distinct in the sense that its politics were different from 
the rest of the kingdom, but also as somehow socially 
different. The borders did pose unique questions for James VI 
just as Catalonia did for Philip 11, but too often border 
feuding is put in a context of an essentially non-feuding 
society and the contrast with the remainder of the country 
is exaggerated. London society and the English coUrt did 
contrast sharply with life on the Welsh Marches, but this 
is much le~s true for Edinburgh and the Scottish borders. 
Thus, books like Fres er's "The Steel Bonnets" while being 
highly interesting and informative t~nd towards a 
sensationalising of the region while others by Rae, Lee 
and Hewitt suggest a one-way stream of enlightened traffic' 
from court to country and again over-emphasise this 
differentiation. One hopes that the point has been 
sufficiently made by now that feud was a social and 
political phenomenon throughout Scotland and that it 
certainly was not in this respect that the borders were in 
anY way distinct. Quite simply their distinction rested 
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upon their being borders and on the political content of some 
of their feuding which crossed international lines or became 
caught up in the higher politics of states and ideologies. 
Neither the presence of feuding nor its degree ever raised 
any comment from King James or his officials, whatever the 
already quoted English administrator may have thought about 
the geographic distribution of feuding. l 
Feud was of course a phenomena found both north and 
south of the border, but there was little doubt that by the 
late sixteenth century its roots were much deeper on the 
Scottish side. In 1586 it was recorded that "the alliances 
and feuds prove of great advantage to the Scots" and ten 
years later Carey informed Burghley that the Scots were 
2 . 
complete masters of the country. Most English border 
officials exaggerated the extent of their difficulties in 
order to maintain their extraordinary powers and privileges 
and also so that they could make more of their subsequent 
achievements, but nevertheless there was a good deal of 
truth in the assertion. Carey cites the case of 
Sir Cuthbert Collingwood whose men slew a Scottish raider 
as they pursued his party back across the borders, but who 
had since had seventeen of his servants and tenants murdered 
in the feud he had incurred with the man's kin. Disparingly 
he wrote that "I see none other than revenge for revenge and 
blood for blood ••• " since it was "... the onlye way to break~ 
1. C.B.P., ii, p 16), quoted above, vol i, p 20. 
2. C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 147; C.B.P., ii, p 189. 
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the necke of this evill custome. n3 Lord Eure drew attention 
to this same problem, writing that lion the smallest theft 
from a Scot, he threatens blood revenge from his clan".4 
Lacking the population and the same degree of adherence to 
the feud throughout English border society, defen~e against 
the vengeance of the Scots had to be sought from the crown 
officials, but they were kept underpaid and undermanned, 
and while an agreement was reached with the Scottish 
government in 1597, English officials were soon expressing 
doubts about whether it could work as long as the feud 
remained so entrenched among the Scottish border families. 5 
What further irritated English administrators was the 
greater private power and patronage available to the 
Scottish wardens and officials. Tudor governments'had 
progressively eroded the power of the traditional leaders 
of northern society, and by appointing men of lesser 
significance had secured an administration dependant upon 
the crown,.. or at least upon court factions and brokers, 
not on Percies, Nevilles and Dacres. This had had a 
detrimental effect upon the locality itself in that the 
cohesion provided by good lordship and strong kinship was 
being displaced without satisfactory compensation in the 
shoe-string administration of the new wardens. HO\Olever, 
3. C.B.P., ii, P 189-90. 
4. ibid., p 48 and see also p 188, P 291. 
5. ibid., p 316; C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 293. 
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in Scotland the old system survived along with the old names. 
Hence the English complained of the injustices caused by the 
Scottish practice of appointing as wardens native borderers 
who are "extraordinarily adicted in parcialities, favour of 
6 " 
theire blood, tenantes and followers". In fact English 
officials could be just as partial and Sir John Forater was 
eventually removed from office for that very reason. The 
difference was in the enormous residual pO"ler which men like 
lord Hume, lord Maxwell and Bothwell all had. Power on the 
English borders depended upon favour at court, but in Scotland 
men like lord Maxwell could raise their fingers to the court 
and still remain powerful whether they had"an office or not. 
In 1602 Sir Robert Cecil advised King James on how to govern 
his borders, pointing out "the abuses in the Wardens 
government in pursuing particular quarrels in blood to the 
disturbance of the quiet of the Borders", and the practice of 
"working a "dependancy of such persons as will the rather at 
any time follow their Warden's in all their private quarrels, 
when they are winked at in their own disorders". Such 
things, he went on, rarely occurred in England because "'foeds' 
here are unusual", officials were well paid, and thus satisfied, 
and were commonly outsiders so that they were "not accompanied 
with those particular respects of blood aOO kindred" found in 
Scotland.7 It was a piece of typical Elizabethan arrogance, 
men like Carey would have winced at the idea of officials like 
6. ~B.P., ii, p 163. 
7. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 1020. 
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him being satisfactorily paid, while lord 'Eure completely failed 
in his job because he was an outsider. As for feuds, they were 
not common, but lord Huntingdon complained to lord Scrope in 
1593 that "feedes" had become established on the English marches 
8 
and were terrorising even the gentlemen of the locality. As 
on the Welsh borders, the English side of the Scottish border 
was less ordered than Elizabethan officials at times pretended 
and lord Eure1s comment, like that of Carey above, that a , 
quarrel between a John Brown and the Scottish warden Cessford 
was outside his jurisdiction because "yt would not end 
without blood", was expressing a sentiment which lay just 
below the superficial coating of Tudor order.9 
Yet if the English side of the borders was more acquainted 
with feud and violence than is often assumed, ther~ is no 
doubt that the sheer scale of feuding in Scotland was much 
greater. While Scottish governments never singled out the 
borders as particularly notorious for feuding, the region 
did have a reputation for disorder, and while the integration 
of border society with Scottish society as a whole must be 
emphasised, it would be foolish not to recognise to some 
extent that it was one of the most difficult regions of 
the country to govern and that feuding had something to 
8. C.~, P 501. There was both cross-border feuding and 
feUding within the English community, e.g. the Grays and 
Selbies and the Charletons and Bells. C.B.P., ii, p250ff, 
p,267ff. 
9. ", .. B.P., it, p 477. For the English borders see James, 
Family, Line~and Societ;:r, Watt,' ~rom Border to l>1iddle 
Shire, for Wales see P .Williams, "The Welsh Borderland" 
p 21, P 24ff, P 27ff. 
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do with this. Cross-border feuds, feuding among the officials 
who governed the region, and the local feuding found elsewhere 
in Scotland all componded the problems of endemic outlawry, 
cattle raiding and the inaccessibility of the region to royal 
government. Furthermore, it was a region important to English 
interests and thus one in which external influences were 
brought to bear in a way that was often to the advantage of 
that power and not at all in the interests of either the . 
Scottish government of the local border administration. As 
a region vital to English interests it was also one important 
to Spanish strategy and hence for a while the local feuds of 
the region became a tiny part of the great Counter Reformation 
struggle of the entire European continent. 
This struggle was at its most intense on the SCottish 
west wardenry. Encompassed within this area was Annandale, 
Eskdale, Ewisdale, Nithdale, Galloway and very probably 
Wigtonshire, Dumfrieshire and Kirkcudbrightshire also fell 
under the jurisdiction of the warden in one way or another. 
Within the wardenry there were ma~ other jurisdictions; 
sheriffdoms, regalities, stewardships, baillieries, baronies 
and burghs and to some extent they retained their powers' 
and could not be bypassed by the warden. However, the office 
of warden was a powerful one, the most powerful regional 
office in the kingdom after the lieutenantries - details of 
. ro f which can be obtained from Rse - and in the south-west 0 
10. T.I.Rae, The_Administration of the Scottish Frontier 
1213-1602, [Edinburgh, 1966), p 77-78. 
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Scotland it was certainly the office of greatest prestige 
and influence. Possession of the wardenry did not make a 
man the greatest figure in the locality, but it went a .long 
way towards it, particularly if he already had a private base 
on which to build. The politics and thus the feuding of the • 
south-west was about a struggle for control of that office 
between the established Maxwe11 family and the emerging 
Johnstone kindred, and it is within that struggle that one' 
can see at work the various layers of conflict between 
local, national and international interests. 
John, eighth lord Maxwell succeeded his brother in 1553 
when he was only a two year old child. His inheritance made 
him one of the greater Scottish magnates in spite of his family 
not having yet aspired to the rank of an earldom. 'He was 
hereditary steward of Annanda1e and Kirkcudbright, he held 
the barony of Caer1averock with its great castle in 
Dumfriesshire, the barony of Granane in Kirkcudbright, the. 
bailleryship of the ecclesiastical regalities and baronies 
of the abbeys of Dundrennan, Tungland, Sweetheart and 
Holyrood, the provostry of Lincluden, the preceptory of 
Trailtrow, effective control of the burghs of Dumfries and 
Annan and customary possession of the West wardenr,y. He 
also held the tower of Langholm, had the keepership of 
. t1 II Lochmaben c~s e and had a town house in Dumfries. Nor 
was his power simply measured in land and office for he 
11. Rse, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, p 12, 
p 26. 
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was also chief of the largest kindred in the south-west which 
included among it lord Herries with his followers and a num~er 
of Maxwell families who had settled in Renfrewshire. Further-
more, Maxwell also had the obedience of a great number of 
lesser border families who sought his protection and even 
among the greater families like the Douglases, Stewarts, 
Gordons and Johnstones there was a recognition of his pre-
eminence. Well might t~e 1577 "Estimate" describe the 
Maxwells as a family of whom "Their power and livinge is 
12 greate." 
Like so many of his contemporaries, lord Maxwell's 
character eludes too close an examination, but he is more 
accessible than most. He never knew his father who had 
been a man of some significance in the first half of the 
century, a survivor of Flodden, a close confidant of James V, 
an early convert to the protestant religion and a collaborator 
with Somerset at the time of his death in 1552 before 
John Maxwell was born. The sixth lord Maxwell was succeeded 
by his eldest son who died a year later and thus it was as 
an infant that John inherited the Maxwell lordship. Leadership 
of the kin effectively passed into the hands of lord Herries, 
an ardent catholic and supporter of Mary, who led the family 
into reversing his cousin's pro-protestant stance. However, , 
in spite of defeat Herries and the young lord Maxwell, who 
shared his kinsman's catholicism and conservatism, emerged 
12. Estimate, p 19. 
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from the civil war unscathed. Lord Maxwell thus made his 
peace with the new order, but his catholic faith remained 
firmly entrenched and was to be a guiding principle in his 
political life for the next twenty years. He was also a man 
of action and violence. This violence and his tendency to 
be very indulgent of the violence of his followers made him 
greatly distrusted by English border officials and by the 
government in Edinburgh, one commentator describing him as 
a man of ttNo greate gouernment or iujementtt •13 However, 
he was also a nobleman of refinement and taste, with many 
friends, and who could inspire admiration even in the 
protestant archbishop Spottiswoode.14 
. The government of the west march, which the Maxwell 
lords had come to recognise as theirs by right, was, however, 
. about to be challenged by the laird of Johnstone who was able, 
like so many others, to cash in on the mid-century upheavals 
in local power balances. Sir John Johnstone of that Ilk was 
also a minor when he succeeded his grandfather in 1567 and, 
like the Maxwells, his family supported the queen during the 
civil war, chiefly because of their connections with the 
Hamiltons. His lands, principally in Annandale, were not 
as extensive as Maxwell's, but they were still substantial 
enough to make him, along with Douglas of Drumlangrig, one 
of the three greatest land-owners in the south-west, and with 
13. Estimate, p 34. 
14. Spottiswoode, HistorY, iii, p 447; see also Scots Peerage, 
vi, p 482-84. 
his tightly bound and sizable kindred made him a man of 
considerable local power. Unlike the Maxwells, the Johnstones 
were chiefly a protestant family.lS 
Thus, while there had been confrontations between the 
two kindreds before the reign of James VI, both families 
fought side by side during the war and lord Maxwell's dominant 
position in the locality remained unchallenged. This dom~nance 
was underlined in 1573 when the regent Morton appointed Maxwell 
to the west wardenry, the previous occupant, Sir James Douglas 
of Drumlangrig, having found it impossible to fulfil the job 
without Maxwell's co-operation. However, ·Maxwell was also 
served warning that the regent did not intend to allow him 
to treat the wardenry as a private domain, and a year later 
included him in a list of border barons who had to give 
pledges for their good behaviour.16 The laird of Johnstone 
was not lqng in making the usual complaints that he was being 
victimised by Maxwell and decided to test his authority by 
openly disobeying him. The privy council backed Maxwell 
completely and the laird soon found himself in prison. 
The incident was nothing more than a testing by Johnstone 
of how things stood in the locality, but both sides had 
gone as far as to cut one another's corns and l-~orton thought 
it wise to have them put their complaints to arbitration. 
This seems to have put an end to any further difficulties 
15. §cots Peerage, i, p 248-52; Brown, "Bonds of Manrent" , 
appendix, p 480, no 314; Fraser, Annandale, i, p 35-36, 
p 37-38. 
16. R.P.C" ii, p 369. 
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between them for a few years, though in 1577 Johnstone again 
complained that Maxwell was treating him unfairly.17 What 
one has here is nothing more than the fairly typical attempt 
by one landowner to free himself from the commissj.on of 
another, in this case the warden, but MBxwell's power and 
authority remained intact and it is doubtful that he would 
even have considered Johnstone as a rival at this stage. 
In 1577 Maxwell suddenly resigned from his office and 
was replaced by Morton's close kinsman, the earl of Angus, 
who was already lieutenant of the whole borders.18 ·Maxwell's 
resignation followed a bitter row he had had with Morton 
who for years had been pressing him to give up the claims 
he had to two-thirds of the Morton earldom, a claim which 
19 . the regent knew was a good one. Morton seems to have been 
able to force ¥~xwell into his resignation and immediately 
imprisoned.him in Blackness on the pretext that MBxwell was 
planning some unrest on the borders.20 Maxwell was soon 
freed after finding caution, but the arbitrary treatment he 
had suffered from Morton had angered him, and not surprisingly 
he joined Atholl and Argyll in the Stirling coup a few months 
later.2l As a reward for his support Maxwell was reinstated 
17. Fraser, !nnandale, ii, p 25, no 35; R.P.C., ii; P 421-22, 593. 
18. C.S.P.Scot., v, p 227; ~.P.C., ii, P 613. 
19. W.Fraser, The Book of Carlaverock, '(Edinburgh, 1873), i, 
p 221-33. 
20. C.S.P.Scot., v, p 232; R.P.C. ii, P 631; Fraser, Pollok, 
ii, p 142, no 136. 
21. Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 206. 
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as ~arden and Angus ~as relieved of his post. As one has 
already seen happen so often it ~as local politics ~hich defined 
Max~ell's and even Atholl's and Argyll's opposition to the 
central government, their alienation having been caused by ~hat 
they considered to be undue interference in their local 
interests. 
The coalition of interests ~hich emerged to form the 
government of 1578-80 ~as reflected in the goverrwent of the 
~est wardenry. With Argyll being appointed chancellor, 
Maxwell, as one of his faction, ~as able to hang on to the 
wardenry, but Morton's pre-eminence in the government meant 
that he had to accept lord ~~thven as a lieutenant on the 
borders and thus as his superior. Therefore, when Ruthven 
led a judicial raid on the borders in the ~inter of 1578 
he reported back that Maxwell was negligent in his office, 
a criticism which could have been levelled at almost any 
. 23 Jacobean official. Maxwell answered the criticism by 
arguing that "he had only the title of warden, and that 
the limitations of his charge and the exemptions granted to 
the gentlemen of the country, made the office needless and 
contemptable. tI He then told the council that if they wished 
him to continue with the job they would have to increase his 
powers. Faced with this ultimatum the council asked 
lord Herries his advice and though reluctant to fall OQt 
22. ~.P.C., ii, p 678-79. 
23. ~.P.C., iii, P 38, p 41, p 46. 
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with his chief, the elderly Herries offered some impartial 
proposals which he felt would provide for better government 
on the west borders. Lord Haxwell was very critical of 
these, especially the suggestion that Lochmaben castle should 
be considered the warden's headquarters, something he opposed-
on the grounds that the castle was his and not transferrable 
with the office. He also objected to the idea of some degree 
of power sharing with the Johnstones. However, the council 
opted for Herries' advice and when ~~xwell refused to accept 
this, even after some concessions to his own demands, Herries 
was appointed in his place.24 
Though Maxwell's removal was in part due to party faction 
at court there were serious grounds for the criticisms made 
against him. A John Bek complained that he had been held in 
- Caer1averock castle and tortured in order to force him to 
renounce a lease he held, while Alexander Carlisle complained 
that though he and another man had both been taken prisoner 
for fighting in Dumfries, the other, a dependant of Maxwells, 
had been freed while he had been held for almost six months.25 
John Smeaton of that Ilk wrote to Maxwell of Poll ok about an 
issue between them, warning that "1 will persew na thing 
befoir the Warden, becais they men ar his Lordschippis 
s ervandis, and 1 knaw he will be a parsia11 judge". 26 The 
24. R.P.C., iii, p 73-74, p 75-76, p 77-86; Spottiswoode, 
History, ii, p 259. 
25. R.P.C., iii, p 40, p 24. 
26. Fraser, Pollok, ii, p 146, no 142; p 147, no 143. 
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effect of all this had been, as MaA~ell rightly identified, 
that he was being by-passed as men sought exceptions from 
his commissions from the government. Chief among those local 
critics had been the Johnstones who in 1578 had bound them-
selves closer together in an alliance providing for them 
governing themselves without outside interference.27 It was 
their leadership of dissent in the south-west which prompted 
Herries to suggest that they be included as junior partners 
in administering the wardenry. Lord Maxwell, however, would 
never accept any diminuation of his power and was in effect 
daring the government to try and rule the region without him. 
Maxweil was soon to find that his friends in Edinburgh 
lacked the influence or the will to give him any political 
protection and in the months which followed Morton"continued 
to tighten the screw against him. On the whole Maxwell co-
operated w~th the stream of orders for him to find caution 
and the like, but he refused to give up Lochmaben castle 
when ordered to do so.28 In January ~579 his tack for the 
castle was revoked and he was ordered to surrender it, but 
Maxwell simply ignored the order and when lord Herries went 
to collect the rent from the castle's tenants the,r refused 
to pay them to anyone but lord )~ell.29 By April though, 
he had relented on the castle itself, Herries was after all 
27. ~raser, Annandale, i, p 35-36. 
28. R.P.C., i~i, p 84, p 168, P 767. 
29. ibid., P 89, p 94, p 133-34, p 170. 
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his kinsman and dependant, but on the tack he would not compromise 
and was eventually ordered to ward in Dundee. From there he was 
again moved to Blackness and then freed to open ward, firstly 
to Inverness and then to Edinburgh under pain of £20,000.30 
Unable to handle this strain between his chief and the 
government, Herries himself resigned at the end of August •. 
Now Morton had a much clearer opportunity·to impose his ow~ 
man and he picked on the ambitious Johnstone who was only too 
glad to accept the patronage of such a powerful.court 
politician.3l Suspicions that the whole affair had been 
cleverly manipulated in order to manoeuvre the Maxwells out 
of the government of the west wardenry were soon being 
expressed, and almost immediately trouble errupted between 
32 . lord Maxwell and the new warden. Maxwell's Lochmaben 
tenants resisted Johnstone's demands on them as they had 
Herries, a~ early in 1580 there was a fight between members 
of the two kindreds in Dumfries in which a number of men 
were hurt. Both sides were ordered to assure one another 
in what was the first official recognition that a feud 
existed between them.32 Three months later Maxwell was 
accused of trying to break the assurance by convocating 
his men to oppose the warden and by withholding documents 
relating to the warden's office.33 This obstructionism by 
30. R.P.C., iii, p 195, P 232, P 240, p 245, p 267, p 273. 
31. ibid., p ?07; Fraser, Annandale, i, p 40-41. 
32. R.P.C., iii, p 216, p 265. 
33. ibid., p 286-87. 
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Maxwe11 continued unabated throughout the spring of 1580, 
but while he was able to wring some concessions from the 
council, they continued to back Johnstone against him and 
in the summer he decided to go to court himself.34 
His arrival coincided with that of Esme stewart who 
very quickly gained the king's attentions and favour. Th~re 
he attracted the attention of Argyll who had continued to 
hover menacingly in Morton's shadows and had been quick to 
recognise the Frenchman's political value. ~ell also 
saw his opportunity and drew close to Stewart thus continuing 
his political alignment with Argyll and Morton's other 
opponents. Thus, when Esme stewart was appointed high 
chamberlain it was no surprise that one of the first to 
be appointed as an extraordinary gentleman of the chamber 
was Maxwell.35 Then at the end of the year, when Esme Stewart, 
captain James Stewart and Argyll finally moved against Morton, 
Maxwe1l gave them his full backing just as he had.in 1578. 
Now he was finally able to settle his account with Morten 
and was granted the title of earl of Morton 8S 8 reward 
for his services to the new rulers of Scotland,36 chief 
of whom was Esme Stewart, now duke of Lennox,with whom 
Maxwell partitioned the lands of the Morton earldom.37 
34. R.P.C., iii, p 288, p 289, P 297-98, P 298-99, P 302, 
P 304-05. 
35. spottiswoode, History, ii, p 269. 
36. ibid., p 280; Fraser, Carlaverock, ii, p 490, no 111. 
37. Fraser, Carlaverock, ii, p 490, no 111. 
Not surprisingly Johnstone's position soon became untenable 
·without the support of Morton and in April he was stripped 
of his office in spite of having been a fairly assiduous 
warden during the time he held it.38 A week later Maxwell 
was reappointed and within days Johnstone had been outlawed 
and charged with various acts of negligence, just as Maxwell 
had been in 1579.39 Maxwell himself quickly re-established 
himself in the wardenry, appointing Robert Maxwell of Cowh-ill 
as his deputy and Herbert Maxwell of Cavens as captain of 
Langholm tower. 40 
The politics of the locality had thus been sucked into 
the factional struggles of the court, but with Morton's 
execution any hope for Johnstone seemed to evaporate and the 
real disparity of power between him and Maxwell was again 
exposed. Furthermore, Maxwell was now firmly locked into 
the fortunes of the new court favourite, Lennox, thus 
hopefully securing himself from being undermined from Edinburgh 
as he had constantly been under Morton. The price of this 
of course was that when Lennox'fell Maxwell went with him, 
and in August 1582, at the time of Lennox's fall, he wrote 
to Pollok that he must know that "sindrie tynis I haifr bene 
mekill detbund ll to Lennox for "divers and sindrie plesouris 
schawin unto me quhen I had to do". Therefore, when Lennox 
was ousted by the Ruthven coup that summer Maxwell was one 
38. R.P.C., iii, p 374 and see also p 352. 
39. ibid., p 376. 
40. C.B.P., i, P 71-72. Cowhil1 had recently reaffirmed his 
allegiance to Maxwell, Brown, "Bonds of Manrent", appendix, 
, p 504, no 32. 
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of those who tried to rally support for him, but his efforts 
were in vain and both fled to France where Lennox died after' 
which Maxwe11 returned home.41 With Gowrie (lord Ruthven, 
earl of Gowrie) being the man who had opened the case again.c:;t 
Maxwe1l in 1578, it must have been no surprise to find himself 
once again dismissed in the new round of purges initiated by 
Ruthven and his rebel conspirators.42 
With Lennox's fall Maxwe11 was thrown back onto his own 
conSiderable resources. He was not dismissed immediately, 
but was ordered to appear before a convention of the nobility 
and answer for his conduct as warden over the previous year 
and a half. Maxwell certainly considered going, but finally 
his suspicions got the better of him, he refused to attend, 
was denounced, and a week later was deprived of his office. 43 
. His enemies quickly added their own complaints and further 
denunciations on other charges followed, while in December 
Johnstone was appointed warden for the second time, having 
latched onto the Ruthven faction much as Maxwell had to 
Lennox in 1580. 44 Johnstone ha~ been lying low during the 
previous eighteen months having spent a time in ward after 
undergoing investigation. 45 He and Maxwe11 had exchanged 
, 
41. Fraser, Po11ok, ii, p 149, no 146; see also Papiers D'Etst 
Re1atifs A L'Histoire De L'fcosse, ed., A.Teulet, (Paris, 
1831), ii, p 499-500, p 563. 
42. Spottiswoode, HistorY, ii, p 298-99. 
43. Fraser, Pollok, ii, p 150, no 147; R.P.C., iii, P 527-28, p 531. 
44. R.P.C., iii, p 534, p 539. 
45. Fraser, Annanda1e, ii, p7, no 9; R.P.C., iii, p 396, p 409, 434. 
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bonds of assurance, but litigation between them had continued 
until it was once again interrupted by the wider political 
context.46 On accepting office this time Johnstone added 
the condition that he would not be held responsible for the 
mess Maxwell had allowed the wardenry to fall into, a criticism 
which though highly suspect may again have had a degree of 
truth in it.47 However, Gowl'ie and his friends were much 
less secure than Morton had been and Johnstone was to find. 
his second term of office even more trying than the first. 
Once again Maxwell's best weapon ~as non-co-operation 
and blatant obstruction of the warden. At the beginning of 
the new year he called a meeting of his friends at Dalkeith 
"for assisting of us be zour counsell, as ze salbe requyritt 
in our effares presentlie ado in courttl .!J3 The result of 
this was a fairly widespread attempt to make the wardenry 
ungovernable. Maxwell again held onto Lochmaben and to the 
wardenry records for as long as was possible, and in 
February 1583 Johnstone wrote to lord Scrope, his English 
opposite number, telling him that Maxwell had ordered his 
servants and dependants to avoid co-operating with him, 
though he added that the king had granted him an additional 
fifty men to get his job done. 49 Scrope in fact had no 
preference at this time and thought that both men were ill 
46. R.P.O., iii, p 466, p 487. 
47. 'ibid., P 539. 
48. Fraser, ,!!ollok, ii, p 150, no 1!J3. 
49. R.P.O.,iii, p 539-40; O.B.P., i, p 95. 
472. 
affected towards England. He was also of the opinion that 
Maxwe11 was not interested in good goverIwent of the wardenr.y, 
and while Johnstone had a better record on this he had not 
the power to act as he might wish to. Furthermore, Johnstone 
found himself tied up in a feud with Drumlangrig who, no 
more than Maxwe11, liked the idea of him being warden and was 
working in concert with Maxwe1l to w~eck the government of-the 
wardenry.50 Thus, by the autumn of 1583 it was being reported 
by English observers that Johnstone's authority on the west 
march was being held in open contempt. 51 
Maxwell had thus taught the government a lesson in the 
exercise of power. Any early modern government could only 
effectively govern away from its centre if it had either the 
sufficient military muscle to impose its will on a -locality 
or sufficient co-operation from the local power within it. 
Sending fifty soldiers to Johnstone did not give the Ruthven 
regime the former, and on his own against Maxwe1l, Johnstone 
could not supply the latter. Control of the south-west 
therefore remained in Maxwe1l' s hands, whatever Edinburgh 
may have decreed. Like Morton before him and Arran after 
him, Gowrie misunderstood the balance of power between 
localities and central government and sought to impose the 
will of the latter on the former without the means to do so. 
His failure was both inevitable and complete. 
50. C.B.P., i,. p 106; R.P.C., iii, p 607-08. 
51. R.P.C., iii, P 567-68; C.B.P., i, p 110. 
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The replacement of Gowrie and his friends by Arran in 
the summer of 1583 did not result in a change of warden. 
Initially Arran seems to have decided to leave Johnstone 
in his office while seeking to woo both him and Maxwell 
with even handed treatment. Thus, the privy council backed 
complaints by l'Jaxwell r s clients on the Dumfries town council 
against Johnstone and also ordered the latter to hand back 
Langholm to lord Maxwell, while at the s~me time Johnstone' 
was benefitting from patronage from Arran. In 1584 an 
order to John, earl of Morton (~mxwe1l) principal steward 
of Annandale and John Johnstone of that Ilk, warden of the 
west marches to jointly deal with certain business reflected 
this compromising approach. 52 
However, events took yet another turn in the spring of 
that year when Mar and the master of Glamis attempted a 
coup against Arran and both Maxwel1 and Johnstone were sent 
for by the king to help him suppress it. The coup failed, 
but only a few hundred men from the western marches turned 
up to support the king and all of these were Johnstones. The 
warden had an obvious stake in the continuation of Arran's 
government, but while Maxwel1 did not actually oppose him, 
he was waiting to see how the wind would blow, since a new 
regime might get him back his wardenry. As soon as news 
of the collapse of the coup became known Maxwell sent his 
excuses, but he, with Herries and Gordon of Lochinvar, had 
52. R.P.C., iii, P 567, p 590-91, p 595-96, p 598; C.B.P., i, 
P 110; Fraser, Annanda1e, ii, p 9, no 11; p 8, no 10. 
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offended the king and let Arran know whom he could really 
depend upon in the region. From that point onwards Arran 
made JOhnstone his sole client in the locality, and the laird 
increasingly found himself tied to the fortunes of the regime 
in Edinburgh, just as he had been under Morton. 53 
This political rift between Arran and Maxwell was not 
the only difference between them and only made their growing 
estangement more apparent. Arran had for some time been 
putting pressure on Maxwell to get him to exchange some of 
his lands in Renfrewshire with himself so that he could 
consolidate his own poss essions there, but ~~1axwel1 had 
consistently refused and had thus angered the chancellor. 
When this was followed by Maxwell's failure to support 
him in 1584, Arran decided to undermine Maxwell within 
his own locality and replace him with the laird of Johnstone. 
His first step in doing this was to persuade the king that 
Johnstone would make a better provost of Dumfries than 
lord ManJell aOO he thus instructed the burgh to elect 
Johnstone to that office as the kingl~ candidate. 54 
Furthermore, Johnstone's powers were enhanced when he was 
promoted to lieutenant of the west march, Nithsdale and 
Galloway, giving him powers which, on paper at least, 
"never any warden had before himl1.55 The sun appeared to 
53. Fraser, f21!Qk, ii, p 155, no 153; ~.B~, i, p 134-35; 
Maxwell did finally take measures against the rebels, but 
only afte~ they hac} fled to England, C.B.~, i, p 135; 
Teulet, Papi~rs D'Etat, 1ii, p 409, p 410. 
54. Spottiswoode, Histo~, 1i, p 325-26; Historie, p 209. 
55. Q.B&, i, p 150 •. 
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have set upon Maxwell dominance of the south-i-lest, but lord 
Maxwell was not prepared to accept this interference in his 
locality by Edinburgh and stepped up his wrecking tactics to 
outright opposition to Johnstone. The Dumfries provostry had 
been "in the disposicion and choise of the Lorde Maxwell, with 
thassent of the burgesses ll , and was thus a prize he would not 
give up easily.56 He therefore packed the burgh with his own 
men so that the warden was unable to enter. Johnstone turned 
back, some of his friends in the town were set upon by the 
Maxwells and the provost continued to be a Maxwell nominee. 57 
It was yet another defeat for the warden and even more 
seriously an exposure of just how ineffective the king's will 
was in the area. 
The credibility of the regime was now being tested in 
the south-west. Though he had to face an inquiry about his 
conduct as warden, Johnstone was relieved to find that Arran 
had not lost any of his determination to undercut Maxwell's 
position in the locality. 58 On his return to court he was 
rewarded with the teinds of Lochmaben castle and the old 
Douglas lands of Parkhead, thus increasing his dependancy 
upon Arran. In the middle of February 1585 the council issued 
a proclamation for the fencibles on the west march to prepare 
for actions against rebels in the Debatable Lands and against 
56. C.B.P., i, p 151. 
57. Historie, p 209; R.P.C., iii, p 767-68. 
58. C.B.P., i, p 164; Johnstone was also having difficulties 
with the middle march warden, Cessford, C.B.P., i, P 167. 
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lord Maxwell who was, at the end of the month, denounced, 
ordered to ward, hand over his castles and have his men 
appear before Johnstone. 59 The full authority of the king 
was being thrown into the struggle in the locality which was 
rapidly taking on the appearance of a test case between Arran' 
and his opponents in the localities. As one might expect, 
Maxwell ignored the royal orders and even freed some prisoners 
that the warden had taken. Johnstone may have had plenty 
of backing in Edinburgh, but as lord Scrope observed, his 
power on the borders was insignificant., he being "hardelie 
hable to susteyn without speedye relieff from the Kinglt.(fJ 
At the beginning of April Maxwell sho\o1ed just how true 
this was. With Johnstone still at court trying to get 
money for a campaign against Maxwell, the latter's brother, 
Robert Maxwell, went with a party of four hundred men, and 
"have ridden upon the Johnstone owne landes tenantes and 
speciall freindis, even at and abowt his cheiff house 
called the Loughwoode ••• ". The Maxwells thus fully exposed 
Johnstone's weakness, burning his principal castle, 
despoiling his lands and those of his friends and dependants 
and slaughtering a number of his tenants. Maxwell1s message 
to the men of the locality was that only his protection was 
adequate, while to the king he was rubbing in the point that 
61 
only he had the pO\o1er to govern in the wardenry. However, 
59. Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 49-50, no 52; p 11, no 13; 
R.P.C., iii, P 721-22, p 725. 
60. C.B.P., i, P 174. 
61. ibid. , p 175, p 178, P 179; Moysie, Memoirs, p 52. 
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the king and Arran were only further incensed by what was 
now appearing to be open rebellion and issued a proclamation 
against communicating with lord Maxwell and revoked his grant 
of the Morton earldom. Preparations for a muster were again 
announced but as yet nothlng more concrete had been done 
and Maxwell was free to act as he wished. 52 Robert l1axwell 
continued to lead devastating raids on the Johnstones, burning 
another twenty houses and leading off vast quantities of cattle 
and spoil while lord Maxwell himself led his forces against 
strongholds in the region which were not secured by his men 
or those of his friends. The largely Johnstone town of 
Lockerbie was attacked and the houses there were stormed, 
the Johnstones in them being either hung or taken away to 
. 63 Dumfries. When Johnstone's son attempted to rally his men 
in a retaliatory raid on a Maxwell village, lord Haxwell rode 
there and drove him out, killing one man, taking many prisoners 
and then going on "with a good nombre both of horsemen and 
footmen, with dromme, and banners displayed" to burn a number 
of Johnstone villages while his brother carried out a similar 
foray along the course of the river Dryfe.64 The Johnstones 
later evaluated their losses on the 15th and 16th of May at 
over 100,000 merks as well as many dead and wounded.65 More 
importantly Maxwell had inflicted a crushing defeat on the 
king and Arran's regime and what had begun as a feud for 
62. R.P.C., iii, p 733-36. 
63. C.B.P., i, P 180-81. 
64. ibid., p 181. 
65. Fraser, Annanda1e, ii, p 54-55, no 57. 
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local hegemony had become a clash between the crown and a 
local magnate. 
The failure to act more decisively against MaX1t/ell in 
the spring had cost Arran and Johnstone dearly, but they 
now became more urgent in their response to his latest 
outrages. The privy council ordered that £20,000 be found 
to fund a campaign against him, but the presence of plague 
in Edinburgh and other towns prevented an army being raised 
and once again military operations were postponed.66 More 
clandestinely Arran tried to detach some of Maxwell's friends 
from his side, issuing a proclamation which declared 
lord Herries' (now the fifth lord) innocence in Maxwell's 
treason and persuading Stewart of Garleis to serve against 
Maxwe11.67 Colonel ste'Wart 'Was sent dOlm to visit· Cessford 
and see if he could raise support on the middle march, but 
the latter was warned off by Maxwell who threatened him with 
feud if he· interfered.68 Johnstone was able to get 200 men 
armed with guns and a further 100 horsemen from the king, 
but when he approached lord Scrope and asked for his co-
operation he found the English warden evasive and unhelpful. 
Scrope had in fact already been in communication with Max\oIe1l 
whom the English government was beginning to look upon with 
some sympathy. At this stage, they had little confidence 
in his success and offered him refuge should he be driven 
,66 • .&.f .• C., iii, p 741. 
-67. ibid., p 742, p 745 • 
. 6S.C.B.P., i, p 179. 
69 
out of the country, but Maxwell had little thought of 
retreat and held a meeting with his friends, including Herries 
and Garleis, at which they decided to continue the offensive 
against the warden. Breaking up their conference ~~xwell led 
a small army of some seventeen hundred men to the Johnstone 
town of Moffet, captured it and used it as a base for further 
raids before marching on to Lochmaben which was being held by 
Johnstone's son, laid siege to it and awaited the arrival of 
the laird to relieve it.?O 
After months of trying to raise support from the king, 
Johnstone was finally able to get nothing more than enough 
to pay for one hundred armed men. With these and a number 
of commissions ordering the barons of the middle and west wards 
to obey him, he set out for Annandale going on ahead himself 
. and leaving the royal soldiers to follow. 71 However, lord 
Maxwell's intelligence was well informed and he sent his 
brother to intercept the soldiers, killing both their captains 
with many of their men and sending the rest in flight back to 
Edinburgh. 72 At the same time Maxwell himself finally captured 
Lochmaben, though young JOhnstone appeared to have escaped, 
and followed this up with the taking of Boneshaw castle, 
Annan, Kirkonnel and the capture of the warden himself. 73 
69. C.B.P., i, p IS2. 
70. ibid., P 183. 
71. ibid., P 183; R.P.C., iii, p 745-46; Fraser, Annandal~, 
ii, p 11 •. 
72. Spottiswoode, Histotl, ii, p 325-26; Historie, p 209-10. 
73. C.B.P., i, p lS4, P 187; Spottiswoode, HistorY, ii, p.326; 
C.S.P.Scot., viii, p 7. 
l{axwell's victory had been both spectacular and total. 
~th almost contemptuous ease he had swept aside the Johnstone 
challenge to his authority in the locality and completely laid 
bare the inability of the Arran regime to enforce royal 
authority in a locality where the local magnate was willing 
to oppose it. In effect MaxHell had placed himself beyond 
royal authority. The king could not afford to raise an ar~y 
of his own to fight Max\-Iell and a great maJ;lY of the nobility 
would not support him because they too were unhappy with Arran. 
Others like the Hamiltons, Douglasses, V~r and Glamis who were 
in exile, saw in Maxwell's successful resistance the inspiration 
for their own return to Scotland. For J.faXlolell himself the 
victory in the locality had its own momentum, drawing him 
on to a wider rebellion against the faction which had tried 
to use Johnstone against him. 
In England too, Maxwell was growing in favour with those 
who distrusted Arran's guidance of the young king. 'By late 
May Selby had begun to suspect that Maxwell might be starting 
something bigger than even he imagined if other localities 
followed his example in rejecting royal authority.74 Thus, 
\rJhile Scrope continued to appear friendly to Johnstone, he 
refused to give him any help, waiting to see how matters \rJould 
develop.75 When Maxwell finally defeated the \rJarden in July 
and began to put out feelers to Arran to see what terms he 
\rJould offer him, the English actively campaigned to prevent 
. 
74. C.B.P., i, p lS3. 
75. ibid., p 184. 
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it, for, as Wotton told Walsingham, Maxwe1l was more use to 
them as a rebel in league with the exiled lords already in . 
England. 76 Of these the Hamilton brothers had by this time 
been in contact with MBxwell while the earl of Bothwell, 
who had fallen out with Arran, was also in communication 
with him. Scrope and Forster were also doing all they 
could to encourage the Scottish border lords to break with 
77 '.Arran. Then on the 29th of July, lord Russell was killed 
in an incident which embarrassed Arran and brought the 
English more fully to a commitment to oust the chancellor. 
Maxwell swayed for a short time between negotiating with 
Arran and rebellion and finally decided to stick with the 
78 latter, and to "persiste in this couse begonne". 
For the laird of Johnstone it was the end of his dreams. 
He was sent to the dungeons at Caerlaverock while a gibbet 
was built in Dumfries and Maxwell threatened to hang him on 
it if his friends did not surrender the few remaining strong-
holds on the west march not under his authority.79 He was 
finally freed on the condition that he accede to all 
Maxwell's demands, dying shortly afterwards "for grieff of 
the great victorie, that his enemie had obtenit over hlm".80 
76. C.S.P.Scot., viii, p 7. 
77. C.B.P., i, p 187. 
78. ibid., p 190, p 192. 
79. ibid., p 191, p 193. 
80. Historie,.p 210; Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 48-49, no 51; an 
abortive attempt was made to free Johnstone in which Robert 
Maxwe1l was for some reason implicated and as a consequence 
was exiled by his brother to Galloway, C.B.P., i, p 197. 
-. 
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A letter from the master of Gray to Johnstone just before 
his death expressed regret that he had decided to agree 
with Maxwell, telling him that it would be much more in 
81 his interests to serve the king. It must have seemed 
a little ironic to Johnstone who had been broken because 
he had allowed himself to be manipulated by politicians 
like Arran and Gray who had failed to deliver their end 
of the bargain. Johnstone died a broken man, but his 
political masters were not long in following him. 
The surrender of Lochmabell castle to Maxwell signalled 
the end of all resistance on the march. After garrisoning 
the castle }~ell held court there and set about raising 
more men, being joined by lord Herries who now came out in 
open opposition to Arran and the king.82 Paralysed and 
isolated Arran could only watch while Maxwell and other 
border lor~s like Bothwell, Hume and Cess ford acted as a 
screen behind which the exiled lords were given English 
assistance in launching a coup. Finally in late October 
they marched on Stirling, and after some fighting took 
the town, forcing the king to negotiate a surrender.83 
Arran fled and a reshuffle took place among the king's 
ministers with Maxwell being rewarded with the return 
of the west wardenry and the custody of colonel Stewart.84 
81. C.S.P.Scot., viii, p·92-93. 
82. C.B.P., i. p 194, p 196. 
8). ibid., p 201, P 208, p 210; !lis.tor!!!, p 214. 
84. Q.B.P., i, p 211-12; C.S.P.Scot., viii, p 174-75; 
A.P.S., iii, p 398-99. 
To argue that Arran fell from po~er because of his greed 
for Maxwell's Renfrewshire baronies ~ould be to grossly over-
simplify the many factors ~hich were brought into play in 
1585, but there is some truth in it. It was Morton's meddling 
in local affairs ~hich brought him down in 1578, and in the 
same way Arran's contempt for local interests and his over-
estimation of the extent of royal authority cost him his power. 
With Morton in 1578 and Arran in 1585, Maxwell reacted 
violently to any undue interference in his affairs. He 
accepted the king's right to appoint ~ardens, but not to 
interfere in ~hat he regarded as his private interests, 
Lochmaben castle, the Dumfries provostry and the overlordship 
of most of the men of the locality. Johnstone could be 
~arden if he ~anted, but Maxwell showed that he ~a~ not 
able to carry that load unless the crown did interfere in 
the balance of power ~ithin the locality. For a man of his 
power Maxwell had little interest in the goings on of the 
court and cared little ~ho ruled there. In foreign policy 
and in religion he was closer to Arran than to the faction 
which replaced him, but the latter had a very high ideal 
of royal authority, moreso than his client Maitland, and 
it was here that the two clashed. The initial disagreement 
between them may have been over the exchange of lands and 
Arran's refusal to reinstate Maxwell as warden, but the 
chancellor's methods of putting pressure on Maxwell 
elevated the struggle to one of royal authority against 
local power, and with the failure of the former, the way was 
paved for a relatively easy rebellion. 
Up until this point Maxwell was acting as the political 
conservative against the interference of central government, • 
but his success in 1585 inspired him to seek even greater 
independence from the king and adopt a radical stance hims·elf. 
Even as decentralised a state as Scotland 'was could not 
allow local magnates to be in control of religion and foreign 
policy, and when Maxwell overstepped the bounds ·in these 
issues he quickly rOtInd himself being disciplined by a 
more united political concensus of king and nobility. This 
rapid transformation in Maxwell's fortunes from being one 
of the chief architects of the new administration to being 
regarded as a common enemy arose from his regligious 
convictions. In fact those convictions had led Maxwell 
to involv~ent in Counter Reformation politics at least 
three years before he took his stand in 1586. Since 1582 
he had been the subject of interest in France where his 
support for the duke of Lennox had been approvingly noted. 
On Lennox's fall, Maxwell had accompanied him to France 
and it may have been then that he formed a relationship 
with the duke of Guise which led to James VI entrusting 
him with business between himself and the leader of the 
French catholics a year later. Certainly Maxwell was by 
1583 'at the centre of a plot to raise a rebellion on both 
. 
sides of the borders while a Spanish army invaded England, 
and in the context of this plot he was known to Guise, to 
agents of Philip 11 and was being discussed in Rome.85 
In the winter of 1585-86 Maxwell decided to make a more 
public display of his commitment and claimed that in return 
for his help in ousting Arran, the king had agreed to allow 
him a measure of religious freedom. Whether this was a trap 
set by the king or permission for him to practice his 
catholicism in private one does not know, but it certainly 
was not what Maxwell interpreted it to be. Thus, in the 
new year of 1586, it was reported that he, with Herries 
and many of the gentlemen of the south-west, had "assembled 
at a Masse in publique manner at the Colleidge aboute a myle 
from Dumfreis".86 A second mass followed at Maxwell's house 
in the burgh, the protestant minister was forbidden to preach 
and "yt is said that this infecton spreadeth yt selfe into 
divers other places in Galloway". 87 Furthermore, l-'..axwell had 
retained a sizable body of paid horsemen and foot in arms 
to protect what was in effect an attempt to establish the 
Counter Reformation in south-west Scotland. 
Rumours of similar activities among Huntly and the northern 
lords, of French subsidies, and of the multiplication of masses, 
were soon spreading and causing nervousness in Scotland and 
among the English border administration. However, the king 
85. Teulet, Papiers, ii, p 499-500, p 563; iii, p 362, P 364, 
p 366-67,·p 669-70. 
86. ~B.P., i, p 216 .• 
87. ibid.,'p 217. 
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acted decisively and ordered Maxwell to appear in Edinburgh 
to answer the charges against him. After an initial excuse,· 
Maxwe11 obeyed the order and was held in ward in the castle 
to which he had to be conveyed in darkness because of the 
popular anger against him. 88 His name was soon being linked" 
with a Jesuit agent, "a verie greate man with Ha.xwel1", who 
Ifdoth draw him on in this matter of the masse", and the 
vultures began to gather in the expectation that an example 
would be made of him.89 Angus demanded the restoration of 
the Morton earldom to the Douglas family and for the second 
time HaXYe1l was stripped of the title, while the new laird. 
of Johnstone turned up at court and attached himself to Angus, 
hoping for some restoration of his family's fortunes in the 
wake of Ma~~ellls fall. 90 The king, however, was reluctant 
to do more than remind Maxwe1l that there was a limit to 
his power and that in the sphere of religion he would 
tolerate no divergence from the faith of the established 
church. At the end of March French pressure resulted in him 
being freed to open ward,91 the threat of an assize was 
lifted, and Johnstone was sent for with the intention of 
reconciling him with Maxwe1l and ending the feud.92 
88. Ca1dervlood, History, iv, p 489; C.B.P., i, p 218. 
89. C.B.P., i, p 220. 
90. ibid., P 218; Q.S,P.Scot., viii, p 216. 
91, Teulet, fapiers, ii, p 768; a few months later V~e1l 
.a1ong with Huntly, Montrose, lord C1aud Hamilton and 
Crawford gave assurances to the French of their deter-
mination"to work for a restoration of French influence 
in Scotland, Teulet, Papie~, il, p 780, P 78). 
92. C.B.P., i, P 221,p 222; C.S.P.Scot., viii, p 282. 
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Maxwell's fall had allowed the young laird to recover 
some of what had been lost duri.ng the previous year and to 
extract some revenge from the Maxwells. From his prison in 
Edinburgh Maxwell had in fact continued to direct operations 
against the Johnston~s, but in one of these the latter finally 
had some success of their own, ambushing a company of royal 
soldiers stationed on the march unde~ ~~xwell's co~mand and 
killing or capturing most of them.93 Johnstone followed 
up this success with raids of his own, burrdng the house of 
Maxwell's dependant, Jardine of Applegarth, and "ravaging a 
dozen Haxwell villages, "to the great impoverishment of' the 
poor commons".94 Though still restricted in his movements, 
~mxwell acted where he was and had Johnstone denounced for 
the slaughter of his men, claiming that the laird had "maist 
barbarouslie cuttit the throttis of the deid personis with 
braig knyveis; and utheris, eftir they were takin prisonaris, 
be sum of thame wer murdrest and slane tua houria eftir thair 
takingn •95 While he was determined to exploit Maxwell's 
temporary weakness as much as possible, Johnstone knew that 
he could not afford to flout the kingis authority himself, 
and after trying the royal patience for over a month he came 
in at the end of April, both men signed assurances and he too 
was held prisoner.96 By now the Maxwells had recovered some 
93. R.P.C., 
94. C.B.P., 
95. R.P.C. , 
96. Moysie, 
.. 
iv, p 55. 
i, p 222-23. 
iy, p 55; C.S.P.Scot., viii, p 308. 
Hemoirs, p 57; C.S.P.Scot., viii, p 364. 
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of their confidence and though lord Maxwell continued to be 
held in Edinburgh, Herries, Robert Maxwell and Douglas of 
Drumlangrig once again unleashed all his power against the 
Johnstones and their allies, even striking into England 
against the Grahams who were dependant upon the laird of 
Johnstone.97 Thus, in spite of the holding of both chiefs 
the feud continued to rage, the only consolation being that 
it had lost the deeper political implications of the year 
before. Both men were therefore forced to agree to participate 
with the king in a planned judicial raid on the march where 
th t f t o Od '98 ere was now no governmen 0 any sor 1n eV1 ence. 
In fact the raid did not take place until November, the 
more immediate question being was who to appoint as warden, 
an .office from which Maxwell had again been removed at his 
fall earlier in the year. Johnstonets behaviour during the 
months which had followed had shown that he was no more to 
be trusted to restore order than Maxwell, and besides, like 
his father, he had not the power to the job properly anyway. 
Thus, as in so many other localities the king was forced to 
turn back to the powerful magnate and ask him to resume his 
duties. To Scrope's dismay Maxwell played hard to get so that 
n every laird, gentleman and borderer rides against the other", 
a much worse condition than having to put up with Maxwell's 
own disorders and religious inclinations.99 However, in 
97. C.B.P., i, p 224, p 225, p 227. 
98 •. l!.P.C., iv, p 76-77, p 84-85, p 89, P 92. 
99. C.B.P., i, p 229. 
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August he finally accepted and almost immediately returned 
to his usual malpractices on the west march, leaving behind 
a much more secure court position which rested upon a 
marriage alliance between his eldest son and a daughter of 
lord Hamilton, the man he had helped restore to power in 
1585.100 
Yet while Scrope may have been gratified that Maxwell 
was better than anarchy, Walsingham was less easily satisfied. 
Maxwell's overt catholicism in 1586 had made him the subject 
of close English scrutiny as Walsingham sought to uncover the 
international Counter Reformation conspiracy which he believed 
must lie behind it. In March Scrope wrote to him apologising 
because he had been unable to identify any connections between 
lord ~~xwell and the Jesuits but that he would follow up 
whatever leads he had.10l In fact throughout 1586 Maxwell 
had continued to plot with the other catholic magnates to 
'free' the king from his protestant advisors. Again it was 
the duke of Guise who was in communication with Maxwell, 
lord Claud Hamilton and Huntly; the leading catholic nobles 
in Soot1and, but by now Philip 11 himself had shown some 
102 interest in the scheme. However, it was Maxwell who was 
singled out by Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in France 
from 1584, for having stressed that while strong native 
100. C.B.P., i, p 230, p 232; R.P.C., iv, p 109; Moysie, 
,Memoirs, p 58. 
101. C.B.P., i,p 223. 
102. Teulet, Papiers, iii, p.412-13, p'414-15, p 416-17. 
490. 
catholic support could be expected, Scotland would not return 
to the catholic fold without outside intervention. Mendoza 
was therefore busy trying to get the one hundred and fifty 
thousand ~cus promised by Guise to pay for an expedition.103 
Philip 11 had by this time received the letters from Maxwell,· 
Hamilton and Huntly assuring him of their support for his 
interests and the king had himself written to Guise about it, 
suggesting that he discuss its feasibility with Parma.104 . 
Both England and Spain were therefore taking V~xwell 
very seriously indeed by the autumn of 1586. By October 
Scrope had evidence that he was in communication with the 
Jesuits and was continuing to hear the mass in private, but 
he was still unable to dig any deeper.105 Some attempt to 
rather clumsily buy Maxwell and the others with a pension 
had meanwhile been turned down and Elizabeth switched to a 
more aggressive policy, trying to get James VI to banish 
these catholic lords.106 James, however, ignored the English 
pressure and in November Mendoza was able to report more 
conversions by the Jesuits in Scotland among some highly 
p1ac'ed men at the court.107 One of these was in fact the 
captain of the guard, colonel Stewart, a man who had been 
both prisoner and jailor to Maxwell during the previous 
103. Teulet, Papiers, iii, p 431-33. 
104. ibid., p 471-72. 
105." C.B.P., i, p 235. 
106. Teulet, Papiers, iii, p 502-0). 
107. ibid. 
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108 year. In December the colonel turned up in Paris, presumably 
on some business of the kingts, though also to pass on messages 
to Mendoza from the Scottish catholic lords. Given the king's 
subtlety in his dealings with Elizabeth it is even possible 
that he too was well aware of what colonel Stewartts real 
business was and he may have been allowing the catholic lords 
to open up indirect channels with Philip 11 for a projected 
invasion of England. Certainly the Scottish lords themselves 
were convinced that James would in time approve of their plans, 
and as late as 1589 Huntly was to be genuinely surprised by 
the king's refusal to join him in a revolt against his own 
officials and the protestant establishment. However, in 1586 
colonel Stewart told Mendoza that their aims were firstly to 
wrest the king away from his present advisors, recover their 
own freedom of conscience, and in time re-establish the 
. catholic faith throughout Scotland.109 
In spite of all this international intrigue and of having 
a spy 11 in such favour with Maxwell and Herries as he had never 
had before in Scotlamlt, Scrope had nothing more concrete to 
repoFt on Maxwell than his involvement in some illegal cross-
border traffic by Englishmen and the fact that he was pacifying 
most of his local feuds as though in preparation for someth~ng 
on a wider scale.110 Early in 1587 more important information 
came to light when it became known to England that Maxwell had 
108. Stewart had also added his voice to the French in getting 
Maxwell freed, a.B.p., i, p 221. 
109. Teulet, Papiers, iii, p·S10-24. For 1589 see above vc1 ii, 
p 361-66. 
110. C.B.P., i, 'p 235, p 236. 
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a catalogue of the names of all the important catholics in 
England and kept in contact with them through a network of 
Jesuits who often slipped across the border to take advantage 
of his protection. III Maxwell was thus coming to represent 
a fairly sinister figure in the eyes of Walsingham and his 
colleagues, even though they were far from knowing the full 
extent of his activities. What was also unknown to them 
was that Parma had virtually vetoed the elaborate plan which 
the Scottish lords, Guise, Mendoza and even Philip 11 had 
been concocting during the previous three years on the grounds 
that his resources were already over-stretched without 
opening up yet another front. In spite of Mendoza's detailed 
arguments and even ¥~ell's guarantee that the Spanish could 
land an army at a port in Kirkcudbright, Parma's diplomatic, 
strategic and logistical objections won the day and the plan 
112 
was shelved. 
In the autumn of 1586 though, Maxwell was still the warden 
of the west march and supreme in that region. In November 
some check on his power was made when Angus was appointed 
lieutenant of the entire borders, and was given a small 
force to assist him in his duties. ll) It was a move designed 
to make the wardens more accountable, and in the vigorously 
protestant Angus the king had a man with the will and the 
power-to keep Maxwell, who appears to have been relieved of 
Ill. C.B.P., i, p 241. 
112. Teulet, Papiers, iii, p 510-24. 
113. R.P.C., iv, pIll; C.B.P., i, p 239. 
493. 
his office, under some degree of restraint. The two men 
managed to achieve a fairly frictionless working relationship, 
and with Maxwell and Johnstone also having agreed to allow 
matters between them to cool for a period at least, the 
wardenry was quieter than-it had been for some years.114 
Satisfied with his success, and probably disenchanted with 
the job anyway, Angus resigned his office in the New Year 
and was succeeded by Maxwell's great ally, lord Hamilton. 
Hamilton was by then one of the elder statesmen of 
Scotland, a man of great political and administrative 
experience, but he was too close to Maxwell to be anything 
but partisan in his government of the borders. When Hamilton 
went to Dumfries in January he was thus persuaded to follow 
Maxwell's advice on how to conduct his new officet-prompting 
Scrope to write, "I fear if his advice is followed, outrages 
will break out agairr, •115 In fact Hamilton stayed on the 
march for no more than a few weeks during which time he 
executed twelve men dependant upon Johnstone or his friends, 
took the laird as a prisoner away with him, and put a number 
of his friends in irons in Dumfries while Maxwell's servants 
were all set free. It was soon being said that Hamilton 
116 
"left matters on the borders worse than he found them". 
The blame for the continued disorder of the west marches 
did not fall on either Hamilton or Maxwe11 though, but on 
114. E~, iv, p 114, p 124, p 132; C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 156. 
115. p.B.P., i, p 241. Hamilton's brother was also involved 
in Maxwell's plotting. . 
116. ibid. p 243. 
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the Johnstones ~hom Hamilton ~anted lord Scrope to outla~. 
Hamilton was able to recommend that Maxwell be once again 
reinstated and at the same time tried to bring pressure to 
bear on lord Scrope to take his ally's side against the pro-
English Johnstones at the ·very time when his investigations 
against Hax~ell were beginning to bring results.117 
The enormous influence ~hich Hamilton ~as able to 
wield in Maxwell favour ~as increased with Mary's execution, 
the Hamilton brothers having been among her staunchest 
supporters during the civil war. With the unrest this caused 
along the borders it also made Maxwell more necessary to the 
king and the latter less susceptable to English pressure than 
before. By April James had accepted Hamilton's recommendation 
and Maxwell was once again warden, having been leading savage 
118 
reprisals into England ever since he heard of Mary's death. 
However, the fluidity of the political situation continued to 
be tortuous with Angus once again taking over as lieutenant. 
from Hamilton and chancellor Maitland uncovering a plot by 
Maxwell and certain others to murder him.ll9 With Hamilton 
less able to shield him, Maitland after his blood, and the king 
increasingly irritated by the reports of his lax regime, English 
intelligence about his catholic activities would have been well 
117. C.B.P., i, p 244. 
118. ibid., p 245, p 248, p 256; Teulet, Papiers, iii, p 567. 
119 •. Lee was wrong to say that after Hamilton Maitland prevented 
any other magnate from exercising such authority on the 
borders, John Maitland of Thirlstane, p 99; R.P.C., iv, 
p 156; Spottis~oode, History, il, p 372; Historie, p 223-24. 
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received and the king decided that once again this magnate 
needed to have his wings clipped. 
With uncharacteristic speed and resolve the king suddenly 
acted. Taking his lieutenant, Angus, and some five hundred 
men he rode south to Annandale, where he joined up with 
Johnstone and other border barons, and from there rode into 
Dumfries on the 2nd of April. Caught unawares, and being 
unwilling to resist the king, Maxwell took advantage of the 
short warning he was given and fled the town. The contrast 
with Arran's attempts to deal with ~~xwell two years before 
are stunning and reflect the power the crown did have 
available to it if it had the support of a majority of the 
nobility and if the king himself took to the field. James 
set up court in Dumfries, dealt with some judicial ·business, 
received the surrender of Maxwell's castles and returned 
home, having let the people of the south-west see that they 
had a king again. Maxwell, meanwhile, sailed for Ayr where. 
he briefly rendezvoused with his old enemy, Arran and then, 
seeing that he could do nothing but accept the king's terms, 
found surety for his good behaviour and left for Spain, the 
spear-head of the Counter-Reformation.120 
To Johnstone's disappointment Maxwell's fall did not 
mean that he would benefit; the king was too conservative 
to appoint a mere laird to do a job which required the 
authority of a magnate. Nor had Maxwell's disgrace meant 
120. C.B.P., i, p 253-54, P 271; Moysie, Memoirs, p 62; 
R.P.C., iv, p 158-59. 
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ruin for his family for it was Herries who succeeded him 
121 
as warden. Though of a quite different temperament than 
his chief, Herries was still a Maxwell and a catholic, so 
that James had done nothing more than effect a minor change 
in the politics of the locality by sending Maxwell into 
temporary exile. However, as a warden he did a far more 
satisfactory job than his chief and this was recognised by 
the privy council which saw that he wa.s rewarded.122 He 
also tried to some extent to heal the breach between his 
own kinsmen and the Johnstones, and at the end of the year 
a marriage took place between his sister and the laird of 
Johnstone himself, a marriage which it was·thought would 
11 cut off all the feuds ll between the two families. Lord 
Maxwell strongly disapproved of this reconciliation, but 
Herries had the backing of a number of the Maxwell lairds 
who were glad of the chance of peace in their neighbourhood 
and Herries exploited his cousin's absence to push through 
a change in the kindred's policy which he had for long 
advocated.123 So close did Herries and Johnstone become 
that in the winter of 1588 they were acting as political 
allies and narrowly escaped more than a horning for attempting 
121. ,B.P.C., iv, p 188. 
122. ibid., p 196, P 209, p221-22. Though like most other 
noblemen he had feuds of his own, his own brother being 
slaughtered in one with the Irvines at· this very time, 
C.B.P., i, P 299, P 476-77; ii, p 467. 
123.·C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 533. See also his friendly letter to 
the previous laird of Johnstone in 1585 at the height 
of the fighting between Maxwe11 and the latter. Fraser, 
Annandale, ii, p 274, no 361. 
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to join Huntly in a coup.124 Herries also succeeded in 
avoiding charges of holding open masses and ejecting the 
protestant ministers from Dumfries and had his warden's 
office confirmed in March 1588 for his good service to the 
k o 125 ~ng. 
Herries' careful cultivation of the king and the 
ruling court faction was, however, to be wrecked at the 
end of April when lord Maxwell returned from Spain without 
permission. While in Spain he had seen the great preparations 
for the Armada, was enthusiastically received by Ph~lip 11 
and given five thousand -acus to aid his return to Lisbon 
and then Scotland where he promised he would serve Philip's 
interests and prepare for a Spanish landing.126 He arrived 
back at Dundee, presumably having gone by way of the Spanish 
. Netherlands, and made his way across the country, "wrapped 
in a plaid like a 'Wayfaring rnanlt, until he reached his 
. 127 
home ground. Once there, his loyal servants and dependants 
and the broken men of the country who had prospered under his 
slack rule flocked to him and he very quickly established 
himself in control of his locality again. News of this 
return reached the court fairly quickly and an act against 
124. C.B.P., i, p 308-09; ~P.C., iv, p 250. 
125. Spottis'Woode, Historx, ii, p 381-82; R.P.~, iv, p 257, 
p 258-59; among other things he arrested Robert Maxwel1, 
9.B.~~, i, P 315, p 319. He 'Was ho'Wever temporarily 
.relieved of his post in February 1588, R.P.C., iv, p 247-48. 
126. Spottis'Woode, Histotl, il, p 383; Teulet, ~aRiers, iii, 
p 582, p 586. 
127. C.S.P.Scot, ix, p 558. 
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resetting him was proclaimed.128 The Hami1tons did what they 
could to calm the king f S anger and initially there was no 
immediate connection made between his movements and those of 
the Armada, his mission being secret until after the Spanish 
had landed and until some clearer co-operation could be 
established with Hunt1y and the northern lords. Herries, 
however, became suspicious and may even have been jealous 
of his chief and informed the king of what he thought was 
afoot. Maxwel1 was charged to appear and answer for his 
activities, but he ignored the summons and continued to levy 
. 129 
companies of horse and foot and to fortify his castles. 
This time the Hami1tons were unable to protect their ally 
and by now the king was fully convinced of his intentions. 
He was denounced on the 8th of May and three weeks later 
the king once again led a surprise raid against him, arriving 
on the west march before MaxwelLJlad had time to complete his 
own military preparations or make any firm agreement with the 
northern 10rds.130 More importantly, from the kingls point 
of view, Maxwell was crushed before the Spanish Armada set 
sail, thus preventing them from making a landing in what would 
have been the most vulnerable region of his kingdom. Unable 
to resist this royal invasion, Maxwell once again took to 
flight. 
128. R.P.C., iv, p 275. 
1291 ·C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 558; Spottiswoode, HistQrI, ii, p 38). 
130. RIP,C" iv, p 278. 
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On this occasion the campaign was more prolonged. All 
Maxwell's castles \-lere ordered to surrender, a proclamation 
~as issued forbidding resetting him or his adherents, his 
cautioners of the previous year were ordered to pay the 
sureties they had promised, a number of Maxwells were 
denounced and Robert Maxwell of Castlemilk had a price of 
a £1,000 put on his head for his part in instigating the 
rebellion.l3l However, the Maxwell garrisons refused to 
surrender, believing either that lord Maxwell and his 
catholic friends would relieve them, or that the Spanish 
would land in time to save them. The king's presence was 
enough to convince most of them that resistance would cost 
them their lives, but at Lochmaben the captain, David Maxwell, 
refused to surrender even to the king, and a request for 
ordinance was sent to Berwick, this duly arriving with a 
company of English soldiers. A bombardment began, but 
Sir William stewart, the brother of Arran, who was in command 
of the king's forces, persuaded David Y~ell to march out 
with his men on the promise that their lives would be spared. 
Having done so, Maxwell discovered that Stewart had no 
permission to make such an agreement and he with five of his 
men was hung. Though stewart' s action brought him almos t 
universal criticism the king was pleased and put him in charge 
of the search for lord Maxwel1 who was lying sick in a small 
bark awaiting the arrival of a larger vessel to take him back 
to Spain. Hearing of this Stewart sent a message to his 
131 • .&.~, iv, p 286-91. 
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nephew, lord Ochi1tree, asking him to bring a ship from Ayr 
and ~ith this he ~as able to track lord Maxwel1down, capturing 
him after a short sea chase.132 
In escaping execution lord Maxwcl1 ~as much luckier than 
he deserved to be. The defeat of the Spanish Armada a month 
later must have been a bitter disappointment to him, perhaps 
even moreso that his own, and it certainly ended any immediate 
prospect of a Spanish led Counter Reformation in Scotland in 
1588. James may have kept him alive just in case Phi1ip II 
did defeat England, but it ~as more likely that the king's 
o~n reluctance to kill his noblemen, and the net~ork of friends 
and kinsmen lobbying in his interests accounted for his rather 
fortunate survival. With friends like lord Hamilton, Huntly 
and probably young Lennox, there ~as really 1itt1e.chance 
that his rebellion ~ou1d cost him his life. 
Ho~ r~listic though ~as Maxwell in his plans for a Counter 
Reformation in Scotland? The whole question of Counter Reform 
in Scotland is unfortunately much too under-researched to be 
at all certain, but one can postulate a few possibilities ~hich 
bring it much closer than is often imagined. Thus, had Maxwel1 
been able to keep his plans secret for just three months longer, 
132. Spottis~oode, HistorY. ii, p 383; Moysie, Memoirs, p 67; 
Melville, ~emoirs, p 360; Gordon, Sutherland, p 209-10; 
Ca1derwood, History, iv, p 678-79; R.P.C., iv, p 292; 
C.B.P., i, p 326. Ste~art was killed by Bothwe11 ~ithin 
the year "to the comfort of many people, ~ha al1egit that 
'God did the same for his betraying ¥~ David Maxwe1l and 
his company in Lochmaberr', H.E.Maxwe11, A History of 
~ries and Galloway, (Edinburgh, 1896), p 211. 
had Medina Siddonia not been so desperately unluc~ in the 
Channel and had Huntly decided to strike in 1588 and not a 
year later, then the p03ition of the catholics in Scotland 
could have been very much stronger. What prevented their 
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success was communicationS and bad luck. Timing an operation. 
which embraced Spain, the Netherlands, England and Scotland 
was in itself an enormous undertaking and was made even more 
hazardous in Scotland by the geographic distribution of the 
leading Scottish catholics. However, when writing to Parma 
of Maxwe1l's position among the Scottish catholic community, 
a priest of his household said he was 
lino more in danger of his life by way of justice, it 
not being possible for his enemies to prove against him 
anything which they had supposed in his accusation; as 
also the King's affection not so far alienated from him 
as it hath been heretofore; and in case they would annoy 
him, or that it were presently reqisite for the weel of 
our cause to deliver him, we have ever, moyen to get 
him out of prison, and abide nought in the meanetime, 
but the King's will towards his 1ibertie; only to avoid 
all persute, that they would make, if we delivered him 
extraordinarilie. When they offered him, in the King's 
name, his libertie, if he would subscribe the Confession 
of the Heretick's Faith, he answered he would not do it 
for the King's crown, nor for an hundreth thousand lives, 
if he had them to lose; and hath offered to confound the 
ministers by publicht disputation. I shall solicit the 
lords his friends to procure of the King his 1ibertie 
very soon; for he importeth the well of our cause more 
than any of the rest, by reason of his forces which are 
neer to England, and the principal town of Scotland, 
and the ordinar residence of our King, as also he is the 
lord most resolute, constart~ and of greatest execution, 
of any of the Catholicks." :h I 
This commitment to the cause of catholicism, so apparent here 
in Maxwe11 and in the previous chapter in Huntly and Erroll, 
133. Calderwood, Histoty, v, p 24. 
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really deserves much closer scrutiny if one is to avoid the 
rather simplistic notion that Scotland ~as irrevocably a 
protestant country after 1560 or 1573. Contemporaries ~ere 
far more a~are of the fragility of the protestant regime and 
took rebellions like Maxwell's in 1588 more seriously than most 
subsequent historians. Maxwell never came close to success in 
1588, nor did Huntly in the years following, but success was 
not beyond their reach and their ambitions deserve serious' 
study. 134 
Yet ~hile too little has been made of the wider international 
implications of the 1588 rebellion, too much has been made of its 
effects upon border administration. Thus Lee has argued that 
while the area continued to be turbulent and lawless, "the 
palmy days when a Maxwell or a Johnstone could defy the central 
government ~ith impunity were over". He has also claimed that 
the appoin~ment of Carmichael as warden in September 1588 was 
a "turning point in the history of the west march", and the 
control the crown now effected over it was "the government's 
greatest administrative success ll • 135 ThiS, however, shows a 
typical neglect of local history which continued to be 
dominated by the Maxwell-Johnstone feud and its relationship 
with wider political interests. Carmichael's appointment was 
I 
no. more a break with tradition than Johnstone's father's bad 
134. One recent eception to this is Jenny Worma1d's article 
. liThe 'Princes' and the Regions in the Scottish Reformation" 
which will be published some time in 1983 by John Donald 
in a book of essays edited by N.McDouga11. 
135. Lee, John Maitland of Thirstane, p 165. 
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been a decade before. Johnstone was a lesser local landowner 
and chief whose clientage was bought by Morton and then Arran 
in an attempt to undermine Maxwell; Carmichael was simply a 
client of Maitland's. He was more of an outsider in that his 
lands lay further to the north, but so was lord Hamilton an 
outsider to the immediate politics of the south-west. Ca rmichael 
was not a king's man in any sense of bein~ somehow above local 
politics, he was Maitland's client, put there to serve the 
chancellor's own personal political interests. 
As in 1587 the laird of Johnstone had been by-passed and 
it was obvious that unlike his father he had failed to attach 
himself to any court faction which could deliver him the local 
patronage he wanted. He was granted the keepership of Lochmaben, 
but the appointment of Carmichsel must have been galling for him 
. f th d t d . 136 even 1 e new war en was a man of gres er age an exper1ence. 
As though in emulation of Maxwell's earlier tactics against 
his father, Johnstone very quickly became Carmichael's biggest 
. 
problem as he and James Douglas of D~umlangrig fought out a 
bloody feud. The two were brought to an assurance, but Johnstone 
had other quarrels with Gordon of Lochinvar and with Baillie of 
Littlegill whose house he attacked, burning it, murdering the 
laird and his daughter and going on to commit further bloody 
deeds and add to his by now notorious reputation for violence 
and blood-lust.137 Nothing had changed on the march and the 
136. Fraser, ~nnandale, ii, p l2, no 15. 
137. R.P.C., iv, p 106, P 109, p 110; Fraser, Annandale, ii, 
p 53, -no 56; p 52-53, no 55; Pitcairn, Qriminal Trials, 
i, part 2, p 184. 
removal of Maxwell, and the temporary hiatus in Maxwell power 
may even have destabilised the region as the more powerful . 
lairds fought to establish a new status quo while the largely 
ineffectual warden looked on unable to intervene with any 
meaningful authority. 
In 1589 external politics once again intervened in the. 
affairs of these local disputes. Just as .one saw Bothwell 
casting his net into the affairs of the north in search of 
clients during 1589, so he was also on the searqh for followers 
along the borders where he already had considerable power as 
keeper of Liddisdale. In the spring of 1589 Bothwell was 
laying his plans for what was to become the ignominious 
Brig O'Dee conspiracy, and, being a little concerned about 
his support in Teviotdale, he began to sound out opinion 
further west, inviting Herries, Johnstone, Buccleuch and 
Robert Maxwell to Peebles to discuss his plans for l~itlandts 
overthrow.138 None of them were willing to agree to the 
earl's schemes and the rebellion collapsed, but Bothwell's 
invitation remained open and was to have implications for 
the future of both Johnstone and lord V~xwell. 
The latter had been in prison since July 1588 and during 
that time had been implicated with Hunt1y and the other 
catholic earls in letters sent to Parma but discovered by 
the king's agents. In these Maxwell had expressed regret 
138. Q. •• B.P., i, P 337. 
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at the failure of the Armada and waS as has already been seen 
still considered to be the most likely leader of the cathol~c 
cause in Scotland.139 English intelligence had also connected 
him with the catholics in Ireland with a view to his supplying 
troops for the rebel cause there so that in spite of defeat 
at home and in Europe, Maxwell had by no means lost heart in 
his catholic enterprises. 14° In spite of this the king 
decided to free him in the autumn of 1589 'along with the _ 
Brig O'Dee rebels, though he demanded £ 100,000 caution for 
Maxwell's good behaviour. The king's reasons were, as 
explained above, to check the power of the presbyterians, 
and given Maxwell's well known commitment, it was a considerable 
gamble. More immediately Maxwell was concerned to recover his 
family's power in the south-west. l41 
Now a man in his thirty-sixth year, Maxwell brought all 
his great experience to bear on setting back the decline of 
the previous three years. Lord Herries was ordered to return 
his castles to him, and having recovered his military base, 
Maxwell set about undermining what little authority Carmichael 
had on the west march. l42 He wrote to Scrope telling'him that 
139. Spottiswoode, Historx, ii, p 391. Even the king appears 
to have given some recognition to the fact that Maxwell 
was the leader of the Scottish catholic community, H.M.C. 
Laing, i, p 80-81. This le'tter is more likely to be 
dated circa 1588 than 1592. 
140. Q.B.P., i, p 346. Maxwell was also fairly intimately 
connected with the exiled Scottish catholic community on 
,the continent and had deposited his gold and silver plate 
in Franc~ with the former archbishop of st Andrews, 
James Beaton, ~M.C. 'Laing~ i, p 84. 
141. Spotti.swoode, His,torx, 'ii, p 399; 1}.'p&, iv, p 412; C."B&, 
p 340. 
142. Fraser, Carlaverock, ii, p 495, no 116. 
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Carmichael was not on the march, that it was his concern that 
this. should not cause disorder and therefore he was inviting. 
the English warden to discuss with him how they might best co-
operate. The letter contained an implied threat that MBxwell 
was quite capable of ensuring trouble if Scrope did not meet • 
him. Scrope knew that Maxwell was right, but his suspicions 
of a man who was an enemy of England, both in his religion and 
in plots against Elizabeth, and as a protector of border raiders, 
was given added confirmation in a. letter he received from the 
king warning him not to trust Maxwell and to look to his 
defences. Scrope decided to pass the matter on and ~rote 
asking Walsingham for instructions in how to progress in 
this matter. l43 
~~xwell's political revival continued with lord Hamilton's 
appointment along with Bothwell as caretakers of the government 
while the king was in Denmark, Hamilton being responsible for 
the southern half of the country and in particular for the 
borders. In November Hamilton made a progression through 
the borders which led to a meeting with Maxwell at Peebles 
on the first of December when he effectively recognised 
Maxwell's de facto control of the west wardenry, the latter 
promising Hamilton that he would be responsible to him for 
the goverance of the march. ~~ell also took the opportunity 
to lodge a complaint against Johnstone who he claimed was 
illegally holding courts in Annandale to the prejudice of 
143. C.B.P., i, p 341. 
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his rights as steward of Annanda1e. Three days later Johnstone 
himself complained to the privy council about letters V~xwell 
had received, presumably from Hamilton, and while these were 
suspended on technicalities, Johnstone's own commissions were 
also suspended. l44 There'was now no doubt that Uaxwe11's 
alliance with Hamilton had made him the effective ruler of 
the west march in spite of Johnstone's complaints and the 
fact that Carmichae1 still held the office of warden.145 
The king's return once again altered the ever shifting 
balance of power. Carmichael was confirmed in his office, 
Hamilton's influence was removed from the borders and 
Johnstone was increasingly coming to see the advantages of 
tying his interests in with the power of the earl of Bothwe11. 
For the next two years the feud between MBxwe11 and Johnstone 
continued to reflect the vagaries of court life, but to a 
lesser extent than had previously been the case, thus allowing 
the participants to continue their struggle in the locality 
itself. In February 1590 the council had to discharge an 
intended combat between a Johnstone and a servant of MBxwe11, 
and then in April it was being reported that the feud had been 
put to mediation. l46 In June the king gave Johnstone a commission 
as justiciar and bail1ie throughout Annanda1e and Nithda1e while 
Maxwe1l was soon to find himself In trouble for the behaviour 
144. BJ:&, iv, p 436-37, p 826-27; Fraser, Annandale, ii, 
.p 26, no 32; .!hP.C., iv, p 442-43. 
145. Maxwel1 was also busy making bonds in the locality, 
Brown, "Bonds of Manrent", appendix, p 504, no 33. 
146. C.S.P .Scot., x, p 850, p 286. 
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147 . 
of his men and for protecting outlaws. On the other hand 
Langolm castle was delivered back into his keeping.148 
A further reduction of Carmichael's power took place in 
the follo,,,ing year. The barons and freeholders of Nithdale, 
largely Maxwell country, compiled a protest about him, 
complaining that he was ineffectual in protecting them from 
raiders, that the impositions and expenses he laid on them 
were too high, and that his powers l-lere excessive. These 
extraordinary pOl-lers had been granted to Carmichael largely 
because of his personal weakness, and similarly his expenses 
were incurred, or demanded, because unlike ¥~xwell he could 
not afford to continue in office without them. However, 
the ccmplaint succeeded and the warden's authority was yet 
further reduced.149 Without any power comparable to Maxwell 
. or even Johnstone, the warden could do nothing to check the 
feud which received impetus in May 1591 when Maxwell hung 
two Johnstones on the strength of his own commissions, 
commissions which Johnstone claimed he was executing with 
It all extrerni tiel! .150 The laird also warned the government 
that he would organise his own defences and in fact carried 
out a number of raids against various local targets in the 
following months so that the region was quickly sliding back 
I 
147. Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 5~, no 58; Fraser, Pol1ok, i, 
P 320, no 163; R.P.C., iv, p 794. 
148. R.P.C., iv, p 801-02. 
149. ibid., p 580. 
15~C.S.P.Scot., x, p 458; R.P.C., iv, p,623. 
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into the state of civil \>Jar \>Jhich had been seen there in 
1584-85.151 
The summer of 1591 \>Jas, hO\>Jever, dominated by the fall of 
Bothwell and not by anything on the \>Jest march. Reckoning 
with many others that Both\>Jel1's eclipse was probably only 
temporary, and that he \>Jas the best menns by \>Jhich Naxwell 
and his Hamilton friends could be checked, Johnstone decided 
to identify himself even more closely with the earl's fortunes. 
Maxwell also considered joining Bothwell as a means of ousting 
the chancellor and furthering catholic interests and his 
surprising truce with Johnstone in June 1592 \>Jas certainly 
seen as a prelude to raising the \>Jest march in support of 
Both\~ell.152 The earl himself fled to this region on his 
escape and there he took and garrisoned Lochmabell castle 
which became his headquarters for the present.153 Fearing 
that V~x\>Jell and Johnstone \>Jould go over to Bothwell, the 
king summoned them both to attend court, but each refused 
and a rebellion appeared immanent. Maxwell and Herries both 
negotiated terms with Bothwell, but at the last moment decided 
that their interests could be better served by remaining aloof 
from his activities. Johnstones on the other hand decided to 
participate in the Falkland raid and on its failure fled back 
, 
151. One of these targets was the burgh of Annan \>Jhere one of 
the burgesses \>Jas slain. Shortly afterwards the burgh 
ratified their bond of manrent with ~~X\oJe1l, Brown, 
"Bonds of Hanrent", appendix, p 504, no 34; R.P.C., iv, 
.p 806, p 705. , 
152. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 686. 
153. C.B.P., i, P 397. 
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to the marches as a fugitive. Maxwell's calculations had 
proyed acc\lrate and all he needed to do now was wait on the 
rewards of his 10yalty.154 
He did not have long to wait. Hamilton and Angus (now 
the tenth earl and a staunch catholic) pursued Bothwell down 
to the borders where they were met by Maxwell and a thousand 
of his horsemen with which they rode on to Johnstone's house 
of Lochwood. The laird was persuaded to surrender himself 
to the king when he arrived on the march, and this he did 
three days later at Dumfries, on condition that their lives 
and lands would be safe, and that Johnstone would not "be 
pitted or in a closs prison", a fate which had cost his father 
his life .155 The next day an act was pass ed by the privy 
council, declaring that whoever was warden would not be 
allowed to prejudice ~fuxwell's rights to the stewartry of 
Kirkcudbright and Annandale, or the lordship of Maxwell, 
or any other of Maxwell's jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
Carmichael was sacked, Maxwell was appointed warden and 
was reinstated as earl of Morton (thus creating something 
of an anomaly since there were now two earls of Morton who 
156 
were incidentally feuding over the title). The defeats 
and disgrace of 1586-89 were now well in the past and l.faxwell 
once again dominated the west march. As in the north and 
154. C.B.P., i, p 397; Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 422; 
. Historie, p 250 •. 
155. C.B.P., i, p 399-401. 
156. R.P.C., iv, p 767. 
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else~here the king continued to favour the great magnate whose 
enormous private power could be bolstered up ~ith royal office 
to the lesser man ~hose office ~ould be ~eakened by his lack 
of private authority. 
. 
Maxwell's success in recovering the ~ardenry ~as directly 
linked to Bothwell as ~ere the fortunes of so many others at 
this time. Chancellor ~~itland also discovered a new found 
friendship ~ith Maxwell, just as he did ~ith Huntly, and it 
~as he ~ho urged the king into the appointment of his one 
time enemy.15? Carmichael reported at the time that Maxwell 
had the "steir" of the country, ~ith specific instructions 
to hunt do~n Both~ellites and their resetters, and not 
surprisingly, ~hen Bothwell made his brief recovery in 
July 1593, Mrua.lell ~as described as one of his chief enemies 
and a 11 friend" of the chancellor .158 Politically V18xwell 
was at one ~ith the ruling court faction, something ~hich 
had only really occurred on three brief occasions in the 
past: in the ~eeks bet~een Morton's loss of the regency 
and his recovery later in 1578, during Lennox's ascendancy 
and for a few months in 1585 after the Stirling coup. 
The English border officials were, however, far from 
happy ~ith Maxwell's apparent orthodoxy. On hearing of 
, 
Maxwell's appointment and the ~emoval of the reliable 
Carmichael, reliable from an English point of view, Lowther 
l5? Historie, p 263; C.B.P., i, P 481. 
·158. C.B.P., i, p 413, p 481. 
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immediately predicted that matters would be "far different 
159 . 
to us" than they had been. After a few months in office 
his disillusionment with the new Scottish warden became more 
pronounced and he wrote to Burghley, "For what justice is to 
be expected from Lord Maxwell, your lordship may see from my • 
last (report)", and he expressed the wish that he "will not 
long continewe wardenl1 • 160 In the spring Lowther and his 
superior, lord Scrope, met with Maxwell and like many others 
the latter was impressed by his personable nature and vocal 
commitment to good government.161 The impression did not 
last though and Maxwell was soon back to the old ways of 
partial and exploitive management of the marches. Now it 
was Scrope who was bemoaning V~xwel1's attempts to overturn 
the 1587 treaty between Scotland and England, and he wrote of 
his "shiftinges to put of justice", of his "negligence ll , and 
after a raid into England by his men, wrote that "I expect 
the like while Man]ell is officer here" .162 The persistence 
of these sort of criticisms throughout }Iaxwell' s life strongly 
suggest that Scrope was not playing at politics here and that 
he genuinely found the over-powerful Scottish warden impossible 
to work with. 
Nor was this the only criticism lord Scrope could level 
against V~xwell, for like his father before him, he too was 
159. C.B.P., i, P 401. 
160.' ibid., p 429. 
161. ibid., p 432, p 458. 
162. ibid., P 468, p 470. 
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suspicious of Maxwell's catholic fervour aDd his international 
connections. In spite of the defeat of .the Armada, England was 
no more secure than it had been in 1587-88, and with the 
situation in Ireland and the Netherlands still so unstable, 
the prospect of another front in Scotland remained a scenario. 
which Elizabeth was determined to avoid. }fuxwell thus found 
himself once again the object of close English scrutiny when 
he re-emerged as the most powerful magnate on the Scottish. 
border in 1591. Scrope told Burghley that Maxwell was 
refortifying Caerlaverock where "he setteth 200 men to work 
dailie" • He was also being unnaturally friendly towards 
Johnstone as though in preparation for some greater plot. 
In his opinion Maxwell was "an unmeete man for that office 
or a comune commander of many men so neare us", for behind 
such preparations could lie only one hand, that of Philip 11 
, of Spain. Maxwell was seen as "the King of Spain's treasurer 
for Scotland, either .to keep or dispose of it at his own 
163 pleasure". How true all this was one does not know, 
and may never know unless the Spanish archives hold as yet 
undiscovered information on the activities of Scottish 
catholics at the time, but it would be consistent with his 
earlier career to expect Maxwell to still be shceming for 
the Counter Reformation he had already given so much for. 
However, the light of Catholic ~rorm had by the 1590's 
passed to the north and to Huntly with whom Maxwell seems 
to have had remarkably'litt1e contact. 
163. C.B.P., i, P 465. 
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vlhatever international machinations Maxwe11 \-la8 planning, 
his more immediate concerns were local. His rebellion in 
1587 and his misfortunes throughout 1586-89 had not been 
without effect upon his po~er in the region. The great man 
of the locality hod been hUmbled and visibly so. Others had • 
looked on and seen the potential for self-aggrandisement in 
a march without lord Maxwel1 and his overbearing exercise of 
power and were disappointed to see his return. Furthermore, 
this particular locality was the centre of even more tortuous 
local politics than usual, and was a hotch-potch of rival 
political and religious factions ~ith an abundance of strong, 
independently minded lairds and a shorts.ge ·of noblemen. 
There were no other nobles in the south-west, the nearest 
being Cassillis fUrther west and Angus north and east of 
the march while men like Johnstone, Drurnlangrig and Lochinvar 
were as powerful as many noblemen in Scotland. Maxwell may 
still have had enormous reserves of power over these men, but 
when in 1592 he was granted virtual vice-regal authority, 
they and others with them vigorously protested their objections.164 
Maxwell, however, was determined to set the clock back and to 
not only re-establish his power in the south-west, but enhance 
it. The king had, among other things, granted him half the 
wards and casualties of the entire region, but Maxwell was 
able· to claim the king's half to, repair and modernise the 
defences of the royal castles he held and use his own half to 
similarly strengthen his own military base. 165 In effect he 
164. Historie, p 26). 
165. C.B.P., i, p 40). 
~as creating the same sort of power base that Huntly and 
Argyll had in the north, and like them he ~as to find that 
while the king might acquiesce in his intent, his neighbours 
were less than enthusiastic about the direction of his 
policy. 
Confrontation ~as very soon in sight. By September of 
1592 it was reported that the local barons were "carringe no 
frendlyaffections towardes himll • 166 · He fell out ~ith 
Drumlangrig, a previous ally against Johnstone; Lochinvar 
complained to the council that his lands had been attacked 
while he was in Edinburgh to press the case for the reduction 
of Haxwell1s commission; the lairds of Bombie, Lagg, Closeburn, 
Hempsfield and Kirkemighell added their own protests; and after 
a short truce, Johnstone added his voice to the criticisms on 
the grounds that Maxwell ~as protecting killers of t~o of 
his men.167 After much persuasion the king agreed to suspend 
the offending aspects of the commission until the privy council 
had had time to discuss the ~hole affair properly. Naturally 
this infuriated Maxwell ~ho threatened Drumlangrig ~ith blood-
feud for the slaughter of the Maxwell laird of Co~hill, broke 
off relations with the English warden to attend to his own 
affairs, and continued to strengthen his forces in preparation 
f ' d' nfl' t 168 or a W1 emng co 1C. 
166. C.B.P., i, P 409. 
167. C.S.P.Scot., x, p·777; R.P.C., v, p 751-52; C.B.P., i, 
p 412, p 414, p 416. 
168. C.B.P., i, p 419, p 420, p 421. One can also trace in more 
detail his quarrel with the laird of Closeburn, R.P.C., v, 
p 53, p 74, p 88-89. 
516. 
Maxwell had more strings to his bow th~m force though and 
he decided to end this sniping at his authority by talking to 
his critics. Maxwell persuaded the other barons of the region 
that they really needed him for their own security and that he 
was willing to work out some sort of policy of co-operation 
with them. By March 1593 an agreement was imminent, a bond 
was signed between Haxwell and Lochinvar while Johnstone's 
friends arranged a truce which "war infalliblie keapit for. 
a whyle", so that "incredible peax was concludi t among 
thayme evin besyd all menis expectatioun that they met face 
to face to-gether and thair band up freyndship be worde and 
writt, never to be broken, under the payne ·of perjurie to 
the failtero,,169 ',lith Lochinvar o~ Haxwell's side, Johnstone 
forced into friendship because of his unpopularity with the 
king, and Drumlangrig isolated, the smaller lairds were 
deprived of the leadership they required to erode Maxwell's 
power. Maxwell even went so far as to try and convince the 
English that he had reformed himself, asking Lowther to try 
and get Burghley to assure the queen of his devotion. As far 
as his future political aspirations were concerned, he promised 
that he was prepared to "wholly run Lord Hamilton's course in 
Scotland" , Hamilton being considered a man of largely pro-
English and reliable political opinions.1?O Whether this 
was all a sham to disguise other. intents, or a genuine 
decision on Maxwe11's part to settle for a quieter middle age 
169. C.B.P., i, p 432-33; Fraser, Annanda1e, ii, p 58, no 61; 
S.R.O., R.D. 1I44/110; Historie, p 297. 
170. C.B.P., i, p 433. 
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one cannot know, but if it was the former it largely succeeded 
in that 11axwell's popularity rose both with his neighbours and 
in England, it already being very high with the king. 
Conversely, the laird of Johnstone's fortunes were 
dropping to even lower levels as his patron's chance of 
recovery grew more and more remote and his enemy's power grew. 
Johnstone had disassociated himself from Bothwell and had 
received a remission for his crimes before the autumn of 
1592, but six months later he was again at the horn for his 
turbulent behaviour on the march.171 He was also involved in 
a number of feuds besides that with the ~fuxwe11s, one of these 
being an internal feud within the Johnstone kindred itself. l72 
In'June 1593 he was warded in Edinburgh castle for failing to 
be answerable for his men, but escaped and returned to the 
borders as a rebel and a fugitive, dependant upon the good 
will of th~ warden, ~ord ~fuxwe1l, for his continued safety 
and freedom.173 The days when it had seemed that his father 
would replace Maxwe11 as the dominant family on the west march 
must have seemed very remote indeed. 
Unlike Maxwel1 though, Johnstone did not temper his 
behaviour to win himself friends or favour, but instead went 
on the rampage as soon as he wa~ ~ack on the march. He invaded 
171. C.B.P., i, p 412; R.P.C., v, p 55. 
172. Fraser, Annandale, iii, p 27; Fraser, Memoirs of the 
House of Douglas, iv, p 243, no 230. 
173. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 99; R.P.C., v, p 87. 
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the lands of lord Sanquhar, Drumlangrig, Lagg and Closeburn 
along the river Nith, taking away vast quantities of booty 
and slaying between fifteen and eighteen men. These slaughters 
prompted the dead men's women to take their bloody sarks to 
Edinburgh and demand justice from the king. Though angered 
by this public demonstration of his subjects' discontent, 
. 
James agreed that something had to be done and told MBxwel1 
to see that Johnstone was dealt with. MBxwel1, however, was 
on good terms with the laird, the two having formed an agreement 
of sorts, and he was in no hurry to break it. The other lairds 
of the locality who had suffered in these raids were even 
afraid to take revenge on Johnstone becaus"e they feared that 
Maxwell would join his side against them.174 After discussing 
their problem together they decided that lord Maxwell "loved 
above all things to be followed,!175 an insight which his 
history certainly bears out. They agreed to come to terms 
with him a-nd offer him their bonds of manrent and whatever 
else "as mycht allure him to thair favour am factioun", but 
on the condition that he break with Johnstone. FUrthermore, 
they approached the king and asked for a commission to be 
made out empowering Maxwell to pursue Johnstone and his kinsmen 
for his crimes, among which they stressed his favour to 
Bothwell.176 Such Machiavellian plotting secured its aim, 
but what is also of great interest is that it was required 
174. Historie, p 296-97; Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 445-46; 
Calderwood, History, v, p 256. 
175. Spottiswoode, liistory, ii, p 445-46. 
176. Historie, p 296-97 
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at all, Johnstone being Maxwell's hereditary enemy. The point 
to be made from it is that this shows yet again how a feud could 
be ended even between two such hostile families, nnd that the 
settlement between them was one to be respected. What revived 
the feud was not, in this case old and bitter memories, but a 
new set of local political problems and alignments which brought 
them into renewed conflict. 
Now, just as he was poised to rise to even greater heights 
of power in the south-vlest, lord r·faxwell' s luck which had been 
running good for him seemed to evaporate. The bond he had made 
with the barons of the locality was lost or stolen and came into 
the hands of Johnstone. The latter sent one of his gentlemen 
to find out if the bond was genuine and though Maxwell initially 
stalled he was finally forced to admit that he had signed it, 
though he excused himself on the grounds that he only did so 
at the king's co~~and. Once again one can quite clearly see 
the great importance that was attached to a bond and to a man's 
word and as a consequence of this breaking of the agreement 
If ane great truble fell out betuix the Lord I-faxwell and the 
177 laird of Johnstoun". Both men began to raise support through-
out the march with Johnstone being able to augment his smaller 
kindred with the support of the Grahams from across the border 
. 
and some of the clans like the Elliots who had ridden with 
Bothwell. Maxwell meanwhile strengthened his garrisons and 
it was at one of these, at Lochmaben kirk, that fighting began 
177. Spottiswoode, Hisi2!:z, ii, p 445-46; Hisi:.<2!:~' p 296-97; 
Noysie, ~~, p 107. 
when Johnstone attacked it and put the men there to the 
sword.178 Now the border war was about to recommence in 
earnest. 
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Lord l1axwell gathered his large forces and those of his 
allies and marched for Annandale, heading for Lochwood with 
the intention of taking it as his brother had in 1585. 
Opposed to Maxwell's two thousand or more men, Johnstone had 
a mere three or four hundred and the laird knew he could not 
win an open battle but would have to force Maxwell into a 
battle of his chosing or else flee. Johnstone chose the 
former, and when Maxwell's army came into sight on the 
6th of December he sent out a small party of mounted 
skirmishers to probe the warden's army and flee if they 
were approached by the Ma~wells. Seeing them, Maxwell's own 
vanguard gave chase and were led into a trap set by Johnstone's 
main force. Surprised and outnumbered, they turned and fled 
back to the rest of the army where their panic quickly spread, 
Maxwell's allies deserted, and finally the warden's own men 
disintegrated and left the field in disorder. Lord Maxwell 
himself was forced to turn and flee, but was overtaken by 
the jubilant Johnstones who struck him from his horse and 
mercilessly slaughtered him, mutilating his body and putting 
his head on the end of a spear. Many other Maxwells were 
slain with him, being driven onto Dryfe Sands and drowned 
while many more were wounded in the flight. For the Johnstones, 
178. Historie, p 299. 
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the humiliations of 1585 were at last revenged, and for their 
Maxwell enemies the battle of Dryfe Sands was a devastating 
defeat which signalled the beginning of the end of their 
family's hegemony on the west march. l79 
Taken in its widest context the battle of Dryfe Sands 
shows the glaring short-comings of an early modern government 
in a kingdom where power was not yet centralised. Three times 
within a year a royal army was to be defeated by private rebel 
armies, for the defeat and slaying of the king's warden in 
December 1593 was followed by Bothwell's tactical victory over 
the lieutenant of the borders, lord Hume, in the spring, and by 
Huntly's defeat of Argyll, another lieutenant, in October 1594 
at Glenlivet. In each case an inferior rebel army sent the 
king's forces running from the battle-field and while in 
each case the victory gained was a short term tactical one 
with little political impact upon the king or his government, 
such conflicts highlight the enormous problems facing James VI 
as he tried to impose his royal will upon local magnates, and 
in this case even on an untitled laird. As far as the south-
west was concerned, it was the second time in a decade that 
the king and his warden had been defeated, Maxwell having 
crushed Johnstone's father while he was in office in 1585. 
In 1585 the political consequences had been far more serious, 
179. Moysie, Mern~irs, p 109-10; C.B.P., i, p 514; Calderwood, 
. HistorI, v, p 290; Pitcairn, Qrimi!!8;.l; .TX~~!§.' i, part 2, 
p 360; Historie, p 299; Spottiswoode, Historl, ii, 
p 4$-47; R.P&, v, p 112-13. 
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but Dryfe Sands seemed to be emphasising the ungovernable 
nature of the region, though in fact by crushing so completely 
the greatest magnate in the south-~est, Johnstone was 
unconsciously paving the way for the growth of royal power 
in the locality in the next decade. In 1593 no-one knew 
that and the immediate result was further chaos, bloodshed 
and feud. 
To John, earl of Morton, and eighth lord Maxwell the 
defeat was obviously total. Twice in the troubled politics 
of his life he had achieved a dominance of his locality 
which was equalled by only a few like Huntly, Argyll or 
Cassillis. In 1587 he lost that mastery because of his 
religion and his international conspiracies, and in 1593 
he lost it again, and his life with it, in a feud which he 
was reluctantly manoeuvred into reviving. As with Huntly 
in the previous chapter, one seens local, national and inter-
national affairs entwined in a web of interests and ambitions 
which can never properly be understood by studying only one 
part of the whole •. As a Counter ·Reformation nobleman 
Maxwell had a fierce commitment to his faith, though again 
like Huntly, and unlike Erroll, he was prepared to temporise 
when necessary. In the end he only succeeded in preserving 
his private faith, the dreams of Spanish aid and a catholic 
revival having been dashed in the English Channel and by the 
/ 
king's swift action in 1587 and 1588. Whether he would have 
gone on hoping, or whether like Huntly he would in the end 
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have decided to accept defeat, one cannot know. One can only 
wonder why the two men never attempted, as far as we know, to 
work together. 
Apart from his bearing on religion and local affairs, 
Maxwell had no real interest in the court. This does not 
mean that he did not know what was going on there or try to 
exploit his connections there, for in attaching himself to 
Lennox and then to Hamilton he found two very useful allies, 
and as the Bothwell affair sho\-1ed, he was quite capable of 
making the right political decision at the right time. 
However, he had no interest in power at the centre of 
government, either in the privy council or in the chamber, 
and he made no attempt to establish any court brokerage or 
faction of his own. Lord Maxwell only wanted to rule in the 
south-west, on the west march. Therefore his career again 
demonstrates the extent to which Scottish nobles were interested 
in their localities and not the coUrt; any interest in the latter 
being inspired by the hope that they could extend or maintain 
their control of their localities. 
At a personal level one is just able to approach John 
Maxwell. He \Olas obviously autocratic and immensely proud of 
his nobility and his kindred. He was violent, but he never 
acquired the reputation for brutality and callousness that 
Caithness, Bothwell or Huntly did. He was a man who inspired 
loyalty and loved to lead others, whose word was considered 
honourable and who was himself loyal to thog:) who served him 
or helped him. His intrigues and plots seemed to avoid the 
odiousness that surrounded other more devious schemers. He 
was brave and a good soldier, capable of more than the usual 
dash and bash of the Scottish nobles, but he was a poor 
administrator and a lax law enforcer. As a family man one 
only knows that he remained married to Elizabeth Douglas all 
his life and that she bore him three sons and four daughters 
180 
who grew to adulthood and that he had another natural son •. 
From so~e of his private letters one also discovers a man for 
whom family and friendship were regarded highly, not simply 
as means to power, but as bonds of real moral and social 
responsibi1ity.18l When writing of lord ~ell in his 
history, Archbishop Spottiswoode said of him "He was a 
nobleman of great spirit, humane, courteous, and more learned 
than noblemen commonly are; but aspiring and ambitious of 
rule. His fall was pitied of many, for that he was not 
known to have done much wrong in his time, and was rather 
hurtful to himself than others.,,182 It seems to be a fair 
epitaph for one of the more attractive members of the 
Jacobean nobility. 
The feud between the Maxwell and the Johnstone families 
was to remain unsettled until June ~623, thirty years after 
Dryfe Sands. A full account of those years is not possible 
180. Scots Peerage, vi, p 483-84 
181. 'See e.g. Fraser, Pollok, ii, p 168, no 176 and others in 
this volume. 
182. Spottiswoode, H!!~, ii, p 447. 
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here, but some discussion of them is necessary if one is to 
see how the changes taking place in legislation, social attitUdes 
and international co-operation affected the borders, and in 
particular feud on the border. Thus the immediate effect of 
Maxwell's death was both private and public. The Maxwell 
kindred were shattered both militarily and politically, and 
as Maxwell's son was only a young boy a struggle developed 
between his wife and lord Herries for leadership of the kindred, 
or at least for control of the Maxwell heritage. l83 On the 
public front, the king was said to have taken the news "hardly", 
but he was far too busy with Huntly and Bothwell to turn his 
attention to the south-west.184 A proclamation was issued 
ordering that neither Johnstone or his patron Bothwell be 
reset, and government of the region was divided between Herries 
and other local barons whose immediate concern was to contain 
Johnstone's men then on the rampage.185 Government by committee 
was, however, no more than a short term measure and when the 
government had had time to think about the matter Herries was 
asked to take over as warden. Herries refused unless 
queen Elizabeth would express her confidence in him as he feared 
that his catholicism would influence her to instruct Scrope to 
be unco-operative. She refused, and Herries continued to 
I 
. 
dither between accepting and refusing, so that betwaen this 
183. The Maxwells met at the end of the month to consider their 
response, Fraser, Pollok, ii, p 170, no 176. For the 
'countess, Pollok, ii, p l72ff, no 176, 177, 179, 181, 183, 
184, 186. 
184. Spottiswoode, HistQ.!:I, ii, p 447. 
185. Birre1, "Diary", p 32; 1!,.P.C., v, p 112. 
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and the loss of confidence within the Maxwell kindred, the best 
opportunity was lost to strike back at the rebel laird of 
Johnstone.186 
The king's concern for Maxwell's death was very limited 
and his obsession with Bothwell continued to be the dominant 
issue of the day. At the same time as Herries was being offered 
the wardenry Johnstone had been approached and offered a way 
back into the king's favour if he dropped his association 
with Bothwell once and for all. Johnstone leapt at the 
opportunity, refused Bothwell his help on the Leith raid, 
and was rewarded with yet another remission.187 Lord Hamilton 
tried to obstruct his progress back into royal favour, 
especially when in July he was appointed lieutenant of the 
west marches in an attempt to fill the vacuum caused by 
Herries' w1certainty, but the Bothwell yardstick was the 
only one the king would recognise and in December, a year 
after Maxwell's slaughter, the laird received a remission 
188 for it... Shortly afterwards he and his men were excused 
their other depredations on the march, the council having 
declared that they would not be prosecuted for any act of 
"deidlie feid or suddane tuilyeisll, but only for acts 
. 189 
committed against those with whom ·there was no feud. 
186. C.B.P" i, P 523, p 530, p 539; ii, p 52, P 55. 
187. Moysie, ~emoir~, p 114. 
188. Calderwood, ~tory, v, p 336; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 395; 
p 545; Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 62, no 65; Fraser, 
Carlaverock, ii, p 497, no 118. 
189. 1k.~.C., v, p 197. 
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In effect Maxwell's death was to be conveniently forgotten 
about, by the king at least. 
Having gained the advantage of nO\o1 being on the right side' 
of the law, Johnstone was determined to maintain the initiative. 
He wrote to the Maxwells, pointing out that the feud between 
him and lord MaX\o1ell had been at an end; "God knawis I had 
dispenssit and buryit thai materis in my hart", and that it 
had been the league against him which caused the "breking of 
the Borderis" in which Maxwell died. Johnstone thus asked for 
the peace to be renewed arid submitted a number of specific 
proposals with the warning that if the Maxwells refused, then 
he would submit a copy to the king and the church to show 
that he at least was willing to make peace.190 As one might 
expect the Haxwells were unrespondent, but Johnstope's 
propaganda did its work, and in May 1595 Herries and the other 
barons were ordered to make their peace with Johnstone and to 
keep the young lord Maxwell "who now begins to haunt the fields" 
from any mischief. 19l If the king was taken in by this 
good will, others, including Scrope, Drumlangrig and Herries, 
were all unhappy with the laird's persistant resort to violence, 
and Herries finally gave in to the war party among his kinsmen 
190. Fraser, Annanda1e, ii, p 61-62, no 64. 
191. Q.S.P.Scot., xi, p 599. Both the king and the queen to 
whom Johnstone attached himself during her quarrel with 
Mar were putting pressure on Johnstone to settle, 
C.S.P.Scot., xii, plO. An attempt was also made to get 
"a number of nob1es to mediate, C.BJ!:., ii, p 59; 
C.S.P.Scpt., xii, p 48. 
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and struck back.192 The raid on Lockerbie ~as, like Dryfe Sands 
two years before, yet another Maxwell disaster. In the slaughter 
which took place in the streets of the small town a score of 
Maxwells were slain, lord Maxwell's old friend, the laird of 
Pollok, being among them, and many others were hurt or 
captured, "to the Lord Herreis great disgraice ll • 193 For those 
Maxwells who had thought that the implications of the defeat 
at Dryfe Sands could be ~iped out by a retaliatory victory~ 
Lockerbie ended their hopes, and thereafter Herries was able 
to persuade his kinsmen that peace with the Johristones and 
a recognition that they could no longer dominate the locality 
was unavoidable. 
By 1595 the king was also beginning to turn from his 
preoccupation with baronial politics to providing better 
government for his kingdom. As a result of this latest action 
he therefore imprisoned Herries, Johnst~ne and Drumlangrig.194 
However, to govern the south-west he had to appoint one of 
these three, or Lochinvar or Carmichael, and by December 1595 
Herries, Lochinvar and Drurnlangrig had all refused a job which 
had seemed more bother than it was worth. Carmichael was then 
approached but again asked for excessive powers and was still 
192. ~.S.P.Scot., xii, p 39-40 for'Serope's misgivings. For 
Drumlangrig, C.S.P.Seot., xi, p 672; xii, p 45, p 47; 
Historie, p 356. 
193. Spottiswoode, Histocr, ii, p 465; Calderwood, i!is,tory, 
.v, p 385; C.B.P., ii, P 68; r-1oY8ie, Memoir~, p 110, 
p 124-25; C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 54, p56. 
194. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 53, p 59, p 65, p 76, p 79, p89. 
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unpopular with the other border barons.195 In May 1596 
Sanquhar, Lochinvar and Gar1eis turned down a joint commission 
even though they were threatened with horning if they did not 
accept, and two months later the Maxwell lairds, with Herries 
and Sir Robert Kerr, all refused to attend a meeting with 
the king to discuss the governance of the west march.196 
Clearly there had been a complete lo~s of confidence on the 
march in the king's administration of the'wardenry and a . 
feeling among the leading men that if the office could destroy 
a lord Maxwell with all his resources then theY'were unwilling 
to risk themselves and their possessions in accepting it. 
In July the king finally took the unavoidable step of 
appointing Johnstone to the task. For the laird it was the 
fulfilment of an ambition he had pursued since his·father's 
term of office had been so cruelly ended in 1585. An agreement 
with Herries had made any objections from the Maxwells less 
likely and even Lochmaben castle was transferred without anY 
great difficulty, and with an understanding that lord ~~ellls 
claim to the castle and its lands would not be prejudioed by 
the move.197 The laird's reputation for violence raised some 
misgivings on both sides of the border, Bowes expressing 
concern that he was "guilty of no less than 20 murders" of 
195. C.-S.P.Scot., xii, p 97. 
196. ibid., p 113, p 237; R.P.C. v, p 292, P 300. 
197 •. For the agreement with Herries, C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 102, 
p 136, P 416; R.P.C., v, p 280, P 302. Johnstone's 
appointment, R.P.C., v, p 304; Fraser, !nnandale, ii, 
p 64-66, no 67. Lochmaben, ~.P.C., v, P 304. 
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198 Scotsmen alone. However, he quickly ingratiated himself 
VIi th lord Scrope VIi th whom he wa s soon 11 in kindness", 
strengthened his standing at court by continuing to back 
the queen against Mar, and began to enforce a degree of 
justice not seen on the Vlest march for some tirne. l99 Like 
the proverbial leopard though, Johnstone had not changed 
his spots and his feuds Vlith the ~ells and the Drumlangrig 
Douglases continued with the latter in particular reaching 
new heights of barbarity and b1ood-letting.2CO This, and the 
laird's refusal to discipline his own men, finally persuaded 
the king to remove Johnstone towards the close of 1597 and 
replace him with lord Ochiltree who VIas given a co~mission 
of lieutenantry, the laird being imprisoned and later ajudged 
guilty of having broken his word of honour to Drum1angrig. 
On receiving his freedom Johnstone returned to the march am 
the fighting and mutual raiding continued unabated.201 
Change, hOVlever, was on the way, and in 1598 the latest 
lieutenant, Angus began to enforce the new policy of pacifying 
feuds, a policy which VIas continued under Carmichael when he 
was reappointed warden in 1599.202 The details of how this 
was achieved am of the feuding between 1596 and 1600 cannot 
be discussed here, but by the early months of 1600 an agreement 
198. C.B.P., ii, p 243. 
199. ibid., p 166, p 174, p 242, P 255; R.P.C., v, p 308, 
p 360, p 366. 
200. For this. see the appropriate volumes of R.P.C., 
O.S.P.Scot., C.B.P., as well as other sources. 
201. As above. 
202. R.P.C., vi, p 33, p 63. 
531. 
of sorts had been hammered out between the warden and the two 
families, and assurances were exchanged with the }!.axwells 
reserving their lIdewtie of blude and freindship to the 
Lord Haxwellll who was not at all pleased about having this 
peace foisted on him.203 Maxwell's determination to have some 
sort of revenge or redress for his father's death was in fact 
becoming the major obstacle to peace. on the west march and 
led to him being effectively isolated from both his kinsmen 
and their allies. Carmichael's murder by a party of Armstrongs 
a few months later once again raised the question of the 
government of the wardenry, and when Johnstone and Drumlangrig 
declared their willingness to accept Herries as '<larden tha t 
isolation was increased. It was observed that as a result of 
this, Herries and "his cheefe the Lord Maxwell ••• be at great 
disliking, and small hope of their furthfull attonments, yet 
he and his brother in law, the larde of Johnston, are nows 
very fyrm~ frendes, leaving ¥~ell to choose, either of 
assurance with the Johnstons, or otherwise (for a tyme) for 
to take travell into some other realIile".204 In fact within 
months Maxwell had been denounced for refusing to answer for 
the good behaviour of himself and his men, while Johnstone 
had all the charges against himself removed, and on Herries' 
resignation in August 1600, was reappointed warden of the 
203. For Carmichael' s \-lork in 1600, Fras er, Annandale, ii, 
P 67, no 70; p 69, no 72; R.P.C., vi, p 65, p 83-84, 
. p 91, p 105; C.B.P., ii, p 6)8, p 644, p 647. 
204. Carmich~el's death, R.P.C., vi, p 117-18; C.S.P.Scot., 
xiii, part 2, p 658. On Herries ann Maxwe11, C.B.P., 




The failure of his first term of office seems to have 
taught Johnstone something of a lesson about how to govern 
the marches and this time he was less blatantly exploitive 
of his position. Ho~ever, Scrope ~as as suspicious as ever, 
dismissing Johnstone's offers to co-operate as "fair pretences". 
In time he becaree more tolerant and suggested that Nicolson 
had been unfair in his criticism of the Scottish warden, who 
"hath more honor than to utter such untruth" and ~ho "makes a 
great show of justice". Like other preceptive nobles and 
landowners Johnstone ~as beginning to realise that there 
was more to be won in serving the interests of the king than 
in being conste.ntly at odds with him. 206 His behaviour 
certainly contrasted with young lord V~xwell wh~ ignored the 
. government's repeated efforts to get him to settle with the 
Johnstones on a permanent basis, allowed his assurance to 
lapse, and for two or three months in the winter of 1601-02 
went on the rampage, murdered two Johnstones and did "schaik 
louse the hail1 estait of the west Bordour".207 The king was 
angry, but still willing to be lenient, banished Maxwel1 from 
the locality and put him under the supervision of his father-
in-law, lord Hamilton. However, h~' refused to allow Maxwe1l 
to have his men absolved from Johnstone's jurisdiction, and 
205. R.P.C., vi, p 121-23, p 152; Birrel, "Diary", p 49; 
Fraser, !nnanda1e, ii, p 69, no 73; p 70-71, no 74; 
C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 661; C.B.P., ii, P 667. 
206. C.B.P., ii, p683, P 685-86, p 692, P 798, p 814. 
207. R.P.C., vi, p 197, p 240, P 317, p 351-52; C.S.P. ~, 
xiii, part 2, p 939, p 947. 
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yhen ~1ell continued to refuse to negotiate, he had him throyn 
into Edinburgh castle. For six months Maxwell lingered there 
before escaping into the countryside, a crime yhich yas 
treasonable, but yhich lord Hamilton persuaded the king to 
. 208 J.gnore. 
The more efficient government of the yest marches Yhic~ had 
been characteristic of the region from 1597 Y8S accelerated by 
the Union of the Crowns in 1603. Hoy that event changed the 
borders is not the subject of this stlldy, but the office of 
yarden yas abolished on both sides of the border and the region 
lost its political significance and some of its distinctiveness.209 
When trouble did break out in 1605 betyeen the Johnstones of 
NeYbie and Herries, the government's response Y8S syift, with 
the lieutenant of the guard being sent to take possession of 
the property in dispute, banish the opposing sides from its 
immediate locality, and have the affair brought to the justice 
court and the session in Edinburgh.210 Times yere changing 
and even the hot-headed lord Maxwell seems to have glimpsed 
some understanding of this yhen on the 18th of April 1605 he 
finally took Johnstone's hand before the privy council. Three 
months later the two men again appeared before that body and 
208. R.P.C., vi, p 347, p 355, p 356-57, p 419, p 492, p 830-
31; C.S.P., xiii, part 2, p 959, p 1003, p 1029, p 1109; 
Spottisyoode, History, iii, p 99. 
209. Donaldson, James V-VII, p 227-28 gives a useful summar,y 
, of these changes. 
210. Lord Hume became lieutenant of the yhole march in 1603, 
R.P.C., vi, p 833. For the affair over Newbie house, 
R.P.C., vii, p 24-25, P 26-27, p 29-30, p 48; Birrel, 
"Diaryll, p 63; Pi tcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 464-72. 
I, 
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shook hands, having "remitted all rancour, hatred and malice", 
and on the 25th of June Maxwell gave Johnstone a letter of 
slains for his father's death. A few outstanding matters 
remained to be settled, but in effect the great MaXloJel1-
Johnstone feud had been laid to rest.211 
Lord Maxwel1, however, had no liking for the changes which 
were taking place around him, and like a less attractive 
Don Quixote, felt a loyalty to an older set of ideals than 
those now being propagated by the Jacobean state. By 1607 
the king had had enough of his "youthfull ryott and insolence", 
he having quarrelled with Johnstone again,with lord Hamilton 
over his failing marriage, and with the earl of Morton whom 
he challenged to a duel over the rights to that title. 
C t1 h . . . d ~n Ed{nburgh. 2.l2 Escape onsequen y e was aga~n ~pr~sone. • 
from that fortress was commonplace and for the second time 
Maxwell and one of his kinsmen broke out. This time 
lord Hamilton would not or could not extend his protection 
and a proclamation was issued against his resett, 3000 merks 
were offered for his capture, and a warrant was issued for his 
arrest on tax evasion until the crown could decide cn whether 
to invoke the charge of treason which his escape demanded.2l3 
211. R.P.C., vii, p 38, p 58, p 64-65; Fraser, Annandsle, ii, 
p>77, no 82; Spottiswoode, Historz, iii, p 165. }~tters 
outstanding or uprising, R.P.C., vii, p 78, p 103, p 132, 
p 188, P 203, p 206; Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 79-80, no 
83, 84. 
212. °R.P.C., vii, p 435, p 539, p 542; McDowell, History of the 
Burgh of. Dumfries, p 279. 
213. B.P.C., viii, p 17-18, P 19, p 20-21, p 24, p 765-66. 
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At the king's insistence more stringent measures soon 
followed. 1.faxwe11's castles were all occupied, the provost-
ships of Dumfries and Annan were tcken out of his hands, his 
goods were arrested, his kinsmen forced to find caution, 
and on the 12th of January his estates forfeited. 214 The 
privy council was uneasy about such extreme actions and wrote 
to the king telling him that there were those in Edinburgh. 
arguing that it was acting illegally in charging l-taxwel1 with 
treason, a criticism with which the council itself clearly 
had some sympathy. The lord advocate, Sir Thom~s Hamilton, 
conducted some research into Maxwe11's career and had 
failed to find anything treasonable there which had not since 
been implicitly forgiven, and thus as a last resort it passed 
the buck to the king. 215 James, however, had already insisted 
upon the treason charge and ignored the request for clarification, 
simply instructing the council to get on with the business of 
capturing Haxwe1l and the band of young hooligans he had 
gathered around him, but the council continued to drag its 
feet over the case and did not share,the king's urgency over 
216 . Maxwell. The difference probably arose over feeling in the 
council that what ~lell had done was no worse than the antics 
of other noblemen and did not deserve such harsh treatment. 
Furthermore, there was a ge~uine uncertainty about the legality 
of the actions it had taken, actions which could establish a 
214. R.P.C., viii, p 29, p 33, p 36, p 487, p 488, p 491. 
215. Me1rose, i, p 38; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 49, 
where this reference is repeated. 
216. R.P.C., viii, p 45, p 48, p 492. 
I. 
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precedent for other noblemen. That, and the influence Maxwell 
and his friends had with certain councillors, made them 1e85'co-
operative with the king who was urging harsh responses from his 
less sensitive seat in London. 
It was lord V~xwe11 himself who prevented any farther 
debate on the subject. Having secured the loyalty of a 
younger brother of Maxwel1 of Kirkhouse, Char1ie Maxwell, 
he sent word to Sir Robert Maxwel1 of spotts and after some 
persuasion persuaded him to arrange a meeting with Johnstone 
with whom he wished to clear up some misunderstandings. 
Johnstone was very responsive to the idea and spotts arranged 
a time and a place for· their rendezvous. The meeting took 
place on the 9th of April 1608, with spotts, the two 
principals and two attendants present. When each side had 
sworn to observe Spotts' conditions, he and the two chiefs 
rode off to discuss their business, leaving Char1ie }~xwel1 
and William Johnstone of Lockerby alone. After some goading 
by Char1ie a quarrel broke out between them, Maxwell drew a 
concealed gun and shot Lockerbie, wounding him. Hearing the 
shot spotts rode over to break up the fighting and as JQhnstone 
turned his horse to follow, lord Maxwe1l drew his own pistol 
and shot the laird in the b~ck, killing him. Thirteen years 
after Dryfe Sands the Maxwe11s at last had their r~enge.217 
, 
217. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 43-47; Ca1derwocid, 
'History, vi, p 704; Sir WaIter Scott, ¥.instrely of 
the Scottish Border, (Edinburgh, 1932), ii, P 173-74. 
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Johnstone's life had been one of'bloodshed and it is 
perhaps no surprise that he met a violent end, even if the 
exact circumstances of his death were a little tragic. At 
a moral level there was little difference bet\o/een him and his 
killer, both shared the same passion for the revenge of their. 
fathers' deaths, and when Maxwell's age, Johnstone had been 
equally unruly and violent. The difference was not in the' 
men themselves, but in the times, for the 1580's and 1590's 
were much less stable years than those of the first decade of 
the seventeenth century. As a politician Johnstone was of 
very little significance outside his own locality, being a 
client of Bothwell and then Lennox, both Stewnrts and 
opponents of the Hamilton faction to which the Maxwell were 
affiliated. Within his region though, he was a formidable 
operator, noted less for his subtlety than his endurance 
and courage, but with the skill to surmount the problems 
caused by his father's utter ruin, his own miscalculation 
in siding with Bothwell, the enmity of the eighth lord Maxwell 
and the botching up of his first term· as warden of the west 
march. He was a fitting opponent of the elder lord Maxwell 
and was described as a man "full of wisdom and courage, am 
every way well inclined, and to have been by his too much 
confidence in this sort treachorously cut off ••• ".218 
There could now be no debate over V~xwelll s future. The 
guard was given another commission for his arrest and a 
218. Spottiswoode, History, .ii1, P 191-92. 
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proclamation was issued for his capture dead or a1ive.219 
This time there was some local resistance with the guard be~ng 
mobbed twice in Dumfries. However, this was the limit of 
opposition and the crown proceeded with the arrest of Maxwe11's 
resetters, the examination of the shocked spotts and the 
wounded Locherbie, banished a number of Maxwe11 lairds from 
the locality, and fined the burgh of Dumfries for sheltering 
Maxwe11 after the murder. 220 Proceeding with the forfeiture, 
however, still raised some scruples. The king had no doubts 
about "The late fi1thie murthour ••• 11 , but the council was 
more cautious and decided to charge Maxwe11 with house burning 
and murder committed against some Johnstones in 1602. It 
also issued a summons of forfeiture to be executed upon 
sixty days warning, time enough to allow Maxwell to flee 
221 the country. The full process of doom and forfeiture 
was not completed until June 1609, and even this was passed 
along with. a separate "Act in favour of the Lord Maxwe1ls 
vasse1ls", clearing any of his kinsmen or dependants of any 
part in his crime and guaranteeing them against punishment. 
Maxwell was also found ~lilty of having intentionally ruined 
his estates as soon as he realised that they were likely to 
fall to the crown, but parliament agreed to recognise all 
outstanding securities and infeftments of the Maxwell estates 
and had clearly decided against a repeat of the Bothwel1 
2l9 •. R.P.C., viii, P 70, p 83. 
220. ibid., p.86, p 90, p 97-98, p 119, p 1~5, p 152, p 169, 
p 230, p 500, p 537; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, 
p 557; iii, p 43-46, p.46-47. . 
221. Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 13, no 18; Melrose,i, p 59. 
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forfeiture when his lands were broken up among supporters of 
the king. The Scottish nobles were clearly not going to allow 
one of the pre-eminent families of the realm to be completely 
broken over a murder, and advocate Hamilton informed the king 
that !lswn of the Lordis of Articles kything more scrupulous 
and precise in sindrie poyntis of that proces, nor we did 
222 forsie or sUSPact!l. It is a comme~t on the limits of 
the king's power and on the independence and conservatism 
of the Edinburgh government. A few minor related matters 
remained to be dealth with, but everyone hoped that Maxwell's 
forfeiture and exile would be the end of the case and that 
peace between Maxwells and Johnstones could be restored.223 
. Unfortunately lord Maxwell found himself unable to stay 
away from his home country for long, and in 1612 he slipped 
back into the country. When word of his return reached the 
government orders for his arrest were issued and a number of 
his resetters were taken and hung. Seeing that time had not 
mellowed the king's determination to punish him, Maxwell fled 
north to Caithness from where he intended to take a ship to 
Sweden, but the earl of Caithness saw in Maxwell an opportunity 
to ingratiate himself with the king, tricked }~xwell into putting 
his trust in him, and abused that trust to have him captured and 
222. A.P.S., iv, p 411-2, p 413, p 450; Melrose, i, p 67. 
223. Further investigations of the murder were carried out, 
R.P.C., viii, p 300, 805-07. Maxwell was tried in his 
absence, Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 32-41~ Further 
actions taken against other Maxwells, R.P.C., viii, p 346, 
p 348. Execution of Maxwell's friend Douglas of Lincluden, 
Pltcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 90-95. 
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taken as a prisoner to Edinburgh.224 
His presence there caused the government a major 
embarrassment, for while Maxwell stood under sentence of 
death, no Scottish nobleman had been executed in Scotland 
since 1584, and that for conspiring against the tough 
earl of Arran who was then chancellor. To execute Maxwe11 
for murder would be to take a step which the Scottish nobility 
were scarcely likely to sanction and so the privy council 
approached the Johnstone family and asked them if they would 
accept assythment or some other punishment. Unfortunately 
the young 'laird, his mother and kinsmen were adamant that 
they wanted Maxwell's head.225 Disappointed by this, the 
council wrote to the king, asking what his will in the matter 
was and including with their own letter a petition . from 
Maxwell's brother expressing the former lord ~~xwell's 
. 226 
repentance and his willingness to make amends. The offer 
was a very reasonable one, and even in 1613 others were still 
avoiding criminal prosecution in just such a way, but the 
king's response was simply to write and express his surprise 
that }~xwell was still a1ive.227 There was to be no reprieve, 
and on the 18th of May 1613 the privy council gave up the 
fight to save Maxwel1's life, issuing a warrant to the provost 
. 
224. R.P.C., ix, p 359-60, p 363, p 378; Pitcairn, Crimina~ 
Trials, iii, p 223-24; Gordon, Suthe~~, p 287-89. 
225. R.P.C., x, p 29 •. 
226. Pitcairn, Criminal.Trial{!, iii, p 50-52 • 
. 
227. 1i:f&:., x, p 44.' 
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and baillies of Edinburgh to "tak the lait Lord MaX'vJCll to 
thair mercot croce upon xxj of this instant, and thair to 
caus strik his head from his body". 228 In the remaining 
three days the council and ministry of the burgh sought 
only to save his soul, but while Haxwell had many talks 
with the latter, like his father he professed "not to be of 
thair religioun, but ane Catholik Romane". To everyone's· 
relief he agreed not to make his scaffold speech an occasion 
for catholic propaganda, but plead with the king to restore 
his brother to his title, asked forgiveness of the Johnstonels, 
while holding to the story that he did not kill Johnstone in 
cold blood but in the heat of the moment, and finally asked 
forgiveness of his friends upon whom he had brought hardship 
and dishonour. After this declaration before the magistrates 
and assembled friends he was taken out to the scaffold where 
he died with perhaps more dignity than he had lived.229 
In some respects lord 11axwell' s execution does not belong 
in this chapter, but somewhere in the following two where the 
uprooting of the feud is discussed. His death was after all 
not occasioned by the fact that he committed murder, but by 
the fact that he deliberately rekindled a feud after the king 
and his councillors had, with some effort, laid it to rest.2)0 
228. W.MacDowell, HistorI o~~Burgh.or Dumrrie~, p 292. 
229. ibid., p 292; Pitcairn, qriminal Trials, iii, p 52; 
Balfour, "Annales", ii, p 42. 
230. Perhaps 11axwell would have benefitted from the advice Njal 
gave to Gunnar in the twelfth century saga called after his 
name, thus, he said "Never kill more than once in the same 
family; and never break any settlement which good men have 
made between you and others. ", N.1al's Saga, p 135. 
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To some his death has come to symbolise a victory for the 
Scottish crown over the magnates ,and there is some truth in 
that assertion. One can make too much of the incident though, 
and it remains an isolated case and as such cannot really be 
brought into any king v nobles equasion. After all James V 
had executed the master of Forbes for similar behaviour in 
the early sixteenth century and few would argue that his death 
symbolised any great victory for the crown. As it was James 
was forced to compromise on the issue, being initially forced 
to accept a rather belated forfeiture, and then,. after 
Maxwell's unlucky capture, found his privy council consistently 
opposed to the execution. If there had been a revolution in 
government, it had not extended to the extreme punishment of 
noblemen and the crown officials of 1613 proved themselves to 
be more conservative in this question than Arran had been 
thirty years before. MBxwell died because he was messing up 
the king's image as the ruler who had put an end to feuding 
in Scotland, an image which was well tarnished anyway,but 
which could not afford the embarrassment of the re-opening 
of one of the major feuds of the kingdom, especially on the 
English border. Scots had a bad enough reputation in London 
at this time; lord Sanquhar having been executed there in 
June 1612. Maxwe11's death was an example, not to the Scottish 
nobility in Scotland, but to James' critics in London. To 
the government in Edinburgh the whole affair was one which 
they' would have gladly washed their hands of, and it had 




of their administration. Maxwell himself was no better or worse 
than his contemporaries, but while they had come to recognise 
the Indian Summer of the feud and to acquiesce in its demise, 
he failed to perceive that while feuds continued and the 
values of the feud were still held by many, court society, 
and the king in particular, would no longer tolerate such 
blatant flouting of legislation passed to extinguish 
feuding. 23l 
However, this is perhaps to digress too much into the 
theme of the next two chapters. Ten years after V~xwell's 
death the laird of Johnstone and the former's brother,by 
then restored to his titles as earl of Nithsdale, finally 
ended their feud. The feud had lasted close to fifty years, 
having been born in lord Maxwell's appointment to the wardenry 
in 1573, and being settled in 1623. Some of the issues 
raised by a discussion of this great feud are repetitions 
of points made earlier, the importance of the locality, 
the interplay of local and national politics, the formation 
of faction and the politics of feud, have all been dealt with 
already, and this chapter has reinforced much of what has 
already been said with evidence from another of the three 
important regions of Scotland, the borders. 
231. The poem "Lord Maxwell's Goodnight" was ostensibly written 
by him some time between 1608-13 and certainly epitomises 
his thinking. Thus "Though I have slain the Lord Johnstone,/ 
What care I for their feid?/My noble mind their wrath 
. disdains:/He was my father's deid./Both night and day I 
laboure~ oft/Of him aveOJed to be:/But now I've got what 
lang I sought,/And I may not stay with thee~'Minstrelx, 
ii, p 177. 
Hopefully the integration of border politics and border 
values with those of the remainder of the country will be 
more apparent from the study of this feud. Furthermore, 
while less has been made of it than one might, the pacification 
of the Maxwell-Johnstone feud was well under way between 1597~ 
1603, and while the Union of the Crowns perhaps hastened the 
process, too much has been made of tJ:?e civilising effect of 
that event. The Union facilitated what was already in 
progress, it did not in itself initiate any great change on 
the border where feud was concerned. 
More specifically the feud had a greater international 
edge to it than most. Border politics was played out in 
the context of Maxwell and Johnstone, of Hamilton and Stewart, 
and of Spain or England, catholic or protestant. Feud on the 
Scottish marches was not only of concern to the government in 
Edinburgh, but also in London. Asheby might smugly write that 
Ita riot in England has a greater fine than high treason here", 
but the English government was keen to exploit such a state 
of affairs and encouraged feuding.232 Thus, when in 1600 the 
feuds of the west march were largely pacified by Angus and 
Carmichae1, Lowther reported that "their private quarrels 
assured, there is more danger to our border", while another 
commentator gleefully described the Maxwe11-Johnstone feud 
as a "weakeninge of Scotlande and a strength to England".233 
/ 
232. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 137. 
233. C.B.P., ii, P 647; i, p 394. 
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However, it was not only on the borders that England had an 
interest in the factious divisions of Scottish society. Cecil 
was advised that "It were the best service that ever was that 
the rebels and the Islanders could be brought to blood and 
feuds and it would do her Magesty more pleasure against the 
rebels than the employment of 10,000 men. n234 English security 
in Ireland could thus be strengthened by opening up feuds .betHeen 
the rebel clans of north-west Ireland and·the Scottish is~ands. 
The king's reforms and attempts to reconcile feuding were thus 
often against English interests as the Elizabethan privy council 
observed in 1600 in its instructions to Nicolson 
" ••• yet if by any late agreements or compositions of 
feuds any old enmities be reconciled you can well judge 
that in such a case her Majesty may be abused and no 
service done. For prevention wherof it belongs to you 
more than any other to be useful, because you are in 
the place where YQU may learn particulars which are 
to us unknown."2j , 
Such meddling could, as Bowes pointed out, be highly dangerous. 
During his' interference in B othw ell , s affairs he thought 11 the 
feud is like to fall on me ••• ,,236,but dangerous or not, it 
was certainly a useful tool of English diplomacy. Obviously 
it could be just as us eful when used to reconcile "well 
affected" noblemen whose friemship would further the interests 
of England. In 1580 Hunsdon was told to establish a pro-
English party by compounding the feuds of those who would be 
useful converts to that cause, and in 1583 cross-border feuds 
j 
234. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 625. 
235. ibid., p 724. 
236. ibid, x, p 732. 
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were ordered to be dealt with since they \-lere dangerous to 
the peace between the two realms. 237 
Security was of course at the basis of such interference. 
At the most fundamental level the English marches themselves 
were safer as long as the Scots \-Iare more concerned with 
killing one another, but there 'Were obvio'J.sly wider strategic 
issues at stake. The connection between I.reland and tbe north-
west coast was clearly one area of primary concern and the other 
was the Scottish border from \-1~ich EntSland itself could be 
threatened. Hence the great English interest in lord Ha.."twell 
during the years of hls most intense involvement wit.h Spain, 
years when Philip 11 also appreciated the value of a powerful 
catholic nobleman on the very edge of English soil. \-lhat 
difference to the struggle between England and Spain it would 
have made if Parma had accepted }~xwel1Is plans in 1586 is 
pure conjecture, but this picture of a Scottish catholic 
nobleman thinking in the grandest of European terms should not 
be obscured by his failure. While Arran WDS more dangerous 
than Haxwell, the latter proved a useful ally and hence the 
satellite diplomacy of 1585, but when he himself became the 
major threat to England, support for him was dropped and one 
can assume that English inte~ligence was filtered back to James VI 
and had some part in his swift action against Maxwell. 
The feud between V~xwell and Johnstone contained 
enough heat for it to have raged ~ithout external help from 
237. C.S.P.Scot., v, p 543; vi, p 586. 
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international powers or court politicians, but the interference 
was still there. Spain was financing much of Maxwell' s military 
preparations, and as a friend of Bothwell and opponent of 
,Maxwell's, the younger of the Johnstone lairds was given 
English protection while an outlaw and it was well known that-
the English Grahams rode with him. Feuding societies are much 
more at the mercy of outside exploitation than other societies. 
Thus one family split another by setting its parts against" one 
another in intra-kin feuds, one noble divided a neighbour 
against his dependants, the king ruled a region by playing on 
the competition of its leading noblemen, and, not surprisingly, 
an external power has available to it a great deal of leverage 
through the opportunities these divisions offer for skilled 
diplomats and statesmen. In the great struggle between Spain 
and England, the politics of the Scottish west march were of 
minor significance, but they were related. The defeat of 
lord Maxwell was, however small, a blo'l1 to Spain, am having 
a Johnstone as Scottish warden was an advantage to England. 
Whether the opposing factions and the blood-feuds in Scottish 
society were between Comyns and Bruces in the fourteenth 
century, Hamiltons and Douglases in the early sixteenth century 
or 1-1axwells and Johnstones in the latter half of the century, the 
fissures they opened up were ?pportunities to be grasped by 
England just as James II so astutely exploited the English 
Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century. Asheby's comment 
that "These feuds make them poor and dividedll238 was known to 
238. ~S.P.Scot., x, p 122. 
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be true by the Scottish king and was, as James VI himself 
pointed out, yet another reason why he had set himself the 
task of eradicating the feuds for ever.239 
. 
239. See above vol ii, p 445. 
UPROOTING THE FEUD 1: 
LEGISLATION AND EXECUTION 
5490 
Sixteenth century governments were not interventionist 
in the way one has come to expect governments to be today and 
even fairly centralised states left the greater part of their 
peoples' lives to be worked out in the localities. During 
the reign of James VI, however, one does begin to find an 
increasing amount of legislation concerned with law and order, 
one of the fundamental concerns of any organised state, and 
at the same time an enhanced ability to enforce that legislation. 
One can make much too much of this, and some have, but while 
the reign of James VI certainly did not see a revolution 
taking place in government and in its role in society, it 
did see change on a scale which contrasted with earlier 
periods. 
Legislation dealing with feuds and the feud environment 
was itself sUbstantial. James VI himself appreciated that 
one could not simply pass laws against feuding, but had to 
deal with related matters like gun control, duelling, 
retaining, outlawry and other factors which were contributory 
to the feuding environment and thus, while there are only 
three acts specificslly concerned with feud, there is a vast 
amount of legislation which was directly or indirectly related 
to it. This is not to say that the king and his Officials 
had a blue-print for the eradication of feuding, far from it. 
Their legislative programme was evolutionary, progressing in 
fits and starts, and the corpus of new laws created oiten had 
to live side by side with customs and practices they were 
designed to replace. In its attitude to feuding, as in so 
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many other aspects of society, one finds in the early modern 
government that overlapping of medieval and modern which is 
its most recognisable characteristic. 
The first attempt by a Scottish government of the period 
to do anything positive about feuding was during 1578-81 when 
parliament interfered in the Gordon-Forbes feud. The political 
reasons for why this feud was so important have already been 
discussed, but some of the principles established there were 
to become the foundations upon which later legislation rested. 
In 1578 parliament appointed a commission of eight men to act 
as arbitrators in settling the differences between the two 
feuding families and this prinCiple was maintained in 1579 
when parliament approved of some alternative among the 
personnel of the commission. Six months later, and with 
nothing apparently decided, the privy council permitted the 
Gordons and Forbes to name their own arbitrators with the 
proviso that if they had failed to come up with an acceptable 
solution, approved by a majority of the arbitrators, then the 
king would appoint a committee of privy councillors to do the 
job. The feud. had DY then been passed through three parliaments 
and onto the privy council which had handed it back to the 
families involved for a limited period only. In 1581 this 
point about the king acting as oversman was ratified by 
parliament and on this basis those aspects of the feud which 
had a bearing on the civil wer settlement were decided. l 
1. A.P.S., iii, p 1l2-14, p 164-65, p 230-31; R.P.C., iii, 
P 278. 
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While this was a completely isolated case which had arisen 
because of its political context, this idea of private 
arbitration followed by the king acting as oversman when 
arbitration failed, was to later be embodied in the feud 
legislation of 1595, 1598 and 1604. 
While personnel is dealt with more specifically in 
the following chapter,one cannot avoid the observation that 
this arrangement, ad hoc though it was, came about during a 
period of factious noble rule. Furthermore, the much criticised 
Scottish nobility were concerned with law and order at a more 
general level. In 1582 the privy council, then dominated by the 
Lennox-Argyll factions, expressed its concern for the state of 
the realm, wracked by bloodshed, oppression and violence, and 
established special justiciary courts to be held throughout 
the kingdom. The council also drew particular attention to 
feuding in the west of Scotland, stating that "becaus of sindre 
deidlie feidis, grudgeis and displeasures standing betuix sindre 
gret personis, thair freindis and partakers, throw bloodsheid 
and uther inconvenientis happinit amangis theme", all sorts ot 
disorder had resulted. The participants of eight separate 
feuds were thus ordered to give mutual assurances before a 
certain date. As far as is known no-one paid any heed to the 
order and it may even have been the caus e of some of the parties 
subject to it joining Gowrie in his coup shortlyafterwards.2 
However, the new government maintained some of the momentum 
2. R.P.C., iii, p 500-0). 
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of this initiative. A convention in February 1583 drew up 
a band in which the nobles agreed to 
"assure eache one others, to be unhurt, unharmed, molested, 
persued, or in anie wise invaded, ather for old feed or 
new, otherwise than by ordinar course of law and justice; 
nather saIl we, nor anie that we may lett, make provocatioun 
of trouble, displeasure, or tumult, in word, deid or 
countenance ••• " 
They all promised moreover that they would within forty days 
submit their feuds to the king who with the advice of his 
privy council, would appoint arbitrators to mediate the feud o 
A~ party which refused to submit to this process, or accept 
the findings of the arbitration, would be ostracised by all 
the otherso3 Royal interference in private feuds was again 
being tacitly acknowledged, though no sooner was the ink of 
the bond dry than it was forgotten about. Essentially the 
1583 bond was a political device by the Ruthven administration 
to have the new status quo accepted by binding the nobility 
not to tolerate any further in-fighting and to break all other 
political bonds they had. 
Yet, while politics may have been the dominant motivation 
of the minority governments, they were by no means impervious 
to their responsibilities. Concern for the violent environment 
had prompted the 1567 government to pass an act making dismember-
ment the punishment for fire-arms offences and in 1574 it was 
recognised that this law had never been implemented, possibly 
because it had been too severe. Amputations were thus 
3. Calderwood, HistorY, 11i, p 700-02. 
553. 
reserved only for those who shot at someone, whether they hit 
them or not; death being the penalty if they killed them, lesser 
punishments of imprisonment and fines being imposed for the 
illegal wearing of guns. 4 On the whole the law was again 
ignored, particularly during the unsettled period of 1578-79 
when a number of proclamations were issued against the wide-
spread use of fire-arms,5 In 1579 parliament again discussed 
the issue and decided that it was still the harshness of the 
law which was the cause for so few prosecutions and the act 
was amended to give magistrates greater discretionary powers 
in its implementation, There were some prosecutions under 
the terms of this legislation, but on the whole it had little 
effect on the gun-t.oting nobility and their armed followers 
who continued to give little respect to the proclamations 
issued to enforce legislation they themselves had been 
instrumental in making law.6 
Other related matters were also given some consideration 
by the minority governments. In 1580 it was pointed out that 
while prlvate combats were still legal where ttna uther triall 
is to be had" they continued to be practlsed for lesser causes. 
The council, therefore, outlawed the sending of "ony infamous 
libellis or utheris, or to appoint or keip tr,ystis for the 
combat" unless a royal licence had been obtained.7 Convocations 
4. AsP,S., iil, P 84-8§. 
5, R.P.C., ii, p 681-83; iil, p 105, P 175, 
6. A.P,S., 111, p 146; i.p,O., 111, p 327; for prosecutions 
see Pitca1rn, Criminal Trials, 1, part 2, p 98-100. 
7. R.P.C., iii, p 333. 
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also came under scrutiny and a new measure was introduced in 
1579 to combat the evils of attending court with large armed 
bands of followers and this was repeated in 1581.8 The 
effectiveness of horning was also looked at and in 1573 local 
sheriffs were instructed in how to co-operate better with 
the treasurer by having lists of horned men in their areas 
published. In 1579 parliament repeated the complaint that 
letters of horning received scant regard, rather like parking 
tickets today. Further efforts were made to oil the wheels 
of the bureaucracy that dealt with them,with the main thrust 
of the reform being the enhanced supervisory powers of central 
government departments like the treasurer's over local officers.9 
Efforts were similarly made to cut down the abuses within the 
patronage system and in 1582 all commissions granted since 
1578 were nullified as too many privy ones had been issued 
by the young king without proper regard being given to their 
't 10 mer~ • 
The majority of this legislation passed during the minority 
years was completely ineffective, but it was passed and it says 
something about the responsible way in which minority government, 
so often castigated, could act. However factious their politics 
might be, when in !toffice" the Scottish noblemen were conscious 
of their role in the community as men with a mandate to govern 
in the interests not only ot their kindred and faction, but of 
the whole community. However, if one remembers the graph ln 
8. R.P.C., 111, P 173, P 487. 
9. R.P.C., li, p 304-05; A.P,S., iii, p 142-43. 
10. R.P.C., iii, p 326, p 510-110 
555. 
the introduction, feuding was on the increase during these 
years and even when the king began to take a more commanding 
role in the affairs of his realm he was to find that his 
early legislation was equally disregarded. This was certainly 
true of his rather naive and theatrical attempt to reconcile 
his feuding nobles in 1587 in an agreement similar to that 
of 1583. Discussion of the problem of the feuds came to 
the fore in the spring of that year when it was proposed that 
"gif parteis having discension not eslie to be reconcelit 
will not subject thame selfis and kynnisfolk commandit to 
obey the chargeis of tua newtrall persones ••• ", but this was 
far too extreme a suggestion and the king was in no position 
to force the issue in 1587, having to await another eight years 
11 before he was able to have it incorporated in any legislation. 
What finally emerged in 1587 then,was a grand banquet of 
the nobility at which they renounced their feuds with one 
another amidst a setting of pageantry and symbolism. 
"Upon the xv day of Mai, the King maid the banchet to 
all his nobiletie, at ewin in Halyroudhouse, quhair the 
King maid thame, etter drinking of Dl8!l7 scolis ane to 
ane uther, and made theme etter supper, quho utherwayis 
had beine at great fead, tak twa and twa be handis, and 
pas from Halyroudhouse to the merket croce of Edinburgh, 
quhair the provost and baillies had prepaired ane table 
and desert for his MSjest1e, at the quhllk theare was 
great mirthe and joy, with sik ane great number of pepill 
as the lyke had not beine seine of befoir. n12 
As one might expect, this temporal communion had no etrect 
11. C.S.P.Scot., ix, P 398. 
12. Moysie, Memoirs, p 63. See alsO, Balfour, Aple., 1, 
p 385; Birrel "DlarT', p 24; Calderwood, HlstoU, iv, 
p 613-14. 
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at all on the hard-headed Scottish nobility, apart no doubt 
from a few hangovers the next day. Two months later parliament 
tried to give more substance to such theatricals with an "Act 
for Universal Concord Among the King's Lieges", but this 
innocuous piece of legislation did no more than state that 
the quarrels among the nobility had proceeded from "the comoun 
trublis and civile wairis quhairwith this cuntrie hes bene 
havelie plagit", and proclaimed that the privy council would 
make friends of those who were enemies and inflict "scharpe 
justice" on thos who refused to conform.13 It was all simply 
blowing in the wind and no-one had the slightest idea how to 
implement such proposals. Like the burst of interest in 
1582-83, that of 1587 passed with the number of feuds and 
the level of violence in the country increasing each year. 
Between 1587-95 the king was too engrossed in the struggle 
with Bothwell and Huntly and feuds became too necessary as a 
tool to control rival factions for it to have been even 
possible to think much about abolishing them. Law and order 
was not abandoned however, and an act was passed in 1588 to 
provide for better administration of justice, while general 
bands in 1589 and 1591 were implemented to try and force 
landowners to keep better control of their men b.T making 
them responsible for their acts.14 It was only scratching at 
what seemed to be an ever expanding surface and in 1591 the 
13. A.P.S., iii, p 458. 
14. C.S,P.Scot., ix, p 629-34; R.P.C., iv, p 448. For the 
1591 band see R.P.C., for Nov-Dec 1591 and C,S.P.Scot., 
x, P 585. 
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council almost despairingly wrote of the "multitude of deidlie 
feidis" in which opposing parties "tak their privat revenge 
and advantage of utheris, disdaining to seik remeid be the 
ordinair forme of law and justice, ~ithout fear of God or 
reverance of his authoritie".15 Yet, as one shall see in the 
following chapter, in its apparent impotence to do anything 
about feuding the council had, in its reference to God, the 
king and the law, hit upon the ideological basis for the 
crown's attack upon feud which was to gain eratic momentum 
after 1595. 
The catalyst for the king's activity in 1595 was an 
external threat. Towards the end of that year there was a 
real or contrived fear of a Spanish invasion which it was felt 
could not be repelled unless the nobility healed their feuds 
and united to meet the common foe. At a convention of the 
nobility in November - feuding was to be consistently dealt 
with at conventions, not parliaments, presumably because they 
were more manageable - it was decreed that because feuding had 
reached such awful proportions that the king would set himself 
the task of mediating the more significant ones and that those 
who refused to accept his mediation would be imprisoned. It 
was in effect a repeat of the proposal which had failed in 
1587 and was only passed in the midst of a panic, being 
"provided upon the resisting of foreign enemies". Lesser 
feuds were to be compounded by sheriffs in co-operation with 
local barons and pres'byteries. This act, passed. "to the 
15. R.P.C., iv, p 686. 
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advancement of his Majesties authoritie and service", and 
"to the ",i thstanding of the pUblict and foreyne inemy", was 
the first major step along a road which would lead to the 
eventual outlawing of feud altogether. As such it was a 
fairly moderate beginning, having the dubious status of an 
emergency measure and lacking any real means of enforcement. 
At most it was a recognition of the king's right to act as 
an overlord over his feuding nobles just as those same men 
did when their own dependants were at feud. As such it was 
dependant upon the king's inclination to get on with the job. 
The privy council did summon the principals of seven feuds, 
including four of the major feuds of the country, to appear 
on specified days to exchange assurances and to submit their 
feuds to arbitration, but the order was either boycotted or 
circumscribed and the act became another dead letter. Some 
minor progress was made in bringing parties to sign limited 
assurances and a committee was formed of two nobles, two 
councillors and two ministers to administer the work, but 
as long as they lacked any meaningful enforcement powers they 
were nothing more than a moribund quango.16 
The act of 1598 was much more substantial and more clearly 
thought out. In May that year it was observed, probably with 
some exaggeration, that "almost all feuds in Scotland are 
renewed so dangerously as this country was not under such 
appearance of trouble these 20 years". In other words nothing 
had been achieved by the 1595 act. However, it was already 
16. C.S,P.Scot., xii, p 73, p 87; R.P.C., v, p 246-49. 
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known that the impending convention intended to make law and 
order one of the major issues under discussion with the feuds 
in particular being given yet another examination. The nobles 
were informed in advance that their feuds were going to be 
discussed and many of the royal officials had warned the 
king that matters were getting completely out of hand and 
that if he wanted them to do anything about the lawlessness 
of the kingdom, then he would have to be more determined to 
back up a~ legislation with his authority. The king's 
commitment to the removal of feuding was unquestionable, but 
his tendency to be easily distracted and to be remarkably 
tolerant of his nobles had contributed to undermining his own 
legislation in 1595, but this strike threat from his officials 
was sufficient to inspire him to one of those frenzies of 
work of which he was highly capable.17 
The convention was held in Edinburgh and was relatively 
well attended by the nobility. The burgh had to make all 
the usual preparations to avoid an outbreak of violence for 
there were ma~ like lords Hamilton and Livingston who 
ignored the restrictions on retinues and rode into town 
with four hundred men at their backs instead of the twelve 
stipulated. It was thus in an atmosphere of tension, amidst 
the cramped living conditions of the burgh, in the middle of 
summer and with feuding nobles living on top of one another 
and going through all the ritual of brinkmanship, that the 
17. C.S.P.Scot., xii, part 1, p 214. This contrasts sharp1~ 
with the news in 1595 that all feuds had been 'compounded', 
C.S,P.Scot. xi, p 511. 
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convention met. Behind the scenes the king was showing a 
great deal of interest in the organising of the convention's 
business, putting final touches to the act and working to 
reconcile some of the feuding nobles who were present in the 
burgh at the time. One had here a revealing picture of the 
Scottish monarchy with the king and his advisors going over 
the details of a legislative programme at one moment and then 
James spending a few hours with the likes of Mar and Livingston, 
trying to persuade them to accept mediation. Bureaucracy and 
lordship were fused in the functions of the crown. 
The act did not, however, have an easy passage and some 
analysis of the composition of the convention is necessary. 
Attendance at a convention was not by right, as parliament was, 
but by invitation of the king and thus what one has was already 
a rather carefully managed affair with a preponderance of men 
on whom the king could count, as well as the presence of those 
too powerful to be ignored. There were, therefore, nine 
government officials present, the representatives of five burghs, 
three bishops,and five men who had been rewarded with the 
temporalities of pre-Reformation abbacies for service to the 
king. These twenty-two would almost certainly have backed 
any crown initiated legislation which was essentially why 
they were there in the first place. The remaining twenty-
five, the duke of Lennox, lord Hamilton, seven earls, nine 
lords and seven lairds, had to be persuaded, and as men 
deeply involved in feuds at every level they were difficult 
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to convince. Of the nobles Lennox, Hamilton, Angus, Erroll, 
Marischall, Ca8sillis, Glencairn, Mar, Sutherland, Maxwell, 
Livingston, Spynie and Ochiltree were all either at that time 
or in the very recent past engaged in feuds of their own in 
which they were bound to resent any royal interference. Of 
the remaining nobles, Fleming, Seton, Fyvie (the future 
chancellor Dunfermline), Newbattle and Elphingstone, none of 
them were at feud and all of them had made, and continued to 
make, a career out of royal service. Finally, of the seven 
lairds, Tracquhair, Edzell and Sir George Home (the future Dunbar), 
were again all men committed to the crown; Tullibardine, Dudope 
and Roisling were men of little importance, and though the 
powerful Mackenzie of Kintail had more feuds than most, he too 
made his fortune by at least appearing to work for his royal 
master. Clearly, then, the king had a majority, probably being 
guaranteed at least thirty or more of the forty-seven votes in 
the convention. The opposition was led by the king's friend Mar, 
one of his most loyal and hard-working nobles, but a man who saw 
the act as a means to get him to settle his feud with the 
Livingstones and Bruces and he was able to rally the conservatism 
of the great nobles, an action which contributed to the 
chancellorship going to Montrose six months later. The king 
knew very well that the co-operation of his nobles was more 
important than a majority vote in the convention and "made many 
long and pithy harangues for persuading agreements amongst them 
all to regaird his services and good", but Mar had shown his 
stubbornness before then, and with his friends forced a 
division, so that "by plurality of votes it passed". It 
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was not the unanimous reception the king had hoped for, but the 
"Act Anent Removing and Extinglllshing of Deid1ie Feuds" had 
18 become law. 
From an analysis of the convention one must turn to the 
text of the act itself. Those parties at feud were to be 
charged to appear before the king and his council where ther 
had to submit their feud to two or three friends on either side 
(they could on occasion make a written submission). In the 
submission they would, as was customary, list their grievances 
and claims against the other party. The arbitrators would 
then be named by the parties themselves, not by the crown, 
and the practice of naming an excess number from whom the 
other side chose those it found acceptable also continued. 
This arbitration committee then had thirty days in which to 
make a decision or they could alternatively elect one of their 
number to act as an oversman and decide on the issues himself, 
but again within thirty days. If neither a settlement nor an 
oversman could be agreed upon then it was the duty of the 
arbitration committee to set out in writing their points of 
disagreement and submit these to the king who at this point 
became oversman himself. If the arbitrators failed to make 
this submission and simply abaldoned or dragged out their 
task then they were each to be fined a thousand pounds. A 
18. A.P.S., iv, p 158-59; C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 228-29. 
It is also of some significance who was not at the convention, 
i.e. men like Huntly, Argyll, Atholl, Montrose, Caithness, 
Crawford, Hume, Ogilvy, Forbes, Glamis and Drummond being 
the more important among them. 
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settlement of the feud vould then be dictated by the king 
himself, or by a committee of councillors appointed by him. 
This vould be delivered to the parties as a decreet arbitral 
against vhich there vas no appeal as vas also the case if the 
settlement was reached by arbitration. The decreet would then 
be registered by the government and given the status of a privy 
council act. In its form the act vas thus very conservative 
and introduced no new means of arriving at a feud settlement. 
The difference vith vhat had happened before vas that the king's 
povers to pressurise parties into an agreement vere increased. 
Where possible the feud vas to be left in private hands and 
only as a last resort did it fall to the crown to intervene 
in the settlement procedures, but at each stage, from the 
summons to submit to a decreet arbitral, the process was 
being hurried along by the crown in an effort to ensure 
that the feud was put to rest. 
The act then went on to define the terms of reference for 
invoking it. Feud was divided into three categories: where 
there had been no slaughter, where there had been slaughter 
on both sides and where there had only been slaughter on one 
side. In the first case the act was to be implemented in 
full, in the hope that such arbitration would prevent the 
feud escalating into something worse than it alrea~ was. 
Similarly, in the second case, in spite of the fact that 
slaughters had been committed and the criminal law thus 
seriously broken, the act would still be operational. This 
was an enormous concession to custom since it recognised the 
trial and punishment of killers by private justice rather 
than before the king's justice courts. In both the above cases 
other crimes, like theft, destruction of crops and property 
and mutilation, were also left in private hands. Only where 
slaughter had been on one side did the crown reserve for 
itself the right to intervene, being unable to "refuis in 
resoun to submit in maner foirsaid all querrell he can beir 
to ony persoun Innocentll. The offended party was specifically 
refused permission to take revenge on the innocent kinsmen or 
servants of the murderer and the party pursued at law for such 
crimes was only to defend itself at law and not in any other 
manner. When the offender was finally punished by the law 
the quarrel was to cease, though even in this category room 
was left for the parties to come to a private agreement before 
the affair reached that stage. Anyone with a capital offence 
was given forty days from the publication of the act in the 
head burgh of their shire to execute letters against their 
enemies and insist on pursuit by law, failure to do so resulting 
in their opportunity to do so being lost for all time and their 
having to submit their quarrel to the terms of the act above. 
Even here one had a very modest assertion of the place of the third 
party in the establishment of justice. The aim of this clause 
was not to increase the role of the justice court, but to 
prevent the taking of revenge. More significant in this 
respect was the clause which asserted that if the private party 
failed to take the case to law or decided to settle for arbitration, 
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then the king reserved the right to pursue in his own action. 
While this was again not new, it did emphasise the king's right 
to do so and increasingly in the years which followed lord 
advocate Hamilton exploited this avenue to increase the amount 
of crime being subjected to royal justice. Finally, the act 
allowed the injured party to demand a trial even after a 
settlement had been reached if new evidence had subsequently 
been uncovered. Guidelines were established for the conduct 
of the trial with warnings about limiting attendants, 
specifications on sanctions to be imposed on those Who 
failed to appear and strictures not to treat the trial as 
a means of acquiring vengeance. On its passage the nobles 
present swore to uphold the act and the king swore not to 
grant respites or remissions which could undermine the 
working of much of this last section.19 
This act formed the main thrust of the crown's campaign 
against feuding. The most striking point about it is clearly 
its conservatism, for while the door was left open for royal 
prosecutions in the last category of feuds, the basis of the 
act was to encourage private mediation or private prosecution. 
Furthermore, the majority of existing feuds were those 
involving slaughter on both sides and there were obvious 
loopholes such as an injured party going out and killing 
in revenge and thus making a feud of the third category 
into one of mutual slaughter. Why, after all, should anyone 
19. A.P,S., iv, p 158-59. 
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whose kinsman had been killed be satisfied with judicial 
punishment when private revenge was more satisfying and probably 
more efficient? The king might try to prosecute both parties 
for their crime, but that would not end the feud, which was 
precisely why feuds with mutual killings were left to 
arbitration. Furthermore, in such a cBse an execution might 
satisfy the injured party, but there was no guarantee that 
the criminal's kin would accept that that was the end of the 
matter and they might still insist on revenge of their own 
whatever the consequences. However, in spite of these and 
other weaknesses the act was an important piece of legislation, 
and its emphasis on persuasion rather than coercion and the 
flexibility with which it was implemented were to ultimately 
make it a success. A more assertive piece of legislation 
would, apart from having even greater difficulty in getting 
passed, very probably have failed completely because of 
hostility to it. As it was the act left private rights intact 
and invoked the king's authority largely to increase the 
efficiency of the settlement procedure and to prevent the 
growth of new feuds, not to establish anJ interference in 
existing ones. 
Application of the act from 1598-1603 was fairly intense, 
the act having been given a further reading before parliament 
in 1600 and thus becoming statute law.20 In 1604, b1 which 
time a great ma~ of the feuds of noblemen had been settled, 
20. A.P.S., iv, p 233-35. There was no opposition to the act 
in 1600, its passage being managed by the lords of the 
articles. 
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the king felt confident enough to extend his powers over the 
settlement procedure and on the 5th of January the privy council 
passed a third act concerned with feuds. The 1604 act resulted 
from criticisms that the king himself levelled against the 
privy council and the 1592 process. James instructed the 
council to compile a list of outstanding feuds and have the 
parties involved appear before it to conform to the 1592 act, 
but, he added, he considered that the taking of assurances 
was "rather ane fosterar nor removear of the same", on the 
grounds that an assurance implied a "grant and confessioun of 
ane feid and querre11". What James was saying now was that in 
allowing this practice to continue the crown was recognising 
the legitimac~ of feud, causing "privat presumptioun" and 
"derogating" the king's authorit~ am the protection of his 
subjects which was his duty 
"as gif the law did (not) astrict ony man to keip his 
Majesties peice, bot the respect and regaird of their 
awin particular band of assurance, sould move thame 
thairto, and as gif, at the ische and exp~ing thairof, 
full 1ibertie and licence wer grantit unto theme without 
controlment of reposse to do quhat they list." 
In future, therefore, when a party felt it had a grievance 
against another it would bring its complaint to the council 
which would, as it always had, adjudge whether it was legitimate 
or not. The council would then warn the offended party not to 
try and exact private revenge and would bind it, or both 
parties where possible, to keep the peace, taking sureties 
as it thought necessary. In return, the council would be 
responsible for guaranteeing that the accused party would be -
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pursued by the crO\oln and that the king \olould not urrler any 
condition grant a respite or remission. The offended party 
\olould be asked if they bore "ony querrell grudge or inimitie 
againis the kin, freindis or surname of the offendour being 
innocent and saikles of the deid committit". If any of them, 
or any of the other party \olhich had also been summoned, 
failed to satisfy the council that they \olould not seek revenge, 
they could be imprisoned and fined "greit and huge sowmes". 
Any indication of such behaviour \olas to be considered an 
insult to the king and "maist baist1ie and detaistab1e, and 
21 incredible to be in the persone of ane ressonable man". 
Here the crO\oln was taking up a much more hostile attitude 
to feuding than it had in 1598 and,while it was still making 
prevention of new feuds the main area of its concern, there 
had been a fairly important shift in its position over the 
intervening six years. The point that the king and his 
councillors were trying to drive home was that while 
existing feuds would continue to be dealt with under 1598 
legislation, in future there would be no feuds, only crimes, 
criminals and victims, the status of which would be decided 
by royal justice. The third party, the state, had finally 
seized the initiative and taken the offensive. This did not 
mean an immediate change in 1604, the crown i tse1t continued 
to sponsor private arbitrations long after that date, even in 
21 .. RtP,C., vi, p 594-96, The very fact that this act was 
passed by the privy council and not by a convention or 
parliament is an indication of there now being less 
noble opposition than in 1598 .. 
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cases where slaughter was involved, but the act marked an 
irrevocable stance against the ideology and practice of the 
feud and together with the 1598 act the beginning of the triumph 
of the justice of the state over the justice of the kindred and 
the lordo 
It would be a gross misrepresentation of events to 
imagine that the passing of this legislation produced immediate 
change either in the amount of feuding or in the means by which 
peace was brought to the feud. If the legislation was cons er-
vative, its implementation was even moreso. After 1598 one 
finds more frequent charges to parties to assure one another 
and the instances of the renewal of assurances at the end of 
the year suggest that records were being kept in the advocate's 
or treasurer's offices of progress in the peace making procedure. 
However, cases like that of lord Maxwe11 and John Crichton of 
Crawfordston,who renewed their assurances periodically between 
1599 and 1607, suggest that there was little urgency about 
moving from this stage to mediation.22 The 1604 act did of 
course lay greater emphasis on keeping the peace, and one does 
find more of this, particularly after the commissioning of 
justices of the peace in 1609. Thus in 1618, John Dalg1ish 
of Durchair and the sons of Scott of Infaseuch were ordered 
to keep the peace in respect of the hatred between them, but 
in spite of the success of this as a preventative measure, 
the privy council continued to use assurances widely for 
22. R,P.C., vi, p 44; vii, p 295-96, p 738. 
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most cases which had reached the stage of feud. 23 
Presumably the feeling was that while the 1604 act had 
made important advances for royal authority in theory, as 
long as men put more faith in their private word of honour 
than obedience to the king's law, then in the interests of 
achieving the best results it was best to continue with 
assurances. Even on its own terms it was a system which 
was far from foolproof and one continued to get complaints 
about the behaviour of one or other party, or complications 
over interpretation, but it remained the best that Jacobean 
Scotland could offer and most of the time it did work.24 
Those like Gordon of Lochinvar and his enemies, Vaus of 
Longcast1e and Stewart of Dundurf, whose assurance broke 
down because the former killed George stewart of Dunduf'f 
while under assurance, could be pressurised by the more 
efficient horning system, the royal guards and the combination 
of privy council,treasurer and advocate to renew their 
assurances after only a few years.25 What allowed these 
pressures to work so much better was, apart from the reform 
outlined below, the removal of opposition from the nobility 
who were on the whole convinced, cajoled, bribed and forced 
into co-operation with the king. Exceptions remained, but 
the noblest acquiescenCe allowed the crown to put more 
23. R.P.O., xi, P 417, P 452. 
24. ,For example see the cases in R.P.C., v, p 467, p 555-56; 
p 266-67. 
25. ~.P.C., vi, p 307-08, p 365; viii, p 61. 
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emphasis on lesser men and any refusal to co-operate with 
the crown at any stage in the pacification procedure was 
likely to bring about automatic denunciation by the privy 
council and, for most of the country, an enforcement of the 
terms of that denunciation.26 
Submission of the feud was thus not as immediate as the 
feud legislation might suggest, but during the decade after 
the 1598 act it became the norm for most feuds. As the 1598 
act had stated, arbitration remained largely in private hands, 
though it was fairly common to see a number of councillors or 
session judges being asked to represent private parties on 
such committees. Some like John Lundy of that Ilk aOO 
Andrew Murray of Balvaird did make a direct submission to 
the king who in this instance named arbitrators who were not 
government officials, but local men, thus handing the fead 
back to the locality on the understanding that the,y were 
doing the king's business.27 Again it was a sensible, 
pragmatic decision, made on the basis of the local men's 
greater understanding of the issues at stake than some Edinburgh 
lawyer or official might have. This is not to 8a1 that the 
crown could not be assertive,and those like Andrew Haitlie 
who refused to participate in a submission made by the rest 
of his kinsmen were denounced and isolated from them until 
26. For examples of such denunciations see Les1ie of Wardes 
in 1596, R.P.C., v, p 272 and Innes of Crombie in 1622, 
R.P.C., xiii, p 477. 
27. i.P.O" vi,p 8). 
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28 they conformed. The government's philosophy was one of 
taking each case individually and treating it according to 
the political implications involved or on the basis of whether 
they thought gradual persuasion would be more effective than 
rigorous application of law. On the whole it was a policy 
which worked, bringing the feuding parties by one road or 
another to the clasping of hands "in perfyte freindship and 
reconciliatioune" • 29 
In the decreets which resulted from such settlements one 
again sees the enormous conservatism of the government at 
work. In its settlement of the feud between Lekkie of that 
Ilk and the lairds of Dunrod and Calderwood during which the 
former's father had been killed, the council decided that 
certain lands should be transferred to Lekkie as assythment 
and that his daughter should be married to Calderwood's nearest 
male heir.30 The settlement was very typical of those described 
elsewhere, but what is interesting about it is that it was 
arranged by the privy council in 1622, a time when one has 
been led. to believe all vestiges of eustom had been clean 
·c 
swept away by the absolutist reformers of the Jacobean state. 
Such simplistic notions fail completely to appreciate the 
subtlety of the changes being effected and the flexibility 
which operated. freely within an environment in which custom 
and new laws which often embraced both traditional and 
28. R.P.C., vii, p 391-92. 
29. ibid., p 183. 
30. ~.P.C., xiii, p 112-14. 
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absolutist ideals lived side by side. This attitude is found 
underlying many incidents at the time. Thus in 1620, the 
Maxwell laird of Gararie and his son were accused of murder, 
but in spite of their being insufficient evidence to send 
them to trial, the Maxwells insisted upon one to clear their 
name. Surprisingly, the assize foWld them guilty and they 
were sentenced to death. On the scaffold father and son 
continued to protest their innocence, doing so even during 
their last prayer "under the aix". Such l!Ias their sincerity 
that their pursuers agreed with the magistrates to 8llol!l a 
stay of execution and "in effect ar agreit with thame". 
The privy council informed the king of this and asked for 
his permission to recognise their agreement and overrule 
the decision of the assize and he consented.)l In 1609 
an Andrel!l Henderson was found guilty of mutilating the hand 
of another Edinburgh burgess in a fight, but later offered 
him compensation for the injury. The injured man refused and 
insisted on pursuing Henderson for his life before the lal!l, 
but the friends of Henderson succeeded in bringing his story 
to the ears of the king who condemned the victim's "malicious 
and revengefull heate" and ordered the council to exile 
Henderson for whom eX8Cutionwas too severe and who had 
already been ruined by the affair. Once again the law was 
interpreted in a manner which was thought to be most socially 
31. Melrose, i, p 353-55, p 357-58. 
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As the king himself wrote to the council, what they were 
doing was implementing a legislative programme, but there 
was a considerable amount of freedom in how it was done.)) 
Too much stress has been laid on the idea of centralisation 
of government, of government by pen and on early absolutism 
when discussing Scotland after 1603, or in the case of some 
after 1585. There clearly were changes, and more of these 
will be discussed below, but there was no transformation and 
no wholesale rejection of what had gone before. Good lordship 
remained an essential ingredient of local government, a point 
the king reminded Huntly and Erroll of when their followers 
opened up a new feud in 1616-17. It was still their business 
as good lords to keep the peace between their followers, 
even if the details of settling the feud were no longer their 
responsibilitYo34 Kinship also continued to have a recognised 
place so that in 1606 when lord Roxburgh and Ker of Ancrum 
ended their feud in reconciliation, Ancrum's younger brothers 
reserved the right to pursue Roxburgh for their own satisfaction 
and that of any other member of the kindred who still felt 
32. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 58-60; R.P.C., viii, p 621. 
There were many other similar cases, e.g. Sinc1air of 
Longformaus and Spottiswoode of that Ilk in 1611, R.P .C. I 
viii, p 602-03, P 622. Furthermore the courts continued to 
recognise old remissions, e.g. in 1611 Forbes of Monymusk 
escaped almost certain execution when he produced a 
remission he had for the murder of Alexander Menzies in 
1580, Pitcairn, Cr1J!l1M] Trials, iii, p 204-06; Spalding 
Miscellany, ii, p 52. 
33. See Longformaus-Spott1swoode note 32 above. 
34. R.F,C., xi, p 206. 
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aggrieved. Ancrum may have been happy with the settlement 
he was offered for his father's death, but the rights of the 
whole kindred had also to be recognised. 35 Such fundamental 
bonds did not simply disappear overnight or even over a few 
years, but took decades to be eroded. 
Feud settlements continued to res emble those discuss ed 
earlier when looking at the first half of. the king's reign.36 
Compensation was, therefore, still regarded as more satisfactory 
than punishment. In 1616 the two branches of the Lindsay family 
finally patched up the feud which had cost the life of lord 
Spynie with a contract of assythment in ~hich the laird of 
Edzell s~ore that the slaying of Spynie in 1607 had not been 
deliberate, "but most unhappilie upone mere accident and 
suddantie as saIl ansuer to God in ye great and fearful day 
of Judgement", (he had in fact been trying to kill the 
earl of Cra~ford, Spynie's nephew and his o~n chief). 
Edzell agreed to pay 8000 merks to Spynie's heir and to sell 
him some land, ~hile Spynie promised Fdzell his forgiveness, 
a letter of slains and received Edzell into his "amity and 
freindship" .37 Nor ~as it just the compensatory aspects of 
assythment which survived. In 1602 the king and council 
35. R.P.C., vii, p 272. 
360 This ~as also true in Schleswig at the same time where in 
spite of government opposition to the feud compensation ~as 
much prefered to punishment. There,reforming acts were 
passed in 1558 and' 1636 which were designed to take the 
jFisdiction of slaughters away from the kindreds to the 
cOQrts,but the,r were largely ignored and compensation 
payments were still being made in 1700, Philpotts, 
Kindred and Clan, p lO4ff, p 124-25. 
37. S.R.O. Inventory of Scottish Muniments at Haigh, i, box D, 
6/Nov/16l6. 
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decided that John Neilson, a tailor burgess of Dumfries, had 
not offered sufficient assythment to two burgh officers at 
whom he had shot while they were performing their duties, and 
as well as ordering him to increase the compensation he had 
offered, they told him to make public amends at the burgh market 
cross by craving pardon, offering the sword by the point and 
doing homage while barefoot and wearing nothing but his sark.3S 
Fourteen years later the council was still recommending this 
ceremony in a feud between two men, the victim having renounced 
financial compensation from the other in place of this.39 
Others were less impressed by such symbolism and the laird of 
Lekky scoffed at such an offer which he said was little use 
to a family ruined by feud. 40 Satisfaction of the parties in 
conflict rather than a rigorous enforcement of the rights of the 
king continued to be the main guideline upon which Jacobean 
governments worked. This was the point the council agreed upon 
in their resolution of a bloody feud between the Kings of Barracht 
and the laird of Meldrum. They decided that 
It it will be more aggreable to the contentment of the pairtye, 
and will procure more assured peace to the said James and 
his freindis, that your maiestie saIl grant ane pardoun 
for the slaughter, nor that the mater salbe broght to pub1ict 
contestatioun and audience at the counsai11 tab1e.,,41 
The king and his council were simply recognising that the feud 
3S. R.P.C., vi, P 472. 
39. R.P.C., x, p 425. 
40. R.P.C., xiii, p 745-46. 
41. Melrose, i, p 326-27. 
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had imposed its own cruel justice and that they would be best 
to avoid further bureaucratic meddling. 
One obvious conclusion to be made from this is that if 
central government was acting in such a conservative manner 
then the localities must have been even slower in giving up 
long established traditions. Evidence there is much more 
fragmentary, but one can find in the letters of local lords 
and lairds a persistence of customary terminology and values. 
A letter in 1618 from Sir Robert Gardon to lord Elphingstone 
asking him to attend a diet between himself and other northern 
barons to discuss a number of local issues could easily have 
been written half a century before,and a series of correspondence 
between the Camerons of Lochiel and their neighbours in 1623 
reflects the same customary ideals and methods. 42 Gordon's 
letter contains all the old inferences about friendship 
among lords, private mediation, loyalty and honour and in a 
sense Gordon himself was symbolic of the co-existence of two 
worlds which continued to influence Scottish society, he being 
a highland landlord at home amidst the wild, broken men of 
Caithness and Sutherland, a clever operator amidst the tangles 
of the governmental and legal offices of Edinburgh, a mildly 
favoured courtier in London and a man of letters into the 
bargain. None of these was as yet exclusive of the others, 
One also finds that while the government had tightened up 
S.R.O., 
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on its efficiency, settlements continued to break down for 
much the same reasons as before. There were still men like 
John stewart, son of the laird of Tynniss, whose brother had 
been killed by the Murrays of Philiphaugh and who tried to 
prevent a settlement because he wanted vengeance.43 There 
were also those like Robert Colquhoun who in 1618 tried to 
stir up the old hatreds between his kinsmen and the Macfarlane 
clan.44 Minorities were another unsettling factor which 
continued to delay settlements or upset ones made during the 
minority. 45 However, there were less and less of such instances 
as the crown's ability to enforce its will grew. Thus in 1604, 
the earl of Dunbar was granted a warrant to arrest Hector Turnbull 
of Barnhill and Hector Turnbull of Stanelege for failing to pay 
2000 merks to Helen Gamislaw as her part of the compensation the,r 
owed for the notorious slaughter of all eight of her brothers.46 
In another case between the Leiths of Harthill and Le8lie of 
Auldcraig it was discovered that the former were unable to pay 
the full amount of compensation they had been ordered to pay, 
but this time the council took all the relevant matters into 
consideration and decided that if the Leiths could find 
2500 merks before a certain date they would be absolved from 
paying the outstanding 1000 merks and this compromise proved 
acceptable to both sides.47 Intelligent flexibility was very 
43. R.P.C., xi, P 337-38. 
44. ibid., P 385. 
45. e.g. ibid., p 171-72. 
46. Airlie Muniments, iii, S.R.O.,G.D. 16/68314l1127. 
47. R.P.C., xi, p 193-94, p 248. 
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much the hallmark of the omnicompetent privy council. 
The result was a real and lasting reduction in feuding 
in Scotland. After 160) the amount of feuding had dropped 
to some forty to fifty feuds a year from the high point of 
sixty to seventy during the 1590's, but it was not until 
1608 that the numbers began to fall more dramatically. There-
after, except for a mild p1ateauing in 1614-17, the fall was 
fairly regular, dropping to under ten in 1625. Of all the 
feuds in Scotland over the entire period over 75% of them 
were at one point or another handled by the government with 
just under half of these requiring attention in more than 
one yearo This does not actually measure the amount of 
government business involved as one feud might have required 
one warning or order while others, like some of the greater 
feuds discussed above, were constantly needing attention year 
after year. In any one year the government, by which one 
means the king acting in a personal capacity, the privy council 
or the crown in court, dealt with as many as thirty-two feuds 
in 1608 to as few as one in 1575 and 1625. During the period 
when the war against feud was at its most intense, from 1595-
1609, the crown was involved with an average of around twenty 
feuds a year, by no means a vast number, and except for the 
years 160)-04 when the Union caused some dislocation in govern-
ment, its activity was fairly constant. This is not to say 
that the crown was responsible for the removal of all these 
feuds,a ~uarter of allfeuda were finally resolved without 
any government interference at all, but the pressure it applied 
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with varying degrees was the catalyst required to push a 
great many of them towards peace. As was shown in the early 
stages of this discussion, the government was directly involved, 
either as an oversman or in pushing private parties into talking, 
in half of the feuds whose settlement procedures can be identified. 
As this figure includes all the pre-1595 feuds as well, its 
activity is probably somewhat under-represented.48 
Such a degree of central government interference in local 
politics and justice marks a fairly profound change in the 
relationship between the two. An enormous degree of power 
continued to reside in the localities, but the decisive tilting 
of the scales towards the crown took place in these years. The 
shift was not sudden or even particularly noticeable at the time, 
but in the attack on feuding the crown stripped away the rights 
of local lords and lairds to conduct their politics without 
reference to the king's privy council or the civil and criminal 
courts. More than ever before, local power was dependent upon 
royal patronage and royal justice. Exceptions existed in the 
western isles and parts of the highlands where feud survived 
on a reduced scale for at least another century and the local power 
of grandees like Argyll in the seventeenth and even eighteenth 
century should be a warning to those who write off the nobility 
too soon. Yet even these great nobles had lost ~uch of the 
political independence whiqh the feud and its environment allowed 
them, and the expulsion of feud from the court and government 
48. See above vol i, p 31 and p 106. 
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itself efrectively castrated magnate politics of much or its 
vitality and set it on the road to the decadent courtier 
machinations of the late seventeenth century. 
This change was quite clearly not just caused by the three 
acts concerned with feuding. The wider legislative programme 
was directly related to the crown's attitude to feuding and 
cannot really be separated from it. Thus firearms control 
continued to be legislated for alongside concern about feuding. 
The problem with controlling guns and other arms was that the 
crown wanted an armed population since the armed followers of 
the nobility were its only defence. One finds in 1574, 1584, 
1596, 1598 and 1599 various measures related to the holding of 
wapinschaws at which landed men were expected to turn up at 
musters in arms with their requisite number of armed followers. 
In 1574 it was suggested that too many men were avoiding their 
responsibilities by borrOWing arms from their neighbours and 
they were thus given eight months in which to buy the necessary 
gear. In 1584 wapinschaws were revived atter a long relapse, 
but they continued to be unpopular and in 1596 it was still 
being pointed out that attendsnies were low and that there was 
a "sluggishness and cairlessness" in men's attitudes towards 
them, caused by "the not exercise of armour this lang tyme 
beganelt • In 1599 the privy council finally decided to abandon 
the wapinschaws arranged for that year simply because they were 
a complete waste of time.49 
49. LP.O" iii, p 91~2, p 676-77; v, p 266-67, P 446-47, 
p 551. Permission not to attend was given if men had 
deadly feuds, R.P,C., v, p 282. 
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This short look at wapinschaws is necessary only to allow 
one to remember that the crown did not want to disarm the 
population, but to educate it in the use of arms. Further 
progress was not made until 1591, twelve years after the 
amendments to the 1574 act had been made. In that year the 
council declared that the law was being openly flouted and, 
therefore, so as to increase the detection of the crime, powers 
were granted to a~ liege to make a form of citizen's arrest 
of a~ person they saw wearing, bearing or firing guns 
illegally. 50 It was a typical piece of Scottish legislation, 
putting the onus of enforcement in private hands, but it was 
no more successful than previous acts and in 1593 the council 
complained that 
"wicked men, holden in deidlie feid and malice, for their 
privat revenge, saIl, be shuiting of hagbutis or pisto1-
lettis, touking outragious countenance or reprochefull 
speichis, do quhat 1yis in thame to entir noblemen or 
gentlemen in b1ude ••• ". 
In response to this threat, which was scarcely new, the 
government issued yet another warning and gave orders for a 
search of Edinburgh to be made for any illegal arms.51 As 
one might expect, warnings meant little and publicised 
searches even less. 
In 1595 a new act was passed to complement that concerning 
feuding. Effectively it was a revival of the 1567 act which 
had made the cutting off of the right hand the punishment for 
50. R.P.C., iv, p 597. 
51. R.P.C., v, p204. 
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any fire-arms offence, even for illegally wearing guns. A 
ten pound fine, imprisonment and confiscation of the goods 
was to accompany this mutilation ~hich ~as revived because 
lithe murthour committit in Scotland ~as sa far o~t of all 
measure and mearcie, be the treasonable use of pistols and 
small gunnis ••• ". '1'0 sho~ his determination to enforce this 
la~ the king ordered that three men taken wearing guns in 
Edinburgh ~ithin hours of the privy council approving the 
act be so punished. Ho~ever, after letting them sweat it 
out before the executioner for a ~hile James relented of 
his harshness and since they had been ignorant of the law he 
had them freed. 52 Later in the year the category of those 
who could suffer mutilation was extended. 53 
In 1596 a slightly new angle of approach was considered, 
one which would put more emphasis on prevention. More 
condemnations of the gun as an instrument of "revenge of 
particulair quarrellis and. privat grudgeis" was followed by 
a declaration that the crown intended to abolish hand-guns 
altogether. Such an ambition was somewhat unrealistic, 
but a limit was put on the size of pistols to prevent them 
being concealed so easily and craftsmen who made them any' 
larger were to be put to death. 54 This attempt to cut off 
the supply of guns was perhaps more intelligent, but there 
are no signs that it was any' more successful and in the 
52. H1storie, p. 355. 
53. R.P.C" v, p 247. 
54. R.P.C., vi, p 274-75. 
autumn of that year further proclamations had to be repeated. 55 
The difficulty was in enforcing such legislation. 56 Some 
cases did reach the courts or the council. In 1597 a 
William Hamilton was arrested along with Alexander Mowbray 
for wearing guns in Edinburgh and when given the choice ot 
an assize or the king's will they chose the latter and were 
lucky to be sentenced to life banishment. 57 Considering that 
the men were only wearing guns and had not used them, it was 
a tairly stiff sentence and reflects a determination to make 
a few firm examples of thos e who so openly disregarded the 
law 0 In that same year all the burgh magistrates of Perth 
were summoned to "byde tryal" when David Edmonstone of the 
Yowmet was shot dead in their town, the implication being 
that if they had been doing their job properly and enforcing 
the law such events would not take place. 58 On occasion 
such enforcement could be swift and savage as in the case 
of George Porteous who shot dead Adam Boswell and on the 
next day was beheaded after having first suffered the agony 
of his hand being cut otr. 59 
Just as the 1595 act on feuding was acoompanied by one 
on gun control, so the same combination took place in 1598 
55. R.P.C., vi, p 322. 
56. This was not just true in Sootland, see Penry Williams 
comments on England in Tb! Tudor Regime, p 236-37. 
57. P1tcairn, Criminal Trials, 1i, p 22-23. 
58. Birrel, "Diary", p 41. 
59. ibid., p 51. 
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with another gun law being passed at the same convention which 
passed. the It Act Anent Feuds lt 0 Earlier in the year further limits 
had been imposed on the size of guns which were to be "an elne 
in the rotche" at least. Pistols and dags were completely 
outlawed, as was even the repair of existing ones06O At the 
convention these two types of guns received further disapproval 
and the nobility promised to enforce the law among their followers 
and within their jurisdictions.6l At the 1600 parliament which 
confirmed the act on feuding, yet another gun law was passed. 
The preface to the act pointed out that previous legislation 
had been outwitted by clever legal trickery which had prevented 
there being many convictions. In future the pursuit of those 
guilty of breaking the gun laws would be the responsibility of 
the treasurer or advocate, with the provision that if they 
were tried by the privy council and found guilty then they 
would be warded, have their movables escheated and be fined 
as the council thought fit, but that if they were taken before 
the justice then the existing legislation would be implemented. 
Finally, all gun licences were to be cancelled and new ones 
62 
only issued by the king and his privy council. . The act was 
an attempt to introduce 8 measure of flexibility into the 
crown's response to infringements of the law and to ensure 
more prosecutions by letting lesser offences be handled by 
60. R.P.C., v, p 437-38. 
61. A.P.S., iv, p 164. 
62. ibid., P 228. For an example of a sixteenth century' gun 
licence see that given to lord Ruthven, the treasurer, 
in 1580, Pltcairn, Criminal Trials, i, part 2, p 91. 
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the privy council. It was also a money making device opening 
up for the treasurer yet another new source of income. 
While further proclamations and minor acts followed, it 
was the 1600 act which remained the basis for future dealings 
with fire-arms offences. Six months after the 1600 act was 
passed, the council proclaimed that it would not be slow to 
use dismemberment if necessary; in 1601 the making of petards, 
a light and mobile cannon, was outlawed,and in 1603 sheriffs 
were threatened with the pains of the law themselves if they 
did not enforce the gun laws. 63 A proclamation in 1608 only 
concerned itself with offences in the north where the law 
continued to be flouted, thus implying that further south 
the government was beginning to have some success with its 
campaign.64 Offences continued, however, with a Robert Johnstone 
being sentenced to lose his right hand in 1609, "to the terrour 
of all utheris to offend in the lyke soirt", and as late as 
1625 one can still detect offences in the lowlands - in the 
highlands guns and other weapons continued to be part of the 
life-style until after the 1745 rebellion -, but one no longer 
reads of large scale shoot-outs and even less spectacular 
incidents involving guns were much less common.65 
The success of this campaign cannot be separated from 
that aimed at feuding. If men were not at feud they did not 
need to carry guns around with them, a gentleman was after 
63. R.P .C" vi, p 258, P 491, P 585-86. 
64. R.P.C" viii, p 37. 
65. ibid., p 602-03; xiii, p 'n1-12. 
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all permitted to carry his sword. Guns had become such a 
problem in Scotland because of feuding which did not require 
the more rigorous ritual of killing of the duel and thus when 
men became safe from feud they were more inclined to leave 
their guns at home. Conversely, the lethal nature of the hand-
gun at close quarters and its ability to equalise combat made 
every man who carried one a potential killer and made it an 
instrument which all too often turned a brawl into a fatal 
encounter and subsequently into a feud. The king and his 
government clearly understood this and hence legislation on 
feuding was often accompanied by new or modified gun laws. 
Equally related to the pacification of the feud was the 
outlawing of duels, or as they were more commonly called in 
Scotland private combats. One is unable to discuss in a~ 
depth here the duel in Scotland, but a few brief comments are 
perhaps necessary. Duelling was never very common in Scotland. 
where the feud predominated over all other forms of conflict 
and one never finds the excesses experienced in France during 
this period, but essentially it took two forms. The first was 
the private combat or duel which in form incorporated both the 
formalised Italian duel and elements of the joust. Thus one 
finds evidence of the sending of cartels for alleged or 
imagined offences to personal honour, of arranged fencing 
matches and also cases like the earl of Bothwell and. his 
servant meeting up with Cessford aid his man on the road to 
Edinburgh, "quhesre meitiug two tor two, tha1focht allong 
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tyme on horseback", the combat ending when Cessford retired 
with his wounded servant.66 The second form of combat was 
the judicial combat, where one man accused another of a crime 
and there was no evidence but his word to prove it. The two 
men could then apply for permission to justit,r their claims 
in combat, or on occasion the king would himself insist that 
they fight it out. Ma~ men did apply for such licences, 
particularly in treason cases, and a number were granted. 
Again these state approved combats could take varying forms 
from charging at one another on horseback with levelled spears 
to duels fought in a circus like atmosphere. The last of 
thes e took place in 1597 with another in 1600 only being 
avoided when late evidence made an appeal to combat 
67 
unnecessary, the accused being guilty of his treason. 
In theory both forms of combat were illegal without a 
licence, but in spite of the 1580 act and earlier legislation 
the private combat continued to nourish. In April 1600 the 
crown decided to be more severe on those who continued to 
fight such duels without permission and heavily criticised 
them as combats resorted to ftupoun everie licht occassioun, 
quhairupoun mo~ deidlie feidis and utheris inconVenientis 
hes oft fallin outett •68 In November parliament ratified this 
act which had made the death penalty the punishment for 
66. Moysie, Memoirs, p 111; Birrel, "Diary", p 31. 
67. Birrel, ttDiarytt,p /iJ,p 42; Chambers, Dom,stic Annals, i, 
p 286; Calderwood, Histor;r, ri, p 194; Spottiswoode, 
HistorY, ii1, p 114; C.S.P.Sgot., xiii, part 2, p 1057. 
68. R.P.C., vi, p 97-98. 
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duelling.69 It was a penalty which the king was determined to 
have carried out and indeed even before the privy council had 
passed the act, an Edinburgh burgess had been executed in April 
for slaying a fellow burgess in a duel. Later in the same year 
a John Wilson killed two brothers in a private combat and "being 
tane with het bluid, was execute at the flesh stocks where he 
had slain the man, the night beforen • 70 Prevention was also 
taken seriously and in 1602 the duke of Lennox and earl of Argyll 
were committed to their chambers for challenging one another, 
while in 1608 the master of Caithness and the commendator of 
Melrose with their seconds were warded tor arranging a duel 
71 
and were subsequently reconciled by the council. 
Another teature of violent conflict in sixteenth century 
Scotland were tuilyeis, happenings which in modern Glaswegian 
might be described as a "rammy" or spontaneous tree-for-all. 
Fear of these fights breaking out was strong, especially in 
burghs where large gatherings of nobles and their tollowers 
took place. Thus when,tor example, parliament,met, it was 
common for the privy council to order that no-one "tak upoun 
hand to invaid molest or persew utheris, or git provocatioun 
or displeasour be word, deid or countenance, owther for auld 
feid or new ••• ".72 In 1573 it had been declared a treasonable 
offence to do otherwise, but the peace ot parliament continued 
69. ,.P.S., iv, p 230. 
70. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 112-24; BirreJ, "Dial7'", p 49. 
71. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 961; R.P.C., viii, p 128, p 131. 
72. R.P.C., ii, P 222. 
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to be interrupted and violent incidents were not unusual in 
the ante-rooms of the privy council or of the courts as rival 
parties bumped into one another before or after hearings. In 
1593 parliament tried to tighten up on such incidents with an 
act which declared it to be treasonable and a crime of lese-
majeste to hurt, strike or slay anyone in the parliament house, 
in the session, before the king or in the council house while 
it was in session. Even if the incident took place before the 
king's deputies or any senior officials a hundred pound fine 
was to be imposed, while striking a judge was to incur the 
death penalty.73 The act had been passed in the context of 
an affair the previous day when two lords of the articles had 
had blows with one another thus disturbing the peace of parliament, 
but it represented more than just a response to one incident 
and apart from being part of the campaign against violence 
it also reflected the increasingly assertive mood of the crown 
under James VI as he sought to give it more dignity.74 
That same day parliament alsO passed an act which gave the 
Edinburgh magistrates greater powers to eatorce policing within 
the burgh. 75 However, making the burgh streets ssfe from this 
sort of violence continued to be a problem and in 1597 the 
inhabitants of all burghs were ordered to assist their 
magistrates in "redding and stoppin all tullyeis" 8S there 
were far too many cases of men 1Iscaping any- punishment because 
73. A.P.S., iv, p 22. 
74. q.S.P,Scot., Jd-jp ,129. 
75. A.P.S., iv, p?8-29. 
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they could not be apprehended. 76 In 1600 the council again 
drew attention to the "frequent tuilyeisl1 in Edinburgh and 
the Cannongate which were simply means by which men tried to 
"revenge thair particular querrelis". The principal concern 
of this act was the king's personal security and all arms 
were banned within a mile of wherever the king happened to 
be, in the hope that this would both make the king more secure 
and reduce fighting among courtiers and officials. 77 
Enforcement of this legislation was on the whole strict. 
In 1601 John Dundas of New1iston was charged with having struck 
another gentleman in the rooms next to where the king was 
sitting in session with the lords of council and session. 
Dundas was lucky to be excused the assize, the king being 
satisfied with a fine. 78 Lesser men were treated with more 
severity, having little to make a fine worth while and in 160.3 
a WaIter Grabam was found guilty of having struck a minister 
close to the tolbooth while the council was sitting. He was 
punished by being scourged from the castle hill to the Nether 
BoIl, having his hand cut off and being banished for 1ife.79 
Even with the great the king could be hard and in 1611, when 
the earl of Lothian became involved in an aftray, the king 
wrote to his council telling them that an earl and a councillor 
ought to know better and to fine him ten thousand merks. 
Shocked by this the earl's colleagues on the council asked 
76. R,P.C., v, p 403. 
77. ~.P!C" vi, p 77-78. 
78. Pitcairn, grimina1 'frialt, U, p 358-59. 
79. ibid., p 416-17. 
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the king to mitigate the fine and he agreed, telling them 
SO they were too soft. Such enforcement certainly distanced 
the king and his officials from the sort of violence the,y 
had been continually exposed to during the 1590's and before, 
and in doing so enhanced the authority of the king. It did 
not stop men from having the occasional punch-up, but these 
were less serious than they once had been and with the 
discouragement of carrying guns combined to greatly reduce 
the sort of violence which had so often been a prelude to feud. 
What had so often made such confrontations dangerous was 
the practice of going about in large armed bands of men for 
protection and to make an impression. These retinues, by 
which was meant the friends, s.ervants and retainers who were 
with a lord wherever he went, or convocations, that is the 
lord's own local host, were themselves thus objects for royal 
control. In 1583 it was ordained that retinues be reduced 
to sixteen for an earl, eight for a lord and six for a baron 
or knight and in 1590 this was further cut to twelve, eight 
and five, all of whom were to be unarmed.Sl This 1590 act was, 
however, highly unpopular and was ignored in spite of being 
repeated and in an effort to be more realistic the numbers 
were increased in 1591 to twenty-tour, sixteen and ten. It 
was again stipulated that sUCh retinues should go about unarmed, 
that a licence be sought before bringing them to Edinburgh am 
that lords would be responsible for any crime their men 
SO. R.P.C., ix, p 606-07, p 609, p 610-11. 
81. C.S.P.Scot., vi,p 515; Calderwood, HistorT, iii, p 750; 
A.P,S., iii, p )01. 
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committed. 82 The main thrust of such legislation was to prevent 
the habit of turning up in court with great numbers of men in 
an effort to overawe either the judges or the assize. 
Convocations and retaining also came in for some criticism. 
In 1587 it was declared illegal to raise companies of mercenaries, 
ostensibly for service abroad, but in fact for domestic use 
"to assist some subjects of this realme in thair particular 
querrelis aganis utheris, to the rasing and intertenying of 
civile seditioun, insurrectioun and uproare within the cuntret'. 83 
As one has already seen, men like Huntly and lord Maxwell were 
certainly known to have persisted with the practice for some 
years after the passing of this act and at one point in his 
career chancellor MBitland was reported to "keep a great train 
to save his life from his enemies".84 More common were the 
clashes in the localities, "chieflie for leding of teinds this 
present seasoun of the yeir quhairupoun hes followit and dalie 
is liklie to follow sindry deidlie feidis and utheris greit 
inconrenientis". Various penalties were threatened, but to 
little effect and this 1590 act had to be repeated in 1591 
85 
and 1595. 
After almost a decade of failure trying to impose the 1591 
retinue restrictions the crown made anotheronslought in 1600. 
The numbers were again reduced to twelve, eight am four, a 
82. R.P.C., iv, p 572. 
8). ibid., p 211-12. 
84. C.S,P,Scot., x, p 19. 
85. LP.O., iv, .p 513-14, p 660; V, p 229. 
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loophole was closed under which a lord had been able to bring 
along eight knights each with their four servants and thus 
multiply his retinue without breaking the letter of the law, 
and in future if a baron was in attendance upon a lord he 
was only permitted one page to accompany him.86 In 1606 the 
council decided to take further steps to prevent men coming 
before it with excessive numbers and announced that if the 
pursuer offended in this way he would automatically lose his 
case, while if it was the defender who did it then he would 
be denounced and all his friends would be arrested.87 Failure 
to enforce this resulted in the persistence of the custom and 
in 1610 the king wrote to the council that "it wald seame 
rather that thair apperance war not so muche ether for 
obedience or cleiring thameselvis ••• as on the uther pairt 
to imprent in thair waik hairtit adversarie some feir of 
thair parteis grite freindship and upoun terrour to enforce 
him to relinquische his just persute". The king's advice was 
that the 1579 act's postponing technique was the best form of 
encouragement and as in 60 ma~ other instances .the council 
responded with another act encapsulating the royal will. 
This, in conjUnction with earli~r legislation, seems to have 
had effect, as no doubt would the fact that in the more peaceful 
environment then emerging such forms of applying pressure were 
88 becoming less meaningful. On convocations the last word on 
the issue was a privy council act of 1612 which extended the 
86. R.P.C., vi, p 169. 
87. ~.P.C., vii, P 288. 
88. R.P.C., viii, p 622-23, p 450. 
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punishments reserved for unlawful assemblies and convocations 
applicable to situations where the convocation had not met 
but had only been planned.89 Such royal confidence was a far 
cry from the days when the massed bands of armed followers 
of lords had held sway over localities and the court alike. 
As with guns, the need for large retinues and convocations 
declined with the feud. If men had no need for protection, 
or no intention of attacking others, the only need for such 
displays of power was to show it off, not to use it. Osten-
tation continued. to demand that lords have retinues, but in 
such inflationary times noblemen were willing to make cuts 
in services which no longer had any functional rationaleo 
Again, as with arms, the converse of this was true and 
without the prevelance of such martial followings feuds were 
less likely to be initiated, it having been these followers 
who were often responsible for dragging their lords into 
clashes with rivals and escalating quarre1so 
During the 1590's the general band remained a basis upon 
which the crown built. As a long established and traditional 
means of forcing lords to control their men it had proved 
itself useful in the past and continued to do so, especially in 
the highlands, for years to come.90 However, it had its critics. 
89. R,p,e., ix, p 370. 
90. The Elizabethan government used a similar system in 
Ireland in which the chiet was responsible for the . 
behaviour of his men, Berloth, ~e Twilight Lords, p46. 
In a similar context parliament passed an act in 1585 
"Against Leagues and Bands" to discourage banding among 
noblemen, but Scottish politics rested upon such alliance. 
and the Act was ignored, A.P.S., iii, p 376-77. 
Independently minded lairds like Forbes of Tolqubane objected 
to being lumped together with all men of his surname and 
being made responsible for broken men over whom he had no 
control and for whom he denied a~ responsibility. It was, 
he said, peaceful men like himself who ended up paying fines 
for the crimes of these outlaws and he poured out scorn on 
this "maist pernicious and dangerous practique". Other 
landlords also complained, but the alternative was a crown 
police force paid for in taxes and on the whole it was 
tolerated.91 Efforts were made to tighten up the supervision 
and enforcement of the band, but it continued to be too 
dependant upon the good will of the men on whom it imposed 
responsibilities to be really effective. If those men 
removed their co-operation the worst that could be done was 
to horn them and it therefore became necessary for the crown's 
own officials and processes of enforcement to receive something 
of an overhaul.92 
One area of its own back yard which the crown desperately 
had to clean up was the old thorn of respites and remissions. 
As a form of fine there was some merit in them, but in a 
feuding society they became an easy price to pay for the death 
of one's enemy and, depending upon the king, they were all too 
easily abused. In 1584 parliament passed an act against the 
91. R.P.C., iv, p 356. 
92. For critics, a.p,o., v, p 249-50, P 260-61, p 279-80, 
p 283-84. For ban4s, R.P.C" iv, p 787-89; vi, p 45-46; 
A.P.S., iv, p 41, p 140. 
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granting of respites and remissions for capital offences for 
three years since it was thought to encourage men to risk 
committing slaughters. Those already held were nullified 
unless a letter of slains had been received from the injured 
party.93 As usual good intent was not enough and everyone 
from the king and his courts to anyone who could get his hands 
on a remission carried on exploiting the system, even though 
a further act was passed in 1587.94 The problems this could 
create in a feuding society were highlighted in a complaint 
made to the king by Hay of Gourdie whose son had been murdered 
by a man who then received a seven year respite. Hay pointed 
out that this was not only breaking the law, but that 
It gif thay salbe frustrat of justice undir pretens of the 
said pretendit respett purchest of his Majestie privatlie, 
and be suppressing of the treuth aganis a publict law, 
and his Majestie solempne vow and promeis, it saIl 
discourage all men to seik redres be way of justice 
heirefter, bot rather to seik thair privat revenge at 
thair maist advantage, quhen thai saIl find it mekle 
mair easie to gett ane respett nor to summond and mak 
a voyage to Edinburgh. n95 
Apart from some fairly candid criticism of the king, the 
com~nt is a good example of the frustration the remission 
system caused and while ma~ respites were granted in order 
to give men time to arrange a settlement with the offended 
kin, receive a letter of slains and subsequently a remission, 
the question the Hays were asking was a good one. Why not go 
93. A.P.S., iii, p 298, repeated two years later, R.P.C., iv, 
p 103-04. 
94. A.P.S" iii, p 457. 
95. R,P,C., iv, p 680-82. 
out and extract blood justice? 
Two months after receiving this complaint from the Hays, 
the privy council responded with a new reform. It was decreed 
that all who held respites or remissions would be called to 
account and to give caution, but that their lives would 
continue to be guaranteed by the crowno Having given caution 
they would then be obliged to "mak assythment and satistactioun 
to the saidis kin and freindis" under the council r s supervision. 
The council would also decide whether the king had an interest 
in the case, imposing a fine or imprisonment as was thought 
appropriate.96 This 1591 act was recognising respites and 
remissions which had been obtained illegally, but it was a 
compromise measure designed to bring peace between the parties 
and not to impose punishments, for while the king1s rights 
were being invoked, it was the private satisfaction of the 
offended party which remained of dominant importance. 
Parliament ratified the act six months later and instructed 
the treasurer, advocate and justice clerk to compile a list 
of those holding respites or remissions and review their 
position in the light of the new legislation.97 This act, 
which was repeated in 1593, was specifically aimed at feuding, 
put its main emphasis on reconciliation and was to become the 
basis upon which the crown dealt with the problem over the 
next three decades.98 
96. R.r.C., iv, p 695. 
97. A.P .• §u iU, p 575. 
980 A,P,S., iv, p 18-19; 
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Both remissions and respites continued to slip through 
these safeguards, but the act was enforced and over the 
following years it gr~dually wore down an abuse which had 
existed for centuries. In 1605 James Gledstanes was brought 
before the justice for a murder he had committed forty-four 
years before, in 1561, and having produced his respite was 
ordered to give caution as a guarantee that he would satisfy 
the injured kindred and get a letter of slains from him.99 
In 1612 a Wil1iam Murray turned up at his trial for slaughter 
with a remission he had obtained earlier in the year, but which 
had been passed wrler the privy seal. The justice declared the 
remission null, but since Murray was also able to display a 
letter of slains from the dead man's kin, the justice ordered 
him to satisfy two younger sons who had been left out of the 
assythment and to get the remission passed under the great seal 
and thus legalise it.1oo Also in 1612, the privy council itself. 
overruled the parliamentary act when it granted a remission to 
an Alexander Scott for the slaughter of a collier on the grounds 
that the dead man's kin had accepted assythment and given him a 
letter of slains, and in the council's view this was far more 
101 
acceptable to the family than punishing Scott. In 1608 the 
council responded in a similar way to a petition from both the 
family of a murdered man and from the murderer in which they 
plead for a remission for the latter on the grounds that 
99. Pitcairn, CrilliMl Trills, ii, p 472. 
100. ibid., ili, p 234-35. 
101. R.P.C., ix, P 337-38. 
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assythment was of more use to both parties than punishment. l02 
Again one is finding that flexible mixture of increased 
efficiency and enforcement of law with a practical respect for 
the values of traditional practice. Here one finds the privy 
council waiving aside the letter of the law in the interests of 
social harmoQ1, coming down hard on the abuse of the remissions 
system and at the same time continuing to recognise its value. 
A related matter where the government itself had been 
vulnerable to criticism was in the granting of commissions. 
These, as one saw earlier, were very often at the heart of 
local feuds and the means by which many of them were obtained 
were notoriously corrupt. Both officials and the king himself 
were open to bribery and pressure to grant commissions to 
parties lobbying for them and as early as 1579 the council had 
told the young king not to write to them "in furtherance or 
hinderance of ony particular personis actionis and causis ••• 
bot suffer thame to do justice in all actionis privlegit to 
be decydit be thame ... It • 103 A year later it was ordered that 
no-one should apply for grants, offices or penaions belonging 
to aQ1 living person since this was exploiting the king's age 
and putting the lives of others at risk.104 In 1582 a number 
of commissions of justiciary were cancelled as they had been 
illegally obtained, though this may have been a political 
102. Pitcairn, Crimipal Trials, ii, p 539, see also note 3 
on that page. 
103. i.P,C., iil, p 98. 
104. ibid" p 286. 
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decision, and in 1585 attention was focussed on letters of 
summons being obtained by privy means.105 These letters, 
whioh contained pains of treason, were to be regarded as 
invalid even if they contained the signatures of the king 
or privy councillors unless the signatures of at least four 
officers of state, one of whom had to be the chancellor, the 
106 treasurer or the secretary. Such a move was clearly 
designed not only to reduce the abuse of privy letters, but 
also to establish some sort of pre-eminence of the privy 
council over the chamber and to channel what political leverage 
and corruption there was available through the hands of the men 
in government office. It was a reform, but it should also be 
seen in the context of council against chamber, a conflict in 
which the latter had most frequently had the king's ear. 
This determination by successive councils to have a monopoly 
of the patronage available to the crown continued to initiate 
further "reforms" after 1585. Shortly after Arran's fall, 
parliament ratified the act passed by his council criticising 
those who had been "Dl8king a oloak of his highnesses name and 
authority indireotly to o011our their private revenge", aDd 
steps were also taken to preYent junior offioials by-passing 
their bosses and slipping papers betore the king for his 
unwitting signature.107 It we. an attllllPt to correct corruption, 
but again it was also a sove by department heads to prevent 
105. R.P.C., iii, p 510-11. 
106. ibid., P 759. 
107. A.P.S., iii, P 377. 
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their assistants undercutting their own slice of the cake. 
The same motivation inspired their criticism of the chamber, 
"the consaill complenying that the chamber were the devysers 
of every wrang that was done be causing his majestie subscrywe 
sindre hurtfull signatours am commissions; and gat past for 
them selves am ther frendis, the best and maist profitable 
casualties".108 What was so galling to the concillors was 
not the corruption of the chamber, but the fact that the 
gentlemen of the chamber were making more out of the favours 
racket than they were. Similarly, the 1590 act to investigate 
commissions of justiciary which had been granted "for thair 
awne particulair proffeit am using of revengement upoun 
personis aganis quhome thai proessit evill will and inimitie, 
as planelie appeiris be the deidlie feidis and quarrellis that 
heirupoun hes fallin oute amangis sindre noblemen and utheris", 
was inspired as much by faction as by a concern for justice.109 
The point of this IIreform" was simply to replace one group of 
factious commissions with another, the rest was mere propaganda. 
Corruption was not satisfaotorily dealt with by the Jaoobean 
government, but it was to :some extent tempered. The privy 
council oontinued to squabble vi th courtiers and the move of 
the court to London put it at some disadvantage, but it had 
won the right to control the flow of sensitive patronage like 
commissioIlB of justiciar.y or those for other local government 
offices. There were exceptions, but the king himself had 
108. Melville, Memoirs, p 375. 
109. R.P.C. iv, p 552. 
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largely agreed with his councillors on the need for a tightening 
up of what pad been a very sloppy procedure, while their 
jealousy of their office ensured that they maintained that 
control. This does not mean that they did not distribute 
patronage corruptly, or to suit faction, but as councillors 
with an interest in enforcing royal policy they were not going 
to wreck their own work by encouraging feuds with an indis-
criminate exploitation of their position. In a sense the 
system was cleaned up, but only as a by-product of the struggle 
with the chamber which the council was better placed to win. 
Yet if the crown had problems with its process of appointing 
men to enforce the law, it was even more in confusion over its 
procedures for dealing with those who broke it. Outlaws for 
criminal or civil offences were so common that the status had 
virtually no meaning am even councillors were at times at the 
horn while still performing their duties. The confusion over 
the issue was highlighted in the trial of Hobert Auchmowtie in 
1600 for the slaughter of a fellow burgess in a private combat. 
The charge against Auchmowtie was that he provoked Wauchope into 
an unlicenced combat and killed him, but Auchmowtie's lawyer 
claimed that Wauchope had been a rebel at the horn and that 
the slaughter of a rebel, particularly in single combat, 
could not be tried by an assi... Taking up the prosecution 
the lord advocate replied that the horDing had been null in 
the first place and had .been declared so some weeks atter the 
killing. !he defence ~ejected this claim on the groundathat 
the session court had no jurisdiction in deciding the status 
of a horning and that only the privy council could judge such 
a matter. They also objected to the hearing on Wauchope1s 
horning having taken place while Auchmowtie was in prison and 
unable to make any objections. Besides he argued, it was well 
known that the horning had only been reduced by the process of 
retourit so that Wauchope l s heirs could inherit from him, a 
rebels goods and lands being forfeited by the king. With 
what would appear to be unchallengable logic the defence 
also argued that the reduction was irrelevant anyway, since 
when Wauchope had been killed he had been a rebel and it was 
his status at that time which mattered. He then went on to 
prove from various authorities why it was perfectly acceptable 
to kill an outlaw and rebel without any redress. If the 
lord advocate's arguments were accepted then no one would 
risk killing such men for fear that the horning would be 
later reduced and their lives put at risk. Finally, the 
defence pointed out, since Wauchope was a rebel he was not a 
liege and therefore no licence was required to fight him. 
It would appear to be a cast iron defence, but advocate Hamilton 
could never be underestimated aDd he exploited to the full the 
jumble of law which surrowed the status of horniDg. 
Hamilton was quite determined to get a conviction so that 
Auchmowtie could b~ ~ed 88 an NBIlPle to discourage others 
from duelling. On the session's .competence he claimed that 
the justice was not competent to give a ruling ana he dismissed 
the argument about the retour it process as irrelevant since a 
605. 
horning could only be reduced if it was wrong in the first 
place. There was, he said, no reason for Auchmowtie to be at 
the inquiry and he disposed on the authorities cited by the 
defence as also irrelevant since they all referred to the 
treatment of rebels and Wauchope had not been a rebel, his 
letters of horning having not been properly stamped by the 
messenger who delivered them, a piece of negligence which 
rendered them invalid. As to the establishing of bad 
precedents, it had never been the case that rebels could 
be slaughtered at will in Scotland and it would be highly 
dangerous if that were the case. Here Hamilton was on17 
half right because it tended to depend on who the rebels 
were and thus, for example, outlaws of the Magregor kindred 
could be slain by anyone without redress. However, the 
defence was not finished and came back at the lord advocate, 
accusing him of trying to have a man executed because a 
messenger had failed to stamp a letter properly_ Hamilton 
replied that everyone knew that Wauchope was wrongl7 at the 
horn since he freely went about his business in Edinburgh, 
a claim that was meaningless since 80 few outlaws paid aD1' 
attention to their status aD1Wa7, and that he was killed for 
private reasons and not because he was a rebel, a point which 
was much closer to the truth. 
Having exhausted these arguments each side then concen-
trated on precedence. The defence brought forward a number 
of authorities on the subject and insisted that a rebel 
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remained a rebel until his reduction was registered. Hamilton 
then cited the Ardkinglass trial where Ardking1ass was tried 
even though Cawdor had been at the horn at his murder. At 
this the defence demanded to see the papers from that trial 
to check the lord advocate's assertions and the trial was 
adjourned while the question was considered. When they returned 
two days later Hamilton announced that the crown could not 
release the papers, his excuses failing to disguise the fact 
that they were being concealed because of their political 
sensitivityo Both sides then criticised the other for trying 
to appeal to custom anyway and they agreed to say no more that 
dayo Three days later the trial continued and the prosecution 
produced a warrant from the king expressing his anger at the 
"verry frivolous subterfugeis" being emp1yed by the defence 
and demanding that they get on with producing a verdict. The 
justice delivered an interlocutor against the defendant's 
case and ordered the assize to get on with their job. Seeing 
that he would not be saved on technicalities, Auchmowtie asked 
to be taken into the king's will, but Hamilton already had a 
warrant refusing this and, anticipating the worst, !uchmowtie 
declared that none of his friends had had anything to do with 
what had happened, was found guilty and executed later that 
d 110 same ay. 
The Auchmowtie case is a rare insight into the drama and 
debate of a Jeco bean court case, but even more importantly it 
110. Pitcairn, Crimiual TrialS, ii, p 112-240 
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reveals the hopeless confusion over horning. In the end the 
king had simply overruled any further debate and Auchmowtie 
was too insignificant a man to be able to stop it, but the 
arguments his defence had put were never really answered in 
full 0 In 1611 the son and heir of the powerful laird of 
Drumlangrig found himself in a similar situation, though he 
had not killed anyone. He too used the rebel status of his 
victim and pursuer as his defence, but in this instance the 
crown arranged a private agreement and let young Drumlangrig 
off on condition that the records of his defence would not 
be filed, Rbeing so dangerousR and likely to set a precedent 
III the crown wanted to avoid. Clearly something would have 
to be done about the entire horning process if such embarrass-
menta were to be avoided. 
Even long before the Aucbmowtie case such an attempt to 
rationalise the system had been UDder way. After the 1579 
act mentioned above three related acts were all passed in 1584. 
The first "Anent slaughter and troubling made by parties in 
persute and defence of their actionslt was intended to revive 
a short term law of 1555. Under this, a defender who slew 
or wounded his pursuer could by an irreducable horning be 
pursued by the wounded man or his kindred without probation 
of the original pursuit, while if the defender was slain then 
his kin and heir were to be absolved of the original crime 
. . 112 
and the matter was never, to be raised again. According to 
111. Pitcairn, C£imiPlk Trials, iii, p 212-18. 
112. A.P.S., iii, p 299-300. 
608. 
this 1584 act it was permissible to kill a rebel, though 
probably on the condition that one held the letters or 
commissions which had caused his horning. This act was given 
a trial period of seven years, lapsed between 1591-94 and was 
then in 1594 given perpetual status.113 The 1584 parliament 
also passed a law for ItThe better execution of decreets" and 
another explaining some aspects of the 1579 act.114 
Two years later the council turned to the less drastic 
but more profitable question of the confiscations arising 
from horningso The act clarified the point that all of a 
rebel's property and goods were to be seized, they were to 
be warded and if they held any offices then they were to have 
all authority stripped from them.115 In 1587 it was declared 
that all escheats were to fall to the crown and not to private 
persons as had been happening, and later in the year it was 
declared illegal to defraud 'the crown of this right by making 
over property and goods to kinsmen.1l6 In 1588, 1590, 1591 
and 1593 further attempts were made to improve on the 1579 act 
which provided for the more efficient arrest and prosecution 
of rebe1s.117 In 1592 Bothwe1l's rebellion inspired the act 
"For punishment of resettars of traitors and rebe1ls" which 
was aimed at those who made life easy for outlaws by sheltering 
113. A.P.S., iv, p 69. 
114. A.P,S" iii, p 300, p 303. 
115. R.P.C" iv, p 10-71. 
116. ibid., P 219-20, P 235. 
117. A.P.S., iii, p 524-25; iv, p 42; ~P,Q., iv, p 490, P 590-91. 
and provisioning them and in 1595 it was ordered that a list 
of resetters be compiled so that energies could be concentrated 
on punishing them. lIB As the king had discovered with Bothwe1l, 
this was to prove a highly successful tactic and began to make 
the term outlaw a little more meaningful. Also in that year 
sheriffs and their deputies were ordered to compile lists of 
horned men so that a central registry could be maintained and 
private persons were also asked to contribute to it names of 
those they knew to be at the horn.119 FUrther legislation in 
120 1597 and 1600 continued this drive for efficiency, though 
as usual the implementation of the legislation was far from 
rigorous.12l Officials themselves were also to be more diligent, 
with sheriffs and stewards coming in for heavy criticism from the 
privy council and in particular from the treasurer, Hume of Spott, 
who was a man livery strict in his office for the King" and both 
in 1598 and 1601 they were warned to tighten up their perfor-
122 
manceso Revenue was probably as much an issue as law and 
order, though clearly local officials did not share the 
treasurer's enthusiasm and while impro!ements had been made, 
the system was still far from satisfactory with many rebels 
continuing to enjoy greater freedom than their status imp1iedo 
118. AoP.S., iil, p 574-75; a,p,C., v, p 247. 
119. R.P.C., v, p 234. 
1200 ~P.S., iv, p 139-40, P 230-31. 
121. One result of this tidying up was that long forgotten about 
hornings could be revived to the great concern of the 
supposed outlaws, but where possible the council applied 
the la\l \lith discerment, ~.P.C., ix, P 4420 
1220 R.P.C., v, p440; vi, p 329; q,S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 916. 
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w~ile the process of horning ~as for men who had, or who 
were thought to have committed a crime, that of lawburr~s was 
intended to prevent them committing or repeating a crime. In 
1579 parliament divided the pains of la~burrows or caution 
between the offended party and the crown in an attempt to recoup 
something out of the system by encouraging the private party to 
collect what was owing them.123 Two years later the scope of 
the la~ was widened to cover not only bodily harm, but also 
intended or threatened bodily harm on the principal, his kindred 
and servants etc by the other principal and his.124 It ~as a 
measure which ~as widely popular with those who feared that 
their neighbours ~ere a threat to them and it ~as also less 
genuinely used as a nuisance tactic by others against their 
neighbours in an attempt to enmesh them in royal restrictions 
and liabilities. It ~as this 1581 act which was in part 
responsible for the phenomenal growth of cautions in the 
privy council records over the next decade. In 1593 parliament 
increased the minimum amount of caution to be found because the 
very small size being demanded ~as so paltry as to be meaningless 
and a year later money was again the issue ~hen it was declared 
that too many people were coming to private agreements and 
defrauding the crown out of its half of the pains. The clerk 
register was therefore ordered to hand in a monthly list of 
oautions to the treasurer and advocate so that they could enforce 
the penalties, and in 1597 another loophole in the financial 
123. A.P.S., lil, p 144. 
124. ibid. p 222-23. 
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arrangements was closed by parliament.125 Like a number of 
these reforms, a tightening up on law and order went hand in 
hand with the crown's desperate need to look for money where-
ever it was possible to squeeze any out of the resources open 
to it. 
The major headache, however, remained enforcement. Getting 
the nobility to obey the king on political matters was hard 
enough, while in criminal affairs the crown had virtually to 
tolerate their excesses as long as they did not become too 
scandalous. Even at the end of this period it was still on 
these men that the crown relied for the enforcement of the 
greater part of the law. Quite simply, without their co-
operation nothing could have been achieved at all. However, 
there were also some minor developments in giving the king a 
greater degree of independence from his nobility in enforcement 
and policing. One of these was the formal creation of a royal 
guard in l5S4. Parliament created this guard (there had of 
course always been guards around the ldng) which was to be 
staffed by forty men paid at £200 per annum drawn from the 
fruits of small vacant benefieea.126 It waa not much, but 
the guard captaincy soon became a much sought after position 
in the chamber since it not only gave the holder access and 
the power to prevent access to the king, but patronage for 
forty men. The numbers were often swollen by more money if 
it was available or from among the captain's own followers as 
125. 4.P.S., iv, p 18, .p 140; R.P.g., v, p 130. 
126. A.P.S., 111,' P 298. 
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Huntly did when he held the position. However, whether th~ 
actually did much good during this period is doubtful. Shortly 
before they received this formal recognition the guards had been 
warned not to "taikis pairt with divers his Majesties sujectis 
quhilk ar under deidlie feid and querrell with utheris", while 
in 1592 they mutinied over their pay and seized the chancellor's 
d . 127 goo s ~n recompense. 
It was between 1603 and 1611 that they exercised a more 
important role. After 1603 there was no need to guard the 
king, but money was made available to transform the guard into 
a mobile police unit which would enforce the king's will where-
ever they were required. The numbers were still only forty men 
128 
and Sir David Murray was given the captain's commission. 
Under Murray, or lord Scone as he is better known, the guard 
was employed on all sorts of missions involving police work, 
such as when they were sent to arrest a couple of the notorious 
Elliot clan who they brought to Edinburgh for execution after 
losing one of their men in the process.~9 In spite of the 
implications of an order from the council telling the guard 
to stop sitting around and to get on with earning their money, 
they were fairly active in dealing with less powerfUl criminal 
elements and were in fact so successful that in 1611 they were 
prematurely disbanded, it being thought that there was no more 
need for them.1.30 Later in the year some of them were re-
127. R.p.e., iii, p 549; Q.S.P,Scot., x, p 642. 
128. R.p.e., vi, p 581-82 
129. Pitcsirn,Crimina1 'fr1a1s, ii, p 559-60. 
130. i.P.C" ix, P 161. 
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employed as debt collectors, a far cry from their original 
job.13l In fact it was a pity they were disbanded so soon, 
there still being plenty of work for them, but the motivation 
for the move was financial and had not been carried out with 
law and order in mind. 
The guard were, however, an elite at the top of the 
administrative iceberg. In l5S5 it was reported that there 
was widespread corruption among the king's officers, with the 
execution of false letters being a common offence for which 
many had been caught and deprived of their ·office. It was 
.. 
therefore decided that another list be dra~n up, this one of 
legitimately commissioned officers, and that this be delivered 
to the Ubiquitous treasurer with the names of their sponsors 
and that all sheriffs, stewards, baillies etc also compile 
lists of their officers and that the officers then report 
to their superiors to be checked off against the lists. All 
complaints about corrupt officers were to be handed in to the 
council which would investigate them and would also see that 
the legitimate officers were properly paid so as to remove any 
need for them to accept bribes.132 Two years later further 
efforts were made to raise the standards of royal off1cers 
and in 1592 parliament passed an act aga1nst deforcement of 
officers, thus coupling demands for better work from them 
while at the same time trying to enhance the dignity of their 
responsibilities.132 Those who continued to follow wayward 
131. R,Pee., ix, p 213. 
132. R.P,C., iii, P 720-21. 
133. A.P .S.,ii1,· p 449-50, p 577-78. 
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paths could be severely punished as was Wi11iam Strachan, a 
royal messenger who forged and executed letters in the king's 
name and was lucky to escape with a flogging and the loss of 
his job.134 
This shake up of lower officials was repeated higher up. 
In 1600 a corr~ission was established to investigate whether 
sheriffs and other magistrates might be helped to better execute 
their offices and the sheriffs themselves were ordered to attend 
a convention of the nobility to discuss the problems they 
encountered and to offer their advice.135 A year later the 
council complained of the corruption and negligence of the 
junior officials at justice ayres and warned them that "the doing 
and ministring of justice is the special1 grund quhairupoun his 
Hienes croun standis and dependisU • 136 In 1603 the sheriffs were 
again the target of attack and they were told to make use of the 
guard if necessary, but there was really nothing the council 
could do about these and other hereditary offices except to 
complain and cajole.13? 
One way around this was to impose a new administrative level 
on local society and in 1609 steps were taken towards doing this 
Vlith the creation of the commissioners aId justices of the peace. 
One of the principal reasons for their creation was "the slouth 
of magistratis in not suppressing the first feidis" which had 
134. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 455. 
135. R.P.C., vi, p 68-69. 
136. ibid., p 233-34. 
137. ibid., p 584, P 590~92. Though sea R.P.C., x, p 20-21 
for some attempt to replace hereditary sheriffs in 1613. 
been allowed to develop from small beginnings. The government 
consistently adopted this line that feuds had come into being 
during the king's minority and it was, as was seen above, a 
point with a fair degree of truth in it. The preamble expanded 
on this 0 
"To extirpate the ungodlie barbarous and brutall custome 
of deidlie feadis whilk by the Inveterat abuse of mo~ 
bibast ages was become sa frequent in this Realme As the 
sujectis of greatest rank and qualitie upoun everie 
nauchtie occassioun of base and unworthie Contraversies 
of neighbourheid for turves foldykes furris or marches 
of landis foolische wordis or drunken discordis betwene 
thair meanest servandis and dependaris and o~ uther of 
the countrey did so readilie Imbrace the protectioun of 
thair Iniust and unneccessarie quarre1lis as did mony 
tymes involve thame selffis and thair haill freindschip 
in maist malice and Crueltie As to the extreme perrell of 
thair amin saulis Infamie of their memoriall and overthrow 
of thair awin and their adversareir houses did distract 
the kingdome on opposite factiounis And mo~ tymes 
furnessit mater of maist pernicious seditioun and civill 
warris ••• 11138 
The language of this legislation is clearly much more hostile 
than that of 1598 or even 1604 and reflects the gradual shirt 
from embracing the peace of the feud in government legislation 
to outright opposition, in theory, to any form of the feud. 
The same was true of a proclamation also published in 1609 
which declared that justice 
11 is in nothing more wronged than by the presumption of 
any private subject to tak revenge otinjuries done to 
theme at thair awne handis, as gir the authoritie of a 
magistrat wer to no purpoisso in that detestable 
monster deidlie reid ••• "139 
In fact the language was, as has been seen, ahead of government 
138. A.P.S., iv, p 434~35. 
139. R.P.C., viii, p '43-44. 
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practices ~here compromise continued to be the norm for some 
time. Nevertheless there had been a marked ohange in thinking 
within the legislatorso To some extent this was propagandist 
and in faot the crown was mistakingly olaiming in 1609 that 
lithe haill knawin feadis within the kingdome being now 
140 
removed", as though to oonvinoe people that the bad old days 
were over before they aotually were. However, as shall be shown 
in the following ohapter, it also reflected deeper thinking whioh 
had within the lifetime of the feud oome to believe that it was 
barbaric, unjust and against God and king. 
Returning to the justioes of the peaoe, the,y were brought 
into being to prevent the outgrowth of further feuds in the 
future and to "prevent all sic oooasionis as may breid truble 
and violenoe amangis his mateis subiectis ••• ". These men were 
to be crown appointees with oommissions to deal with breaohes 
of the peaoe, disorderly gatherings, weapons offences and suoh 
things as might oreate a feud. l41 Thus in 1611, the justioes 
of the peace of the sheriffdom of Fife brought Sir David Carhegy 
of Kynnaird and Bruoe of Earlsha11 before the council "upoun 
suspitioun of some oontraversie betuix thame". It was largely 
at this preventative stage that most of their work was done. l42 
Their powers were more clearly defined over the next few years 
and in 1623 their position was renewed, but while they had some 
success in fulfilling their function one ought not to overestimate 
140. B.P.C., viii, p 343-44. 
1410 A.P.S., iv, p 434. 
142. R.P,C" ix, p 206. 
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their effect.l43 The worst of the feuding was over before 1609 
and what remained was on the whole outside of their ability to 
deal with except where very insignificant men were involved. 
Whether feuding would have revived without them one cannot 
know, but the rapid decline before 1609 and the changes in 
thinking about feud probably meant that the sun had set anyway. 
At best the.y were part of the whole tightening up of law and 
order during the previous two decades and to isolate them 
from it is to give them more significance than is warranted. 
In spite of all this impressive legislation, the change 
from a society which fought its battles in the field and not 
in court, and resolved its disputes in private and not according 
to the law of the state, was neither sudden or complete. As one 
has seen, the privy council and the king continued to use 
customary measures to settle feuds where such an approach was 
more likely to bring results. The government's attitude to 
feud may have become one ot total theoretical opposition, but 
its practice was far more pragmatic. As late as 1623-24 the 
crown pushed the settlement of a feud between the Buchanan and 
Macfarlane clans out of the justice court into the hands ok 
private mediators and supervised the pacification of a feud 
rather than the enforcement of strict legal justice.l44 Times 
were changing, however, as the earl Marischal complained to 
143. R.P.C., ix, p 220-26, p ~9-11, p 525-26. 
144. R.P.C., xi, p 634, p 635, p 550, p 552-55; xiii, p 375-76, 
p 377, p 386, p 1.23-24, p 441, p 493, p 801-03; Pltcairn, 
Crimlna1 Trial., 111, p 545-52; Fraser, Chlets or G2i~t" 
li, P 42; Mar and (enie Muniments, S.R~O-., G.D. 12 , {b4. 
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Erroll in 1600, asking him to settle their affairs by friends 
and 11 nocht be the law or truble quhilk is the cummour custome 
of the cuntrie in maiteris of less wecht".145 Ten years earlier 
Marischal would not have had to make this point since private 
arbitration would have been taken for granted. The law was 
encroaching itself upon his and his contemporaries world. 
Sir Robert Gordon observed the same transformation, writing of 
the affairs of one clan, "Thus doe the tryb of Clanheinzie 
become greit in these pairts, still incroaching upon thir 
nighbours, who are unacquented with the lawes of this kingdome" .146 
The implication was that the best weapon in family rivalry now 
was the exploitation of the law and the Edinburgh legal 
establishment, something whioh Gordon himself applied with 
great success against the more conservative earl of Caithness 
who became a victim of the changing order. 
Caithness's fate is a telling example of just how much the 
situation had changed during these years. His difficulties 
really began when he ordered the burning of lord Forbes's 
corns at Sanset in 1614. While the burning of standing corn 
was a treasonable offence it had been a fairly common one and 
one unlikely to be of concern to the far away government in 
Edin~urgh. Lord Forbes and his ally, Sir Robert Gordon, were, 
however, determined to curb Caithness's excesses and prepared 
to take the case to law. Seeing that he could not avoid 
criminal prosecution, in spite of attempting a very murky 
145. "Erroll Papers", S2'liiPCMiage1laay, 11, P 286, 
146. Gordon, Sutherlalld, p 248. 
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cover up, Caithness agreed to come to terms with Forbes and 
settle out of court. The resulting assythment was a very 
favourable one for Forbes and his friends and in return he dropped 
all charges against the earl, no one appearing on the day of the 
trial to accuse him. However, shortly afterwards, the king wrote 
to the privy council and told them to press ahead with the case 
against Caithness and his son, lord Berrida1e, and prevent the 
pursuers from dropping the charges. On receiving the letter the 
council had Berrida1e immediately arrested and his father out-
lawed. Berridale turnEd to Sir Robert Gardon for help, telling 
him that he had never had a~ part in his father's feuds with 
him, but that "from their infancies they had bein bred in jarrs 
and contentions, the one against the other, which did overballance 
that deutie and freindship wherunto they were naturally bound". 
Berridale's friendship with Sir Robert and his innocence made the 
king's case difficult because Caithness had already made over all 
his lands to his son and it was thus pointless forfeiting the 
earl. However, Caithness and Berrida1e could not avoid royal 
disfavour altogether and in return for the king not pushing 
ahead with the case, they had to agree to satisty their many 
creditors, resign in perpetuity the sheriffdom and justiciary 
of Caithness, hand over the burners of Sanset for execution 
and hand over the house- of Strabiater and 2000 merks worth of 
land to the bishop of Caithness to augment his livings. Even 
though they accepted these harsh terms Berridale spent another 
five years in prison for his family-'s debt, until Huntly-'s son 
freed him in 1621. The agreement with the king was strictly 
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speaking still an out of court one, but it was the threat of 
legal sanctions which had forced Caithness to accept it. Thus, 
even though he had made a private settlement with his enemies 
the king had insisted on his own claims being satisfied and had 
demonstrably succeeded in making good his c1aim.147 
In the hey-day of the feud the crown could never have 
achieved such a success. There were others like it which proved 
quite clearly that there had been a change in the crown's 
attitude to feud and its environment, and in its ability to 
do something about it. Thus in 1614, the bastard son of the 
famous master of G1amis was sentenced to perpetual banishment 
for simply threatening to kill his cousin, the earl of Kinghorn. l4S 
In 1608 Sir Robert Gardon of Lochinvar was pursued by the privy 
council for killing his own page; John Muir of Auchindrain 
and his son were executed for their part in the vengeful 
killing of Kennedy of Culzean and a young messenger who was 
an unwitting witness to their plot; and in 1618 the son and 
heir of Stewart of Kilpatrick was executed for a feud killing 
in spite of having influential support on theprlv,r council.149 
The whole question of private revenge was in fact brought into 
question in an important trial in 1617 when Gordon of Glght was 
147. Gordon, Sutherland, p 329-40; R.P.C., x, p 844_ 
148. Ba1four, Annales, ii, p 52. The sentence was however relaxed. 
149. R.P.C" viil, P &1; Baltoar, Annaleg, 11, p 26-27; Pltcairn, 
Criminal Trials, iii, p 4JiJ-41. For the Mutrs see Pltcairn, 
Criminal Trials, il and 11.i, Bee references throughout and 
in R.P,C., viil and ix. 
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charged ~ith the slaughter of a Hay in what had been a judicial 
murder 0 The records of the trial are lengthy with the Gordons 
arguing for the rights of blood justice and the lord advocate 
pressing the claims of the crown for a monopoly of jurisdiction 
in the pursuit and punishment of criminals. In the end the 
advocate had the best of the argument, though the way was left 
open for the Gordons to appeal to the king to personally 
mediate between Huntly and Erroll.150 It was the last time 
that the feud would ever stand up against the criminal law 
in courto 
The feud was thus broken by a combination of direct assaults 
upon it and the dismantling of the environment it bred in. Feud 
itself was gradually forced into a position where it had, in 
theory, ceased to exist. Violent acts of feud simply became 
crimes, and while feud settlements continued to take traditional 
forms for some time, there were less each year 8S the crown 
tried to make good its claim that feuds no longer existed. 
Meanwhile, the prohibition of private combats, the restrictions 
on the carrying of weapons and on the size of retinues, the 
reform of government officers and methods of enforcement, 
all made feuds less likely to begin and more easy to suppress 
if they did. All this was, of course, taking place against 
a background of intellectual and social change, some of which 
is discussed below, which further removed mall1' of the 
foundations in which the feud rested. 
150. Pitcairn, Criminal Triall, iil, p 399-401, p 1iJ2, 
p ~8-28. 
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An improving government machine and a flurry of intelligent 
legislative reforms151 virtually extinguished the feud from most 
of Scotland yithin a generation.152 What alloYed this change 
to take place yere the years of peace, the long reign by a 
highly competent adult king and the change in thinking about 
the feud by the king and the governing class of Scottish society 
during this period. After 1595 the croyn yas able at last to 
turn ayay from baronial struggles and for the first time since 
the days of the king's grandfather, really concentrate on other 
issues besides rebellions, re~igious divisions and external 
threats. Only a peaceful and secure society can afford the 
luxury of attending to the quality of life of its members and 
Jacobean Scotland ended the turbulent and violent sixteenth 
century both at peace and secureo 
What took place was not a revolution in government. Scotland 
continued to be governed by a system in which men meant more than 
offices or administrative structures, yhere kinship and patronage 
yere still enormously important, yhere the politics of the 
chamber could still frustrate the policies of the council, where 
poyer Yas still very much in noble hands and the crown was 
dependent upon noble support. Hoyever, the Jacobean legislators 
had initiated change. They had made the violent world of the 
feud impossible in the future they anticipated, a future yhere 
the rule of lay would predominate and yhere the writ of the 
151. 
152. 
this legislation see Appendix two. 
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king would command respect and obedience. Theirs was a 
conservative programme, at times halting and uncertain, always 
the victim of pragmatism and self-interest, and in no sense 
was victory inevitable. However, the laws they passed and 
enforced, hesitant, repetitive and contradictory though they 
sometimes were, represent a faith in the power of law and the 
legal process to improve society which was not misplaced. 
UPROOTING THE FEUDS II: 
THE PERSONNEL 
624. 
The eradication of the feud from all but the Gaelic culture 
of the western islands and highlands within a generation was a 
remarkable achievement considering the deep-rooted nature of the 
"barbarous" custom and reflects a profound and permanent change 
in the values and practices of Rcottish society. Raving seen. 
the deeply held convictions about the moral responsibilities of 
feud and the social and political environment in which it 
flourished, it should be clear that the feud did not decline 
and simply fade away. Thus the intentional use of the king's 
own metaphor of uprooting. The feud had far too. much momentum 
to disappear passively, but had to be positively removed by 
. I 
those who had come to believe in its ethical and political 
degeneracy. The disappearance of the feud was essentially due 
to the intervention of government, which, with the co~operation 
of a sizable proportion of the ruling class, was convinced that 
the feud was a blemish in its society and thus persuaded, cajoled, 
threatened,. punished and resorted.to violence in order to remove 
it. Who these opponents of the feud were is the subject of this 
last chapter. 
Responsibility for this achievement has been claimed for 
various men and groups of men. Maurice Lee concluded that 
chancellor Maitland was the man who crushed the nobility and 
created the framework in which government could easily dispose 
of private quarrels and the like, but r.ee never really understood 
the f.eud and its place in Scottish politics, including the 
politics of his own subject. He did, however, recognise that 
putting an em to feuds was James VI's "favourite project", 
, 
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an observation which ought to have drawn him to a quite 
different conclusion. Jenny Wormald has on the other hand 
looked to a later date and to the lawyers as the architects 
of real change. Thus, she argues 
"Their influence, not that of the crown, was decisive; 
the final decline of the blood-feud came in the century 
after James VIIS departure from ~cotland in 1603, when 
Rcottish monarchy was absentee monarchy, and effective 
control passed to a privy council dominated by lawyer-
administrators." 
This argument can be more persuasive than Leels, but it fails 
to take account of the pre-1603 reforms, neglects the kingls 
very detailed involvement in the handling of feuds after that 
date and is an inaccurate assessment of the composition of the 
privy council. Others like Donaldson, Dickinson and Duncan 
have all put the emphasis on the king, but without suffioient 
evidence to ward off the ohallenges of either chancellor 
Maitland or the lawyer-administrators.l 
This ciaim on behalf of .Tame~ VI requires more substantiation 
if it is to be made good. One major diffioulty in aocepting that 
this could be true is caused by the kingls bad press both from 
oontemporaries, mostly English, and subsequently from historians. 
At worst he has been cast as an imbeoile, bewildered by his 
violent nobility; at best he was a coward whose terror of 
violence persuaded him to try and keep it at a distanoe from 
himself. Thus fire-arms legislation has been seen to reflect 
1. Lee, John Maitla~_of Thirl~tane, p 295; Wormald, "Bloodfeud, 
Kindred and Government in Early Modern Rcotland", p 96; 
Donaldson, :!am~s V-VII, P 222; W.C.Dickinson and A.A.M.Dunoan, 
Sc~tland.from the E~rliest Times to_1603, (Oxford, 1977), 
p 387-88. 
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the king's fear of loud bangs. Reports speak of "his careless 
guid,ing and government" 1rIhich caused "such murders and havoc 
amongst his subjects 1rIho should be preserved under his 
. 2 
protection!'. A Scottish 1rIriter 1rIas equally critical, pointing 
, 
out that "when negligence has so overcum him, he lousis the 
brydill to all mischeif in his cuntrie".3 Others complained 
of the intrigues he encouraged so that .. that 1rIhich is one day 
condemned is another day cleared and approved, such is the. 
time and the government here"; a typical piece of Elizabethan 
arrogance considering the machinations of the Epglish court.4 
The problem 1rIith such violence is that much of it dates from 
the period 1589-94 1rIhen the affairs of the kingdom 1rIere at 
their 1rIorst and is thus unrepresentative of James's management 
of his whole reign. It was at this time that the king had 
himself to submit to the politics of feud to survive. 
More serious criticism can be levelled by poinM.ng out 
the king's encouragement of feud procedures in pacification 
and his abuse of the remissions system. The first half of 
this is easily dealt with. The king 1rIas conservative in his 
reforms and. sa1rl no reason to do anthing more than was necessary 
to pacify the feuds and abolish them forever. Like the privy 
council he 1rIas pragmatic, but his objective, once decided upon, 
was always the same, the extinction of 1rIhat he quite clearly 
thought 1rIas an intolerable practice. That he did abuse the 
2. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 573. 
3. Historie, p 246. 
4. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 667. This is from a later date. 
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remissions system in order to get cash is indefencib1e. There 
were many prosecutions for slaughter which broke down on th~ 
production of a privy remission and as late as 1621 the council 
was trying to persuade the king of 11 our humble opinionis 
concerning thir remissionis ll in an effort to prevent him 
granting yet more. 5 M~ney was the cause of it and while there 
is no evidence to suggest that James was any worse than previous 
kings, it was a habit which undercut some 'of his own aims in 
other fields like abolishing the feud. However, it should also 
be pointed out that many of these respites and remissions were 
granted so that the holder of them could negotiate a letter of 
slains from the offended kin and this was, as has been seen, 
the condition the privy council demanded if they were to be 
passed through the great seal. Besides, the council itself was 
not opposed to remissions on principle. In 1623 they wrote to 
the king telling him of how some gent1emen'of Moray had slain 
certain thugs who had been ho1di~ prisoner a servant of the 
earl of Moray in revenge for the execution of one of their 
friends. Now these men and their friends were pursuing the 
gentlemen for slaughter and the council was advising the 
king to grant them remissions in order to prevent this.6 Such 
a practice was consistent with the king's own ideas, it not 
always his practice, on remissions. 
5. !:1~~ros~, ii, p 402. For other examples ot remissions which 
the king gave see Pitcairn, ~ina1 Trials, i, part 2, 
p .171; ii, P 461; ~~, i, P 97. 
6. Melrose, ii, p 535-37. 
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"Use justice, but with some moderation, as it turne not in 
Tyrannie: otherwaies .!~um Iu~, is LUI.!!lJla iniuria. As for 
example: if a man of a knowen honest life, be invaded by 
brigands or theeves for his purse, and in his owne defence 
slay one of them, they being both more in number, and also 
knowen to be deboshed and insolent livers; where by the 
contrarie, hee was single alone, beeing a man of sound 
reputation: yet because they were not at the horne, or 
there was no eye-witnesse present that could verifye their 
first invading of him, shall hee therefore lose his head? •• 
Surely no: for lawes are ordained as rules of vertuous and 
sociall living, and not to be snares to trap your good. 
subjects: and therefore the law must be interpreted 
according to the meaning, and not the literall sense 
therof: Wam ratio est anima legis. 7 
There was, then, a perfectly correct justification for remissions, 
and while the king may have erred on the side of leniency, 
particularly with noblemen and their friends during his earlier 
years, it was a fault which was never excessive and of which 
James himself was aware. 
\Jhen he wrote "Basilikon Doron" in 1599 the king was able 
to look back on the earlier years of his reign with more self 
criticism than most other monarchs ,would ever display in public. 
"And when you have by the severitie of Justice once 
settled your countries, and made them know that ye can 
strike, then may ye therafter all the daies of your life 
mixe Justice with Mercie, punishing or sparing, as ye 
shall finde the crime to have bene wilfully or rashly 
committed, and according to the by-past behaviour of the 
committer. For if otherwise ye kyth your clemencie at 
the first, the offencies would soone come to such heapes, 
and contempt of you grow so great, that when ye would 
fall to punish, the number of them to be punished, would 
exceed the innocent; and ye would be troubled to resolve 
whom-at to begin; and against your nature would be 
compelled then to wracke many, whom the chastisement of 
few in the beginning might have preserved. But in this, 
my overdeare bought experience may serve you a sufficient 
lesson: F~r I confesse, where I thought (by being gracious 
7. "Basilikon Doron" in ~olitical Works, (ed.) MacIlwaine, p .37-.38. 
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at the beginning) to win all mens hearts to a loving and 
willing obedience, I by the contrary found, the disorder 
.of the countrie, and the losse of my thankes to be all 
my reward." 8 
James thus admitted responsibility in part at least for the 
mess the kingdom got into between 1585-95, when feuding reached 
. 
its peak, when the number of horned men became too great to 
handle, when whole regions were engulfed in civil war and the 
king's own authority was very low indeed. This is not to.say 
that James caused the situation, or that having allowed it to 
develop he was not determined to restore peace ~nd order and 
to extinguish the worst malady of the age, the feud:. 
The king's views on violence, revenge and the feud have 
been preserved both in his writings and his works. Thus, when 
venting his anger against those who had ill-treated his mother 
.... and continued to show her disrespect, he advised that they 
should not be tolerated, but ..... without using any persuasion 
of revenge". He admitted that "l have ever thought it the 
dewtie of a worthie Prince, rather with a pike, than a penne 
to write his just revengell but had avoided doing so, " ••• wishing 
all men to juge of my future projects, according to my by-past 
actions".9 In other words he was determined, where possible, 
to set a good example. To James, revenge was like a deadly 
sin "see that yee sute no unlawfull things, as revenge, lust 
10 
or suche like". He was scathing of murder and oppression, 
criticising .. the ouer common use of it in this nation, as if 
8. "Basilikon Doron" in ~litica1 Works, (ed.) Macl1waine, p 20. 
9. ibid., P 9. 
10. ibid., p 15. 
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it were a vertue, especially by the greatest ranks of subjects 
in the land" .11 Perhaps with more optimism than was their due, 
James wrote ttthe most part of your people will ever natupaUy 
favour justice", which "is not there ye should reward your 
friends, or seeke to crosse your enemies ll , or IIfor satisfying 
any particular passions of yours, under colour therof. 
"Otherwise", he argued, IIho'W justly that ever the Offender 
deserve it, ye are guiltie of murther before God: For ye . 
must consider, that God ever looketh to your inward intention 
in all your actions.nl2 Of course what James wa~ expounding 
. 
here was his beliefs which were, as is the case with most men, 
not always in accord with his actiOns, but one should not under-
estimate his moral and Christian conviction because of that. 
The king diagnosed the principal source of many of his 
problems to be the nObility. 
"The naturall sicknesse that I have percieved this estate 
subject to in my time, hath beene, a fectlesse arrogant 
conceit of their greatnes and power; drinking in with their 
very nourish-milk, that their honour stood in committing 
three points of iniquitie: to thrall by oppression, the 
meaner sort that dwelleth neere them: to maintaine their 
servants and dependars in any wrong, although they be not 
answerable to the lawes, (for any body will maintain his 
man in a right cause) and for anie displeasure, that they 
apprehend to be done unto them by their neighbours, to tak 
up a plaine feid against him, and (Without respect to God, 
King or commonweale) to bang it out bravely, hee and all 
his kinne, against him and all his! yea they will thinke 
the King farre in their common, in-case they agree to 
grant an assurance to a short day, for keeping of the 
peace: where, by their naturall dewtie, they are oblished 
to obey the law, and keepe the peace all the daies of 
their life, upon the perill of their verie craigges.,,13 
11. IIRasilikon noron" in Political Works, (ed.) MacIlwaine, p 21. 
12. ibid., p 20, p 22. 
13. ibid., P 24-25. 
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James was clearly antagonistic towards the feud which he saw 
as an aberration, a sickness which required curing. One can 
also see here his irritation with the assurance system which 
he was not able to take steps against until 1604 by which 
time he had developed his arguments against it. He did, 
however, go on to outline his policy up until that time in 
that passage from which a quotation was drawn at the beginning 
of this study. He wrote 
"And for the barbarous feidis, put the lawes to due 
execution made by mee thereanent; beginning ever rathest 
at him that yee love best, and is most oblished unto you; 
to make him an example to the rest. For yee shall make 
all your reformations to beginne at your elbow, and so 
by degrees to flow to the extremities of the land. And 
rest not, untill you roote out these barbarous feidis; 
that their effects may be as well smoared down, as their 
barbarous name is unknowen to anie other nation: For if 
this Treatise were written in French or T.atin, I could 
not get them named unto you but by circumlocution. And 
for your easier abolishing of them, put sharplie to 
execution my lawes made againt Gunnes and traiterous 
Pistolets; thinking in your heart, tearming in your 
speech, and using in your punishments, all such as weare 
and use them, as brigands and cut-throates.,,14 
As one has already seen, the legislation against fire-arms 
was very closely allied to the passing of the major feud 
laws and the king was also accurate in pointing out the need 
to concentrate on the feuds of those closest to him, for it 
was to the feuds of the great nobles like Huntly, Montrose, 
14. "Basilikon Doron" in ,fol:i;tical Works, (ed.) Macllwaine, p 25. 
James VI was not the only European monarch to be concerned 
with eradicating feuding as his brother-in-law Christian IV 
of Denmark shared his passion. Christian III had also been 
set against feuding and. in 1537 had called feuds "a general 
plague in the kingdom", a metaphor which has echoes in 
.Tames's "sickness". It was in fact Philpotts who first 
suggested that the Danish connection may have helped to 
formulate the Scottish crown's policies for dealing with 
feuds, Philpotts, !indred and Clan, p 82-84, p 101. 
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Mar, Lennox or Hamilton that he devoted much of his personal 
attention in the early years of the campaign. 
Nor was James any more sympathetic of the duel or private 
combat, though he gave his licence for a few judicial duels to 
be fought. To him it was fundamentally unlawful "committing 
the quarrel, as it were, to a lot; wherof there is no warrant' 
in the Scripture, since the abrogating of the olde lawe". Not 
surprisingly he was horrified at the thought of a sovereign 
submitting himself to the duel, thus submitting "the safetie 
, 15 
or wracke of the whole common-wea1elt to the outcome. He 
returned to the theme in 1613 when trying to outlaw duelling 
in England. He bitterly complained of those who "cha1enge 
any man into the Field, towards whom they cary grudge or malice 
in their minds under the pretext of satisfaction to pretended 
wrongs without imploring aide either of the loawes or Civil 
Magistrates". What, asked the king, was the point in C'rod 
and society having laws if men were to be free to "rate the. 
quality of the wrong supposed, or the satisfaction that belongs 
to it". He poured scorn on the enchantment of a mistaken 
concept of honour which transformed "consideration into passion, 
reason into appetite, and men into beasts", and on young men 
who nas soone as they can hold a Sword in their hand" set out 
to prove themselves in the field. This should be unnecessary 
in a state where there was a law provided for every contingency 
and it showed a contempt for justice which was aroused by "their 
15. "Basilikon Doron" in Political Works, (ad.) Mac Illrlsine, p 28. 
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old Paradox, supposing no satisfaction to be sufficient, 
besides that which the partie that hath bene offended taketh 
wi th his owne hande, and by the sword". Such behaviour was 
nothing mo!'e than the antics of "Cavillers" who employed 
themselves in "pleasing of the vulgar taste" and had nothing • 
whatsoever to do with honour.16 It was a complete reversal 
of the code of honour discussed above. and the replacement of 
it by one which respected and upheld the laws of God and the 
state. 
James also wished to see a demilitarisation of society 
as a means of reducing the likelihood of fatal encounters 
and removing the emphasis from martial prowess. Armour should 
not be permitted at court, but only those accoutrements which 
were Itknightly and honourablelt , by which "I meane rapier-
swordes, and daggers". Other weapons, "tullyesome weapons", 
at court, "betokens confusion in the countrey". He wanted to 
banish both offensive and defensive weapons. 
ItFor besides that the wearers therof, may be presupposed 
to have a secret evil intention, they want both the· uses 
that defensive armour is ordained for; which is, to be 
able to hold oute violence, and by their outward glaunsing 
in their enemies eyes, to strike terrour in their hearts: 
Where by the contrary, they can serve for neither, being 
not onely unable to resist, but dangerous for shots, and 
giving no outward showe against the enemie; being onely 
ordained, for betraying under trust, wherof honest men 
should be ashamed to beare the outward badge, not 
resembling the thing they are not. ~nd for answere 
against these arguements, I knowe none but the olde 
Scots fashion; which if it be wrong, is no more to be 
a.llowed for ancientnesse, then the olde Masse is, which 
16. J.F.Larkin and P.L.Hughes, Stewart Royal Proclamations 
James I, (Oxford, 1973),'p 302-08. This proclamation 
was in part composed by Southampton. 
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also our forefathers used."l? 
In short the uniforms of aggression were to be done away wi~h. 
James also drew attention to the dangers of being served 
by factious officials. 
"Surfer none about you to meddle in any men's particulars, 
but like the Turkes .Tanisares, let them know no father but 
you, nor particular but yours. And if any will medde in 
their kinne or friends quarrels, .give them their leave: 
for since ye must be of no surname nor kinne, but equall 
to all honest men: it becommeth you not to bee followed 
with partiall or factious servants.,,18 
Unfortunately, unless the king was willing to fpllow Turkish 
practices to the letter this was beyong his powers to control. 
Royal officials continued to be as factious and court parties 
continued to be formed around alliances of friends and 
kinsmen, but at least the idea was there, reflecting an unease 
with the system and perhaps acting as a brake upon it. On this 
same subject of officers the king turned to hereditary sheriff-
doms and r.egalities, "the greatest hinderance to the execution 
of our lawes in this cuntrie". J1e clearly wanted to establish 
Itthe laudable custome of Englaril" and J .P' s were in part a 
fulfillment of that desire, but James had to admit that 
"1 know no present remedie, but by taking the sharper account 
of them in their Offices; using all punishment against the 
slouthfull, that the Law will permit: and ever 8S they vaike, 
for any offences committed of them, dispone of them never 
heritably againe.1I19 As one saw from the legislation which 
17. "Basilikon Doron" in Political Works, (eel.) 1I.a.cl1waine, p 46. 
18. ibid., p 33. 
19. ibid., p 26. 
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arose from these ideas, the crown was very limited in what it 
could do and there were very few like the earl of Caithness 
who lost their hereditary offices. 
"Basilikon Dorontl is thus something of a royal manifesto, 
outlining some of the king's achievements and his aspirations: 
In it James declared that there were times for the use of the 
sword, "given you by God not onely to' revenge you upon youre 
owne subjectis, the wrongs committed amongst themselves •• ~tI;O 
but on the whole his philosophy was one of creating an environment 
by persuasion and legislation in which feud and its attendant 
forms of violence could not exist. One has to beware of 
reading too much into James's writings, but they are deeply 
infused with his high sense of kingship, his respect for law 
and his Christian faith which made it impossible to tolerate 
the feud in the kind of society which he believed God had given 
him to rule. James was a man of conservative instincts, but 
here one finds him attacking reactionaries who opposed reform 
in the name of being custodians of the past, and throwing out 
the values of the honour society as it had been understood by 
most men at the beginning of his reign. He objected to violence, 
to the excessive abuse of privilege, to the corruption of kinship 
and to the whole realm of revenge. For a Calvinist he had a 
remarkable faith in men's innate goodness which could be 
harnessed by wise rule and good laws to create a better, more 
harmonious and peaceful society, held together by adherence to 
the ethics of "the Christian church and the authority of the 
20.· "Basilikon Doron" in ,folitical Works. (ed.) MacIlwaine, p 28. 
'. 
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temporal ruler who was the king. 
Yet James was a man with the unique opportunity of being 
able to implement his ideas and it is in his actions that o'ne 
can test his commitment to such reforms. Beginning in 1585 
with the overthrow of the Arran regime, before which one can 
still effectively talk of a minority situation, one finds 
that following the success of the rebel lo~ds James immediately 
pleaded with them not to pursue their feuds with those who had 
been about him during the preceding years. A year later Randolph 
wrote of his "readiness to compose matters that might trouble 
his peace,,2l and in 1587 this desire for peace was given 
expression in the great banquet he devised to reconcile his 
nobles. The idea was naive and expressed the king's own 
youthfQl optimism about the ease of the problem facing him, 
but it was still his conception. 
"At the. conventioun the King maid ane harang to his 
nobellitie and estaites, declairing, that seing he was 
nO\01 come to his perfect aiege of twentie ane yeiris 
compleit, hafing mony wechtie effaires to be advysit, 
thocht it best first to reconceill his nobelletie, 
quhairin his Majestie had teane no small travell, and to 
suche poynt as all sould tend to the pleasour of God, his 
Majesties standing, the weill of the countrie, and thair 
awin ease and tranqu1lletie; protesting befoir God that 
he loved nothing so mikle as ane perfyt unioun and 
reconciliatioun amangis his nobillety in hairtes and gif 
ony sould seime obstinat, that the remnant of his nobiletie 
sould hald hand to the repressing of thame, and the first 22 
brekkaris of that happie unioun persewit be all extremitie." 
Of course as has been already pointed out the whole incident 
smacked more of the circus than serious government and was a 
21. Spottiswoode, Hist.ory, i.i, p 333; Estimate, p $. 
22. Moysie, Memoirs, p 63-64. 
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total failure. It was to be eight years before James could 
return to the feuds during which time experience may have 
brushed off some of the simple idealism of that day in 1587, 
but it also confirmed him in his resolve to be rid of the 
feuds with more realistic and workable methods. 
The 1595 initiative also appears to have come from the 
king himself. Thus "The King understanding the great revengeis 
to lurk in the hartis of men, be reason of auld debaittis" 
summoned all the feuding nobles to Edinburgh and attempted 
. 23 
to either reconcile them or put them under assuranc~s. Another 
commentator also gave the credit to the king. 
"Our estate presently is thus occupied. During the life 
of the late Chancellor his Majesty thought all well governed. 
Now he begins to think other ways, minding by using of his 
laws to make great profit to himself and contentment to his 
people,i which order if it be prosecuted shall "effectuat" 
both.".!.4 
This is a complete reversal of Lee's argument that Maitland 
handed the king over a well ordered state primed for absolutism. 
Instead one sees James realising that his late chancellor had 
handled affairs less w.ell than had been thought and deciding to 
do something about it. The result was the 1595 act and a period 
of hard work by James during the winter of 1595-96 when it was 
observed that "The King is so resolute to all agreement of feuds 
against this time as they adventure to excuse but not deny their 
coming ••• ~s to the horners the King is severe therin and begins 
to reign and rule like himself .,,25 However, James was as always 
23. Historie, p 356. 
24 •. Q_.S.P .Scot., xii, p 99. 
25. ibid., p 136. 
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prone to fits and starts and by the spring had run out of steam 
and without the king's hand in the operation the whole campaign 
collapsed. Shortly before the 1598 convention of the nobility, 
when James1s officials were threatening to strike if he did not 
give them greater backing, -it was reported that since the arrival 
of the duke of Holstein " ••• by reason that the King to accompany 
26 him and his hounds neglected the staying of these matters". 
It was not quite that simple, but there can be few better . 
ex~ples of how medieval the government still was. Clearly 
there was no well trained staff there to carry on with the 
faceless implementation of royal policy through the channels 
of a well oiled absolutist state machine. The king ~ent hunting 
and one policy at least ground to a halt. 
In the summer of 1598 James returned to the feuds ~ith new 
energies inspired perhaps by the threatened strike, by 
Holstein1s account of how they dealt with feuds in Denmark or 
by his renewed anger at the continuing high levels of feuding; 
one does not really kno~ ~hich. The 1598 act clearly drew on 
past experiences and in particular parliament's settlement 
of the Gordon-Forbes feud, but the specific authorship of the 
act was the king's. During the convention liThe King the last 
week had his Council ~ith him to advise on ~hat should be 
trusted in this Convention and in the end dre~ articles himself 
of the matters ••• n~7 The privy council later recognised this, 
drawing attention to the king's particular determination to 
26. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 214-15. 
27. ibid., P 228. 
eradicate "all sic cuustomis, faschiouns and behaviouris as did 
in ony wayis smell of barbaritie and revenges ••• amangis the 
quhi1kis enormities as nane wer maie barbarous and detestable 
than the usual conuetud of deidlie feidis". The king vas therefore 
"movei t to abhore and detaist the same and to tak resolutioun for 
the utter abo1isching and.extinguisching of sic a devi1ische 
forme", yhich proved to be "a1togeder .difficile, yea maiest· 
impossibill at the forst". In order to make a more effective 
impact it was therefore decided to legislate against fire-arms 
and 
"thairafter in ane Generall Conventioun of the Estaites 
of that his Hienes realrne, certane articles pennit be 
his Majesties awin self for removing of the saidis feidis 
being consentit and accordit unto, the same wes thairefter 
past and a110yit for ane publict law in the nixt 
Parliament ••• ".28 
Obviously there is an element of flattery in this, written in 
the preamble to the 1604 act, but it is a description which is 
consistent yith other evidence and besides if it vas nothing 
more than flattery then yhy vas the king not given the credit 
for other legislation during his reign? The case for James 
himself having at the very least drafted the terms of the 
1598 act after some consultation yith his advisors seems to 
be unansyerab1e unless evidence to the contrary can be uncovered. 
Nor did James end his interest yith the passing of the act and 
in the fol1oYing months it vas regularly reported that "The King 
hastens all agreement of feuds", "The King is hastening to agree 
all other feuds. by all possible means or at least to get them 
28. R.P.C., vi, p 594-96. 
under assurance.", and "The King labours these agreements at 
all hands. 1I29 The result was that by 1603 while the number of 
feuds was still very high, most of the great noble feuds had 
been either laid to rest or had been assured, an achievement 
which was to a very large extent a personal one for James. 
However, the king's i"nvolvement did not end in 1603. The 
1604 act also bore his personal stamp with the incorporation 
of his ideas on assurances first expressed in 1599 in 
"Basilikon Doron". Both Spottiswoode and the council's own 
records relate that the king wrote to them and ordered them 
to clean up the feuds, and in particular to put less emphasis 
on the assurance system because it implied recognition of the 
legitimate rights of parties to feud. Thus they wrote, "his 
Majesteis awin experience movis him to consider that the 
taking of assuranceis betuix parteis hes bene rather an fosterar 
nor removear of the same ••• ". The king's ideas were duly 
30 . 
enacted. The same happened in 1609 when James wrote to the 
council about some recent feuds and told them to stop using 
assurances altogether, for instead of providing peace they 
"retene the memorie of that monster itselff, and. makis you by 
accepting any suche conditioun to seame to gif allowance thairto". 
He then went on to chastise the council for laxity in allowing 
"the new budding oute of that rnischevous weid of deidlie feid". 
The king warned them that "we resolve heiretter to blamye nane 
29. C.~.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 419, P 422, p 579. Spottiswoode 
also agrees with this interpretation, ~pottiswoode, Histotl, 
iii, p 91. 
30. R.P.C., vi, p 595; Spottiswoode, History, iii"p 164-65. 
utheris bot you for the same, since ye haif authoritie and 
po~er in your handis to committ disobeyaris, and to do every 
thing els that is requisite and expedient for seting and 
keeping oure peace thair." The letter ~as ~ritten on the 
29th of July and on the 6th of August the privy council 
published a ne~ proclamation against feuding ~hich basically 
reiterated the king's ~ords to them.~l Elsewhere this role 
. . 
of the king as a motivator of his council is substantiated. 
Spottis~oode saying that he "was ever seriously commending to 
the council the removing of the barbarous feuds".32 
The king's commitment ~as even more specific than simply 
to legislate and he showed himself willing to get involved in . 
the implementation of that legislation. His part in some of 
the great feuds already discussed has been touched on and 
needs no repetition, but there were ma~ others which received 
his personal attention. In 1589 he composed a feud between 
Huntly and Marischal, in 1591 he intervened in the internal 
squabbles of the Kerr family, in 1599 he brought Drumlangrig 
and J ohnstone to an agreement and ona number of occasIons he 
took a hand in the affairs of the hopelessly divided Kennedy 
kindred. 33 At the 1602 convention of the nobility he persuaded 
Ochiltree and Loudon to submit a feud. and at the same time took 
up the outstanding issues between Lennox and Argyll which they 
31. ~.P.C., viii,p 591-92. 
32. Spottis~oode, HistorY, iii, p 190 • 
. 
33. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 6, p 544, p 588-89; xiii, part 1, p 579; 
Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 27-28, p 41-43. 
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agreed to submit to him as their oversman, thus causing him 
to be employed on their business right through from Februa~ 
to May in which month he spent two whole days on this feud 
alone. The reconciliation he finally achieved broke down 
after only a few months and the whole process had to begin 
again, though with a slightly heavier hand behind it.34 Here 
James was acting as a good overlord putting into practice the 
good lordship he expected of his own nobles, pacifying tho~e 
closest to him as he had suggested in "Basilikon Doron". The 
picture is very much one of the feudal or medie~al lord living 
and working among his vassals and servants and being involved 
with them in their disputes both great and small. It was the 
kind of government to which the Scottish nobles best responded 
and which James did best.35 
To some extent this all ended in 1603 when James left for 
London and many of the great nobles and courtiers left with him. 
Yet while james no longer needed to fulfil quite the same role 
as an overlord he kept very much in touch with what wes going 
on in Scotland. In 1605 he wrote to the council telling them 
that he had heard that Douglas of Torthorwald was in Edinburgh 
and had not been arrested for the murder of the former chancellor 
Arran. He demanded an explanation and got one from lord advocate 
Hamilton who detailed the arrangements that were being taken to 
pacify this particular feud and promised that the "name and 
34. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 940, P 962, P 977. 
35. The king showed remarkably detailed interest in even minor 
feuds as in 1590 when he intervened in one between the 
laird of Abercairny and a John Gibson, H.M.C., iii, p 419. 
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memorie of deidIie feidis", would b~abolished.36 When 
Torthorwa.ld was murdered three years later the king was again 
busy W • t· d d· 1 ti d ff· . t· i 37 r1 1ng, eman 1ng exp ana ons an 0 er1ng cr1 1C sms. 
In 1606 James gave specific instructions regarding a Gilbert Gray 
of Bandirrane who had slaughtered the master of Oliphant and in 
1607 he wrote his instructions for the council in its dealings 
in the feud between Mar and his Macfa·rlane dependants on the 
. 38 
one side and Colquhoun of Luss on the other. That same year 
he expressed his anger at the murder by the laird of Lochinvar 
of one of his own servants and shortly afterwards the laird 
was chaged with the crime.39 In 1608 his orders for the 
treatment of a feud between the Forbes family and Irvine of 
Drum were acted upon immediately after his letter was received 
and the council even picked up some of his phraseology in the 
. process. 40 A year later he told the council that they were 
to ensure that no feud broke out between Scott of Tusche1aw 
and Scott of Thirlstane as he had had a letter from the former 
telling him that Thirlstane had threatened to kill him.41 In 
1609 it was he who insisted on the execution of lord Doune's 
son for murdering a man with whom he was at reud while the 
council was very reluctant to go through with it.42 A feud 
36. Melrose, i, p 7. 
37. R.P.O., viii, p 543, p 809. 
38. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 514-15; R.P.C., vii, p 528. 
39. R.P.C., vii, p 435, p 540-41. 
40. R.P.C., viii, p 530. 
41. ibid., p 598-99. 
42. ibid., P 602, P 610; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 74-76. 
between Elphingstone of Blythswood and Bruce of Airth received 
his attention in 1610 and he again took the opportunity to remind 
the council of his hatred of feuding "so odious to God and 
reprotchefull to that natioun".43 
The Union therefore did not end the king's very particular 
concern for the "uprooting" of the deadly weed. After 1610 his 
interest becomes less intense, probably because the feuds really 
were on" decline after 1608-09 and the council was by then 
sufficiently confident of its role to deal with the remainder 
without the king's constant advice. Absentee kingsh~p did not 
mean that the king handed affairs over to his officials and 
let them get on with the job. In the treatment of the feuds 
one repeatedly finds the privy council referring matters to the 
king and the king constantly reminding them of their duties and 
advising them on cours~s open to them. Even when James came 
north in 1617 he found himself deeply involved in the negotiations 
between Huntly, Erro1l and his councillors to pacify 8 feud which 
had erupted between the two old allies the year before. In the 
end the king decreed a compromise which showed the same 
pragmatism and flexibility seen elsewhere and justice was seen 
to be done without the letter of the law being invoked. The 
feud was settled with the customar;rhand-shaking, forgiveness 
and toasting one another which the king had participated in 
in settlements made before 1603.44 Whether in this rather 
isolated case or in the flow of letters between him and the 
43. R.P.C., viii, p 611-12, p 621-23. 
44. Gordon, Sutl\erland, p 340-42; Ba1four, !nnalQS., ii, p 68; 
R.P.C., x, p 594-95. 
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council in the Crawford-Edze1l feud or in his insistence on 
the execution of lord Maxwell one finds a king determined to 
maintain an interest in the details of what was for him a very 
important policy, one which he had shown enormous interest in 
over the years and which he oversaw from its conception to its 
successful culmination. 
Yet as James VI himself wrote, kings were not tyrants and 
nor were they supermen. The king could not have legislated 
against feuds and conducted a campaign against them without 
co-operation from other bodies in the state, the most important 
of whom were his nobility. It would have been quite impossible 
for James to have pursued this policy in the face of a defiant 
nobility_ This is not the place to discuss the nobility of 
early modern Europe or even of Scotland, but the weight of 
opinion at the moment appears to be very much on the side of 
a powerfully resurgent nobility which was far from being in 
retreat before the united forces of crown and gentry, noblesse 
de robe, lairds or whatever terminology is used to describe 
the top layers of the middle ciasses for this period.45 As 
Wormald has already pointed out, the problem facing James was 
not keeping his nobles out of government and thus undermining 
them, but persuading them to participate in the 
45. For a general discussion of this see Anderson, Lineages of 
the Absolut![~ State, esp. ch. 2; the revival of the Spanish 
nobility is stressed by Lynch, SEa!n under the HaEsburgs, 
vol 11, p 140-48; for France J.Dewald, The Format!Qn of a 
Pr~vincial N~bilit~, The M8fistrate~t_the Parlement ot-~~ 
1499-1610. [Princeton, 1980 , see the conclusion for a summary; 
and James makes the point that even the Tudor monarchy was 
dependant upon the nobility, English Politics and the ConceRt 
of Honour, p 2. 
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46 government. Thus 11 noblemen forbear Court and Council, unless 
for their own particulars, when the occassions force them".47 
Jameswas very conservative when it came to appointing his 
officers and showed a distinct bias towards his nob1es which 
was only partially tempered by Lee's obs ervation that it was • 
only those who were not at feud or who agreed to the king's 
mediation of their feuds who received favour. 48 Certainly Mar 
lost the chancellorship over his refusal to settle a feud,· but 
if the king had employed this condition too rigorously even 
during the first decade of the seventp.enth centUry he would 
have been hard pressed to find many nobles on whom he could 
bestow his favour. The nobility were v.ery much a part of the 
Jacobean government, both at the centre where they continued 
to hold office and dominate the chamber and in the localities 
where they still monopolised the vast pO\lerS which made their 
co-operation in the execution of the law crucial. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, the noble domina ted 
minority period passed legislation which was designed to reduce 
violence and lawlessness, while the 1578-82 settlement of the 
Gordon-Forbes feud and the 1582-83 moves against feuding all 
took place within this period. While the Gordon-Forhes 
settlement was perhaps more political than anything else, the 
initiative in July 1582 against feuds was more clearly a general 
measure and the men who passed that measure are worth some 
46. Wormald, Q.ourt. Kirk and Community, p 51-52; Brown, "Scottish 
Politics, 1567-1625" in,!he Reign of James VI and I, ed. 
Smith, p 26. 
47. ~.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 618. 
48. Lee, Q~vernment By Pen, p9. 
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analysis. Of the nobles present, Lennox and Arran were the 
dominant figures. Lennox was a Frenchman who had come from 
an environment little different from Scotland and Arran, though 
not a noble by inheritance, was the son of a nobleman and of a 
noble family. Without any kindred Lennox was very vulnerable· 
and ~as driven from the country within months of this procla-
mation being passed, but Arran kne~ his way through the webs of 
. . 
Scottish politics, ~as already deeply involved in a blood-feud 
~ith the Douglases and ~as eventually to die at their hands. 
Of the other nobles present, Crawford, Glencairn'~ Eglinton, 
Montrose, Maxwell and Ogilvy all had feuds of their own, 
Glencairn and Eglinton with one another, while lords Doune, 
Cathcart and Rothes had, as far as is known, no feuds to contend 
with. In other words the majority of the men who decided to 
press for the pacification of a number of feuds in the west 
of Scotland were themselves at feud. 49 
Where the idea came for this attempt to pacif1 feuds in 
1582 is difficult to identify. Calderwood suggested that it 
yas the fifteen year old king yho expressed a desire to see 
his nobles at peace and he may be right. 5O The tact that the 
feuds all lay in the west of Scotland points strongly to Arran 
and Lennox having had a significant say in directing the policy 
and when one considers Arran's tough approach elsewhere and the 
very similar ideas he and the king had on a number of issues, 
49. R.P.C.!. i:].i, p 503. The sederunt is not recorded for that 
day, but the above had all been attending council meetings 
in the preceding yeeks •. 
50. Calderwood, History, ii1, p ?OO. 
he emerges as the best candidate for pushing the matter further. 
Certainly none of the others showed any inclination to give . 
support for such a policy in the future, the exception being 
Montrose, but not until the later 1590's. However, one has to 
remain a little suspicious of the measure which may have had . 
more to do with attempting to build up Arran's and Lennox's 
influence in the west of Scotland, in Ayrshire and Renfrewshire, 
where most of the feuds it was addressed to were located. 
When the king returned to tackling the feuds in 1595 
noblemen continued to be associated with royal policr. One 
nobleman who was very closely involved with the court and the 
government was John F.rskine, earl of Mar. Having been raised 
with the king in Stirling Mar "first made his mark in 1578 
when he aided Morton in his recovery of power, he being then 
" only sixteen. Between 1578-84 he remained a regular attendant 
at court, but drifted increasingly apart from the king and into 
enmity with Arran from whom he had to flee in 1584 after a plot 
against the chancellor collapsed. He returned with the exiled 
lords in 1585 and during the next ten years he survived all 
the hectic strife and faction to emerge as the most respected 
nobleman of the court, popular with the king, the English and 
with most of his contemporaries. However, he was suddenly 
projected into the last great political feud of the century and 
his refusal to co-operate with the king in settling it outside 
of the law lost him some favour. Mar had prior to this been 
present in 1587 at the great attempted reconciliation of the 
nobility and he was attending the council meetings fairly 
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regularly at the time of the 1595 act and so he knew the king's 
commitment to ending feuds. However, his determination not ,to 
settle with lord Livingston caused him to oppose the passing of 
the 1598 act and to refuse to obe,y its terms in the months which 
followed. In time he did settle, but his obstinance had cost. 
him the chancellorship, though not the king's favour. Evidence 
that his opposition on the 1598 act ~as on personal ground's and 
not in.principle comes from his behaviour·thereafter. In spite 
of his own tardiness in obeying the king in this matter he sat 
on twenty-five of the thirty-eight recorded council meetings 
during the winter of 1598-99 when the act was being implemented 
fairly intensely, he continued to be a regular in attendance up 
until 1603 when he went to London and he was one of the lords 
of the articles who saw that the 1598 act received parliamentary 
approval in 1600. He remained with the king in London as one 
of his close friends Until 1617 when he returned to Scotland 
as lord high treasurer, an important office in implementing 
much of the above legislation. He held the offioe until his 
death in 1630. Clearly Mar was a nobleman at home at the 
council table enforcing government policy against feuds and 
also in his locality fighting his own feuds there. 5l 
This dual role was also to be found in John Graham, third 
51. Scots PeerageJ v, p 615-21; R.P.C., v, vi, sederunts. 
In each of the brief biographies which follow only the 
basic references are given as to include all references 
·to each case would be tedious. Man,r of the points made 
about th~se men are simply gleaned from an overall reading 
of the sources for the period, but apart from those 
references given I also found W.Anderson, !he Scottish .. 
liation; or the ~ur~m~s, Fa~iliest Literature and Honours 
and Bio~a hicBl Histor of the Pea le of Scotland, 
Edinburgh, 1867 useful. 
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earl of Montrose, the man who beat Mar to the chancellorship 
in 1599. An older man than Mar, Montrose first joined the 
privy council in 1571 having from the start of the civil war 
supported the king's party. In 1573, at the Pacification of 
Perth, he was appointed to oversee any complaints arising 
from breaches of the agreement north of the Forth, but he 
gradually shifted away from Morton and in 1578 joined Argyll 
and Atholl against him. Thereafter he was firmly with Argyll 
and Arran being given the position of chancellor of the assize 
which found Morton guilty of treason and also s~tting on that 
which convicted Gowrie three years later. Arran rewarded his 
loyalty in 1584 by appointing him an extraordinary lord of 
session and to the post of lord treasurer which had been held 
by Gowrie. However, Arran's fall saw him retreat into the 
background where he was troubled with feuds which had their 
origins in his activities while in power between 1581-85 and 
any likelihood of him making a return seemed to be jeopardised 
by him being implicated in the rebellions of 1589 and 1593. 
In spite of this he was able to work, his way back into royal 
favour during the next few years and earned the reputation of 
being a fairly reliable and hard working man willing to co-
operate with the king. This reputation was enhanced when he 
distanced himself from the worst incidents of his family's 
feud with the Sandilands kindred and showed that he was eager 
to submit the feud and have it pacified. In 1599, at the age 
of fifty-one! he was appointed chancellor, an office he filled 
quietly, lacking the subtlety and intelligence of his predecessor 
and successor. From 1599-1604 he thus presided over a period 
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of intense anti-feud activity and iri particular over the 
pacification of many of the feuds of his fellow noblemen. 
Like Mar he had had his own feuds, but was sympathetic to 
royal policy and oversaw its implementation. No doubt he 
realised that this was the quickest road to favour, but as 
his earlier career showed he was no sycophant and his conversion 
to co-operation with the crown should not be underestimated. 52 
Though these two were the most prominent noblemen working 
within the central government administration, there were 
others. Lord Fleming was a former Marian who was restored 
in 1579 and entered the royal household where he was appointed 
usher in 1583. In 1590 he joined the privy council and was 
sent as ambassador to Denmark. He was present at the 1587 
. 
convention and at the passing of the 1598 act, being present 
at gbout half the coun~il meetings during its implementation 
during the months which followed. In 1606 he was rewarded 
with the title of earl of Wigton and in 1609 played a major 
part in overseeing the final stages of the reconciliation 
between Glencairn and Eglinton. He was also asked to 
investigate the activities of the unruly earl of Orkne,y and 
filled a number of, other quango type posts during his career. 53 
Lord Seton was also present in 1587 and 1590, was one of the 
lords of the articles in 1600 and was involved in the privy 
52. Scots Peerage, vi, p 231-37; G.Brunton, An Historical 
Ac~ount of the SenatQ~s of the College of Justice from 
the Institution in MDXXXII, (Edinburgh, 1832), p 188-91; 
R.P.C., V, vi, sederunts. 
53. Scots Peerage, viii, p 545-47; R.P.C., v-viii, sederunts • 
• 
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council's work until his death in 1603. 54 Lord Newbatt1e's 
involvement can be traced back to the time of the 1595 act 
when he was active on the council, he was at the 1590 convention, 
sat on the articles in 1600 and continued to serve the crown 
until his own death in 1609 by which time he had been created. 
earl of Lothian. 55 Lord Spynie, who had received his title 
through the favour he had gained in the chamber, was also· 
there in 1598 and on the articles two years later, but he ~as 
less involved in the affairs of the privy council and 
lord Livingston followed a similar course. 56 L~rd Ochi1tree 
was at the 1598 convention and participated in the government 
during the period immediately following it, being appointed 
to a number of jobs, the most important of which was lieutenant 
of the Western Isles in 1608. 57 The earl of Cassillis was also 
at the 1598 convention, took part in the government during the 
th f 11 ' d ed h t t· t 58 mon s 0 OW1ng an serv for a s or 1me as reasurer. 
Finally, tpe master of E1phingstone was present when the 
1598 act was passed, became treasurer in 1599, a post he held 
until 1601, was appointed an ordinary lord of session in 1599 
and was a regular attender at privy council meetings.59 
Of these men, Wigton, Lothian, Ochiltree and E1phingstone 
were present when the council issued the 1609 proclamation 
54. ~ots Peerage, viii, p 590-91; S.P.C., v, vi, sederunts. 
55. Scots Peerage, v, p 455-57; ~.P.C., v-viii, sederunts. 
56. Scots Peera~e, viii, p 95-101; .R.P .C., v, vi, sederunts. 
Scots Peera~e, v, p 443-45; R.P.C., v, vi, sederunts. 
. 
57. Scots Peerage, vi, p 516-17; R.P.C. , v, vi, sederunts. 
58. Scots Peerage, ii, p 475-77; .!bl.C. , v, vi, sederunts. 
59. Scots Peera/ie, iii, p .3,6-.38; B runt on , Senators, p 242-4.3; 
R.P.C., v, vi, sederunts. 
against feuds, the last specific measure concerned with the 
subject and one which marked the end of the period of intense 
anti-feud activity.60 They had thus served throughout the 
entire campaign to end feuding in Scotland and, with Mar and 
Hontrose, they cast doubt on the non-noble nature of the 
administration. They, and the others with shorter careers, 
were not without their own feuds; Spynie was killed in a feud, 
Mar and Livingston were at feud with one another, Ochiltree 
had his feud with Bothwell when he was younger and Cassillis 
was embroiled in feuding, but this did not prev~nt them from 
getting on with implementing royal policy. One has also to 
remember that in the localities one had men like the eighth 
earl of Angus who filled a number of border offices and was 
described as "a lover of justice, peacable ••• ", but who 
61 
unfortunately died in 1588 while only thirty-three. Others 
like Argyll, Lennox and Hume were less attractive, but they 
still got on with the job of crushing rebel clans and border 
kindreds or in mediating between friends and thus bringing 
peace of a kind. Much of this was simply good lordship and 
no different from how their ancestors had behaved, but they 
were also enforci~g the new legislation of the 1590's. 
One cannot argue that the destruction of the feud was the 
result of a change of heart among the nobility; that would be 
to go too far. Yet far too much emphasis is put on noble 
opposition to royal reform. At the end of the Jacobean age 
60. R.P.C., viii, p 343-44. 
61. Scots Peerage, i, p 194-97. 
real power still lay in the collective will of the nobility, 
however much the means by' which they displayed that power may 
have altered. To imagine that the crown could have legislated, 
and more importantly, executed the measures described above 
without noble co-operation is vastly to overestimate the power 
. 
of the king and the importance of central government. Many 
nobles were difficult and had to be managed through a variety 
of persuasive or coercive options to accept the changes which 
were taking place, but quite clearly others not only accepted 
reform but actively encouraged it. Why should it be so 
impossible to believe that noblemen could, along with lawyers, 
officials or ministers, see the advantages. in a more peaceful 
society and understand the political and religious justification 
for the attack on the feud? Of course self-interest was also at 
work, most of these men were rewarded with office and entitlement, 
but one has to avoid the assumption that all men serve only for 
the gain t~ey see at the end of the tunnel. Some of these 
nobles may have been motivated by the prospect of reward, but 
others may have come to believe that the feud was an affront to 
the crown or to God. Certainly one cannot leave the nobility 
out of the reckoning and this picture of noble co-operation is 
enhanced when one comes to examine the other administrators of 
royal government. 
Something of a myth has grown up about the "lawyer-
administrators" of the Jacobean government. Lee writes of 
"a sort of nobless e de robe" formed from among the less er 
gentry. These men were employed and subsequently rewarded by 
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the crown, so that "in this way the loyalty of these classes 
to the government yould be fostered and encouraged". Wormald 
similarly writes of "the speed yith which James' council, 
dominated by these 'neVJ men', tightened up and extended 
legislation a~ainst feud after the king's departure to England".62 
As has already been shown, the most productive legislative 
period was before James went south and even from there he 
-continued to direct affairs yith considerable attention to 
detail. Furthermore, the question of 11 new men" or It noblesse 
de robe" has not really been substantiated and it is to the men 
who have been granted this dubious distinction that one must 
now turn. 
They can be divided broadly into two chronOlogical groups; 
those who served in the administration during the 1560's and 
roughly up until the end of Maitland's chancellorship and 
those who were predominant during the post 1595 period. Of 
the first group chancellor Maitland and treasurer Glamis yere 
the most important, but they have al!eady been discussed in 
some depth and one can only repeat that neither of them showed 
any interest in ending feuds but were dependant upon the 
political environm'ent of feud and faction for their own success 
at court. Quite possibly they would have participated in the 
drive to extiIlgcruish feuding had they been involved in the 
government after 1595, but Maitland's death and Glamis's 
fall from favour prevented this and it is as court brokers 
62. Lee, John Maitland of Thirlstane, p 143; Wormald, Court. 
Kirk and Corr.munity, p ~56. 
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and intriguers that they are best remembered. 
There were, however, six others who played important parts 
in the administration of these years. All of them were from 
lairdly families, all became session judges and half of them 
were younger sons. Robert Pitcairn, commendator of Dunfermline, 
was a protege of the regent Moray and thus· a beneficiary of 
noble patronage. He was educated for the church, but changed 
his career plans at the reformation to a future in the legal 
profession and by a combination of his own tale~t and Moray's 
influence acquired the Dunfermline commendatorship 1n 1561, 
became an extraordinary member of the privy council in 1565, 
a lord of the articles in 1567, was promoted to the bench as 
an ordir~ry lord of the session in 1568 and in 1510 became 
secretary of state. He continued in that office after Moray's 
death and survived various changes of government until 1584 
when he fell foul of Arran for siding with the Ruthven raiders. 
He died shortly after his dismissa1.63 Mark Kerr had been 
abbot of Newbattle before the reformation but renounced his 
catholicism and was allowed to hold onto his lands as commendator 
of Newbattle. Like Pitcairn his clerical education stood him 
in good stead and in 1569 he was appointed an extraordinary 
lord of session, was invited to join the privy council and 
remained in government service until his death, also in 1584.64 
Sir Lewis Bellenden of Auchinoul inherited the job of justice 
clerk from his father in 1578, joined the privy council a year 
63. Brunton, Senators, p 139-40. 
64. ibid., p 147. 
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later and, in spite of siding with the Ruthven raiders, was 
at Maitland's instigation appointed a lord of session in 1584. 
He died in 1591 having been a firm ally of chancellor Maitland.65 
Adam Bothwell, bishop of Orkney, was chiefly famous for marrying 
queen ¥~ry to Bothwell, but he had also been a session lord 
since 1564 and by joining the king's party in 1567 remained 
66 in the government throughout the next two decades. Alexander 
Hay of Easter Kennet was another friend of the Maitland family, 
being nominated by him as clerk to the privy counc,il. Like the 
others he survived the various changes in polit~cs, became 
director of chancery in 1577, clerk register and a session lord 
in 1579 and filled a number of committee positions between then 
and his death in 1594.67 Finally, Alexander Colville, commendator 
of Culross, was appointed to the session by Morton in 1575, 
joined the privy council in 1579 and remained in the government 
until 1597 when he died.68 
These six men were the more important of the government 
officials who were largely unaffected by political change during 
the period. They were therefore involved in the important 
Gordon-Forbes settlement, in the 1582 initiative against feuds 
and the other less, important legislation of these years. 
Pitcairn, Culross and Newbattle were all in fact arbitrators 
65. Brunton, Senators, p 194-96. 
66. ibid., p 119-22. 
67. ibid., P 175-76. 
68. ibid., p 160-62. The importance of these officials can 
also be assessed from their fairly regular attendance at 
council meetings during the l570 l s and l580 l s, see 
R.P.C., ii-iv, sederunts. 
at one stage or another in the Gordon-Forbes settlement.69 
Yet while these men were lawyers, one finds nothing to 
distinguish them from previous royal administrators. Without 
the reformation possibly four of them would have still served 
the crown, but as churchmen in the manner that church-trained· 
lawyers had served the crown for centuries. Two of them had 
noble patrons, two owed their advancement to the Maitlands and 
of these Bellenden had his father before him to ease the road 
to the top. One could very probably find similar career paths 
in the officials of James V's administration. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence to suggest that any of these men 
influenced the direction of royal policy in any particular way 
during the 1580's because of the class of men they were. For 
these Ye8rs at least there is certainly no justification for 
speaking of new men. 
This is perhaps not entirely surprising since the measures 
of the 1580' s were also lacking in any real impact. The years 
after 1595 were quite different and here one might expect a 
slightly different picture. Of the eleven men who formed 
the core at the top levels of the royal administration in 
this later period all but two of them were recruited during 
the 1580's and while nine of them were to become session judges 
they were not all by any means predominantly lawyers from 
lesser gentry families. 
69. A.P.S., iii, P 112-14, p 164-65, P 230-31; R.P.C., iii, 
P 278. 
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Sir George Home of Spott was a lesser iaird, dependant 
upon lord Hume who brought him to court in the early 1580 I s 
and succeeded in getting his man appointed a gentleman of the 
bedchamber. His family's involvement in the feud with Bothwel1 
in which his brother was slain worked to his advantage and he . 
became a client of chancellor Maitland's and a favourite of 
the king's. In 1590 he was knighted and had the office of 
master of the wardrobe bestowed upon him. While he remained 
close to the king and achieved some notoriety for his opposition 
to the Octavians in 1596, he remained very much.a chamber figure 
throughout most of the decade, only becoming more prominent 
in the affairs of the privy council after 1601 when he became 
lord treasurer. He had, however, been sitting on the council 
for some years before that and was on the council at the time 
of the 1595 act and present at the 1598 convention. He was 
regular in his attendance at council meetings and after 1601 
only Hontrose sat at more meetings than he did. In 1603 he 
went with the king to England and while he became the most' 
powerful man in the Scottish administration between 1604 and 
his death in 1611, his frequent absence in London meant that 
he was less involved in the practical implementation of policy 
than he had been between 1601-0,3 when he had been a very active 
treasurer. In 1605 he became earl of Dunbar and a year later 
led a raid against border kindreds which confirmed his image 
as a tough and uncompromising figure in the administration. 
Given his closeness to the king it seems likely that Dunbar 
had some part in influencing royal policy in the matter of 
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feuds, and certainly as treasurer he earned a reputation as a 
man willing to put legislation to effect. This, and his hawk-
like attitude to opponents of the crown, makes him, in spite of 
his long absences in London, a fairly crucial figure in the crack-
drown on feuding. Yet he was clearly no noblesse de robe. H~ 
had no legal training, was involved in feuds himself, owed his 
advancement to the patronage of his lord and then to Maitland, 
began his royal service in the chamber, was successful principally 
as a courtier and even after 1603 spent more time at court than 
in Edinburgh with the privy council. 70 
David Murray joined the royal household at much the same 
time as Dunbar. He became the king's cup-bearer and then master 
of the stables, but did not take any active part in politics 
. , 
until 1596 when like others in the household he joined the 
clamour against the Octavians who were trying to make spending 
cuts. In 1598 he was knighted and a year later was appointed 
comptroller and steward of Fife and asked to join the privy 
council. In 1600 his part in helping frustrate the Gowrie 
conspiracy brought him more favours and in 1603 he was appointed 
captain of the newly formed horse guards, being created lord 
Scone a year late~. It was in this capacity that, he did most 
of his work in relation to the feuds, acting as something of 
a government hatchet man, suppressing disorder with his force 
of mobile police. By some he was regarded as a rather ignorant 
man; but he "got business affactuated", his most notable business 
70. Scots Peerage,iii, p 286-88; R.P.C., vi-viii, sederunts. 
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probably being when he received the 'submission of the west 
highland chiefs. Like Dunbar, Murray was a household serva~t 
who made his way up through the rungs of the chamber offices, 
just as royal servants had been doing for centuries. 7l 
Another product of the chamber was Walter 8tewart, prior 
of Blantyre. He was, along with Murray, brought up at court 
and was educated alongside the king by Geor~Buchanan. In 
. 
1580 he became a gentleman of the bedchamber and two years 
later joined the privy council, was appointed lord privy seal 
and a lord of the session. He was thus involved in the 
government during the 1580's along with those mentioned above, 
while politically he gravitated towards his stewart kinsmen, 
though it was to the more moderate Lennox rather than Bothwell 
to whom he was attached. In 1595-96 he was one of the 
Octavian government and it was reported that "with the good 
Prior of Blantyre's advice" the king began "to put in practice 
the good laws". He was a member of the 1595 council which 
passed the first feuding act, was present at the 1598 convention 
and was lord treasurer during the months when the act was first 
being executed. After a temporary disgrace in which he lost 
all his offices he quickly returned to favour, was a lord of 
the articles at the 1600 parliament, was created lord Blantyre 
in 1609 and got his job back on the session in 1610.72 
The other man whose career embraced both generations of 
royal offici~ls was Robert Melville of Murdocairl'lf. A younger 
71. Scots Peerage, viii, p"19l-96. 
72. ~cots Peerage, ii, p 81-83; Brunton, §enators, p 225-26; 
R.P,O., v-vi, sederunts. 
662. 
son of Me1vi11e of Raith - another of whose younger sons was 
Melville of Halhill - he left Scotland in his youth to take ~p 
service with Henry II of France. However, in 1559 he returned 
and was immediately employed by the lords of the Congregation 
as their ambassador in England. In 1562 he joined the privy • 
council and was employed by Mary on another mission to England, 
deciding in 1567 to stick with the queen and only surrendering 
with Lethington-in 1573. His life was saved by English inter-
vention and he spent the next six years in retirement before having 
the benefits of the Pacification of Perth extended to him in 1579 
and in 1580 being recalled and knighted at Lennox's instigation. 
His great talents were quickly put to use again and lord Ruthven 
had him appointed as his deputy in the lord treasurer's office, 
but in 1583 Me1vi11e betrayed his boss by helping the king to 
escape from the hands of the Ruthven faction. His loyalty was 
rewarded when he was again asked to join the privy council and 
Arran sent him on various missions to England. In 1589 he 
became vice-chancellor for the duration of the king and Maitland's 
visit to Denmark, in 1593 he was once. again sent to England to 
negotiate with Elizabeth and a year later he became an extra-
ordinary lord of the session. Me1vi1le was thus a member of 
the government at the time of the various measures attempted 
during the 1580's and by the time of the 1595 act he was one 
of the most regular in attendance at council meetings. On the 
appointment of the Octavians he resigned his job in the 
treasurer's department, but received it back in 1598 when he 
. 
returned ·to the government. He was present at the convention 
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that year and continued to be regular in attendance at council 
until 1600 when a bad illness reduced his activity. He continued 
to serve as best as he could, however, and in 1616 was given the 
long overdue title of lord Melville, dying five years later at 
the grand old age of ninety-one. Though more of a career 
official than the other three discussed above, Me1ville was not 
primarily a lawyer even if he held a judicial position. Clearly 
his loyalties to the crown, first to Mary and then to James, 
were strong, but again one can detect nothing new about the 
type of servant he was and he falls into the category of all 
those men who served their lords well, even though this lord 
was the king.73 
Of the other seven men four were important members of the 
Octavian government while the non-Octavians can be dealt with 
more quickly. Edward Bruce, commendator of Kinloss since 
1583, made a name for himself as an accomplished lawyer in 
the Edinburgh commissary court and was appointed deputy to the 
justice-general of Scotland, the justice being the earl of 
Argyll who held the office in hereditary. He too was employed 
on diplomatic service in 1594 and in 1597 he was appointed to 
the session. He was present at the passing of the 1598 act and 
his presence at council meetings in the period which immediately 
followed was exceeded only by Montrose. His prominence in the 
council continued until 1603 when he left with the king for 
England where he took up office in the English administration 
73. Scots Peerage, vi, p 96-99; Brunton, Senators, p 227-30; 
R.P.C., v, vi, sederunts. 
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and became a naturalised Eng1ishman. 74 Sir John Cockburn of 
Ormiston was also a lawyer and in 1588 he succeeded his father 
as an extraordinary lord of session and having been appointed 
to the council, was in 1591 appointed lord justice clerk, 
becoming an ordinary lord of session two years later. He 
was the most regular councillor at .the time of the 1595 act, 
attended th~ 1598 convention and remained prominent in the 
council until 1603.75 The third man was Sir Richard Cockburn 
of Clerkington, another Maitland client and a lawyer, who 
became secretary of state in 1591 when Maitland resigned that 
position. He was also appointed to the session that year and 
in 1596 gave up the secretaryship in return for the lesser 
post of lord privy seal in a government reshuffle that year. 
He continued in these offices until 1626 and was thus a member 
of the privy council from the time of the1595 act right through 
the period of intense legislation and anti-feud activity.76 
These three men do then fit into the category of lawyer-
administrators, with the two Cockburns in particular being 
identified with crown policy during the period when feuds 
received so much attention. As the,y were principally 
administrators and not politicians one knows little more 
about them and measuring their significance is thus impossible, 
but one can assume that their long service was a sign of the 
confidence the king had in them to enforce, if not to shape 
his policies. 
74. Scots Peera~e, iii, p 474-76; Brunton, ~nator~, p 238-40; 
~.~.C~, v, vi, sederunts. 
75. Brunton, Senators, p 216-17; RtP.C., v, vi, sederunts. 
76. Brunton, ~tqr~, p 219-20; ,R.P.<b" v-viii, sederunts. 
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Sir John Skene of Curriehill also comes quite comfortably 
into this category. The sixth son of an Aberdeenshire laird, 
he was educated in the burgh and at king's college before 
moving on to st Andrews where he took his M.A. During 1564-65, 
while still in his early twenties, he served on the university 
teaching staff and then went off to Scandinavia and Paris to 
continue his study of law. Returning in 1575 he was admitted 
as an advocate and his talents were "quickly recognised by"the 
regent Morton who commissioned him to write a digest of Scottish 
law along with Sir James Balfour. This project was abandoned 
at Morton's fall, but over the next ten years Skene continued 
to serve on a number of government and church committees where 
his legal expertise was required. In 1589 he became joint 
lord advocate but spent the next two years in the Netherlands 
as ambassador to the states-general, a duty which probably 
brought him his knighthood in 1592. In 1594 he became clerk 
register to the council and an ordinar.y lord of the session, 
, 
and a year later was one of those who composed the Octavian 
administration. He continued to serve as clerk register until 
1611 when he died, having published a number of books, the 
most famous of which were his editions of "Regiam Majestatem"" 
and "Quoniam Attachiamenta".77 
Also a lawyer, but of greater importance, was Sir Thomas 
Hamilton. He too was the younger son of a small 1airdly 
family who was educated at the local school, this time 
77. Brunton, Senators, p 230-34; Y.C., v-viii, sederunts. 
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Edinburgh High, and who then went on to study lay in Paris. 
He was admitted as an advocate in 1587 and within five years 
his brilliance had earned him a place among the session lords. 
In 1593 his abilities came to the notice of the king and he 
was asked to become a privy councillor. Three years later he" 
became lord advocate in the Octavian governB~nt and he continued 
to hold this office for the next forty years. He attended the 
1598 convention when the ItAct Anent Feuding" was passed, . 
delineating his powers as lord advocate in the prosecution 
of crimes committed in feuds. He Yas very active throughout 
Montrose's administration and increasingly brought pressure to 
bear on parties at feud to settle by threatening, and sometime~ 
insisting, on the king's rights to prosecute crimes which had 
taken place in the course of feuds. More than any other man 
it Yas he who executed crown policy against feuding and it 
seems almost impossible to imagine that he, and possibly Skene 
too, did not influence the king in directing that policy and 
in providing much of the legal justification for the king's 
case. Certainly he was highly valued by Joes and was. 
knighted in 1603, became lord clerk register which he exchanged 
for secretary of state in 1612, was created lord Bining in 
1613 and earl of Melrose in 1619, exchangiug this title for 
that of earl of Haddington in 1627. In spite of being less 
trusted by Charles I, he continued to add to his offices and 
dignities during the remaining ten years ot his life. He was 
thus a crucially important figure in the government and politics 
of his time and in particular he was, after the king, the most 
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important enemy the feud in Scotland had. 78 
The remaining two men are less easy to categorise. James 
Elphingstone was the third son of lord Elphingstone and as 
such was clearly no "ne", man". 'Though appointed a session lord 
in 1586 it was his expertise as a linguist ",hich attracted the 
crown's interest, and prior to the Octavian administration he 
was employed on a part-time basis to advise the privy council 
in matters where the use of French or Latin was required. He 
was also used by the king to conduct some private affairs and 
this familiarity with James made him a target of th~ 1596 riots 
when it was feared that his being a Roman catholic ",ould be a 
bad influence on the king. The latter, however, was unimpressed 
by the objections levelled against him and Elphingstone ",as 
appointed secretary of state in 1598, created lord Balmerino 
in 1603 and became president of the court of session in 1605. 
Three years later his career was cut short by a scandal 
implicating him in treasonable correspondence with Rome and, 
though condemned to death, the sentence was never carried out 
and he lived on confined to his own estates until his death in 
1612. Though an important political figure and one ",ho "'BS 
deeply involved in the government of the period it is unlikely 
that he was much involved in the campaign against feuding, 
his interests and duties lying elsewhere. 79 
78. Scots Peerage, iv, p 309-34; Brunton, Senators, p 221-25; 
~.P.C., v-viii, sederunts. 
79. Scots Peerage, i, p 554-62; Brunton, Senators, p 206-12; 
R.P.C., v-viii, sederunts. 
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Finally, Alexander Seton was also from a noble family, 
being the second son of lord Seton and brother of the above 
mentioned earl of ~inton who also made his career in government 
service. Seton was intended for a future in the catholic church 
and studied at the Jesuit college in Rome, making an impressiQn 
on the Pope in 1571 with a notable oration. However, the 
reformation changed his mind about his future and he too moved 
to France to study civil law before coming to the Scottish bar 
in 1577. It was to be eight years though before he was asked 
to sit on the privy council and another two before he reached 
the bench of the session, first as an extraordinary'and then 
as an ordinary lord. Six years later he became president of 
the session and was also given an post in the queen's household 
as baillie of her estates at Dunfermline. So good was his 
handling of her affairs, and in particular her finances, that 
he was asked by the king to be one of the principal figures 
of what came to be known as the Octavian government. He was 
present at the 1598 convention and sat as one of the lords 
of the articles in 1600, was after chancellor Montrose the 
most regular in attendance at council meetings between 1598-
1604 and on his resignation that year was himself appointed 
chancellor and created earl of Dunfermline two years later. 
From then until his death in 1622 he was in effect.the head 
of the king's administration in Scotland, though until 1611 
he showed a degree of deference to Dunbar when he was present. 
He thus presided over the work of the privy council during the 
years when the feud was almost squeezed out of existence. 
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As president of the session he was able to combine enormous 
executive power with judicial influence at a time when the crown 
was trying to persuade men to take their business to the session 
before it ever became necessary for the criminal law to be 
invoked. Legal thinking was clearly important to Dunfermline, 
but like Balmerino he was of a noble family in which service to 
the crown was held in high regard, t~e elder brothers of both 
men also having pursued careers in the royal administration. 
One explanation for this may be that both families were catholic 
and realised that in a hostile environment their best hopes of 
success lay in becoming clients of the king. One certainly 
cannot point to these men as examples of a new and rising class. 
Rather they belonged to the old ruling class, many of whose 
members were, as has already been argued, quite in sympathy 
80 
with the direction of royal policies. 
From the analysis of the men who served James VI during 
his reign it should be clear that one cannot be too general 
in one's distinctions. The attitudes adopted by these men 
was on the whole to oppose the feud in their role as government 
employees, but just as one found that men like Mar, Montrose 
and Ochiltree had their own feuds and continued to participate 
in customary feud settlements, so in the officials one finds a 
similar overlapping of practice and principle. Thus in 1611, 
justice clerk Ormiston was ordered to appear before the privy 
council to arrange a settlement of his feud with the earl of 
80. Scots Peerage: 111, p 369-72; Brunton, Senators, p 198-202; 
R.P.C., v-viii, sederunts. 
./ 
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Linlithgow and some months later a traditional reconciliation 
took place between the two in the presence of the council.8~ 
Two years after this lord Scone and lord Burle,y found themselves 
in trouble for exchanging challenges and in 1615 William Kerr 
of Grange, the lieutenant of the border guard was ordered to • 
compose his differences with Rutherford of Hunthill. In 1609 
chancellor Dunfermline "who loved the Dumbars intirelie" 
personally intervened in a feud among the Dumbar family and 
arranged a compensation agreement to end it.82 The gradual 
change in legislation, the way in which the privy council 
compromised in its implementation of that legislation and the 
varied composition of the council all point to change which 
was slow and in which men showed varying shades of respect 
for the old and the new, but without any being either too 
black or too white. 
Government personnel was thus composed of neither rearguard 
reactionary nobles or revolutionary lawyers of a lower social 
status; it was a mix. As had already been pointed out, the 
nobility retained a sizable influence in government and were 
by no means ousted during the reign of James VI. Household 
servants also continued to held important offices in government 
and, while these men may have been from lesser families, their 
relationship to the king was essentially one of "lord" and "man". 
Such a maintenance relationship was far from new and Dunbar, 
81. ~.P.C., ~, p 240, p 262. 
82. R.P.C., x, p 60-61, p 61-62, p 76-77, p 92-93, p 395; 
Gorden, Sutherland, p 261. 
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Scone, B1antyre and even Me1vil1e are simply examples of 
household servants who made it to the top by means no different 
from previous generations of such men. Their achievement was 
personal not representative and their loyalty was entirely to 
the crown and not to the aspirations of any class or profession, 
though in their opposition to the stringent Octavian administration 
the household did show some semblance of solidarity. As for 
Dunfermline and Balmerino, Scotland may have followed the 
English example in only conferring nobility on the eldest sons 
of nobles, but the social attitudes of these men was likely to 
be closer to members of that class than petty gentry. Certainly 
their education may have altered their perception of society, 
but if anything they are a bridge between noble administrators 
like Mar and ennobled lawyers like lord advocate Hamilton. 
Of the five who were clearly lawyers, Hamilton, Skene, Kin10ss 
and the two Cockburns, they did not have the political weight 
to dominate the privy council, important men thou~h they may 
have been. They were lawyers and one must assume that they did 
exert a strong influence in the interests of the legal establish-
ment in Edinburgh and that their views would be shaped by the 
principles of the law which they practised, but they were only 
one shade of opinion on the council and besides their opposition 
to the feud was not total.83 Whatever prejudices and beliefs 
all these men had, whatever their background, their one common 
experience was that they served the crown and it was primarily 
83. See the above discussion on priv.y council settlements 
during this period, vol ii, P 569-77. 
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this service which shaped and influenced their thinking. There 
were other factors like early training for the catholic chu~ch, 
studying law in Paris, spending a lifetime with the king, being 
younger sons, their religion, service in the treasurer's 
department, but while all these brought varying degrees of 
commitment to or against a cause, it was government employment 
which helf it all together; it was the catalyst which directed 
their actions. 
( 
Condemnation of the feud, however, was not ~ monopoly of 
the king and his servants. An equally vehement critic was 
the reformed church of Scotland. The fact that the feud dis-
appreared in ~cotland during the period when the protestant 
reformation was firmly established appears to point towards 
a direct link between the two, to the conclusion that the feud 
. was a casualty of Scottish Calvinism. However, that would be 
a little s~mplistic. Throughout its history the church had made 
peace making one of its responsibilities. Thus, " ••• the parish 
was not conceived by the church as a ?omogeneous unit, but as 
an assemblage of actually or potentially hostile entities among 
whom its function was to maintain a precarious peacen •84 This 
peace-making role was found both in the mediating capacity of 
the parish priest, but also in the ritual of the church where 
. 85 
the peace of the community took on a sacramental form. 
84. J. Bossy, "Blood and Baptism", P 142. This role continued. 
long after the reformation, p 139 • 
. 
85. ibid., p 141-42. 
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Particular poace movements at times during the middle ages had, 
of course, given emphasis to this aspect of Christian living, 
together, with attempts to pacify feuds or limit their 
destructiveness in measures such as the prohibition against 
feuding on Sundays.86 Thus, Bossy has argued., "the rituals of. 
social peace had acquired in the common under3tanding an 
intrinsic holiness It , a holiness which was recognised not only 
by it being an effect of the presence of toe sacraments, but 
also because it was not the normal state of ~elations between 
87 
men. 
With the reformation came a new upsurge in religion, a 
revitalising of faith, but a revitalisation ~ich was not 
exclusive to those who found it necessary to 1eave the catholic 
church. The council of Trent, for example, legislated against 
duelling, but it could be argued that the greatest difficulty 
facing the Tridentine reformers was not "indi.vidual backsliding 
or Protestant resistance but the internal articulations of a 
society in which kinship was a more importan~ social bond and 
feud, in however conventionalised a form, a flourishing social 
activity'. As an example Bossy cites evidence of the difficulties 
the church had in persuading whole parishes ~ attend communion 
86. Bloch, Feudal Society, p 412-20, for a diseussion of "The 
Peace and Truce of God" and Duby', :the Chivalrous Society, 
ch.8 "Laity and the Peace of God". The lImssian Orthodox 
church was also an opponent of the feud ~d had an important 
effect on legislation which curbed the right to b10od-
v.engeance in that country, D.H.Kaiser, The Growth of the 
Law in Me~ieval Russia, (Princeton, 1980). p 16. 
87. Bossy, "Blood and Baptism it, P 132-33; Bossy, "Holiness and. 
Society", Past and Present, vo1 75 (1977) ~ p 132-33. 
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because of feuds. Thus Alessandro Sauli was sent from Borromeo's 
Milan as bishop of Corsica and found it impossible to impose 
Tridentine reforms until he had initiated confraternities 
devoted to eliminating the feuds. 88 Such a function was a 
common one for confraternities like the Nome di Dio in Bologna 
begun in 1566-67 to compose differences between conflicting 
parties and settle their law suits before they came to co~t.89 
.. 
ylhether this was the same as the pre-reformation peace movements 
is doubtful. The emphasis was not on the social advantages and 
necessity of imposing Christian ethics, but on r~ligious 
observance, of the need to attend the mass and to submit to 
confession. Both of these were impossible in a feuding environment, 
the first because two hostile groups would not meet together 
and the latter because it implied what Bossy called "unilateral 
. disarmament". 90 However, while the reformation may have thrust 
new divisions into societies already structured on lines of 
division, and may have destroyed the old ideals of "the covenant 
of peace", so prevalent throughout the medieval period, it did 
inspire the church, both catholic and protestant, towards new 
. 91 
efforts to pacify their communities. . 
88. Bossy, "The Counter Reformation and the People of Catholic 
Europe", Past and Present, vol. 47 (19'70), p 55-56. 
89. Paoli Prodi, Il Cardinale Gabrell Poleotti, (Rome, 1959, 
1967), vol il, p 189-91. My thanks to Mr.Chris Black of 
the University of Glasgow, Department of Modern History, 
for this reference. 
90. Bossy, tiThe Counter Reformation and the People of Catholic 
Europelt , p 56. 
91. Bossy, "Holiness and Society", p 134. 
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The protestant church was equally concerned with its 
responsibility to encourage men to participate in the sacraments 
and to create a Godly society; indeed the church claimed to be 
society. In Scotland the church followed closely the teaching 
of Calvin and what he had to say on revenge and kinship was 
uncompromising. He recognised that "the condition of humanity 
requires that there be more duties in. common between those ·who 
are more nearly connected by the ties of relationship, or . 
friendship or neighbourhood", but "the whole human race, without 
exception are to be embraced with one feeling of charity" .92 
Calvin was critical of those who excused themselves from such 
an extreme view on the grounds that such a code of conduct was 
not for the whole Christian community but for monks and those 
under special vows.93 ·In his comments on the sixth commandment 
he stressed the sanctity of human life, arguing elsewhere that 
the taking of a life was not to be avenged by the taking of 
another.94-- The pride which is common in all men was to 
Calvin a "disease" which "begets in all men a furious passion 
for revenge, whenever they are in the least troubled". _ Justice 
was not the prerogative of the private man, but was for God to 
deal out; 1IVengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord". 
Consequently, to take revenge oneself was to deprive God of 
his right to do so, it was to usurp the place of God. "Hence, 
as it is not lawful to usurp the office of God, it is not 
lawful to revenge; for we thus anticipate the Judgement of God 
92. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Reli~ii7 (tr.) by Henry 
Beverbridge, [Edinburgh., 1863), i, p 359, 8/55. 
93. ibid., p 359-60, zlal56. 
94. ibid., p 346-47, 2/3/39. 
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who will have this office reserved. f'or himself. It Nor was it 
right to even look for a vacarious kind of vengeance from th~ 
magistracy, for it is "superflous to make a distinction here 
between public and private revenge, both he who, with a 
malevolent mind and desirous of revenge, seeks the help of 
a magistrate, has no more excuse than when he devises means 
for self revenge. 1t One should not even ask God to satisfy' 
our desire for vengeance, since in doing so Itwe do not 
make God so much our judge as the executioner of our 
depraved passion". ltlith regard to God, one was .simply to 
await his judgement in his own time and pray for one's 
enemies.95 However, to earthly magistrates was assigned 
the duty to punish, as "to avenge the afflictions of the 
pious at the command of God, is neither to afflict nor 
hurt".96 Calvin, therefore, was insisting that the civil 
magistracy had the exclusive right to enforce justice, a 
justice which was ultimately God's. The argument was by 
no means new or unique, but in a society like late sixteenth 
century Scotland where such reasoning. was eagerly appreciated. 
by the faithful, it provided a powerful ally for a magistracy 
95. 
96. Calvin, Institutes, ii, p 659-60, 4/20/10. For other 
relevant passages see Romans, p 471-77; Institutes, ii, 
p 667, 4/20/20; Commentaricg on the Book of Genegis, 
(tr.) J. King, (Edinburgh, .1847), i, p 2Q():OS. 
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which was equally militant in asserting its rights.97 That 
the king and many of his ministers were themselves Calvinist~ 
served to both convert them to this line of thinking and to 
reinforce prejudices they may already have had. The divine 
mandate given to the crown to extinguish the feud was 
perhaps the most potent weapon in its arsenal. 
An end to violence and feud was thus something on which 
the king and the clergy could, and on the whole did, agree upon. 
Few ministers would have appreciated the stoic attitude of the 
old laird of Kilravock who lived amongst the feuds of the 
north-east and when asked by the king how he could continue 
to live there, answered that "They were the best neighbours 
he could have, for they made him thrice a day to go to God 
on his knees, when perhaps otherwise he would not have gone 
.once.1I98 Kilravock may have been jesting with the king, 
97. For example Bullinger wanted to see magistrates who 
IIswerves from the path of justice neither because of 
partiality, fear nor bribes" and concluded that public 
vengeance executed by the magistrate "was by no means 
prohibi ted by God in the church of Christ", [~inrich 
Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other Reformed Tradition, 
J. Wayne Baker, (Ohio, 1980), p 117-18. Flandrin, 
Families in Former Times, quotes the puritan William Gouge 
who excepted children from obeying their parents when they 
made them promise to avenge them on their death-beds. For 
some further discussion see also, stone, Crisis, p 21; 
James, Polit.ics and Honour, p 45ff; Macfarlane, The Origins 
of English Individualism, p 50-51, in which he agrees with 
Weber's argument that protestantism in particuiar under-
mined kinship and replaced it with a "community of faith"; 
however, J. Samaha in Law and Order in Historical 
Perspect.ive: The case of Elizabethan Essex, (London, 1974), 
.p 69, argues that the enforcement of justice was no better 
under protestant J.P.'s than catholic ones. 
98. Chambers, Qomestic Anpalp, i, P 287. 
.. 
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but in 1576 the general assembly had been in a less jocular 
mood when it discussed feuding, resolving to take the initiative 
since, in confirmation of what one had already seen, the regent 
Morton had no policy at all for the problem. The assembly 
complained that the kingdom was "miserably divided in factions 
and deedly feed", and went on to draw attention to the same 
problem identified in catholic societies. Feud was so bad, they 
complained, that 
It. •• the parishioners, for fear and suspicioun which they 
have of others, dar not resort to their parish kirks, to 
hear the word of unity preached, nor to recieve the 
sacraments and seals of their salvation; quherof riseth 
a shamefull and insufferable slander to the Kirk of God, 
and his true religion within this realme ••• ". 
The essence of their complaint was not at an ethical level, 
but like the Tridentine reformers it was that feud was inter-
. rupting the business of the church, the giving of the sacraments 
·and the preaching of God's word. This is not to say that they 
had no ethipal objections, Calvin after all had made it plain 
that the Christian attitude was to regard all men as brothers, 
not as kinsmen, friends or enemies; but it was at this other 
level that the church WBS most offended. To deal with this 
problem the general assembly thus resolved to commission the 
visitors of the various localities, men who essentially executed 
the assemblies decisions, to "endeavour themselves, and travell 
with parties, to reduce them to a Christian unit ye and brotherly 
concord, as becometh the brethern and members of Jesus Christ". 
The church 'Was, therefore, determining to fulfil its long 
established role as a peace-maker in local society. Peace, 
the church argued, was a matter which had a bearing on salvation 
and required the church's blessing,but here the stress was on 
the individual's salvation not on the peace of the community. 
Justification may be by faith, but the fruit of faith included 
peace and men who spurned peace denied the power of the Holy. 
Spirit to work, they repudiated their own salvation. For the 
sake of the" individual who had to be saved from his own folly, 
land for the sake of the church whose own claim to be the body 
of Christ was cast in doubt by wars within it, feud had to be 
eradicated.99 ;." 
.,.-
One might then argue that the first voice to be raised 
I 
against the feud in Scotland was that of the church, at least 
it is the first recorded voice to object to it. Earlier 
complaints in the privy council records criticised the events 
of particular feuds or the general violence resulting from 
feuding, but this resolution of the general assembly's in 
1576 was the beginning of a more fundamental opposition which 
was later to be taken over by the crown and in particular by 
the king. " Unfortunately one knows nothing about what these 
visitors did, if anything, and certainly they had no effect 
on the general level of feuding which continued to rise after 
this date. Five years later the assembly again brought up the 
problem. Committees of local barons, gentlemen and ministers 
had been established to oversee parish reorganisation but were 
being hampered by "deidit feidis, grudgeis, variances and 
99. B,U.K., i, p 216-17. 
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occasiouns of displeasours amangis thame 
" 
. .. , that is among 
the parish community. On this occasion the church was to CQ-
operate with local officials in ensuring that assurances were 
100 
exchanged between contending parties. Then in October of 
1581 the general assembly ordained that William Christeson go. 
to the king and inform him of "the great division, and deadly 
feeds in all quarters of the realme, .to the great hinderance 
not only of religion, but of the common wealth; desiring his 
Grace to authorise some Commissioners of the kirk, as they 
shall direct, for repairing therof".lOl The same assembly 
also directed Mr David Lindsay and John Durie to tell the 
king about "the great feeds and disorders in all the countrie, 
and to desire order to be put therto; as alsua concurrance of 
some of his Commissioners with such of the Assembly will deut 
on their part, to treat amity and reconciliatione betwixt 
102 parties". 
While some effort was made to deal with feuding in the 
summer of 1582, the government largely ignored the church I s 
offer. ~bether the Lennox regime just did not take the problem 
seriously, or whether there was strong lay objections to the 
church trying to formalise its role as a public mediator is 
not certain, there may have been a bit of both. In 1594 it 
was reported of some of the ministry that "In pulpits they 
100. BtU.K., ii, p 520-21. Only one example of the effect of 
this problem was found in §tirling Presbytery Records 
1581-1587, S.H.S., (Edinburgh, 1981), (ed.) G. Kirk, 
when one party was axcused from attending his trial for 
adultery before the presbytery court because of the 
danger to him of t~ud; p 246. . 
101. B.U.K., ii, P 530. 
102. ibid., p 544. 
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earnestly persuade the noblemen to cast of their "particulars" 
and band their forces against the common enemies", they being 
the catholic nobility and in particular the northern earls.103 
Perhaps the nobility just did not like this sort of interference 
in their private affairs and were determined to keep the church 
out of them? 
Certainly it was a subject on which the ministers put 
great emphasis, adopting a militant and aggressive attitude 
which cut through the very basis of magnate politics and even 
power. No doubt the average parish minister kept his mouth 
shut, after all it was very likely that it was the local 
magnate who was feeding him. However, men like Robert Bruce 
could from the security of his Edinburgh pulpit pour out his 
protests and those of the church on an audience of nob1es, 
government officials, lawyers, burgesses and the king himself, . 
In 1588 B~uce severely criticised the crown for failing to 
curb t~e excesses of the nobility. 
"There is no example or proclamation of judgement that 
will make them leave off from burning, slaying, am 
murder. This is not looked to by the Counsel1, and 
he should punish this overseeth it. Ane thay that are 
inferior magistrates overseeth it, so that this land 
is overwhelmed with sin that it cannot be discharged 
until the great God himself do it.,,104 
From offering to co-operate with the crown, the church, or 
some of its more vocal ministers, had moved to taking issue 
wit~ the king and. his officials themselves for laxity in 
103. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 488. 
104. Sermons by the Rev. Hobert Bruce, (ed) W .Cunningham, 
Wodrow Society vo1 6, (Edinburgh, 1841~, "The Second 
Sermon Upon Psalm LXXVI", p 321-22. 
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enforcing law and order. Bruce was, of course, quite right, 
apart from some legislative tinkering and the 15"87 band the 
crown had just not been taking the problem seriously and had 
ignored the church's efforts in 1576 and 1581 to lobby for some 
sort of response to what had clearly become a situation of 
endemic disorder. Significantly, Bruce's criticisms were to 
a greater extent than before more ethical and perhaps even 
. . 
more political than those of 1581 or 1576. In 1576 the ch~ch 
had complained that it could not carry out its function properly 
because of feud and warned that men were riski~ their souls, 
while in 1581 it had pleaded for reconciliation not punishment. 
Bruce, however, was drawing attention to behaviour in the 
nobility, sanctioned by the crown, which was offensive to God. 
He was telling the nobility that they could not behave as they 
wished and the crown that it had a God-given responsibility to 
ensure that their behaviour was restricted. Bruce did not stress 
the indiviqual sin which would bring the loss of salvation, but 
the collective sin of the community which was the product of 
bad government and irresponsible behaviour among those 
privileged to rule. 
Bruce had more to say about the nobility in a sermon on the 
sacraments a year later. "We have many things to lament", he 
preached, "We have the estate of this cuntrey to lament ••• 
For I see the maist part of our great men of this countrey 
running headlong to banish the spark of life that is left in 
105 them". In 1591, while preaching from. Isaiah, he continued 
on this theme of the degeneracy of the It great men", saying 
105. Bruce, Sermons, "The Fourth Upon the Sacraments~ p lOSe 
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that "surely this country is heavily diseased ••• so long as 
thir floods of iniquitie quhilk flows from the great men 
remains ••• ,,:06 Again Bruce drew attention to the fact that 
their wrongs would affect all society, that "there is a heavy 
judgement hanging over this countryft. Still on Isaiah Bruce 
" . 
continued with his attack. 
-' 
"There is no great man but whatsoever liketh him, he 
thinketh it leisum; and not only in this in this part 
of the land, but in all uther parts of this nation 
gross iniquities are 80mmitted, and the kirk is made 
a praie to all men."l 7 
More important than the lack of protection the "church may 
have been experiencing in what seemed like a siege situation 
was the divine judgement which would fall on the nation just 
as it had on Israel when its kings and rulers had sinned. 
"To come to the particular, the Lord is not risen as yet 
in this countrey, suppose he bath sitten long. And why 
hath he sitten but to see gif his enemies will repent? 
And hath this taken effect? No; for he hath not greater 
enemies in no part than the great men in this country, 
where" the 1-Yord is so clearly uttered. So that the 
greater the knowlege be the greater is .the contempt, 
aoo the greater the contempt be the heavier must be the 
judgement that abideth them. Now, in all this time of 
the Lord I s sitting what are they doing? They are burning 
and scalding, slaying and murdering, and using all kinds 
of oppression~ and raging so as there were not a king 
in Israel."lO~ , 
Again the nobility suffered most from Bruce' s tongue, but his 
real target here was the king. It was. "as though there were 
not a king". In other words, for all the good he was doing 
there might as well not be a king in Scotland. If judgement 
106. Bruce, Sermons, "The First Sermon Upon Isaiah", p 171. 
107. ibid. 
108. Bruce, Sermons, "The Fourth Sermon Upon Isaiah", p .313-14. 
fell then it would be because the king had not acted to enforce 
God's law, to fulfil the role of the Godly magistrate assigned 
to him. It was a little unfair of Bruce to make this attack 
in 1591 when it was by no means the king's fault that magnate 
politics were so destructive; James himself was only just keeping 
his head above water. Yet it had been four years since the 1587 
band when the king had last tried to do anything and to ministers 
like Bruce it was their responsibility to warn, to prophecy 
God's judgement on a disobedient people and their rulers. 
Bruce may have been trying to shame James into action, but 
his real anger was still reserved for the nobles. In 1589 he 
had lectured them on their responsibilities, inviting them to 
self examination, to make a moral assessment of their behaviour. 
"Be ye in the rank of great men, ye ought to take tent to 
your consciences; speciallie, in respect that the Lord has 
placed you in ane great calling. Ye have many things 
quheirin ye ought to controle your consciences; ye ought 
to crave the advice of your conscience or ever ye put 
your hand to onie work, in respect ye are bound to manifold 
duties to God am. to your inferiors; and na doubt, gif 
some of our great men had advised weill, these dissolutions 
had not fallen out into their awin bodies.,,109 
Like the king and the ministers the~elves the nobility had a 
calling which demanded more of them than the serving of their 
own and their kinsmen's interests. It was their bad council 
which was largely to blame for the state-of the couutry and 
their failure to ask themselves moral questions in which right 
and wrong was determined by God in his law am not by any other 
obligations which to were to blame for their individual sinfulness. 




The result was "Thir oppressions of the poor, thir deadlie 
feidis with their awin companions ••• ", which " ••• would not 
burst out in sick and high maesure, gif the,y had advised weill 
their consciences". Oonsequently, God 
11 spoiles them of faith and of the hope of mercie; am 
out of question ye saIl see their end miserable; ye saIl 
see them spectacles of the judgements of God; they that 
has eyes to behold it sall see the God of heaven make 
thir men, quha gais sa dissolutely to work, spectacles 
of his judgements of the world; for the Lord leaves not 
sic men unpunished. 1t 
Hopefully lesser men would then notice this judgement of their 
betters am look to their own consciences.110 In a profoundly 
religious age one has to realise that suc~ a threat would for 
many men be a real one. How much such appeals to the heart 
and the mind affected the behaviour of the Scottish nobility 
and their followers one cannot know, but ideas do change people, 
as does faith, and one cannot ignore conversion or repentance 
in alteri~g attitudes to the feud. 
Bruce, like the good Calvinist he was, was not optimistic 
about the chances of bringing about such a call to good works. 
Their very lack of reform prompted him to S8Y, that n ••• it is 
no marva 11, for their is no words will move them; yea it is 
impossible for the bloody man or oppressor to refrain, fra 
111 time once they be given over to sin ••• ". If men would 
not repent themselves then they would have to be forced to 
by God's representatl~e on earth by the king. The church 
110. Bruce, Sermons, "The Fifth Upon The Sacraments", p 143. 
111. Bruce, Sermons, "The Second Upon Isaiah", p 188. 
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had to pray that the king "may be touched with the sense and 
feeling of the misery of his subjects" and the only way this 
could be done was for it "to be knocked in his ears" by those 
noblemen who were aware of their responsibilities. Bruce was, 
however, a little too confident of the ease with which the 
problem could be dealt, thinking it would be as easy to "remedy 
the oppression of his subjects, as it is to take his repast when 
he is hungry". To him all that was lacking was "a good will 
and a stirring up, which would be done by you, my lords, who 
are about him". The problem 'Was that in 1591 most of those who 
'Were about him were steeped in feuds themselves, both at court 
and in their localities. On the assumption that he could 
persuade the better nobles to unite with the ministry Bruce called 
for them all to rally arown the king and "stir up the motion 
'Which God has given him in some measure", a recognition that 
James had shown at least some interest in the subject before then. 
They had to realise that those who broke the la'W challenged both 
God and the king, which was "but folly". He called for a royal 
crusade with 
It God striking a man inwardly in his conscience 'With the 
feeling of his guiltiness, and the prince striking him 
upon the craig with the sword outwardly, there can be no 
opposition; and this is not the 'Work of nature; it is the 
work of his calling; and walking in his calling, he must 
ever prosper ••• ft. 
The charge to act according to their calling was thus essential 
to the nobles, as magistrates and advisors, to the king as 
the prince put there to rule by God, and to the minister's, 
called to preach God I s word. It wa~ a duty and responsibility 
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of kingship and nobility to fight crime and violence, to enforce 
God's law and punish evil-doers, to "purge" the country. 
"What, shall murder never cease? Shall never this 
ravishing cease? Shall never these oppressions cease? 
But shall the ears of the judges, magistrates and 
pastors, perpetually be grieved? Therefore I say, let 
him go foreward in that work which he has already begun; 
and I pray God give it a good success, and let him be 
spirited up and there shall be no such thing as rebellion 
or laese mageste, as every man to oppress his subjects.,,112 
Bruce 'Went even further than this. Like Calvin he condemned 
revenge. "Their is nothing quhereunto nature bems the self 
mair nor to rankour and envie; and their is nothing quheirin 
nature places her honour mair gluckedly nor in private 
revengement.,,113 It was not just crime which was an abcess 
in Scottish society, but also the system of blood-vengeance 
",hich masqueraded as justice. Again, like Calvin, he argued 
that men should forgive one another and leave vengeance to 
. 114 God. Nor in a Christian society ",as there a~ room for 
bonds of blood, only spiritual bonds ",hich united all God's 
people together. Not surprisingly Broce launched an attack 
on the ",eb of kinship and alliances ",hlch sustained the feud 
while preaching on the Lord's Supper.. Quoting.from the gospels 
he pointed out how lightly Jesus himself "esteemed the carnal 
band" when he said "These are ray mother and brethern quha 
heares the word of God and dois it", 
" ••• as gif he ",ould say, It is not that carnall band 
that I esteeme of, it is not that carnall conjunction 
112. Bruce, $armons, "A Sermon Upon Heb Xll, v 1", P 395-96. 
113. Bruce, SennollJh "The Fifth Upon The Sacraments", p 146. 
114. Birrel, "Diary", p 32. 
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that I reverance: it is the spirituall conjunction, be 
the participation of the Halie Spirit, quhereby we are 
moved to hear the word of God, to give reverance to it 
and obey it. This carnall band yas never profitable, 
as that same Luke vlll dois plainly testifie.,,115 
Here was a clear alternative to the fabric of social re1ation-
ships which then existed in Scotland. Bruce, and no doubt 
other ministers who thought like him, were by no means trying 
to undermine what they yould have regarded as the legitimate 
. . 
claims of kinship and lordship, but they were invoking Christ's 
command to give Ceasar his due only if it did not contradict 
one's obligations to God. The "band of blood, running throwe 
ea race" yas "never esteemed by Christ" and could not therefore 
be recognised by the church, at least not in the yay it was then 
understood. How could men slaughter one another on the grounds 
of kinship when those same men claimed to all be bound together 
in Christ? For 
It ••• our saull cannot be joyned. nor bound with the flesh 
of Christ, nor the flesh of Christ cannot be jo1Oed. with 
our saull, but by ane spiritua1l band; not by ane carna11 
band. of blood or a11ya, nor be the twiching of his flesh 
with our flesh: But he is conjoyned with us be ane 
spiritual1 ba~~ that is be the power and vertue of his 
Ha1ie Spirit.nu6 . . 
Banding yas by no means eOOed by the reformation, but the 
nature of the band was changing to reflect a unity based 
on faith, not kinship, and to take its ultimate form in the 
Covenant and its theology.117 Obligations to one's faith, 
115. Bruce, Sermons, "Upon The Lord's Supper In Particular", 
p 67. 
116. ibid., P 66. 




whether catholic or protestant, episcopalian or presbyterian, 
were in time to replace those to kinsmen and lords, fractur~ng 
old allegiances and creating new ones which were to clash in 
their o'\m wars and religious feuds of the seventeenth century. 
On discussing lordship Bruce was equally revolutionary, 
demanding a complete reversal of the practices and attitudes 
which had constituted good lordship until the reformation. 
In November 1589 the earl of Bothwell had to do public penance 
for his part in the Brig 0 IDee rebellion and Bruce was asked 
to preach at the service. Though his words were addressed to 
Bothwell he again took the opportunity to lecture to the 
nobility as a whole on their responsibilities as good lords. 
Bothwell was instructed to \lcast away your affections", to 
"bury them under your feet" and "let justice strike indifferently 
where it should strike". Bruce was asking the Scottish lords 
to do in the name of justice what the,y regarded to be a betrayal 
of th~ir own understanding of their calling. 
"let no community of name, ally, proximity of blood, or 
whatsoever it be, move you to pervert justice, but let 
every man be answered aocording to the merit of his cause. 
Except these affections that accompany great men be removed, 
no question, ye must pervert that place. Let no thief pass 
because he is your servant, nor the murderer because he is 
your kinsman, nor the oppressor because he is your dependar: 
Therefore in time lay them aside, and let the execution 
declare that no man is spared for teed or favor."llS 
Bothwell was being commissioned to take over much of the 
government while the king was in Denmark and Bruce's words 
had a particular context, but he was also trying to persuade 
. . 
lIS. Bruce, Sermons, "A Sermon on 2Tim 11, v22", p 355. 
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noblemen to adopt a new attitude to their role in society. 
He wanted them to unite with the king and the church in a 
bond against those who threatened the peace of the Christian 
community either through heresy or crime. 
How widespread such thinking was within the ministry is 
unknown, but the influence of Bruce and those colleagues who 
thought like him was great. Mr Robert RoJ,lok, "otherwise a 
mylde and meeke man", became quite worked up on the subject 
of remissions and prayed to God to grant the king one for all 
those he had sold.119 In 1601 Mr Henry Blyth, the minister 
of the Cannongate kirk, openly criticised the king for granting 
a remission to lord Glamis after he had murdered one of his 
servants and as a consequence of his outspokenness was examined 
120 by James. A year later after a service in Holyroodhouse 
kirk some Lindsays slew one Ogilvy and wounded another in the 
sight of a number of high ranking government officials and 
courtiers and that afternoon Blyth preached a stern sermon 
against their laxity for which he was, after repeated warnings 
to stop his protesting, briefly imprisoned.121 James Melville 
also concentrated on the nobility's failure to fulfil their 
. calling as men with public responsibilities, '~ut rather as 
private men, thinking it enough to keepe that which their 
fathers have left them, and tak their pastyme or pleasure, 
or to conqueis more to their childrein ••• ", by playing 
119. Calderwood, History, v, p 359 • 
. 120. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 884; Birrel, "Diary", p 56. 
121. a.s.p.scot., xiii, part 2, p 1028-29. 
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" the oppressors and bangsters". 122 Melville was leading 
to the more subtle point that by withdrawing so much from any 
public responsibility the nobility was allowing the crown to 
increase its jurisdiction and power and become absolute, but 
his basic objections to their behaviour was the same. 
Calderwood was in his writing just as censorious as Bruce in 
his pulpit. He drew a picture of 
"muche blood shed, and manie horrible murthers cornmi tt Erl: 
the sonne slaying the father, the one brother the other, 
and brother scnnes killing eache other, theeves spoiling 
and oppressing, and men daylie ravishing women; but no 
execution of justice, ather by the king or by the inferior 
magistrates. Yea it was an easie thi£2 to obteane a 
rernmissioun from the king for blood." 3 . 
Calderwood's concentration on infra-kin feuds may have been 
more for effect than accuracy, but he too was voicing the 
revulsion of the church at the blood-feud and his anger at 
the crown's slowness in doing anything about it.124 
While the crown had shown no initial interest in the 
church's complaints and while the king himself was slow to 
respond for largely political reasons., James was on the 
whole willing to co-operate. What tensions there were tended 
not to be on whether feuds and other forms of violence ought 
122. Quoted in A.H. Wi1liamson, SCQttish National Consciousness 
in the Age of James VI, p 72. Williamson also has ma~ 
interesting ideas on some of the subjects niscussed above 
though from a different perspective. 
123. Calderwood, History, p 359. 
124. Not all ministers were against feud or even totally 
against it. Thus, archbishop Spottiswoode when writing 
about the Cunningham-Montgomery feud let slip that 
Eglinton's murder was "honourably revenged, Spottiswoode, 
History, ii, p 346. 
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to be eliminated, but on the question of j'urisdiction between 
church and state. James welcomed the church's interest, it may 
even have been such preaching which convinced him of the need 
to eradicate feuding and supplied him with much of his propaganda, 
but he did not like to be·told what to do or to have the churQh 
acting unilaterally. Hence he was angry in 1598 when Haddington 
presbytery excommunicated lord Hume for the murder of William 
Lawther because it complicated the assythment process am 
ttthe Kirk must be satisfied also towards Lord Home".125 
Similarly James had opposed the excommunication.of Hunt1y 
for Moray's murder, or that of Livingston of Dunipace and 
Bruce of Airth for the murder of Mar's servant.126 It was not 
that the king approved necessarily of these killings, though 
he.·did in the case of Moray, but that feuds involving such 
important men were of too great political importance to allow 
the church to act without his express authority. In the same 
way B1yth was arrested because his outbursts simply were not 
helpful, the king and. his ministers were acting to pacify the 
Lindsay-Ogilvy feud and Blyth I S attack only- served to undermine 
the authority- of both.127 
Co-operation was, however, the more normal relationship 
between the two. In 1591 the ministry- approached the king 
with a petition asking for the better administration of justice 
and were rewarded with various regulations shortly afterwards.128 
125. ~.S.P.Scot., xiii, p 214. 
126. See above chapters 4 and 5. 
127. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 1028-29. 
128. C.S.P.Sco.t, x, p 585 and for 1591 legislation appeDiix two. 
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On another occasion the king agreed ,to "a commission to be 
made to some ministers and others, for taking up of deid1ie 
feeds among professors ••• ", an idea which be considered by 
some universities today.129 In 1596 the general assembly 
again complained about feuding, but while relations between 
that body and the king were even more strained than usual 
that year, James exempted from the restrictions imposed on 
rr.inisters gathering together, those meetings for "taking u9 
of deadly feuds, and the like, which has not found fault with 
his maj estyl! .130 In 1598 the same convention wl:>.ich pass ed 
theltAct Anent Feuding" legislated against those who failed to 
turn up for communion throughout a year because of I!alledgance 
131 ' 
of feuds". The government imposed a fine for such an 
evasion and two years later the general assembly ordered all 
ministers to compile a list of those not attending communion 
for feuds or other reasons and have them summoned before the 
local prespytery for discip1ining.132 The details of how the 
church went about its role as a local peace-maker are not 
known but the bishop of Aberdeen and,the ministers of his 
locality were accredited with mediating and putting under 
assurance many of the minor feuds of that region, those involving 
the likes of Hunt1y being left to the king to deal with.133 
In Aberdeenshire there may have been an attempt by the church 
129. Ca1derwood, HistotI, v, p 178. 
130. B.U.K., iii, p 874-75; Spottiswoode, HistorY, iii, p 53. 
131" C.S.P.Scot., xiii, p 322. 
132. B.U.K., °iii, P 951. 
133. Spottiswoode, History,. iii, p, 62. 
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to associate feuding with catholicism and this is certainly 
the.imp1ication of the Synod of Aberdeen's letter to the king 
in 1606. Clearly those who did not obey the church and crown 
in matters of religion were not expected to obey in other 
matters either and by identifying the two so closely the 
offenders were doubly damned. It was also a useful tactic to 
employ in persuading the king to act against catholics.134 
Like the king and his officials one appears to have the same 
mixture of total condemnation of the feud and appropriation 
of the pacification procedures of feud in order. to lay it 
to rest. One certainly does not yet find the rejection of 
assythment that Philpotts fOQnd in Denmark because " ••• the 
Lord God has ordained, that every man who fights with the 
sword shall also fall by the sword" and that while " ••• we 
135 do not condemn thee, but thine own deeds, and the holy law". 
Such uncompromising retribution was never chAracteristic of 
the Jacobean period though it would be characteristic of 
the century which followed. 
Thus, while others may hav'e legislated and. acted. to uproot 
feuding, the initial and the most sustained protest against it 
came from the church. As one has seen peace-making had always 
been a practice the church had tried to fulfil, but too often 
in the past the pre-reformed clergy had been thems'elves inter-
woven into the fabric of a feuding society. While they may 
have objected to particular acts of violence, there was no 
134. "The Wodrow Manuscriptslt, §palding MiscellanY, ii, p 151-52. 
135. Philpotts, Kindred and Clan, p 110. See also Worma1d, . 
"Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government in Early Modern Scotland", 
p 93-94. 
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condemnation of feud itself and the social structures on which 
it was built. The re-awakening of Christianity in the sixteenth 
century in both catholic and protestant countries altered that. 
From Trent and from Geneva came an increasing clamour against a 
form of justice which was neither approved of by the church nor 
biblical, but. was in fact contrary to Christian ethics. In 
Scotland the renewal of faith which had swept away the old church 
and caused religious leaders to examine a whole host of soeial 
and ethical questions from poor relief to witchcraft, also turned 
the new light of scripture on the feud and found it wanting. 
However, for all its confidence the church of Scotla'nd was 
still dependant on the power of crown and nobility to execute 
its reforms. Some, like witchcraft, were taken up wit.h zeal, 
others like universal education and an advanced system of poor 
relief were left on the drawing board. Feud fell somewhere in 
between. Acting as the conscience of the community, the church 
found an ally in the king who was almost as good a Calvinist 
as he was a ruler. James's only condition was that he remained 
in control of the campaign and ~hile there was occasional tension, 
the king and the ministers found that on the whole co-operation 
on this basis worked. The church was never slow to point out 
James's faults, particularly in granting remissions, and there 
was clearly impatience with his slowness in taking up the issue, 
but once he had one significantly hears little more of the 
subject from the church which could be well satisfied that 
it had fulfilled its task of rorr.inding magistrates of their 
calling, identifying sin, warning sinners to repent aM bringing 
Christ's peace among men. 
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To the church's argument that the feud created violence 
and 'Was a usurpation of God's o'Wn right to divine vengeance; 
the king added his o'Wn that the feud 'Was an affront to the 
authority of the cro'Wn. Ho'W important religion 'Was in rr~king 
up James's mind for him remains a matter for conjecture only.-
He was a religious man and shared most of the doctrinal beliefs 
of the clergy. Moreover, one can be ,sure that he would take 
seriously the allegation that he 'Was not doing his job pro~erly, 
for the king had a strong sense of the "calling" Bruce 'Was so 
keen to inspire in men. For political reasons and because of 
the naivity and youthful carelessness 'Which James himself later 
admitted to, he 'Was not really able to get do'Wn to dealing wit~ 
the feud problem until 1595, almost twenty years after the 
church first drew attention to it. Even then James was 
rarely doctrinaire about 'What he was doing and continued to 
make a political use of feuds, to sell some rerr.issions and 
to tr~de the letter of his own la'Ws for the advantages of an 
agreement between private parties who were willing to settle. 
Though he made much of the crown's dignity and authori,ty in 
outward 'Ways the king was a pragmatic politician who was 
essentially concerned with results. James 'Wanted his subjects 
to obey his laws and live at peace and he used patronage, 
persuasion, legislationg or the gibbet to get his 'Way. Like 
everyone else the king was part of the system and he could 
onl~ fight it from within, with the weapons it provided. Yet 
there can be-no doubt about his co~mitment to the uprooting 
of feuding in Scotland. Like the democratic socialist in a 
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capitalist society, the king tolerated the feud far longer than 
he wished to, but he shared the vision of the churchmen who 
would be rid of it. In his writing he showed a consistent 
loathing of feud and its attendant forms of violence and 
exploitation, he initiated and detailed much of the legislati~e 
programme against it and he part.icipated in the settlement of 
a great many particular feuds, showing a minute knowledge of 
them whether he was there on the spot or writing from London. 
Eradicating the feuds was something which was important to 
James VI and something in which ?e showed a deg~ee of pride 
which was perhaps displayed a little prematurely, but which 
was ultimately justified. As the last king of Scotland to 
really understand the good lordship which was an essential 
ingredient of medieval kingship and as the first to lay claim 
to, though not to exercise the substance of, the absolutism of 
the monarchy of the future, it was a role for which he was 
admirably ·.cast. 
Of course the king did not do the job by himself. The 
church were one important ally who provided an enormous 
propaganda outlet for what began as a protest by them and 
became royal policy. Another was the nobility. Whatever 
their private feelings and practices a good number of the 
nobility were persuaded by a combination of religion, royal 
service and self-interest to make it possible for royal 
policy to evolve and be enforced. The nobility and other 
kindred chiefs certainly remained the most opposed group 
in society to replacing b100d justice with royal justice, 
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and even among the more co-operativenobles their conservatism 
continued to have a restralning effect on whatever the king .or 
his more radical servants tried to do. As the principal law 
enforcers of the country, however, it would be absurd to imagine 
that a threadbare royal administration could have abolished 
feuding and reduced local violence without their help, or at 
least without their opposition. Even at the end of this period 
of change their local and their collective national power. 
remained enormous. Abolishing feuding may have altered their 
habits, but it did not necessarily reduce their:power and those 
who realised that participated in the reform process. More 
fundamentally, why should one assume then one had to be of the 
"middling classes" to oppose violence and want justice? During 
James VI's minority both these issues had received limited 
attention from noble politicians and after 1585 noblemen 
continued, along with those others who were concerned, to bring 
peace in however halting and imperfect a manner to their society. 
In a sense the nobles were like drivers who approve of seat-
belts but dislike being told that they have to wear them. 
Most of them had feuds and most bloodled their hands at least 
once in their lives, but that does not mean that they would 
not have had it otherwise. What irritated them was when the 
crown tried to interfere in their localities. There and 
elsewhere the feud was primarily a vehicle for their politics 
and as such it was expendable, what was not were the issues 
themselves, and the majority of these and most of the families 
who fought over them remained to struggle on under the new 
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rulGs. Even at an ideological level· there were compensations 
as revenge, in spite of Calvin's plea, lived on in the punis~ents 
of the state and the fortunes of providence. 
As in the case of the nobility, it is inaccurate to speak 
of government officials and servants as though the,y were some· 
clearly identIfiable and closed class whose aspirations were 
those of their class. At the top level the men who ran the 
central government apparatus were a mixture from different 
backgrounds, with varying educations, experiences and ambitions, 
and they cannot be lumped together into an identifiable group 
except that of being crown officials. Those who were lawyers, 
particularly lord advocate Hamilton and chancellor Dunfermline, 
did bring very keen legal minds to their jobs, but even if they 
had wished to accelerate the reform process even further, and 
there is no evidence that they did, they did not dominate the 
privy council or the means of enforcement sufficiently to do so. 
Besides, what evidence there is points to the king being the one 
who was impatient with their hesitancy and conservatism. There 
was thus no revolution in the royal administration but.a 
continuity with the royal servants of the past. The nobles and 
the courtiers remained and the church trained. canon lawyers 
were replaced by a number of civil lawyers, some of whom had 
in fact been trained initially for a career in the pre-
reformed church. It was then as men accustomed to thinking 
in the interests of the crown and as men who would also be 
exposed. to tHe church's condemnation of feud that they acted. 




far from it, but their future wealth'and entitlement was 
dependant upon the extent to which they served the king's 
interests. 
All these men, king, ministers, nobles, courtiers and lawyers 
were living in a society which was changing. It was changing 
in terms of religious ideas, it had changed politically in that 
it became part of a united monarchy, and i~ was in the early 
stages of the social revolution of the seventeenth century. 
The dismantling of the feud was in fact one of the pre-requisites 
for that social revolution though it was not appreciated at the 
time. Its immediate effect was to make Scotland a more peaceful 
place to live, at least until the mid century wars erupted, but, 
that was a violence of a quite different king. In the long term 
its removal made the crown more independent of the magnates, 
loosened the bonds of lordship and lessened the need for strong 
ties of kinship. In 1625, however, Scotland was still & society 
domina'ted by powerful lords and woven through with kindreds, 
a society where men like the earl of Mar could look back over 
almost fifty years of public life and still recognise the 
landscape of his youth. It was a change which had been 
conservative am minimal rather than a transformation from 
darkness into light. Even that metaphor may be inaccurate 
since the feud was far from all bad. At a fundamental level 
Scottish society was little different from what it had been 
in 1573 with the basic political and economic order having 
survived l.lIltouched.. There may have been shifts here and 
there of power and wealth, out most men had not been affected 
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and the relationships between social class'es ",as unaltered. 
The reforms which had uprooted the feud had, however, brought 
to Scottish society a level of domestic peace and a reduction 
of violence never seen before and that was a change which 
touched most men. The man who "'as perhaps most responsible 
for implementing the details of those reforms, lord advocate 
Hamilton, certainly recognised that change and its benefits. 
In 1617 Hamilton had to convince a convention of the Scott~sh 
nobility of the need to raise money for the king's visit that 
year. Later he wrote to James telling him what he had said 
" ' 
and the accuracy of his words are not diminished by his desire 
to cast the king personally in the best lieht possible. 
"l scha", that the blessingis of justice and peace and. 
fruttis arysing thairof, did so obleis euerie one of 
us, as no thing in owre power could equall it, desyring 
that it might be remembered, that whairas the Islander 
oppressed the Hielandmen, the Hielander tirranniscd 
ouer thair Lowland nighbours; the powerfull and violent 
in the in-cuntrie domineered ouer the lyues and goodes 
of their weak nighbours; the bordouraris triumphed in 
the imI>uni tie of thair violences to the pairtis of 
Edinburgh; that treasons, murthours, burningis, thiftis, 
reiffis, nearschippis, hocking of oxin, distroyeing of 
growand cornis, and barbaraties of all sortis, "'er exerced 
in all pairtis of the cuntrie, no place nor person being 
exemed or inviolable, Edinburgh being the ordinarie place 
of butcherlie revenge and daylie fightis; the paroche 
churches and churche-yairdis being more frequented upon 
the Sonday for advancement of nighbourlie malice and 
mischeif, nor for God's service; nobilmen, barronis, 
gentilmen, and people of all sortis, being slaughtered, 
at it wer, in publict and uncontrollable hostilities; 
merchandes robbed, and left for dead on day light, going 
on thair mercats and faires of ,ontrois, Wigton and Berwick; 
ministers being dirked in Stirling, buried qUick in 
Cliddisdaill, and murtho1.lred in Galloway; merchandis of 
Edinburgh being waited in their passage to Leith to be 
maid prisoners and ransoumed, and all uther abominations 
which setled be inveterat custume and impunitie appeired 
to be of desperat remeid, had bene so repressed, puneissed, 
and aboleissed be your maistes wisdome, caire, power, and 
expensis, as no nation on earth could now compaire with our 
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prosperi ties; whairby we wer band to retribute to your 136 
maiestie, if it wer the verie half of oure hairt bloud." 
Whether James himself deserved quite so much of the credit or 
not it was an achievement of which the Scottish crown and church 
could be proud. Furthermore, it was a demonstration, in spite 
of what modern commentators might think, that, as the king 
himself wrote in 1623 "For our pairt, as we haif found one 
reule infallible, whiche is that the mater of feadis is not 
- . 137 
eternal1, bot may be removed and not transmitted to posteritie." 
136. Melrose, i, p 273. 
137. R.P.C., xiii, p 262. 
CONCLUSION 
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On the 26th of September 1982 an article appeared in the 
"Observer" newspaper in which was included the following 
comment: "JustIfying the invasion of West Beirut, the Israeli 
Ambassador to Paris declared last week: IIn the Orient there 
is blood vengeance"t. The implications of that statement 
are enormous and in understanding it one can appreciate much 
more meaningfully the politics of the Middle East. What the 
Israeli ambassador was trying to say was that because there 
was blood-feud in the Lebanon, the Israeli army would, like 
the Scottish crown, have to act as something of a mutual peace-
keeping force between the vengeful factions. The role was 
certainly one on which the Arab writer of this article cast 
some doubt, describing Israel as "a state which has just 
exacted thousands of eyes for an eye". He then pointedly 
asked "ls revenge, then, the monopoly of the Orientals?tt 
It is an interesting and important question and one 
which -deserves an answer. What, one wonders, did western 
journalists or readers make of it? Certainly the question, 
and the Israeli statement which preceded it, would fail to 
arouse the same immediate response from them that it would 
in an Arab or early modern Scottish audience. To most 
westerners, particularly those whose cultural roots are not 
in the Mediterranean, vengeance, vendetta and blood-feud 
are all concepts which they associate with the Orient, the 
Wild West, the Mafia,or the darker recesses of their own 
civilisation's history. Unfortunately, historians have on 
the whole reinforced the idea that the blood-feud has nothing 
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to do with our society or its past and it only creeps into 
written history as something which progress has abolished. 
Consequently, the greater part of what we know of the feud 
has arisen from research undertaken by social scientists 
studying the blood-feud as·they find it to-day in places like. 
the Lebanon. Thus one has models of the feud as it exists at 
fixed times in societies which are primitive or under-developed 
in comparison to western Europe, but very little by way of ~ 
linear history of feud. What historical knowledge of feud we 
have tends to be confined to the dark ages and the early 
medieval periods. Thereafter, and possibly even in these 
centuries, the interest of historians has focused on central 
government and its struggle to get rid of feuding, and the blood-
feud itself has generally been given limited recognition for its 
own sake. The history of the blood-feud in Europe has, therefore, 
never really been written. 
In-drawing attention to the Scottish blood-feud one hopes, 
therefore, to be able to contribute to the growing debate of 
what feud actually is. Sociologists and anthropologists may 
approach the subject from a different perspective, and even with 
a different end in view, but the historica~ evidence which is 
readily available in Scotland is important and ought to be 
taken account of in any conceptual discussion of feud. Thus, 
social· scientists may find some comparative value in the 
Scottish feud, particularly in the debate over peace and 
violence in the feud. Perhaps more importantly, the,y might 
find in the uprooting of the feud in Sootland some prophetio 
insight into the future oourse of feud in the sooieties they 
are investigating. One hesitates to suggest more and one 
oertainly wishes to avoid trying to establish yet another 
definitive definition of feud and would ask only that those 
working with the feud, whether as historians or sooieal 
soientists, would tred more cautiously in this whole area 
of what is feud. It may well be that the final answer will 
remain elusive, or that the most we will have will be a number 
of parallel definitions based on the varied experienoe of blood-
feud in those sooieties, past and present, whioh oan be studied. 
Returning to the European experience, Sootland is, of 
course, a very small part of the overall pioture, but Sootland 
was in the sixteenth oentury still suffioiently European for 
its. history to be oontributory to the wider oanvass. Here one 
must again walk with oaution and the most one has to offer are 
questions, not answers. Thus, one would like to know how 
widespread the blood-feud was in early modern Europe and just 
how typical the Soottish experienoe was. English oommentators 
oertainly refer to the Soottish blood-feud in suoh a way as to 
suggest that it was unique, but one suspeots that the oontinental 
evidenoe might point to England as being a less typioal example 
of European oulture. One also needs to know more about the 
ideology and form of the feud elsewhere, or about the extent 
to whioh feuds dominated local politios and impinged on the 
political issues and structures of the centre. Why, one wonders, 
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did feuding disappear so quickly from England but outlast 
this period in the Balkans and throughout Mediterranean soci~ty? 
Was it because the feud was less dominated by strong lordship 
there, or because central government was never so evolved, or 
because the catholic church was less effective in countering • 
the ideology of feud than their protestant counterparts? The 
answers to these and other questions would, of course, require 
both specialised studies of other regions and an attempt to 
develop some of the themes raised here in a European context. 
That the work ought to be done seems obvious ir:Scotland is 
fairly typical. In Scotland the blood-feud was so integral 
to political life and social relationships that without it 
one cannot sufficiently understand either. Should feuding 
prove to have been as common elsewhere, and in some areas it 
undoubtedly was, then however much one examines the institutions 
and policies of central government, and if one is dismissive 
of the feud as simply aristocratic quarrels, then one is not 
only ignoring a very large part of social history, but is 
creating an incomplete picture of political life, how it 
worked and what the priorities within it were. The growing 
emergence of a recognition of the importance of local history, 
and a renewed respect for narrative history which maintains 
a conceptual perspective can only benefit the feud and will, 
hopefully, rescue it from its exile amongst the mythology of 
the Sicilian mafia • 
. 
Within the narrower confines of Scottish history there are 
also a number of questions which arise from studying the blood-
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feud during the reign of James VI. The most fundamental of 
these arises from recent revisionary histories of the fifteenth 
century. If such research is right in leading to the conclusion 
that Scottish kings ~ere essentially strong and po~erful while 
their nobility were largely co-operative, then one needs to 
kno~ more about what happened between James V's death in 1542 
and the re-emergence of effective royal po~er in the 1590's. 
It would appear that Scotland suffered an even longer and more 
harrowing mid-century crisis than the better known mid-Tudor 
crisis in England. vlliat occurred in Scottish royal government 
during this half century to so reduce its authority over the 
localities is a vitally important issue for sixteenth century 
historians to tackle. Olearly t~o long minorities interrupted 
only by Mary's weak rule, the upheavals of the Reformation and 
the effects of high inflation and harsh economic conditions 
were central to this erosion of royal power and the increase 
in local autonomy and instability, but there were other factors 
too which have to be identified and the mechanics of their 
combined effect has to be ~orked out. A concentration on 
religious history and on personalities during this period is 
understandable, but it has been at the cost of sufficient 
attention being paid to royal government, its effectiveness in 
the localities and the state of law and order there. 
Of course, the idea that there was a mid-century crisis 
is dependant upon acceptance of the general thesis of fifteenth 
century stability. Perhaps one can,therefore, be forgiven for 
feeling a little uneasy about a canvass which has the supposed 
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anarchy of the early stewarts at one end and the apparently 
rampant disorder of the latter half of the sixteenth century 
at the other. In the hundred and eighteen years in between, 
from 1424 to 1542, Scottish kings, in spite of repeated 
minorities and political difficulties, appear to have been 
little troubled with feuding and to have effectively imposed 
royal justice throughout most of the lowlands. Fifteenth 
century royal justice may simply have approved of the feud. 
as a mechanism which imposed its own order and, subsequently, 
there may have been no real concern to abolish it, but both 
James Ill's and James IV's parliaments brought feuding to the 
attention of the government, thus reflecting an underlying 
unease about its existence. That unease may never have become 
more than that because feuding was less wide-scale and less 
destructive in the fifteenth century, something which could be 
established by local studies, or, alternatively, Scottish kings 
may have lacked the power to intervene as extensively and 
effectively in the localities, however sllccessful they may 
have been in crushing individual areas of resistance to royal 
'authority. One can argue that law and order. in the localities 
was not the crown's business anyway, but that of the local lord, 
and there is a great deal of truth in this even in the later 
sixteenth centur,y. Yet it is difficult to believe that previous 
stewart kings did not desire to enforce their laws on society 
and, without more evidence,itis even more difficult to accept 
that the peace mechanisms of the feud were somehow more 
sucoessful. in the fifteenth century than they were in that 
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following. Hence if the stability of the fifteenth century 
and the earlier part of the sixteenth century is to be more 
convincing one will need to know a great deal more about the 
local politics of individual localities and regions. The 
results of such research may simply reinforce our new 
perception of this period, but until one has such local 
evidence one can only continue to suspect t.hat the power of 
Scottish kings was less impressive than has been recently . 
argued. 
Oertainly in the Jacobean period there is little doubt 
that the blood-feud Was and was seen to be both a cause and 
an effect of weak royal government, instability and disorder. 
Yet for all its publicised violence and bloodiness, the feud 
was not simply the product of anarchic and criminal behaviour, 
though it encompassed both of these. Its violence was 
controlled and ordered by a coherent ideology, by the obligations 
and organisation of kinship and. lordship and by the issues of 
political conflict, both locally and at a higher level. That 
it was not anarchic is not really very surprising; lords and 
their men had no conscious interest in incessant and mindless 
destruction and both church and state had always imposed some 
degree of restraint. Peace in the feud did exist, whether as 
a result of local agreements, or, less commonly, of externally 
impos·ed pacifications. However, it was the very limited extent 
of·the latter and the inherent instability of the feud's own 
peace mechanisms which ensured that the blood-feud remained 
both widespread and violent. The obligations which its own 
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ideology imposed, and the structure of social and political 
organisations, made the competetive relationship the dominant 
one outside of the kinship-lordship interest group, and as one 
has seen, even ~ithtn it there could be intense competition. 
Not all competition resulted in conflict, but a great deal of • 
it did and hence the ~idely spread and numerous blood-feuds in 
Scottish society. One is not ar~Qing that Scotland ~as wracked 
by ever present violence; it ~as not, but the feud was a problem, 
not a solution. 
The violence of the feud seems to be beyond dispute, but 
the violence of Scottish society is not. The level of violence 
in the feud varied greatly, but it ~as always there and one has 
tried to reflect something of that variety which embraced the 
murderous fratricide of the MacLeods and the calculated restraint 
of the Montgomeries. Both of these feuds ~ere very different, 
but in each violent conflict was the essential currency of 
exchange and the same is true for almost every other feud. 
Having established that one would like to know more about the 
environment of violence. Was it something which was basically 
political in that the feud ~as political, or 'had it much deeper 
social roots and did it characterise other social relationships 
such as those in the home or between servants and their masters? 
Some comment has been made on this above, but it is far from 
satisfactory, except as an introduction to a discussion of the 
feud, and one would like to see the sort of social analysis 
of human relationships in Scotland' that is currently taking 
place in England. Given the violence which still characterises 
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our own society, one suspects that research of this nature 
would not only be of historical value. 
In stressing the violence rather than the peace of the blood-
feud one could be accused of reinforcing those prejudices which 
for so long made it a subject not worthy of study. The dis-
• 
approving contempt of Calvinism and the dismissive arrogance 
of a tradition which can be traced through the Enlightenment 
. 
and the Whig view of history to modern humanism have combined 
to consign the feud to a murky and unworthy past with, until 
comparatively recently, considerable success. In the more 
sober twentieth century we are, however, a little more critical 
of humanity and a little less optimistic about man's future. 
The cruel logic of the blood-feud thus makes more sense, or at 
least is more sympathetically understood, in a world in which 
peace appears to rest on the assured vengeance of the nuclear 
powers. With even greater certainty than our sixteenth century 
, 
ancestors we can promise our enemies an eye for an eye on a 
scale which would annihilate them and all their kinsmen. Perhaps 
then we can see that early modern man was not so very different 
from ourselves as he struggled with whatever tools and organisms 
available to him and sought with equal ignorance and anxiety to 
cope with the legacies history had left him with. As king James 
pointed out, most men probably did want peace, just as they do 
to-day, but for them the best way to achieve that peace appeared 
to li~ in the guarantee that they could and would unleash bloody 
violence in limited or not so limited doses on their enemies. 
The result was a continual state or "tension or conflict - again 
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something with which we are not unfamiliar at an international 
level - but it was a tension which ensured peace for those who 
lived within its limits of tolerance, as well as war for those 
who overstepPed them. Here one can agree completely with the 
view that the fear of blood-feud held many men back from 
plunging into conflict and thus did bring peace. Yet the 
fear had to be there, and it could only be there when men were 
able to point across to a neighbouring glen or to the next· 
parish and warn their sons and servants that the destruction 
and killing taking place there could and should be avoided, 
though without loss of honour: any deterrence needs its 
example. 
Scottish society in the early modern period wes primarily 
local in its structure and in the issues which most affected 
the majority of its members, even among the elite political 
classes. The concern of historians to debate the form and the 
policies of central government is understandable; most of the 
records left to us are from the archives of the crown and the 
agencies of central government. Apart from these practicalities 
it is also right that one begins with the centre and tries to 
understand it, for institutions like the crown and the church 
formed the skeleton on which the Scottish kingdom hung. One 
can also appreciate the extent to which questions like Anglo-
Scottish relations, the Reformation and James VI's personal 
achievements as a king have dominated the historical debate in 
this period. However, just as in recent research on the Reformation 
Scott.ish historians have emphasised the need for an understanding 
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of the locality, so must those whose concern is to examine the 
politics of James VI's reign begin to dig below the skin of . 
court factions. At a first glance disputes over the possession 
of peat turfs in:Xalloway or teind sheaves in Lothian may appear 
of little interest, but as issues of importance to local society 
they form an essential aspect of local social history and tell 
one just what was important to the average lord, landowner or 
even those on a lower social scale. HerG too a great deal-more 
work needs to be done if we are to understand how local society 
functioned and one hopes that recent works on local rural 
economies, politics and religion will only be the beginning 
of more emphasis being placed on this area of early modern life. 
Furthermore, these disputes matter at another level, -at 
that which binds local kinship and local conflict in a complex 
_ web of relationships with the alliances and feuds of great 
magna.tes and politicians. The dominance of local issues even 
for these men should not be neglected for what we regard as the 
big issues of the day. Men like the earl of Huntly and lord 
Maxwell showed a passionate concern for the Spey fishing 
rights or the Dumfries provostship which was often lacking 
in their opposition to chancellor Maitland or chancellor Arran 
or in the persuit of Counter Reformation politics. Only by 
trying to appreciate that passion for the locality and its 
issues, and by understanding the complexities which bound up 
power there with power at the court and in government, can one 
hope to see the machinery of Scottish politics and the questions 
of political debate and conflict as they were seen at the time 
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by contemporaries. For this one requires to kno~ much more 
about the Scottish nobility and the nature of their po~er. 
That po'Wer \o13S essentially local and it was the defence and 
extention of that power base in the locality which dominated 
their politics; controlling the crown or its offices 'Was for . 
the overwhelming majority of them only a means towards this 
end. Being a successful nobleman was a full time job and those 
like Huntly who appreciated that fact were very busy men with 
quite enough to do as it 'Was without trying to do the king's 
job as well. Absenteeism and the gro~th of the ~ourt and of 
central government would alter that emphasis during the 
seventeenth century, and the origins of that shift can be 
seen taking place during this period under discussion. However, 
before the Jacobean reforms and before the union of 1603 the 
balance of po\~er still lay with the localities, and even 
individual localities could in themselves be difficult to 
control from the court and could pose a real threat to central 
government. Apart from its own intrinsic value then, the 
politics of the Scottish localities formed constituent parts 
of the wider political history of Scotland during the early 
modern period and thus ought to receive rr:ore attention from 
future researchers in this field. 
In including local politics in one's overall view of 
Jacobean politics one has to recognise that politics were not 
only about affairs of state or the church, but were also 
social in their nature. Thus relationships of kindred, lordship 
and blood-feud were as important as the apparently more 
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ideolozical issues of religion or the principles of good 
govern~ent. One is not arguing that the idealogy of the blood-
feud took precedence over other issues, but for its place 
alongside them, for a recognition of the great problems catholic 
lords had in pursuing the ideals of their faith and fulfilling 
their obligations in local and court feuds, or that men like 
Mar had in serving the king as best he could while opposing 
him vigorously in the question of his private quarrels. 
Sometimes the issue or the context was such as would permit 
the feud to be laid aside, but all too often it could not and 
political alignments had to take account of who a lord's 
friends and enemies were. The subtleties of faction and feud 
were an integral part of Scottish political life and the 
complexity they created ought to be untangled. Scottish 
politics were not simply about the rise and fall of favourites 
and of particular families in the pursuit of personal ambition 
and self-in~erest, though none of these can be excluded from 
. one's analysis. \.Jhat one also has here is a complete political 
system with its own rules of conduct, machinery, support, 
leadership and issues. Hopefully future discussion of the 
politics of this period will avoid repetitions of the old 
cliches about what are very loosely labelled "magnate politics" 
and concentrate on examining the anatomy of that system. 
Yet for all the vitality of that system and of the blood-
feud which formed such a large part of it, the latter was pushed 
out from its place at the centre of political life and was 
confined to the geographic fringes·of the kingdom during the 
716. 
second half of James VI's reign. With its demise came a change 
in the conduct of politics and in the system through which 
politics were conducted. That, of course, has long been suspected 
if not known. 'd.hat is perhaps more open to debate is how it was 
done and who did it. Here one has tried to demonstrate that it 
was not simply a matter of the crown deciding to get tough with 
the feud and with local disorder, but that the change went much 
deeper and involved a change of mind within the ruling classes 
themselves. This change was the product of pressure from the 
church whose ministers heavily criticised the violence of the 
feud and the glaring injustices of its ideology and the social 
organisation which sustained it. The crown, and James VI in 
particular, added to this moral onslought its own, based on 
traditional crown aspirations and a more militant absolutist 
trend which James did so much to popularise with his Divine Right 
principles. TIle servants of the crown shared these opinions 
whether they were based on a perception of a Godly society, 
or a civil one, or both, but those servants were not simply 
the supposed group of middling lawyers, lairds and burgesses 
who historians repeatedly assume were the decent, hardworking 
backbone of any civilised society. Those elements were there, 
though members of that same class can be found pursuing their 
feuds with a determination that any noblemen would have done 
well to have excelled, but so too were those pO\Olerful nobles, 
lairds and even clan chiefs who had been persuaded, not forced, 
to bring about these chan~es. To repeat a point made in the 
last chapter, changes of this nature could not have taken place 
without the substantial co-operation of the nobility and their 
717. 
dependants. As one might expect, changes which were taking 
place with the support of a wide variety of interests, including 
those most likely to lose by them, and which were being presided 
over by a king who was in every way conservative in his attitudes, 
could never be radical and' immediate. There was thus no break. 
,,,ith the past, and no "New 110narchy" enforcing its will on a 
crushed nobility by allying itself with the middle classes. 
What change there was evolved with the co-operation of the. 
ruling classes, it was not a revolution carried out in spite 
of them. 
That is not to say that the long term consequences of 
these "reforms" were not significant; they were, but the 
significance was never consciously anticipated. The uprooting 
of the Scottish feud did make Scotland a more peaceful country 
to live in, it took private violence out of political life, 
it a1~ered the balance of power in the kingdom between the 
localities and the centre and. between the nobility and the 
crown, it loosened the influence of magnates in the localities 
and consequently politicians' need for them at court, and it 
undermined the strength of kinship. Obviously the uprooting 
of the feud did not do all this alone and, for example, the 
decline in the value attached to kinship was also caused by 
the bonds of religious loyal ties '\olhich were to cut across 
kindreds and divide lords from former dependants. All this, 
however, took place over a fairly long period; the crown was 
not thrust forward into the "absolutist age", the po~er of the 
nobility did not collapse and the removal of feuding probably 
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only made the minimum of impact upon peoples' lives. Kinsmen 
and lords continued to matter, and for most the harshness of 
life would be such that its quality was imperceptively improved 
by the uprooting of the blood-feud. That is not to say that 
getting rid of feuds did not matter, but one has to put it in • 
perspective. Feuds had been a problem in Scottish society 
since records began and their removal was a great achievement, 
representing a major step forward in the ordering and civilising 
of society. One would like to know much more about whether 
there was a reduction in other forms of crime and in particular 
whether violent crime was actually reduced or simply depoliticised, 
but that is part of a much wider law and order debate which will 
have to be argued elsewhere. In suppressing the feuds at least, 
James VI and. the political classes in church and state showed. 
a genuine concern for peaceful social living which deserves 
both recognition and even admiration. 
The blood-feud had not disappeared from Scotland by 1625. 
Towards the end of his life, in the early 1630's, the earl of 
Huntly was still defending his power with much the same tools 
and tactics that he had used to such good effect in the 1580's, 
while during the mid-century civil war many of the highland 
feuds came to occupy a prominent place in the calculations 
of rival politicians seeking to win supporters. In spite of 
this the feud was in irreversible retreat and to-day the blood-
feud,· as it is historically understood in Scotland, has 
completely disappeared. Yet dark reflections of it still 
haunt us in the deep religious divisions, in the hate filled 
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chanting of rival football supporters, in the violence of the 
gang, be it the territorial gang in Glasgo"l or the ne"l cultur~l 
gangs or tribes exhibitinJ their musical and fashion values, 
and even perhaps in the political violence of extremists. 
Less spectacularly there are still the quarrelling neighbOurs • 
who have fallen out over the use of a dustbin or a washing line, 
and the families tragically fractured by parent-c~ild confrontations 
or the settlement of a will. Host of us do not settle our 11 feuds" 
by killing our enemies or rivals, though we may cut ourselves 
off from them, insult them openly or behind their backs, take 
them to court and possibly even damage their property or try 
to hurt their person: some of us unfortunately do kill them. 
That we are more restrained than our ancestors may be due to 
our better education and the higher value we place on human life, 
but it might equally be due to a heightened sense of self-
preservation and a well placed fear of the state whose powers 
to detect, arrest and punish would be the envy of any early 
modern ruler. However we express our opposition to one another, 
and in football hooliganism, racial rioting and political 
violence we all too often see it expressed in the worst sorts 
of ways, o~r competition for resources, support, acceptance 
or power can easily lead us into conflict. Yet the determination 
to get enemies and rivals to talk to one another, and thus to 
understand one another, was and is the basis for peace, in 
blood-feuds, religious divisions, industrial disputes, political 
issues and in diplomacy. The recognition of that principle was 
inherent in the blood-feud itself and its formalisation in law 
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by the Jacobean state ensured that, when enforced with 
conviction, it was one which even the most bitter of divisions 
could not resist. 
721. 
APPErDIX 1 
Notes on the Maps· in Chapter Five 
The above shown maps are based on the "Scotland of Old" 
map by Sir Ian Noncreiffe which is not entirely acctll'ate. 
To have made an accurate map would have taken as much research 
as the text itself and so .one should see the maps as conveying 
a broad impression of the spread of power at anyone time. 
Again one should remember that the amount of land owned does 
not mean that a man had necessarily more followers and \Vealth 
than a neighbour \Vhose lands were smaller. Huch of the area 
shown is mountain-country where neither man nor beast lived. 
The map also fails to sho\V the many lairds of the country \Vho 
held their lands from another and may have remained aloof from 
the feud. Finally, the maps primarily sho\V political independence 
and not simply economic relationships so that, for example, 
Mackintosh may have held lands from Moray, but he was Huntly1s 
"manll by the terms of his bond. Hovle1rer, if one bears this 
in mind and sees the maps as aids in understanding the changing 
situation in the north and not as accurate portrayals of what 
\Vas happening then they \ViII have served their purpose. 











Huntly and Gordons 
Erroll and Hays 
Bondsmen of Huntly 
Dependants of Huntly but no 
surviving bond 
Atholl, Horay and Ste\Vsrts 
Argyll and Campbells 
Ste\Vart/Campbell bondsmen 
ste\Vsrt/Campbell dependants 
but no surviving bond 
Forbes 
Marischall and Keitbs 
1. The Re-establishment of Huntly Po,,,er. 1~85-9l 
This map simply shows the bonds made by Huntly bet\Veen 
1585 and the crisis d1 ring the winter of 1590-91, including 
those at the end of the year. The bonds were as follo\Vs: . 
1. Munro of Foulis, 1585-
2. MacAngus of Glengarry, 1585 
3. Mackenzie of Kintail, 1585-86 
4. MacLeod, fiar of Lewis, 1585 
5. MacGregor of Glenstray, 1585 
6 •. Drurnmond of Blair, 1585 
7. Robertson of Struan, 1586 
8. Dunbar of Curnnock, 1586 
9. Gorm of Sleat, 1586 
10. Grant of Freuchy, 1586 
11. Campbel1 of Lochne11, 1587 
12. Rattray of Craighall, 1587 
13. Menzies of Pitfodells, 1588 
14. Campbell of Glenorchy, 1588 
15. Henzies of That Ilk, 1588 
16. Scott of Abbotshall, 1589 
17. Beaton, fiar of Ma1gund, 1589 
18. Mackintosh of Dunnachatan, 1589 
19. Innes of Invermarky, 1589 
20. Lord Spynie, 1590 
21. Cameron of Lochie1, 1591 
22. A number of l1acphersons, 1591 
23. Sutherland of Duffus, 1591 
A summary of the details of these bonds can be found in 
11 Bonds of Nanrentll , J. Brown. 
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2. Distribution of Power in the North up to Nov~mber 1590 
On Huntly one can fairly confidently say that everyone 
above the line of the river Dee had little choice but to 
recognise Huntly's authority in one way or another, even 
without his lieutenancy. Only a few like lord Forbes, and 
the earl ~~rischal coQld retain some degree of independance. 
The other magnates in the region were Erro11 who was a close 
ally to Huntly while further north both Caithness and Sutherland 
and even Orkney courtes his friendship. South of the Dee, in 
Angus and the Mearns, Hunt1y's influence was much less apparent 
and here it was Crawford, Glamis and Ogilvy who fought for 
predominance. Horay's lands in the north-east are obviously 
insi"gnificant, but one suspects that they must have been a 
1i ttle mor"e extensive than is shown in the map and he 
certainly appears to have had land in the Spey valley, around 
Spynie and in the territory assigned to Mackintosh. Athol1's 
supporters may also have been more numerous than is shown, 
for while he was never anything like" as strong as Hunt1y and 
Argyll, he was nevertheless of greater account than other 
northern landowners. Argyll's influence is not clearly shown 
in that his arm reached far out to the west and even south of 
what is shown, but such areas bore no real relation to this 
feud. 
3. The Clan Chattan's Revolt, winter 1590-91 
Possibly the Brodies joined in on this (between Moray 
and Calder) and what the Chisolms
' 
attitude was is not known. 
There may also have been some sort of negative revolt in the 
Elgin, Banff and Nairn areas. Mackenzie obtained relaxation 
from Hunt1y'~ corrmissions, but remained his dependant. 
APPEtmrx 2 
GOVERNl-1ENT LEGISLATION 
1573: Pacification of Perth 
Act Anent Horning 
1574: Act Anent Fire-arms 
1578: Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
1579: Act Anent Fire-arms 
Act Anent Lawburrows 
Act Anent Gordon-Forbes Feud 
Act Anent Horning 
Proclamation Against the King's interference in 
Council and Session business 
1580: Council Act Against Private Combats 
Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
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Proclamation Against Private Lobbying For Patronage 
1581: Act Anent Lawburrows 
Act Anent Gordon-Forbes Feud 
1582: Proclamations and Council Acts on Feud, Justice 
Commissions and other related matters 
1583: Band by the King and Nobles for better Justice and Amity 
Council Act Anent Retinues 
1584; Act Creating a Royal Guard 
Act,Anent Respites and Remissions 
Act Anent Slaughters at the Horn 
Act Anent Horners 
Act Anent Better Execution of Decreets 
1585: Act Against Leagues and 'Bands 
Council Act Against Privy Letters 
Council Act Anent Royal Officers 
1587: Act Anent Murder Un~er Trust 
Band Reconciling the Nobility 
Council Act Anent Escheats 
Act Anent Reform of Royal Officers 
Proclamation Against Raising of Mercenaries' 
1588: Act Anent Horning 
1589.: Pacification of the Nobility 
1590: General Band 
Council Act Anent Convocations 
Commissions of JUsticiary Reviewed 
1591: Council Act Anent Retinues 
Council Act Anent Respites and Remissions 
Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
1592: Act Anent Respites and Remissions 
Act Anent Resetting 
Act Anent Deforcement 
1593: Act Anent Maintenance 
Act Anent Horners 
Act Anent La\.Jburrows 
Act in favour of Edinburgh Concerning Tumul ts 
Act Anent Troublers of Parliament and the Courts 
Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
1594: Commissions of Justiciary Revi9\.led 
1595: Act Anent Feuding 
Council Act Anent Fire-arms 
Council Act Against Resetters 
Proclamation Against Horners 
1596: Council Act Anent Application For Commissions 
Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
1597: Act Anent General Band 
Act Anent Horning 
Act Anent Lawburrows 
Council Act Anent Tuilyeis in Burghs 
159S: Act Anent Feuding 
Act Anent Fire-arms 
Council Act Anent Fire-arms 
Proclamation Concerning Horning 
1599: Council Act Anent General Band 
1600: Act Anent Feuding (ratification of 1598 act) 
Act Anent Fire-arms 
Council Act Anent Retinues 
Proclamation Against Private Combats 
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1601: Proclamation For Better Administration of Justice 
Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
1603: Proclamation Creating l-1obile Guard 
Proclamation Against Fire-arms 
Proclamation Against Tuilyeis 
1604: Council Act Anent Feuding 
1606: Proclamation Against Convocations 
1608: Proclamation Against Fire-arms. 
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1609: Proclamation Against Feuding . 
Act Anent the Corr~issioners and Justices of the Peace 
1610: Council Act Against Convocations 
1611: Council Act of Directions and Regulations of J.P.'s powers 
Disbandment of the Guard 
1612: Council Act Against Convocations 
Council Act Anent ~.P.'s 
1613: Council Act Anent J.P.'s 
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